For now, however, it was all part of the training. It was important that if an officer or senior rating were killed the rest of their crew would know what to do. Senior officers would therefore appear, telling the crew that their turret or working space had been knocked out, or that their officers had, and the survivors would have to keep on fighting the ship. As von Müllenheim-Rechberg put it: ‘The damage done to the Bismarck would be presented as realistically as possible: electrical breakdowns by removing fuses, fires by using some bombs, gaseous fumes by using tear gas, and so forth. In the case of damage that could not be portrayed, “damage notices” would be posted in the relevant parts of the ship.’14 In the main electrical control station, Stabsoberfeldwebel (Senior Non-Commissioned Officer) Oskar Bahro kept telling his team of electricians: ‘If I become a casualty, you must keep everything going exactly the same way, regardless of your grade!’
After each drill or battle exercise, the crew would be gathered on the quarterdeck and Lindemann and his senior officers would discuss what had happened, what had gone wrong, and what the crew needed to do better the next time. The aim was to point out mistakes, but to be thoroughly objective, and to make sure they weren’t repeated. Throughout all this, Kapitän Lindemann remained unruffled, and was quick to praise those who deserved it. In this way, the crew of the Bismarck were rapidly being brought up to the peak of their proficiency. As Lindemann put it in the ship’s diary: ‘All our time was taken up in training. Heavy emphasis was placed on how the men would perform in the upcoming operation. The men seem to have come to recognise for the first time the magnitude of our mission, which they still don’t know, but easily guess.’15
All this time, though, tension on board the Bismarck was building. The crew knew perfectly well that after their training was over they’d be sailing on their first operational sortie. Rumours abounded, and when they proved unfounded, new ones circulated in their place. They didn’t know when it would happen, or where they would go, but it didn’t take much to guess that it would be soon, and would probably involve a raid into the North Atlantic. What they were sure of, however, was that with every day of drills and exercises, they were getting better prepared for any challenge the Kriegsmarine – or the Royal Navy – could throw at them. Even Kapitän Lindemann was in the dark, as despite the report from Kapitän Topp of the Tirpitz, and requests from naval headquarters that he complete his training sooner than previously directed, he had no firm confirmation of just when he’d be required to lead his ship into enemy-held waters.
Lindemann had other problems, too. These exercises had revealed a few minor defects in the battleship’s engines.16 A ring on the middle shaft coupling was broken, there were problems with the steam line casings, and saltwater had got into one of the turbines. These were all relatively unimportant, and given the ship was brand new they were even to be expected. Still, Lindemann wasn’t pleased, and he made sure that everything was completely rectified before the training programme had run its course. This was achieved on 13 April, when Bismarck put in to the quay in Gotenhafen for four days to take on more stores and ammunition, during which time the engineers fixed the engines. So, by the end of April – a month ahead of schedule – Lindemann was finally able to declare to the Naval High Command that his ship was ready. Soon, her readiness would be put to the test.
Operation Rheinübung
On 2 April, as Bismarck was in the midst of her working up, the Kriegsmarine’s Seekriegsleitung (Naval War Staff) issued a preparatory order that specifically mentioned Bismarck, and her role in the coming sortie.17 This was an operational directive, spelling out what would be expected of the battleship. It began by covering the earlier sorties into the Atlantic, claiming that they had achieved ‘important tactical results’, and had also ‘demonstrated what important strategic effects a similar sortie could have’. Before going into specifics, it stated the strategic aim of the enterprise: ‘We must not lose sight of the fact that the decisive objective in our struggle with England is to destroy her trade. This can be most effectively accomplished in the North Atlantic, where all her supply lines come together.’ It emphasised this again by saying: ‘Gaining command of the sea in the North Atlantic is the best solution to this problem’, but added that the Kriegsmarine lacked the resources to achieve this. It also noted: ‘We must strive for local and temporary command of the sea in this area, and to gradually, methodically and systematically extend it.’
