The Lamian War and Cyrene
When word spread of Alexander's demise, many resentful of Macedonian dominance took the opportunity to rise up in revolt. Most prominently, this took place back in Greece, where the Athenians and Aetolians declared against the empire and issued a call for others to join them. But trouble also arose in Asia as the Greeks who had moved into the far northeastern districts (the "Upper Satrapies" as they were known) sought their independence as well.
Upper Satrapies, Plataea II, Thermopylae-Lamia and Odrysia IV (323 B.c.)
The rebellious settlers in the Upper Satrapies raised an army of 20,000 foot soldiers and 3,000 cavalry per Diodorus (18.7.2). Parke (1935, 203) considered these figures an exaggeration unless there were a good many Asians included, something he thought improbable. However, given the extensive nature of foreign settlings in this region, such a levy just might have been possible. If so, the infantry likely consisted of 15,000-16,000 hoplites and 4,000-5,000 skirmishers. The Greeks chose a certain Philon as their general. Perdiccas dispatched Pithon, one of Alexander's bodyguards, to address this threat. He started out with only two regiments of phalangites (3,000) and 800 (two squadrons) of hetairoi (Diodorus 18.7.2-3), but got more troops from the local satraps. These amounted to 8,000 infantry (perhaps 6,000 hoplites and 2,000 light-armed) and 800 javelineer horsemen.
Pithon proved a savvy operator and was able to bribe a rebel officer, Letodorus, prior to battle. The nature of Letodorus' command isn't specified beyond containing 3,000 men; however, this strength exactly matches Diodorus' claim for the rebel cavalry, which also fits well with what happened on the field. There, Pithon advanced his phalanx with the pikemen on the left and hoplites on the right. He must have spread both divisions thin (files of eight and four respectively) to counter a long opposing line that likely stood eight shields deep. (Alternatively, should we honor Parke's suspicions and cut the rebel force in half on all counts, Pithon could have matched the enemy with all of his heavy infantry in eight-man files.) This would have seen both phalanxes fronting over a 1km span. Once engaged, the battle was "doubtful" (Diodorus 18.7.6) as the rebel array must have offered a strong challenge, especially on its left where Pithon lacked the stouter defense provided by his pikemen on the other wing. Just then, Letodorus pulled his troops from at least one flank (maybe both if he indeed led horsemen) and took them off. (His ability to disengage and cleanly leave a fight still in progress lends credence to the idea that he led mobile, mounted units.) With their enemy now free to envelop (the hetairoi and others perhaps already doing so), the rebels fled in confusion and panic. They would surrender afterwards only to be treacherously shot down by javelins in accord with Perdiccas' instructions.
Meanwhile in Greece, the Athenians enlisted 8,000 (Diodorus 18.9.1) of the veteran mercenaries that Alexander had expelled upon his return from India. (Pausanius improbably gave them 50,000 [8.52.51.) These had gathered in the Peloponnese and were recruited by Leosthenes. He had also gone to Aetolia to arrange an alliance and picked up another 7,000 soldiers there, taking the opportunity to also solicit the Phocians, Locrians and others to his polls' cause. For their part, the citizens of Athens called up all those fit for duty under the age of 40 (perhaps 7,000 hoplites and 700 horsemen from a pool of roughly 10,000 middle-upper class residents). These represented ten tribes (taxeis), three of them standing to defend the city while the others made ready for distant campaigning. From the latter, 5,000 hoplites and 500 cavalry set out along with 2,000 additional mercenaries to aid Leosthenes' blockade of the pass at Thermopylae. Additional insurgents had already joined him there, including troops from both the mainland and the islands as well as from Illyria and Thrace.
The Boeotians backed Macedonia and gathered near Plataea to intercept the troops coming from Athens. Their army had no more than 7,000 spearmen and 700 in cavalry, though there could have been a couple of thousand mercenary hoplites from Macedonian garrisons on hand as well. Still, this would have provided a good match for the approaching Athenians if Leosthenes had not now upset the odds by marching down with part of the army he had at Thermopylae. Diodorus describes his command as "his own men" (18.11.5). This might mean no more than that they were distinct from the Athenians; however, these might well have been the soldiers he had personally recruited: 8,000 mostly (if not all) hoplites. Likely adding some light infantry and allied horsemen (maybe 1,000 each), he hooked up with the column from Athens. Leosthenes was then able to employ his edge in manpower to defeat the Boeotians with files pushing through foes stacked only half as deep. We've no details on the action's casualties, but might suspect that the Boeotians gave way fairly quickly and took but modest losses (5-10 percent) in a cavalrycovered escape. The victors would have paid only a very minor price on the day (maybe under 3 percent killed).
