by Noam Chomsky
It is not entirely clear how to reconcile Howe’s self-description as an “ardent supporter”—still less, the picture presented in Kol Hair—with his earlier account of his stand: “I have never been a Zionist; I have always felt contempt for nationalist and chauvinist sentiments” (see note 83). This account is perhaps plausible, pre-1967, but what about more recent years? A closer look at some of Howe’s writings may help dispel the mystery, while providing some insight into the nature of post-1967 support for Israel in significant circles, as discussed in chapter 2. We may begin, perhaps, with Howe’s explanation of why unnamed “New Left intellectuals” oppose Israel—namely, because of their “growing distaste” and “downright contempt” for “the very idea of democracy,” so that they “despise Israel not because of her flaws but because of her virtues,” because of Israel’s commitment to “combining radical social change with political freedom.” Howe explains that to regain the favor of these “New Left intellectuals,” whoever they may be, Israel would have to institute a fascist-style dictatorship in a bloody revolution. Then, he writes, this is what we would see:
Everywhere the New Left rejoices. Brigades of youth from Scarsdale, Evanston, and Palo Alto race to Israel to help with “the planting.” The New York Review plans a special issue. And Jean-Paul Sartre and Mme. de Beauvoir take the next plane to Israel, prepared to write a thousand pages in four weeks on The Achievements of the Israeli Revolution (while getting the street names of Tel Aviv wrong).155 In fact, Sartre was honored by the Hebrew University in recognition of his support for Israel, the New York Review has always been strongly pro-Israel, and the mainstream of the New Left tended towards the positions of Israeli doves. But facts are really irrelevant here, which is why Howe feels free to ignore them in his writings on this topic. The point is to destroy one’s enemies, relying on a useful convention of political discourse: slander and abuse are quite legitimate and argument and evidence are superfluous when the targets are activist elements of popular dissident movements. It is convenient to have one’s political enemies committed to the destruction of Israel and bloody fascist revolutions, so they are, whatever the facts. Note that Israel is really irrelevant to this drama, except insofar as the overwhelming support for Israel is used as a stick to beat the student movement, the New Left, peace activists, etc. Hence the possibility that someone who has “never been a Zionist” might appear to be such an “ardent supporter” of Israel—perhaps even to himself as well, after only a few years of playing the role—that he will still be waving the blue and white flag when everyone else has deserted the cause. From 1967, many others have adopted the same device, which has proven a useful and highly effective one; see chapter 2 and references cited for further discussion of the phenomenon illustrated here, which is of some significance in the development of the “special relationship” in the 1970s, particularly in its ideological aspect.
7.2 The Rise of Religious-Chauvinist Fanaticism The predictable cycle of repression, terror, and violence continues to arouse much concern in Israel, particularly among older, more Europeoriented segments of the population, who recognize all too clearly what is happening. The first warnings came from Professor Yeshayahu Leibovitz, one of Israel’s best-known scholars, who has continued to speak out forcefully against the occupation (also against the war in Lebanon), a fact that has won him little praise. Amnon Rubinstein, former Dean of the Tel Aviv University Law School and a Knesset member, describes a series of actions by “extremist and racist elements,” including military rabbis, adding that “an ill wind is blowing against the direction of the Zionist vision, against the character of humanistic Judaism, against all that we had wanted Israel to become.” “Perhaps the worst sign of this,” he adds, “is that it is becoming hard to distinguish between the lunatic fringe and the mainstream of our political life.” He describes anti-Arab terrorism by student leaders at the Hebrew University