After Operation Rheinübung, the Kriegsmarine avoided further surface operations in the Atlantic, and instead relied on U-boats to disrupt Britain’s convoys. However, despite the heavy losses in this campaign – known as the Battle of the Atlantic – this vital maritime lifeline was never severed. The entry of the USA into the war and the growing number of escorts and search aircraft helped turn the tide, and eventually the Kriegsmarine was forced to call off its offensive. Bismarck’s sister ship Tirpitz remained a latent threat, though, and her presence in Norwegian waters forced the Home Fleet to tie down capital ships to protect the Arctic convoys. Eventually, in November 1944, she was sunk off Tromsø by RAF Lancaster bombers.3 By then, the Kriegsmarine was a spent force, lacking the surface ships, U-boats or even the fuel to present a serious threat to the Allied war effort. So, in some ways, Operation Rheinübung was its last great swansong.
In June 1989, the wreck of the Bismarck was discovered by an expedition led by Dr Robert Ballard.4 He had achieved worldwide fame ten years before when he discovered the wreck of the RMS Titanic. Now he decided to look for the world’s most famous battleship. The British claimed she sank in 48°10’ North, 16°12’ West, but thanks to the rough seas and overcast skies this was an approximate position, as it was impossible to obtain an accurate navigational fix using the sun or stars. So, when he found nothing there he widened the search area, and covered more than 200 square miles of seabed before he finally found her. She lay 15,719ft below the surface of the Atlantic, on the slope of an extinct underwater volcano, and her hull, though battered, was in remarkably good condition. Ballard discovered that the ship had glided some distance before she came to rest, although her four turrets, which dropped out of her as she capsized, fell directly down towards the seabed.
From this, Ballard was able to reconstruct her journey to the seabed.5 When she capsized, Bismarck sank, but righted herself soon afterwards, and then the hull glided like a paper plane, until it struck the side of the volcano. It then careered down its slope another 1,000 yards before coming to rest, scattering debris as she went. By then, all of her remaining crew were dead. The hull was remarkably intact, which suggested that she was already full of water by the time she reached a depth at which an air-filled hull might be crushed by the water pressure. Ballard felt this supported the theory that she was scuttled, and her own crew sank the ship. Examination of her hull, however, uncovered torpedo and shell damage that showed she would have sunk anyway. So, the old argument over whether she was sunk by the British or scuttled by the Germans is largely irrelevant. Both fates befell her at the same time, and one merely hastened the other.
Using Remotely-Operated Vehicles (ROVs), the expedition was able to examine her hull, which revealed the pounding Bismarck suffered during her final battle. Bismarck is resting upright on the seabed, embedded in mud as far as her waterline. Her hull is remarkably intact, although the last 30ft of her stern appears to have broken off as she sank. This suggests some major structural failure took place, and may explain why she sank so quickly after she capsized. Debris fell off her as she glided towards the seabed, and Ballard followed this until he discovered the four turrets, lying upside down on the seabed. He could even identify ‘Bruno’ turret, which had had its back ripped off during the final battle. These, then, marked the actual spot where Bismarck sank.
The debris trail itself was littered with the mangled remains of the ship’s superstructure, as well as her funnel and masts and gun directors. On the ship herself, the armoured conning tower was well preserved, but the bridge in front of it was completely destroyed. Most probably it was here that Lütjens and Lindemann were killed by a direct hit from a shell fired from Rodney. Further aft, the secondary turrets remain in place, some with their rear doors jammed shut, which trapped the gun crews inside them when the ship sank. Only the main turrets were missing, leaving enormous circular holes where their barbettes once sat, protecting the loading hoists that linked the turrets to their magazines. The aircraft catapult was still there, where the crew tried to launch a floatplane carrying Admiral Lütjens’ Fleet War Diary. Some of her flak guns were swept away by British shells, but others still remain, where they fired at Ark Royal’s Swordfish on the evening of 26 May 1941.
Then, in July 2001, an expedition led by David L. Mearns discovered the last resting place of the battlecruiser Hood. 6 The expedition was sponsored by Channel 4, a British television company. Like Bismarck, the wreck was located using sidescan sonar, after a search lasting just two days. Hood lies in 9,200ft of water, but as the ship broke in two when she blew up, the wreck forms two distinct sites, some 300 yards apart. Other scattered debris, including a 15in. gun, lies further away from the two main wreck sites. Once the wreck was found, Mearns and the team set about investigating the remains. They soon found that a 200ft section of her hull was missing, forward of ‘X’ turret. This was the epicentre of the fatal explosion on 24 May 1941 that ripped the great battlecruiser in two.
