by Noam Chomsky
Putting such considerations to the side for the moment, the historical record seems plain enough. It strongly confirms the conclusion that the U.S. and Israel have headed the rejectionist camp, increasingly so as the 1970’s progressed. The Arab states that are directly involved in the conflict have approached or joined the international accommodationist consensus, as has the mainstream of the PLO. Irrelevantly to these considerations, it should perhaps be remarked, given the climate of irrationality on this matter in the United States, that this historical record does not show that the Arab states are decent regimes—they most definitely are not—nor does it bear on one’s judgments about the merits of the PLO.* It is simply a matter of fact.
As for the matter of principle, it seems to me that rejectionist programs are unacceptable, for the reasons already indicated. Furthermore, whatever one’s views about these matters may be, there surely is no justification for maintaining the illusions and misrepresentations that are so characteristic of the American literature on this subject, one would think.
* Though the matter is of no relevance here, for the record, my own judgments have been consistently harsh, both with regard to their actions and programs. See, e.g., Peace in the Middle East?, pp. 99f., 108; TNCW, pp. 262, 430; Socialist Revolution, April-June 1976.
Notes—Chapter 3 Rejectionism and Accommodation
1. For examples, see virtually any article or editorial on the topic in the New Republic; e.g., for various aspects of the picture, Michael Walzer, “The new terrorists,” Aug. 30, 1975; David Pryce-Jones, “The Palestinian pattern,” Nov. 8,1982.
2. Jon Kimche, There Could Have Been Peace (Dial, New York, 1973, p. 306).
3. For discussion, see Fred J. Khouri, “The Arab-Israeli conflict,” in P. Edward Haley and Lewis W. Snider, eds., Lebanon in Crisis (Syracuse Univ. Press, 1979).
4. U.S. Department of State Bulletin (January 5, 1970), cited by Khouri, op. cit., p. 299.
5. Tillman, The United States in the Middle East, pp. 223f.
6. Ibid., pp. 276-7; emphasis in original.
7. For discussion of these matters, see my Peace in the Middle East? and TNCW.
8. See, for example, Tom Hayden, The American Future (South End, Boston, 1980), for argument in support of his rejectionist position on the Arab-Israeli conflict (roughly, that of the Israeli Labor Party), in essentially the terms described. On his support for the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, which went well beyond the position of the Labor Party, see chapter 6, section 6.4.
9. For references, see TNCW, pp. 249, 438.
10. Foreign Affairs, Spring 1981.
11. Thomas R. Stauffer, Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 13 1982.
12. For a detailed analysis of technical aspects of the problem, see Jehoshua Schwarz, “Water Resources in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip,” in Daniel J. Elazar, ed., Judea, Samaria, and Gaza: Views on the Present and Future (American Enterprise Institute, Washington, 1982). Also Thomas R. Stauffer, Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 20, 1982. For further references, see TNCW, p. 447. See also David Elstein and Sharon
Goulds, New Statesman, July 10, 1981 and Middle East International, July 31, 1981; Business Week, Dec. 20,1982, citing an Israeli estimate that by the year 2000 demand will outrun expected supply.
13. Schwarz, op. cit. See Thomas R. Stauffer, Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 20, 1982 and Middle East International, July 30, 1982, on what he calls “the lure of the Litani.”
14. Economist, Sept. 11, 1982; Zvi Barel, Ha’aretz, Sept. 9, 1982.
15. See “Talking Points,” New York Times, Sept. 9, 1982.
16. Shaya Segal, Ma’ariv, Dec. 7, 1982.
17. Kapeliouk, Israel, p.23; Yitzhak Rabin, interview (“1983: New Opportunities for Peace”), Trialogue, Winter 1983.
18. New York Times, Nov. 1, 1982. Lewis, who has been one of the most outspoken critics of recent Israeli policies in U.S. journalism, basically supports the Labor Party position, it appears.
19. Boston Globe, June 1, 1978; Ma’ariv, Oct. 11, 1981; Israeli Mirror, London.
20. Amos Perlmutter, New York Times, May 17, 1982.
21. Kapeliouk, Israel, pp. 220, 21. Ben-Gurion’s statement is “known to every child in Israel,” according to Kapeliouk.
22. New York Times, Sept. 6, 1982.
23. Sykes, Crossroads to Israel, p. 48.
24. David Ben-Gurion, Memoirs (World, New York, 1970, p. 118).
25. Flapan, Zionism and the Palestinians, p. 134, citing a speech of October 12, 1936. For the actual record of Palestinian nationalism, see the outstanding two-volume study by Yehoshua Porath, The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, The Palestinian Arab National Movement (Frank Cass, London, 1974, 1977).