So, that was the plan – not just to sortie into the Atlantic as a commerce raider, but also to temporarily achieve control of the area. That was a tall order, even for a battleship as powerful as the Bismarck. The strength of the British Home Fleet meant that if she lingered, Bismarck invited being brought to battle and overwhelmed by sheer weight of numbers. Therefore, what the Seekriegsleitung really meant was that by being at large in the North Atlantic, Bismarck could attack convoys and disrupt or divert the progress of others. It would also tie down enemy ships, which would be vitally needed in other theatres. Taken together, this amounted to gaining a temporary control of the area, but it still fell far short of the High Command’s lofty strategic goal.
The Seekriegsleitung then got to the crux of the operation. Having initially said it would prefer Bismarck to sail in company with the Tirpitz, it added that this wouldn’t be possible yet. So, as an ‘intermediate step’, Bismarck would be used to lure escorts away from convoys, allowing other warships to attack them. In other words, Bismarck would serve as a decoy. It continued:
At the earliest possible date, which it is hoped will be during the new-moon period of April, the Bismarck and the Prinz Eugen, led by the Fleet Commander, are to be deployed as commerce raiders in the Atlantic. At a time that will be dependent on the completion of the repairs she is currently undergoing, Gneisenau will also be sent into the Atlantic.18
As we have seen, the addition of either the Scharnhorst or the Gneisenau was thwarted by developments in Brest, where they were currently based. So, in the end, Bismarck and Prinz Eugen would make the sortie on their own.
These operational orders differed from the ones for Operation Berlin. For that operation, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had been forbidden to attack heavily escorted convoys. Now, though, the mission was to attack any promising convoy, even if it were escorted by a battleship. Clearly, the Seekriegsleitung had a low opinion of the older British battleships that formed the bulk of these heavy escorts. It did, though, inject a note of caution: ‘However, the objective of the battleship Bismarck should not be to defeat in an all-out engagement enemies of equal strength, but to tie them down in a delaying action, while preserving her own combat capability as much as possible, so as to allow the other ships to get at the merchant vessels of the convoy.’19
This meant that the German force commander Admiral Lütjens had to walk a tightrope, enticing the heavier enemy warships away from the convoy, leaving it exposed to attack by the Prinz Eugen, while not getting into a major fight himself. Success would depend on Bismarck’s speed and armour, and on Lütjens’ nerve. A lot could go wrong. As if to underline the need for caution, the Seekriegsleitung added: ‘The primary mission of this operation also is the destruction of the enemy’s merchant shipping; enemy warships will be engaged only when the objective makes it necessary, and it can be done without excessive risk.’20 This single sentence, or rather Lütjens’ interpretation of it, would soon spare the lives of up to 1,500 British sailors, in the closing stages of the Battle of the Denmark Strait.
This operational order came from the Seekriegsleitung, and the pen of its director, V. Adm. Otto Schniewind. However, he was also the chief-of-staff, and therefore Grossadmiral Raeder’s right-hand man. So, despite the curious wording of it, the plan represented the wishes of the German Naval High Command. Compared to a similar document issued before Operation Berlin, which precluded the deliberate engagement of enemy capital ships, these instructions offered more leeway, and thus incurred greater risk. This showed that both Raeder and Schniewind were
willing to up the stakes in their naval campaign, in the hope of winning an even greater reward in terms of the number of enemy merchant ships sent to the bottom.
The operation also had a name – Operation Rheinübung (Rhine Exercise). The previous sorties by the cruiser Admiral Scheer (October 1940–April 1941) and the two battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau (January–March 1941) had been reasonably successful, despite the relative lack of firepower and armour of the ships involved. Clearly, then, the Bismarck was better able to take care of herself if she got into a fight, and this represented the Kriegsmarine’s best counter to the new British tactic of using battleships to escort convoys if they thought a German sortie was imminent. So, while the emphasis of the operational orders was still one of evading trouble, and the preference was to reach the Atlantic undetected, this operation would require considerably more subtlety than previous ones. It would also rely heavily on the judgement and intuition of the force commander.