What they did find was evidence of the immensity of the explosion. Turret plating was bent and bucked, as were parts of the armoured hull. To the team, and to the experts who examined the evidence, it all suggested that while the explosion might have been utterly catastrophic, structural faults in the old battlecruiser may have hastened her end, since the blast severed her so effectively into two parts while demolishing the section in between. Traces of this middle section were eventually found, but there wasn’t enough to definitively pinpoint the location of the explosion, or explain the exact sequence of events that led to Hood breaking in two. However, it actually lies to the south of the two main wreck sites, and proves that Hood actually broke into three or more pieces, rather than two. This after part of the stern section was damaged, possibly suggesting a secondary explosion in one of the after magazines.
Her bow section was much less damaged, lying on the seabed on its port side. It showed fewer signs of damage, apart from the usual erosion expected after decades lying on the seabed. Incidentally, the 650-ton conning tower was found over 1,000 yards from the rest of the ship, having been blown clean off. However, even the bow section was broken in two, just forward of ‘A’ turret, which strengthens the notion that structural integrity of the hull failed, either as a result of the explosion or as the bow section dropped towards the seabed. So, this expedition confirmed all the eye-witness accounts – Hood was torn apart just forward of ‘X’ turret, and the two portions separated slightly as she sank. One other important discovery was the rudder, locked at an angle of 20 degrees. This confirms that V. Adm. Holland had ordered Hood to turn when she was hit by Bismarck’s fatal sixth salvo.
Interestingly, both expeditions treated the wreck sides they discovered and explored as war graves. After all, 1,415 British sailors went down with the Hood, and 2,086 German ones with the Bismarck. Both groups of undersea explorers went to great lengths to avoid disturbing the final resting places of these men. On Hood, though, the ship’s bell was discovered and raised, and is now on display in the National Museum of the Royal Navy in Portsmouth – a tangible and very poignant reminder of a once mighty warship, and the men who lost their lives in her. Interestingly, one of Hood’s three survivors, Ted Briggs, was present on board Mearns’ mother ship when Hood was rediscovered.7 He was also there when an ROV laid a plaque on the deck of his old ship. A dozen years before, a similar plaque had been laid on the deck of the Bismarck. So, the two wrecks and war graves remain undisturbed, over a thousand miles apart, but linked by a common bond of history and sacrifice.
Notes
Prologue
1 For the most part, this account of the engagement is drawn from Von Müllenheim-Rechberg, Burkard, Battleship Bismarck: A Survivor’s Story (1990), pp135–152. Weapons and vessel data is drawn from Campbell, John, Naval Weapons of World War Two (1985) and Gardiner, Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships (1980), pp9, 15, 224–229.
2 Müllenheim-Rechberg, op cit, pp38–139. Also Gardiner, op cit, pp9–15.
3 T
his account is based on the testimony of a survivor, Ted Briggs, recounted in Coles, Alan & Briggs, Ted, Flagship Hood: The Fate of Britain’s Mightiest Warship (1988), pp184–196.
Time, Speed, Distance and Bearing
1 For a full description of all of the maritime conventions described here, see Ministry of Defence (Navy), Admiralty Manual of Seamanship (1979), Vol. 1.
Preface
1 The depth of the Bismarck wreck site and its general description is drawn from Ballard, Robert D., The Discovery of the Bismarck (1990), pp163–179.
2 The official British version of the hunt for Bismarck is provided by Roskill, Stephen W., The War at Sea (1954), Vol. 1, pp395–416. Examples of the many others include Winklareth, Robert J., The Bismarck Chase: New Light on a Famous Engagement (1998); Skwiot, Miroslaw Z. & Prusinowska, Elzbieta T., Hunting the Bismarck (2006); and Zetterling, Niklas & Tamelander, Michael, Bismarck: The Final Days of Germany’s Greatest Battleship (2009). Several other accounts of this campaign are listed in the bibliography.
3 Kennedy, Paul, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (1983), p148 et passim.
Chapter 1: The Bismarck
1 Müllenheim-Rechberg, op cit, pp30–34.
2 The building of Bismarck and the design rationale behind her is described in more detail in Asmussen, Bismarck: Pride of the German Navy (2013); Konstam, Battleship Bismarck 1936–41, Owners’ Workshop Manual (2015) and Zetterling & Tamelander, op cit.