26. Kapeliouk, Israel, p. 32.
27. London Sunday Times, June 15, 1969. For a longer excerpt, see John K. Cooley, Green March, Black September (Frank Cass, London, 1973, pp. 196-7). See Porath, op. cit., for a serious discussion of the facts concerning Palestinian nationalism.
28. Kapeliouk, Israel, p. 32.
29. Cooley, Green March, Black September, p. 197.
30. Flapan, Zionism and the Palestinians, p. 83.
31. See TNCW, p. 231, citing an official government document. As noted, this state is to incorporate parts of the West Bank, according to Labor Party doctrine.
32. The reference is to Israel’s demand, later abandoned, that the negotiations take place in Jerusalem, recognized by virtually no one (specifically, not by the U.S.) as Israel’s capital.
33. Arnold Forster, letter, New York Times, Dec. 20. 1982.
34. New York Review of Books, Nov. 18, 1982.
35. The Socialist International has been unusual, outside of the U.S. and Israel, in often taking a rejectionist stand, denying Palestinian rights, leading to sharp condemnation by Israeli doves. See TNCW, pp. 270-1.
36. Cited by Tillman. The United States in the Middle East, p. 143, from the New York Times, August 6, 1978.
37. See TNCW, p. 442, citing the Israeli journal Emda, December 1974.
38. K. Amnon (Amnon Kapeliouk), “The 1976 elections in the territories” Al Hamishmar, April 16, 1982.
39. See TNCW, p. 269.
40. See The Dawn (Al Fajr), Jerusalem, Sept. 3, 1982.
41. The results appear in Time, May 24, 1982.
42. “Israeli Soldiers Kill Arab Youth in the West Bank,” special to the New York Times, Dec. 19, 1982.
43. On the investigation (more accurately, apparent lack of investigation) in the Shak’a case, see TNCW, p. 445, citing discussion and protest in the Israeli press.
44. Trudy Rubin, Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 18, 1982; see also New York Times, same date.
45. Robert I. Friedman, “West Bank Bombings,” Nation, Dec. 25, 1982; Middle East International, Jan. 21, 1983.
46. Nov. 12, 1982 (see the reference of note 52); Ha’aretz, Oct. 1, 1982; Action Alert, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), October 27, 1982. In January 1983, Ms. Shak’a was granted an exit visa, after intervention by the State Department; ADC Bi-Weekly Report, Jan. 31-Feb. 11.
47. Menachem Golan, letter, Jerusalem Post, Nov. 3, 1982.
48. New Outlook, June/July 1982. Rubinstein covers the West Bank for the Labor Party journal Davar.
49. Danny Rubinstein, Davar, Nov. 15, 1982. There is an up-beat account the preceding day by David Richardson in the English-language Jerusalem Post.
50. Michael Precker, “A maverick view of the West Bank; Begin’s former administrator calls for a role for the Palestinians,” Boston Globe, Dec. 19, 1982. The quoted phrases appear in the front-page notification of Precker’s article-interview.
51. Uri Avneri, Haolam Haze, Oct. 13, 1982.
52. For a detailed record of Milson’s actual achievements, including these, see Only Do Not Say That You Did Not Know, a publication of the Israeli Committee for Solidarity with Bir Zeit (the West Bank university that was closed by Professor Milson 3 days after he took office and kept closed for two months,
then repeatedly closed and harassed afterwards), Jerusalem, June 1982, described as “the Black Book of the civil administration’s actions in the West Bank and Gaza strip.” It was published on June 5, 1982, to mark “the fifteenth anniversary of the Israeli occupation”—and the opening of Israel’s “war of aggression against the Palestinian people in Lebanon.” A translation is being prepared for publication.
53. Zvi Barel, Ha’aretz, 20, 27 August 1982.
54. Testimony of Merle Thorpe, Jr., President of the Foundation for Middle East Peace, Dec. 16, 1981; see chapter 2, note 11. Thorpe testified along with the other members of the study group, two formerly in the State Department, one a former Secretary of Commerce and former President of the World Jewish Congress (Philip Klutznick).
55. Vincent Sheean, Personal History (Doubleday, Doran & Co., New York, 1935; sections reprinted in Walid Khalidi, ed., From Haven to Conquest, Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut, 1971).