who threatened the university authorities with violence if they were disciplined, attacks by “unknown cowardly inhabitants of Kiryat Arba [the religious settlement at Hebron] on the house of an Arab widow,” the failure of the authorities to react, the refusal of a construction company to rent an apartment in Jerusalem to a Christian couple, the sentiment among youth that the Arabs must be expelled, etc., concluding that “what we are witnessing is not the action of minor and marginal fringe movements.” As internal conflict intensified in Israel in the wake of the Lebanon war, Rubinstein—among many others—warned in still clearer terms of the consequences of the “Nazi storm trooper style” of the agents of “criminal violence,” now fortified by “a political ideology of violence” with tacit government support and overt support from Gush Emunim Rabbis who publicly “incite to kill Arab civilians.” Again he described how right-wing students “use their fists to control the campuses of the Jerusalem and Tel Aviv universities,” using “not only fists but clubs and iron chains,” and threatening violence if the university were to attempt disciplinary action. “Large areas of Israel are simply closed to anyone who is not from the Likud” because of the violence of the supporters of Begin and Sharon, which they make no attempt to control (see section 4.4 above). Those who oppose the Likud are threatened with murder, or silenced “by shouting, screaming and threats,” and are attacked if they attempt to distribute their materials. Perpetrators of overt violence “are rarely caught.” He warns of a sorry fate if these tendencies continue.156
What Rubinstein and others fear is a virtual civil war, in which elements of a fascist character are increasingly visible—a fact that they do not disguise. But quite apart from the scale of the verbal and physical violence and its socioeconomic, ethnic and religious-cultural roots, there are other indications to support Rubinstein’s judgment that the “ill wind” is a serious phenomenon, not confined to the lunatic fringe.157 The Director General of the Israel Broadcasting Authority (radio and television), who “is a long-time admirer of South Africa and a frequent visitor there,” wrote an “emotional article” in 1974 expressing his preference for South Africa over Black Africa, complete “with citations of research proving the genetic inferiority of blacks”—a view which “seems to reflect the feelings of many in the Israeli elite.” The journal of Mapam (the left-wing of the Labor Alignment) is capable of publishing an explanation of the superiority of Israeli pilots, based on American research which has “proven” that Blacks (including, apparently, Arabs) are inferior in “complex, cognitive intelligence” (which is why “American Blacks succeed only in short-distance running”). The same journal also devoted 2 full pages to racist idiocies tracing genetic differences between Jews and Gentiles to Abraham, and explaining the alleged cultural ascendance of the U.S. over Europe in terms of the change in the proportion of the Jewish populations. The article begins by noting that “in the atmosphere prevailing today in the Holy Land, everything is possible, even racist doctrine…,” but then proceeds to give a rather sympathetic portrayal of the author of the example they provide, letting the interested reader know how to obtain more information. In the Labor Party journal, we read about “genetic experiments” that have shown that “the genetic differences among Jewish communities [Poland and Yemen are cited] are smaller than those between Gentiles and Jews” (the medical correspondent, reporting research conducted at Tel Aviv University), while the Ministry of Education sponsors a creationist congress organized by Orthodox scientists from Ben-Gurion University in which the theory of evolution is dismissed as “speculation,” “secular dogma” and “myth” while most of the participating scientists “reaffirmed their belief in divine creation.”158 It is not too surprising, then, to discover that Israel’s Christian Maronite allies in Lebanon are really Syrian Jews in origin159—though it is likely that they lost this status after the Beirut massacres, a few days after this information appeared.