3 Kennedy (1983), pp274–276. For a wider discussion of the topic, see Kaufmann, Robert G., Arms Control During the Pre-Nuclear Era (1993), pp180–215.
4 Gardiner, op cit, p227.
5 Ibid, p225. Also Gröner, Erich, German Warships, 1815–1945, Vol. 1, Major Surface Vessels (1983), pp31–32.
6 Broszat, Martin, Hitler and the Collapse of Weimar Germany (1987), pp9–10.
7 Maiolo, Joseph, The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany, 1933–39 (1998), pp26–33.
8 Gardiner, op cit, p225.
9 Ibid, pp228–229. Also Gröner, op cit, pp65–67.
10 Konstam (2015), op cit, pp12–15.
11 Ibid, p15.
12 Ibid, pp16–19.
13 Asmussen, op cit, pp12–13.
14 Konstam (2015), op cit, pp19–21.
15 Gardiner, op cit, pp228–229.
16 Asmussen, op cit, pp213–214.
17 Konstam (2015), op cit, pp21–24.
18 Müllenheim-Rechberg, op cit, p27.
19 Ibid, p34.
20 Ibid, p35.
21 Ibid, p37.
22 See Konstam (2015), op cit, pp111–113; and Amussen, op cit, pp132–133. For a more detailed discussion of analogue gunnery direction systems see Brooks, John, Dreadnought Gunnery and the Battle of Jutland: The Question of Fire Control (2005). While this deals with an earlier conflict, it outlines the development of the system that was subsequently used on board Bismarck. Also see Friedman, Norman, Naval Firepower (2013), pp140–156.
23 Müllenheim-Rechberg, op cit, p42.
24 Ibid, p52.
25 Ibid, p52.
26 Konstam (2015), op cit, p31.
27 Müllenheim-Rechberg, op cit, pp64–66.
Chapter 2: Germany’s Atlantic Strategy
1 Mahan, Alfred Thayer, The Influence of Sea Power on History (1893), pp320–326. Also see Herwig, Holger H., ‘The Failure of German Sea Power, 1914–1945: Mahan, Tirpitz, and Raeder Reconsidered’, published in The International History Review, 10:1 (February 1988), pp72–73. Vego, Milan, Maritime Strategy and Sea Denial: Theory and Practice (2018) also discusses the concepts outlined by Mahan, and applied by the German navy in both world wars.
2 Herwig, Holger H., “Luxury” Fleet: The Imperial German Navy, 1888–1918 (1987), pp17–20.
3 For a full discussion of the success of German naval strategy, see Sondhaus, Lawrence, The Great War at Sea (Cambridge, 2014), pp275–277.
4 Konstam (2015), op cit, pp34–35; Zetterling & Tamelander, op cit, pp18–23.
5 Whitley, M. J., Battleships of World War Two: An International Encylopedia (1998), pp63–65.
6 Konstam (2015), op cit, p15.
7 Bekker, Cajus, Hitler’s Naval War (1974), p33–34.
8 Gardiner, op cit, p220.
9 Ibid, p225–226.
10 Ibid, pp224–244.
11 The structure is outlined in Goerlitz, Walter, History of the German General Staff, 1657–1945 (1985), pp185–197, with a précis in Konstam (2015), op cit, p35.
12 Gardiner, op cit, p4.
13 Whitley (1998), op cit, pp67–72.
14 Roskill, op cit, pp43–46.
15 The directive is published online by Yale Law School, as part of The Avalon Project (http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/wardir1.asp)
16 Bekker, op cit, pp17–20.
17 Zetterling & Tamelander, op cit, p25.
18 Ibid, pp26–27. Captain Kennedy of the Rawalpindi was the father of Ludovic Kennedy, broadcaster and the author of Pursuit (1974).
19 Ibid, op cit, p30.
20 For a detailed account of the campaign, and its strategic ramifications, see Jackson, Julian, The Fall of France: The Nazi Invasion of 1940 (2003), particularly pp40–57.