It was for this reason that the Naval High Command only had one choice when it came to filling this key post: Admiral Lütjens. The fleet commander for Operation Berlin, Lütjens already had a successful breakout into the Atlantic under his belt, and was a man whose cool judgement and analytical mind were perfectly suited to the challenges expected in Operation Rheinübung. Also, his orders after the Berlin operation meant that he was already waiting in readiness to command a similar sortie. So, Lütjens was given his orders, while Lindemann and Brinkmann were told to have their ships ready by 26 April.
The fleet commander had his misgivings about the operation – the two ships had different roles and requirements, and didn’t make a good pairing, as the sister ships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had.21 Thanks to her smaller fuel tanks, the Prinz Eugen had much less of a range than the Bismarck, and so couldn’t stay at sea as long. It would also be hard to coordinate convoy attacks with the two ships. Furthermore, the long summer nights were fast approaching, which would make slipping past the British blockade undetected even harder. Lütjens planned to discuss these problems with Raeder, but first he had to deal with a last-minute setback. At 03.00 on 23 April, a magnetic mine detonated close to the starboard side of Prinz Eugen as she steamed through the Fehman Belt, 50 miles from Kiel.22 The damage to her hull was minor, but it would take at least 12 days to repair, back in Kiel. So, Operation Rheinübung was postponed.
Three days later, on 26 April, Admiral Lütjens travelled to Berlin to discuss the operation with Grossadmiral Raeder and V. Adm. Otto Schniewind. It was the perfect chance to air his misgivings about the operation, but there is no evidence that he did. Instead, all the fleet commander managed was to suggest waiting until Tirpitz was ready to accompany him, or the battlecruisers in Brest had been repaired. Raeder rejected the idea – for him, speed was essential in light of the rapidly lengthening days. There was another reason, too. As part of Hitler’s inner circle of advisors, he knew that Operation Barbarossa – the German invasion of the Soviet Union – was planned to start in mid- to late June. He feared that if Operation Rheinübung were delayed, Hitler would cancel the operation, so that Bismarck could be used in the Baltic instead.
So, a new date was set for 16 May23 and Lütjens was told to sort out the details of the operation – his plans for the breakout into the Atlantic and the arrangements for logistical support from tankers, weather ships, minesweepers and reconnaissance vessels, and from both the Luftwaffe and the U-boat fleet. It was a complex operation, and back in their headquarters in Kiel the fleet commander and his staff set to work. Meanwhile, in the nearby Deutsche Werke shipyard, work on the Prinz Eugen was coming along splendidly. On 6 May, she left the dry dock and headed back to Gotenhafen, arriving there the following afternoon. She was once more ready for service, although she had managed to miss all the excitement that had gripped the port the day before.
Meanwhile, during the last days of April, Kapitän Lindemann concentrated on getting the Bismarck ready for active service. Then, on 1 May, he received a call from Lütjens’ office warning him that the German Führer Adolf Hitler intended to visit the port in four days, to tour both Bismarck and Tirpitz. Last-minute training schedules were therefore abandoned as Lindemann and Topp had their men clean and paint the two battleships and prepare their best uniforms. On 5 May, Hitler arrived in Gotenhafen, where he was met by Admiral Lütjens.24 He began his tour by boarding the tender Hela, which brought the visitors out to the Bismarck, which was anchored in the roads. The crew lined the upper decks, and as he clambered on board Hitler was greeted by Kapitän Lindemann and his senior officers. The ship’s band struck up the national anthem, then the German warlord began his tour of inspection.
He was accompanied by GFM (Generalfeldmarschall/Field Marshal) Keitel and his Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe aides; Hitler, by his own admission, was no naval expert, but he had an intense interest in military technology. So, in the after gunnery control room he listened with rapt attention as Lt Cardinal explained the workings of the ship’s fire control system. The analogue computer on board was able to calculate firing solutions for the ship’s great 15in. guns, capable of hitting targets 18.5 miles away while the ship was travelling at full speed. Clearly, Hitler was impressed. Next, he listened to an optimistic presentation by Lütjens on the successes of Operation Berlin, and the potential of future raids into the North Atlantic. When Hitler questioned the risk posed by the Royal Navy’s superior numbers, the fleet commander replied: ‘The Bismarck is superior to any British battleship. Her firepower and protection is so outstanding that there is no need for fear.’25 Hitler seemed to be satisfied.