Having sent to Asia for help, Antipater felt that he could delay no longer and marched out in the fall of 323, leaving the general Sippas behind to find more men. His army had 13,000 Macedonian heavies, probably 9,000 pikemen and 4,000 hypaspist hoplites. There were also 600 hetairoi, and some light footmen (perhaps 3,000 or so) must have been present as well. Moving down the coast to Thessaly beside a large fleet, Antipater met Leosthenes on the plain north of Thermopylae and south of the city of Lamia. The Thessalians had by now gone over to the rebel side to leave the Macedonian short of troops, yet he still accepted battle. Leosthenes would have had better than 30,000 infantry (he had 22,000 the next year after losing 7,000 Aetolians and some others). His mounted arm included at least 3,500 horsemen (again, attested in 324), including 2,000 Thessalians. The mercenaries, Aetolians and Athenians could have given him around 17,000 hoplites and 5,000 light footmen, while other allies might have contributed at least 4,000-5,000 more in heavy infantry along with 3,000-4,000 foot skirmishers.
Antipater must have set up no more than four-deep to avoid an extreme overlap. And even then, the enemy's large force of cavalry and light footmen offered a serious mismatch off his flanks. Braving such opposition appears insane and, whatever inspired him to do so, Antipater's men paid a heavy price for his mistake. Leosthenes drove them from the field, killing perhaps 3,000 (30 percent) of their infantrymen. (This reflects that the heavy-armed force of 40,000 fielded by the Macedonians the next year included 30,000 new arrivals and only 10,000 from Antipater.) Losses on this order indicate that there was at least a partial envelopment followed by a thorough chase. Those who survived took refuge with Antipater inside Lamia (from which the name "Lamian War" for this conflict comes) and promptly came under siege.
A conflict arose at this time in Thrace as well. Seuthes, the Odrysian king, had taken the field to oppose that province's governor, Lysimachus. The latter had a garrison force of only 4,000 foot soldiers (maybe 3,000 pikemen and 1,000 hoplites) and 2,000 horsemen plus some foot skirmishers. He was facing what Diodorus claimed (18.14.2-3) to be 20,000 barbarian peltasts and 8,000 cavalry. That Lysimachus came out to fight against these odds strongly suggests that he chose ground where his heavy infantry had terrain protection on its flanks. The ensuing clash was "a stubborn one" with the Macedonians repelling repeated assaults and "killing many times" more than they lost (maybe 10-12 percent versus 1-3 percent). Nightfall must have brought the action to a close with neither side a clear victor. There's no record of further combat, but Seuthes would ultimately become an unwilling ally of Lysimachus.
Lamia, Rhamnus, Cappadocia and Crannon (322 B.c.)
Leonnatos crossed over from his satrapy that spring to aid Antipater. After recruiting in Macedonia, he marched to Lamia with an army of more than 20,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry (Diodorus 18.14.5). Composition of this force is speculative; however, it seems reasonable that it had something like 9,000 phalangites and 6,000 spearmen plus 5,000 light infantry. The latter must have been a mix of peltasts, archers and slingers, many of them Phrygian. As for his horsemen, he maybe had 800 lancers (two squadrons) with the rest javelin-armed. Leonnatos' approach caused the rebels to break off their siege and move u
p to meet him. Leosthenes had lost his life beneath Lamia's walls and Antiphilus now led the Greek effort. Part of his force having dispersed that winter, he retained some 22,000 footmen (perhaps 16,000-18,000 of them hoplites) and 3,500 riders (Diodorus 18.15.2). Still, this allowed for a modest edge in manpower as long as he could engage before the newcomers linked up with Antipater.