21 Roskill, op cit, p291.
22 Ibid, pp285–291, 369–372. Also Zetterling & Tamelander, op cit, pp42–47.
23 Zetterling & Tamelander, op cit, pp44–45.
24 Whitley (1998), op cit, pp77–79.
25 Roskill, op cit, pp373–375.
26 Zetterling & Tamelander, op cit, p63.
27 Ibid, pp66–67.
28 Ibid, pp67–68. Also Roskill, op cit, pp390–391.
29 Zetterling & Tamelander, op cit, p72.
30 Ibid, pp77–78; Roskill, op cit, p375.
31 Roskill, op cit, p374; Zetterling & Tamelander, op cit, pp64–66.
32 Zetterling & Tamelander, op cit, pp78–80.
33 Roskill, op cit, pp377–379.
34 Ibid, p379.
35 Gröner, op cit, p67. For the general strategic situation in early 1941 see Zetterling & Tamelander, op cit, pp82–85.
36 Roskill, op cit, p486.
Chapter 3: The Home Fleet
1 Konstam, Angus, Jutland 1916: Twelve Hours to Win the War (2016), p44. Also see Konstam, Angus, Scapa Flow (2009), pp7–9.
2 See Brown, Malcolm & Meehan, Patrick, Scapa Flow (1968), a series of first-hand accounts of wartime service in and around Scapa Flow, for a detailed picture of the base in wartime. Also see Kennedy (1974), op cit, pp37–38, and Konstam (2009), op cit, pp43–46.
3 Konstam (2009), op cit, pp47–48.
4 Ibid, pp49–51.
5 Ibid, pp50–51.
6 Kennedy (1974), op cit, p38.
7 Sondhaus, op cit, pp157–162.
8 Bekker, op cit, pp55–73.
9 Roskill, op cit, pp249–264.
10 Ibid, p345.
11 Heathcote, Tony, The British Admirals of the Fleet 1734–1995 (2002), p86. Also see Kennedy (1974), op cit, pp38–44.
12 Whitley (1998), op cit, pp126–136.
13 Ibid, pp92–113.
14 Ibid, pp113–120.
15 Ibid, pp121–127.
16 Ibid, pp126–127. Also Roberts, John, The Battlecruiser Hood (1982), p9.
17 Whitley (1998), op cit, pp137–146.
18 Ibid, p146.
19 Winklareth (1998), op cit, p48. Also see Campbell, pp28–30.
20 See Friedman, Norman, Naval Radar (1981) for a discussion of the relative capabilities of British and German radar during this period.
21 Hobbs, David, British Aircraft Carriers: Design, Development & Service Histories (2013), pp68–99. Also p373 for the specifications of the aircraft embarked in these ships. Also see Chesneau, Roger, Aircraft Carriers of the World, 1914 to the Present (1992), pp97–105.
22 Hobbs, op cit, pp42, 80–82, 90–98.
23 See Friedman, Norman, British Cruisers: Two World Wars and After (2010), pp230–251 for a discussion of the role and capabilities of British cruisers during this phase
of the war. Friedman has also produced British Destroyers: From Earliest Days to the Second World War (2009), a similar volume outlining the capabilities of these smaller warships.
Chapter 4: Preparations
1 Asmussen, op cit, p34.
2 Kennedy (1974), op cit, pp25–26.
3 Ibid, p223. Also quoted in Zetterling & Tamelander (2009), op cit, pp54–55.
4 Müllenheim-Rechberg (1990), op cit, p69.
5 Ibid, p69.
6 Asmussen, op cit, p34.
7 Ibid, p74.
8 Müllenheim-Rechberg, op cit, p70.
9 Ibid, p71.
10 Asmussen, op cit, p37.
11 Müllenheim-Rechberg, op cit, p70.
12 Kennedy (1974), op cit, p27.
13 Ibid, p27.
14 Müllenheim-Rechberg, op cit, p72.
15 Ibid, p71.
16 Ibid, p71.
17 Ibid, op cit, p80.
18 Ibid, p81.
19 Ibid, p81.
20 Ibid, p81.
21 Ibid, p85. Also Zetterling & Tamelander, op cit, pp92–93.
22 Asmussen, op cit, pp37–39.
23 Kennedy (1974), op cit, p30.
24 Zetterling & Tamelander, op cit, p102.
25 Ibid, p103.
26 Asmussen, op cit, p43.
27 Ibid, p43. Also Kennedy (1974), op cit, p32.
Chapter 5: Through the Baltic
1 Asmussen, op cit, p43.
2 Müllenheim-Rechberg, op cit, p100.
3 Konstam (2015) op cit, p35.
4 Müllenheim-Rechberg, op cit, p100.
5 Kennedy (1974), op cit, p32.
6 Asmussen, op cit, p44.
7 Müllenheim-Rechberg, op cit, pp100–101.
8 Asmussen, op cit, p44.
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