56. Norman Kempster, Los Angeles Times, September 29, 1982; Charles Hoffman, Jerusalem Post, Jan. 30, 1983. The first editorial in the new Arabic newspaper put out by the Village Leagues states that they will “work for the national goals of ending occupation and acquiring the right to self-determination, through direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians” (Supplement on the Palestinians under Israeli Rule, Israel & Palestine, vol. V, no. 110, 1982, citing Ha’aretz and the Jerusalem Post, June 17, 1982).
57. Abba Eban, “Obstacles to Autonomy,” New Outlook (Tel Aviv), June/July 1982.
58. New York Times, May 19, 1976, Dec. 21, 1980; see TNCW, pp. 281f., for fuller discussion.
59. Pryce-Jones, “The Palestinian pattern.”
60. Al Hamishmar, August 20, 1982. Saif ad-din Zuabi, who has long been associated with the Labor Party, was Vice-President of the Knesset and a high official of the Ministry of Agriculture.
61. Kapeliouk, Israel, p. 281, citing an interview with Eric Rouleau, Le Monde, February 19, 1970.
62. Kimche, There Could Have Been Peace, pp. 288f.
63. Amos Elon, Ha’aretz, Nov. 13, 1981; reprinted in Israleft News Service (Jerusalem), Nov. 17, 1981.
64. See Kimche, There Could Have Been Peace, pp. 286f.
65. See the comments by General Haim Bar-Lev, a cabinet member in the Meir and Rabin governments, in the Labor Party journal Ot, March 9, 1972, quoted in TNCW, p. 460.
66. Edward Witten, “Cold Silence,” Ha’aretz, Jan. 6, 1983.
67. See Peace in the Middle East?, pp. 120-2.
68. Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1976, pp. 1279, 1291; for further discussion of this curious document, see TNCW, chapter 6); James Akins, review of Years of Upheaval (Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1982), in American-Arab Affairs, Summer 1982. For some further examples of Kissinger’s astonishing inanities, which much impressed many journalists and academics, see TNCW, p. 406; also chapter 6, section 2.3, below.
69. See Tillman, The United States in the Middle East, chapter 6, on Soviet policies. He observes that “The official Soviet position has been consistent since 1948 in support of Israel’s right to exist and consistent since 1967 in support of Israel’s right to a secure national existence, as called for in Security Council Resolution 242, within its 1967 borders.” The USSR has even offered to provide security guarantees (p. 246).
70. Charles William Maynes (editor of Foreign Policy), Boston Globe, June 15, 1982.
71. For some examples, see Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy, Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, January 2, 1975 (U.S. Government Printing Office. Washington, 1975, Part III, Section VII).
72. Ha’aretz, June 25, 1973; Yediot Ahronot, Sept. 16, 1973. Cited by Kapeliouk, Israel, pp. 49-50, along with a range of similar evaluations by Israeli generals (among them, Sharon), intelligence specialists, orientalists, and others.
73. Amos Perlmutter, Michael Handel and Uri Bar-Joseph, Two Minutes Over Baghdad (Vallentine, Mitchel & Co., London, 1982, p. 33-4). They argue that Sadat’s war aims were limited because of the threat of nuclear retaliation by Israel, and also allege that Israel’s threat to use nuclear weapons impelled the U.S. to provide a massive shipment of conventional weapons to Israel. For more on this topic, see TNCW, pp. 321, 458. As for the USSR, “Evidence that the Soviet Union did not support President Sadat’s decision to go to war is persuasive” (Barry M. Blechman and Douglas M. Hart, “The Political Utility of Nuclear Weapons,” International Security, vol. 7, no. 1, 1982).
74. Jerusalem Post, November 13, 1981. On the January 1976 Arab initiative, which has virtually disappeared from history in the U.S. (it is not even mentioned in the unusually careful review in Tillman, The United States and the Middle East, for example), see TNCW, pp. 267, 300, 461.
75. For references and discussion, see TNCW, p. 268; also section 2.4.2, above.
76. Jerusalem Post, Nov. 15, 1976; Davar, Nov. 21, 1976; Israleft News Service, Dec. 1, 1976.
77. Bernard Gwertzman, New York Times, August 21, 1977.
78. New York Times, March 21, 1977.
79. Tillman, The United States and the Middle East, p. 213. Tillman gives an extensive (though incomplete) record of PLO moves towards accommodation, some of them fairly explicit. See also my articles in New Politics (Winter, 1975-6; Winter 1978-9), reviewing many of these developments. See also TNCW, chapters 9, 13.