It is, however, primarily in religious circles that such “Khomeinism” (as it is now sometimes characterized in Israel) is to be found. These circles are increasingly influential as a result of
the social and demographic processes noted earlier. There also appear to be efforts to support Islamic fundamentalism in the occupied territories in opposition to secular (and hence more dangerous) forms of Palestinian nationalism. Commenting on this phenomenon in both the West Bank and Gaza, Danny Rubinstein observes that the military authorities—who generally clamp down on demonstrations with an iron hand—allowed busloads of “Islamic fanatics” to pass through IDF roadblocks to join demonstrations at Bir Zeit—and al-Najah Universities, one sign oftheir support for Islamic fundamentalism against left and “nationalist” (read: pro-PLO) trends.160
“The uniting of religious fanaticism with extremist nationalism is not an unknown phenomenon in Israel in the past few years,” Eliahu Salpeter writes, citing as one example the pronouncements of a young Rabbi on the “filth” of mixed marriages and the “hybrid children” they produce, “a thorn in the flesh of the Jewish society in Israel” that may become a real catastrophe unless proper measures are taken—he recommends total school segregation and exclusion of Arabs from the universities. The Rabbi denies that he is prejudiced against Arabs, insisting that he has “close Arab friends”—a remark familiar to Jews, Salpeter comments. Salpeter cites other examples of the dangerous religious-nationalist brew: e.g., the failure to find those responsible for the terrorist attack on Arab mayors, the difference in treatment of Arabs who throw rocks and religious Jews who stone people who drive on the Sabbath. 161
In earlier years, the Rabbinate had cited biblical authority to justify expulsion of the Arabs (a “foreign element”) from the land, or simply their destruction, and religious law was invoked to justify killing of civilians in a war or raid.162 After the 1973 war, the highly-respected Lubavitcher Rabbi (New York) deplored the failure to conquer Damascus.163 He also warned against abandoning any of the conquered territories, condemning those “who for the sake of miserable money and honors, and especially in order to be well-regarded by the big Goy [Gentile] in Washington, are ready to threaten the security of the Holy Land by giving up territories against the opinions of military experts,” which is “against the Jewish Religion…”164 Another American Rabbi* explained that the religious law empowers Israel to “dispossess” the Arabs of the conquered territories: “As long as the war which initiated the conquest was conducted under instructions from the Israeli government, who halachicly [by religious law] possesses the same
* Rabbi Isaac J. Bernstein, who is identified as “spiritual leader of Manhattan’s Jewish Center...an executive member of the Rabbinical Council of America and a lecturer in Talmud at Stern College.”
powers as the biblical king, all territories captured as a result of this war belong to Israel.” As for “the argument that by not surrendering the territories, we might be heightening the possibility of a future war,” this is “not valid” under religious law which “indicates that, on the contrary, we must start a war to prevent even the possibility of permanent settlement nearer our borders than heretofore.”165 After Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem, a group of leading Rabbis and religious authorities in Israel and the U.S. warned the government that it is “forbidden” to return any territories of the Land of Israel,166 and the Supreme Rabbinical Council of Israel later reiterated this judgment, citing biblical obligations and religious law.167
The chief Rabbis also gave their endorsement to the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, declaring that it conformed to the Halachic (religious) law and that participation in the war “in all its aspects” is a religious duty. The military Rabbinate meanwhile distributed a document to soldiers containing a map of Lebanon with the names of cities replaced by alleged Hebrew names taken from the Bible, along with the explanation that much of Lebanon belonged to the Hebrew tribe of Asher. They also provided a strategic analysis of the Lebanon war under the heading “Joshua son of Nun to the clearing of the nests of the enemies in Lebanon,” referring to the biblical account of the conquest of the Land of Canaan168—the phrase “clearing the nests of terrorists” is now a standard way of referring to operations against Palestinian vermin. Speaking to soldiers under the auspices of the hasbara (“propaganda”; literally, “explanation”) officer, a military Rabbi in Lebanon explained the biblical sources that justify “our being here and our opening the war; we do our Jewish religious duty by being here”.169