Both armies set up in phalanx at some ways apart on the plain above Lamia and the cavalries advanced to open a fierce mounted battle. Leonnatos was a devotee of Alexander's style and led his horsemen into this fight to send it swirling across the flat. A portion of the ground was marshy, and it was here where Leonnatos found himself cut off as the highly skilled and more numerous Thessalian horsemen gained the upper hand and shot him from the saddle. As its soundly defeated cavalry retreated with the general's body, the Macedonian phalanx withdrew as well lest it be enveloped and destroyed. Taking up a defensive stance on high ground, it was then joined by Antipater the next day. Though well supplied with infantry, Antipater was wary of engaging a foe so much stronger in horsemen; he chose, therefore, to retire, doing so across rough terrain so as to discourage attacks from the enemy's riders. Antiphilus had gained a stunning strategic triumph at very little cost (no doubt less than 200 horsemen to maybe twice that for the opposition).
About the same time that Leonnatos was meeting defeat to the north, another Macedonian was faring no better along the coast of Attica. Micion (probably Antipater's admiral) had come ashore there to deal some payback to the Athenians for besieging his comrades in Lamia. Plutarch characterized his landing party as "a large force" (vol. II Phocion, 261). Given a fleet of 110 triremes (Diodorus 18.12.3), he could have had nearly 4,500 heavy-armed Macedonians and mercenaries (40 or so per ship). Oarsmen with javelins (maybe 1,000) provided light support. The Athenian general Phocion (nearly 80 years old at this time) led out his city's three available taxeis of prime-aged men (just above 2,000 hoplites and 200 horsemen) along with the spearmen over 40 years of age (3,000). He also had 300 or so cavalry and light footmen drawn from the baggage carriers (maybe 1,000-2,000). Catching the enemy near the town of Rhamnus, Phocion formed up his phalanx and engaged in a pitched battle.
Micion might have fielded up to 3,000 pikemen (two regiments) on his left and center with about 1,500 hired hoplites forming his right wing. The armed-rowers would have split to screen along either side. Phocion likely set up his slightly larger force at eight shields deep across a 625m front, putting younger men at the fore and the oldest at the rear. This would have led Micion (had he kept his phalangites eight-deep) to stretch out his mercenaries using files of four in order to avoid an overlap. (Note that this assumes a 2 to 1 preponderance of pikemen over hoplites. If the ratio had been the reverse, Micion could have achieved the same frontage and kept his spearmen at a more competitive six-deep.) In the combat that ensued, we might suspect that it was on the thinner and pike-less Macedonian right where Phocion's men won the day. Perhaps aided by a sweep off that flank by their cavalry and more numerous light infantry, Athens' spearmen pushed back and enveloped the Macedonian commander and his hirelings where they stood on that wing. The Athenians "entirely routed the enemy, killing Micion and many more on the spot" (Plutarch), giving chase to probably claim a death toll of 20-30 percent among those beaten before they got back to their ships. Still, despite the success here and at Lamia, things began to turn against the insurgency as it now suffered a pair of defeats at sea.
Back in Asia, Perdiccas (with Arrhidaeus the king in tow) was engaging the Persian satrap Ariarathes for control of Cappadocia that he might deliver that province into the hands of Eumenes as promised. This pitted him against a force of Asians and mercenaries. Based on their subsequent casualties (at around 15-30 percent), his foes likely numbered 13,500-27,500. (Though Diodorus said there were more, putting them at 45,000: 30,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry.) A reasonable projection toward the upside would give Ariarathes something like 10,000 Greek hoplites. The equivalent of a baivarabam, he had hired these over a period of years, taking advantage of having "amassed a great sum of money" (Diodorus 18.16.1). Likewise, he'd been able to afford a strong local force that included perhaps 15,000 foot soldiers. These were mostly helmeted spearmen with small shields who also carried javelins. Finally, his mounted arm probably consisted of 2,000-3,000 light horsemen based on the Cappadocian riders sent to Gaugamela back in 331 having been only a partial levy.