Next came lunch, served in the wardroom. Due to Hitler’s dietary requirements, this was a one-course vegetarian affair – a simple vegetable stew. Then Hitler addressed the assembled ship’s officers. He spoke of the persecution of Germans in Romania, and his belief that the USA wouldn’t enter the war. Rather courageously, Lütjens disagreed with the Führer, voicing the unspoken concerns of many of the officers gathered there. Still, the incident was overlooked, and moments later Hitler re-embarked on the Hela for the short trip back to the quayside, and a quick tour of the Tirpitz, which was tied up there. Lütjens accompanied him and saw Hitler off before returning to Kiel and his planning office.
A week later, on 12 May, the fleet commander returned to Gotenhafen and embarked on his new flagship.26 Once again, he was greeted by Lindemann, his officers and the ship’s band. This time, though, he was led to his own suite of cabins, while his extensive staff of 65 officers and men were shown theirs, as well as the fleet operations offices housed in the battleship’s after superstructure. By that time, Tirpitz had sailed off to continue her sea trials and Prinz Eugen had arrived. So, the task force was fully assembled.
On 14 May, a slight delay was caused by the malfunctioning of one of Bismarck’s two deck cranes, causing the ship to return alongside for repairs, which took two days. Finally, on 16 May, Lütjens reported that his force would be ready for operations in two days’ time.27 In return, a message arrived from Raeder, giving him permission to proceed with his mission. So, that was it. There would be no more delays. Operation Rheinübung would begin on 18 May.
Chapter 5
Through the Baltic
‘Muss i denn’
It was time. Four days earlier, both Lütjens and Lindemann had received the coded message ‘Marburg 5724’.1 This meant that the Seekriegsleitung expected Bismarck to pass through the Great Belt between the Danish islands of Funen (Fyn) and Zealand (Sjælland) on the night of 18–19 May. Admiral Lütjens, whose staff had been embarked with him, had carefully read and re-read his orders and studied his charts. He now thoroughly understood his mission and had considered the many imponderables, the most important of which was the reaction of the British Home Fleet. Also, in the areas where he had complete initiative and freedom of action, he’d already figured out what his best course of action might be. He was now as ready as any flag officer could be on the eve of such a major undertaking.
The
day before, leave had been cancelled for the two ships and all the last-minute preparations had been carried out. This included the taking on of fuel. On Bismarck, this was preceded by the fuel bunkers being cleaned out.2 Von Müllenheim-Rechberg explained the procedure:
A Petty Officer and a seaman, armed with a fresh air pipe to enable them to breathe, and a safety lamp, had to go into each bunker and clean out the sludge. They collected the muck in buckets, which were then passed from hand to hand, via the upper deck, to barges made fast alongside … The dirtiest work was done by Polish forced labourers, with whom the language difference made communication difficult. But after 24 hours the job was done, and the bunkers were spanking clean, and ready to take on a new supply of fuel. The Polish workers were rewarded with schnapps and cigarettes.
Next, the ships began to take on water, stores, ammunition and fuel, so that everything would be ready for departure.
Finally, on the morning of 18 May 1941, it was time to put it all in motion. Of course, Lütjens wasn’t the only senior Kriegsmarine officer to wake up with a sense of purpose that morning. While he had operational control of the venture, overall control still rested in the hands of Grossadmiral Raeder in Berlin, and strategic direction lay with Admiral Otto Schniewind of the Seekriegsleitung, who was also based in Berlin.3 Then, while in northern waters, Lütjens and his two ships would come under the control of Generaladmiral (Grand Admiral) Rolf Carls and his Group North, based in Wilhelmshaven. Once Bismarck and Prinz Eugen broke out into the North Atlantic and passed an invisible line running west of the northern tip of Scotland, Lütjens and his ships would move into the area controlled by Group West based in Paris, which was run by Generaladmiral Alfred Saalwächter. However, these commands were largely administrative ones. Once at sea, Lütjens would be in sole operational command.
Hunt the Bismarck Page 8