Such pronouncements are by no means novel, and since 1973 at least, they have been taken seriously in significant circles. In the masscirculation journal Yediot Ahronot in 1974, Menahem Barash wrote with much admiration about the teachings of Rabbi Moshe Ben-Zion Ushpizai of Ramat-Gan, who used biblical texts and traditional commentary to explain how Israel should deal with the Palestinians, “a plague already written in the Bible.” “With a sharp scalpel and convincing logic” the Rabbi uses the writings of the “greatest sages” to elucidate the commandments, still binding today, as to how to “inherit the land” that was promised by God to Abraham. We must follow the doctrines of Joshua, he explains, referring to the genocidal texts that appear in the book of Joshua and elsewhere. “The biblical commandment is to conquer the land of Israel in its detailed borders, to take possession of it and to settle it.” It is “forbidden” to “abandon it to strangers” (Gentiles). “There is no place in this land for the people of Israel and for other nations alongside it. The practical meaning of [the commandment to] possess the land is the expulsion of the peoples who live in it” and who try to prevent the Jews of the world from “settling in our land.” It is “a holy war, commanded in the Bible,” and it must be fought against Palestinians, Syrians, Egyptians “or any other people in the world” who seek to block the divine commandment. There can be no compromises, no peace treaties, no negotiations with “the peoples who inhabit the land.” “You shall destroy them, you shall enter into no covenant with them, you shall not pity them, you shall not intermarry with them,” the divine law dictates. Whoever stands in our way must be annihilated, the Rabbi continues with his “convincing logic,” citing numerous traditional authorities. All of this is reported quite seriously, and with much respect.170
After the Beirut massacres of September 1982 there was a renewed outpouring of militant support for the war in religious circles. The influential Gush Emunim group, which spearheads West Bank settlement, published a statement praising Begin, Sharon, and Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan, describing the war as a “great act of sanctification of God’s name.” The statement also spoke of “the return of the territory of the tribes of Naftali and Asher to the boundaries of Israel,” and of Israel’s “responsibility to act to the limits of its ability to destroy the foundations of evil in the entire world.”171 Two months before, Rabbi Elazar Valdman of Gush Emunim wrote in the journal Nekudah of the religious West Bank settlers:
We will certainly establish order in the Middle East and in the world. And if we do not take this responsibility upon ourselves, we are sinners, not just towards ourselves but towards the entire world. For who can establish order in the world? All of those western leaders of weak character?172
In Israel, one does not take pronouncements of Gush Emunim lightly. Their influence has been considerable, and they have regularly created policy (with state support) by their actions in the occupied territories. This statement therefore caused some consternation. One of the founders of the movement, Yehuda Ben-Meir, sharply denounced it, stating that “according to Gush Emunim, we must conquer not only Syria and Turkey but with the blood of our children we must become the guardian of the entire world.”173 It may seem odd that such ludicrous pronouncements are taken seriously, but in the current atmosphere of spreading “Khomeinism” among significant circles of the fourth greatest military power in the world, they cannot be disregarded, and are not, by serious Israeli commentators. We return to further indications of this grandiose self-image, and its implications.174
Those who really deserve the name “supporters of Israel” will not be unconcerned over such developments. Within Israel itself, they have often led to near despair. Boaz Evron
writes that “the true symbol of the state is no longer the Menorah with seven candlesticks; the true symbol is the fist.”175 In conformity with his judgment, when West Beirut was invaded, IDF Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan announced:
What must be destroyed—we will destroy. Whoever must be imprisoned—we will imprison.176 Aharon Meged writes of his sadness with regard to “the new ‘Zionist mentality’,” which is coming to reign and “cannot be stopped”: “the age of military Zionism.” “The old fear of a ‘Sparta’—is changing to fear of a ‘Prussia’.” Like Danny Rubinstein (see note 172), he is much concerned over the ravings of Rabbi Valdman, and offers the hope that return of the territories can still overcome this fate, citing Chief Sephardic Rabbi Ovadiah Yoseph, who agreed that return of territories is legitimate if it would lead to peace. It may incidentally be noted that his Ashkenazi counterpart, Chief Rabbi Shlomo Goren, drew the opposite conclusion from religious law, holding that retaining “Judea and Samaria” takes precedence over the religious duty to save life (“pikuach nefesh”). He “rejects categorically” the idea that achievement of peace would justify territorial compromise.177 The example once again illustrates the fact that one should be rather cautious in contrasting Ashkenazi doves with Sephardi hawks.