Perdiccas' army had some 18,000 phalangites and 3,000 hypaspists along with perhaps 5,000-6,000 light footmen and 3,000 horsemen (including 2,000 hetairoi). Given that so many Macedonian troops were in Europe at this time, it's likely that at least a narrow majority of his men were Asian. This included all of the light-armed (mounted and afoot) and half the hetairoi and pikemen. The latter, outfitted in Macedonian fashion, were prototypical pantodapoi phalangitai (native phalanx fighters who would become common in Successor armies). These were a portion of the men that Alexander had ordered trained in Persia while he was away in India. Among the troops from Macedonia, the hypaspists must have carried dory and aspis that they might counter the large opposing mercenary contingent. Both these and their sarissa-armed comrades likely stood eight-deep in the imperial phalanx.
We've no description of the battle in Cappadocia. However, it likely turned on success by Perdiccas on his right using some combination of his elite troops (hetairoi and hypaspists). In the collapse that followed, 4,000 of the insurgents died, probably hoplites from the bested left wing for the most part. Like their kind along the rest of the line, these had arrayed thinly (files of four to six) in front of the local spearmen and proved too slow to escape from the envelopment. Ariarathes and another 5,000 of his men surrendered. Perdiccas tortured and impaled the satrap and his kin before turning Cappadocia over to Eumenes and heading back to Babylon with the king.
Craterus, meanwhile, had crossed over to Thessaly from his arsenal in Cilicia. He brought 6,000 Macedonian infantry (Diodorus 18.16.4), which were probably four taxeis of pikemen. He also had 1,000 Persian bowmen and slingers plus 1,500 horsemen, the last including perhaps 800 companion lancers. There were also 4,000 mercenary hoplites in his column that had joined during the march. Craterus delivered all these troops to Antipater. Having already taken on Leonnatos' men, Antipater now had more than 40,000 heavy infantry, 3,000 archers and slingers and 5,000 horsemen (Diodorus 18.16.5). His heavy footmen consisted of around 10,000 hoplites (both hypaspists and hired) and 30,000 phalangites. The horsemen might have been around 2,000 Macedonian hetairoi with the rest lighter, javelin-armed riders. In addition to the 3,000 specialist missilemen (including 2,000 inherited from Leonnatos) there were probably some 5,000-6,000 peltasts on hand as well. Opposing this huge host was a much smaller army under Antiphilus, who could call on no more than 25,000 footmen and 3,500 cavalry per Diodorus (18.17.2). His infantry likely broke down into about 80 percent hoplites and the rest mostly peltast foot skirmishers.
These forces camped near the Peneius River in the vicinity of the town of Crannon, where Antipater, seeing his numerical advantage, offered battle. His foes delayed for several days as they gathered up as many troops as they could before coming out to fight. Having some 20,000 hoplites, the Greeks must have set up their phalanx across as wide an expanse as was practical, perhaps filing at depths of four (mercenaries) and six (militia). This would have let them match lengths with an enemy array that might have stretched across the plain for some 3.75km at eight men deep. Clearly, the rebels' best chance for victory lay in a mounted battle and this is what they sought, sending their riders out front to start the action. And, indeed, the Thessalian-led Greek horsemen soon began to take charge. At this juncture, Antipater moved to head off the sort of defeat that a preliminary cavalry reverse had put on Leonnatos the previous year. He led his phalanx forward, flushing the horsemen flank-ward and initiating shock contact with the thinly arrayed enemy spearmen.
The advantage now shifted. Unable to penetrate the pike hedge on the Macedon
ian left and center, the insurgents had no real hope of withstanding the deeper files pushing into them along the rest of the line. They therefore withdrew. In an amazing display of discipline, their hoplites were able to disengage and pull back in good order. Where they faced pikemen, this was done at minimal cost, those foes being poorly equipped to pursue even a short distance. However, along the leftward third of the rebel front, it was somewhat more mobile spearmen who stood in opposition and the Greeks paid dearly to get clear (most of the 500 soldiers they lost that day going down there and then). Once onto high ground at the rear, Antiphilus and his men held off all enemy attempts to advance uphill as their cavalry fell back to join them. Antipater broke off the fight at this point, having chased the enemy from the field at a cost of only 130 (less than 1 percent) of his men (Diodorus 18.17.5).
Greek and Macedonian Land Battles of the 4th Century BC Page 35