80. David Hirst, Manchester Guardian weekly, August 7, 1977.
81. Elie Eliachar, quoted by Merle Thorpe, in the congressional testimony cited in note 54; Mattityahu Peled, interview, Hotam, Jan. 28, 1983; the Basle program did not actually refer to a “Jewish state” but rather to the vaguer concept of a national “home”. The history of the exploitation of the Covenant would make an interesting research project, which might contain some surprises.
82. Tillman, The United States in the Middle East, pp. 217, 271-2, 238.
83. Letter, New York Times, Jan. 12, 1982.
84. See TNCW, p. 321; also John K. Cooley, “The Palestinians,” in Haley and Snider, eds., Lebanon in Crisis, pp. 28-9, citing Sadat directly to this effect.
85. See chapter 2, section 2.2.2.
86. Cited by Amnon Kapeliouk, Le Monde diplomatique, August 1982, from Ma’ariv, Dec. 5, 1975.
87. Editorial, New Republic, Nov. 29, 1982.
88. For example, Theodore Draper writes that “Even Mr. Sadat admittedly did not accept [Israel’s] existence until he decided to come to Jerusalem” in 1977, and even then his “program called for peace on the most extreme Arab terms, except for those Arab extremists who would be satisfied with nothing but the total destruction of the state of Israel” (New York Times Book Review, May 17, 1981; for a longer quote, see TNCW, p. 460). Or Mitchell Cohen, Professor of Political Science at CUNY: “We must also note the historical persistence of the Palestinian national movement’s insistence on no compromise and no partition, which helped lead it to destruction in 1948 and to Beirut in 1982” (New Republic, Oct. 25, 1982). Or Arthur P. Mendel, Professor of History at the University of Michigan: it is now likely “that Hussein will follow Sadat’s example and negotiate with Israel the compromise that most Israelis and Palestinians (in contrast to the P.L.O.) have long wanted” (letter, New York Times, Oct. 10, 1982). Or Kenneth Jacobson, director of Middle Eastern Affairs for the Anti-Defamation League: “In fact, the PLO is the major obstacle to Arab-Israeli peace, ideologically committed to Israel’s destruction, never moving an iota from that commitment…” (Christian Science Monitor, July 13, 1982). Or Ivan Novick, who, with innumerable others, explains that “the core problem of the Arab-Israeli dispute is the failure of the Arab nations to come to terms with the existence of the permanence of the Jewish State”; see note 34). Or Yitzhak Rabin: “the facts speak for themselves”; “the main reason—the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict—was, and still is, the fact that except for Egypt, there has been no readiness on the part of the Arab leaders to reconcile themselves with the existence of Israel as a viable,
Jewish, independent state—regardless of its boundaries”; and as for Egypt, “for 28 years [i.e., until 1977], no one believed that Egypt would make peace with Israel” (Harvard International Review, Sept-Oct. 1982; recall his statement in Davar. Nov. 1976, referring to Sadat’s willingness to make peace in 1971, section 2.4.1 above, though in that case to an Israeli audience, who could be expected to know the facts). Or, to cite one of 1000 editorials: “the unexpected conquest of the land in 1967 and the Arabs’ refusal to reclaim it with a peace treaty have left the Begin-Sharon bulldozers in charge of policy” (Max Frankel, editor, New York Times, Nov. 15, 1982). See also note 111. And so on, in an almost endless litany.
89. New York Times, June 20, 1982, referring to the situation as of 1982. Note that as in the case of many of the references of the preceding note, this was written well after numerous other Arab initiatives, beyond the pre-1977 ones just reviewed.
90. “…Sadat was the first Arab leader who, a year after coming to power, declared his willingness to make peace with Israel in his famous reply [February 1971] to [UN negotiator] Dr. Jarring’s memorandum” (editorial, Ha’aretz, October 8, 1981); four days after Sadat’s “initiative, later known by his own name, for solving the Middle East problem,” Gunnar Jarring presented his “famous report of 8 February 1971…to which Egypt gave a positive reply” (Ghali Shoukri, Egypt: Portrait of a President, Zed press, London, 1981, pp. 50-51). See also Mordechai Gur (Ma’ariv, Oct. 11 1981; Israeli Mirror): “In February 1971 [Sadat] said that he was prepared to make peace with Israel.” Also Rabin, p. 68. and many others.
91. Kapeliouk, Israel, pp. 59-60.
92. Eric Pace, “Anwar el-Sadat, the Daring Arab Pioneer of Peace With Israel,” New York Times, Oct. 7, 1981.
93. Frederic L. Paxson, one of a group of American historians who offered their services to the state for this purpose during World War I; see TNCW, p. 70.
