Eurymenae I-II and Apollonia (312 B.c.)
Back in Greece, Antigonus' general Ptolemaeus was drawn from his campaign against Cassander by the revolt of his admiral, Telesphorus. The renegade commander had made a bid to take over and spoil Elis and its Olympic shrine on his own behalf. Ptolemaeus marched into the Peloponnese and resolved the situation without a battle, restoring Elean freedom and the shrine's wealth. Taking advantage of this distraction for his foe, Lyciscus, Cassander's general in Acarnania, took an army into Epirus to address a resurgence of resistance there. This involved the Epirotes new king, Alcetas, who had replaced the fallen Aeacides. Having a strong garrison contingent of perhaps 3,000 pikemen, 1,000 hoplites, 1,000 light infantry and 400 horsemen, Lyciscus moved to confront Alcetas, who had only a modest force and was awaiting help from his sons, Alexander and Teucer. When many of the Epirotes deserted rather than oppose the invasion, Alcetas fled to the city of Eurymenae and met Alexander, who brought a considerable reinforcement for his father.
Maybe fielding some 4,000 heavy-armed now, Alcetas engaged and defeated Lyciscus. We know little about this action beyond its general result; however, it's possible that Epirote spearmen might have overcome Macedonian hoplites on Lyciscus' right, these perhaps having filed at a depth of only four (half that of the foe and their own phalangites) to avoid an overlap. Lyciscus got away with much of his command, possibly due to effective screening of the retreat by his cavalry. Shortly thereafter, Deinias, another general of Cassander, arrived with more troops, and the Macedonians, maybe half as much stronger than before, gained a victory over Alexander and Teucer. In all likelihood, the second battle featured a point for point reversal of the previous engagement's particulars. Lyciscus took Eurymenae after Alcetas' sons and the other survivors had fled. Nonetheless, Cassander himself marched an army into Epirus in the end and established friendly relations with Alcetas.
Having calmed Epirus, Cassander took part of his army and moved on Apollonia. That city had revolted and cast out its garrison in the aftermath of Ptolemaeus' recent successes. Probably leading something like 6,000 phalangites, 2,000 hypaspists/hoplites, 2,000 foot skirmishers and 400 hetairoi, Cassander fought a battle before the city's walls against the townsmen and their allies (probably all Illyrian). Diodorus described the Apollonians as being "superior in number" (19.89.2), which suggests they might have had better than 10,000 Greek and barbarian spearmen along with several thousand in light infantry and 1,000 or so horsemen. Cassander, possibly beaten on his right and stalled elsewhere, took significant casualties (maybe 20 percent or more) and withdrew all the way to Macedonia. There, he would come to terms with Antigonus in the coming year, joining Lysimachus and Ptolemy in a pact that confirmed each in his realm. Cassander was to rule Macedonia and Greece under this agreement until such time that Roxanne's boy was old enough to assume his kingly duties as Alexander IV. Cassander then had the woman and her son murdered. This was readily accepted by the other Successors, since the youngster's demise removed an heir of Alexander who might have challenged the legitimacy of their own titles. In 309, Cassander would go on to precipitate the assassination of Heracles, Alexander's son by his mistress Barsine and the last of the great conqueror's direct blood-line.
Agathocles of Syracuse
Syracuse had fallen under less popular rule after the death of Timoleon and a much more restrictive oligarchic cabal known as the "Six Hundred" seized control c. 330. Opposition to this regime found a leader in Agathocles, a wealthy factory owner who had run afoul of the ruling party and fled to Italy. He rose to prominence there as a mercenary commander fighting against Syracusan expansion. Able to return home c. 319 during a brief interruption in the oligarchs' rule, Agathocles suffered banishment once more when they reclaimed power. He now waged war on Sicilian soil, leading a private army of exiles, Siculi and hirelings (Griffith 1935, 198) against the Six Hundred and their allies from Carthage. When a Carthaginian-mediated truce restored him again to Syracuse, he became the city's general (strategos) only then to instigate a coup in 316 and establish a mercenary-backed dictatorship. Harboring grand ambitions, this new tyrant set out to extend his sway across the rest of Sicily.
Galeria (312 B.c.) and Ecnomus Hill (311 B.C.)
Agathocles had by 314 brought all of the major Greek cities of Sicily under his nominal control. This arrangement was formalized in a treaty with Carthage that recognized Syracuse's mastery over the entire island save for the western portion (known as the "epicraty") that had long been subject to Punic rule. However, Agathocles wanted to eventually control Carthaginian Sicily as well and began building up his forces to that end. Able to call on something like 5,000 Syracusan citizens and a like number of allied Greeks, he also amassed mercenaries to the tune of 10,000 foot soldiers and 3,500 horsemen (Diodorus 19.72.2). As this was going on, there arose fresh resistance to his dictatorship at Acragas and Messana, the latter openly sheltering many that he had cast from Syracuse.
Agathocles set out in 312 to pacify the trouble-makers in his realm, opening with a march on Messana at the island's northeastern tip. Expelling its Syracusan exiles, that city submitted without a fight. The tyrant then headed down to Acragas on the southern coast, but found that a Carthaginian fleet had landed there to reinforce the town. With the Carthaginians having thus been first to breach the treaty of 314, Agathocles took the liberty of raiding into their territory to the west, subduing various sites by either force or negotiation. This spurred Deinocrates, leader of the exiles from Syracuse, to ask for help from Carthage and gather up an army of his fellow outcasts. Deinocrates and his co-commander Philonides had a force of 3,000 infantry (perhaps 75 percent hoplites) and 2,000 cavalry (Diodorus 19.104.1-2). They set up camp outside the otherwise unknown town of Galeria. Agathocles kept most of his army to meet any threat from Carthage while sending two of his officers, Pasiphilus and Demophilus, to deal with the exiles. Their command was the same size as that of the opposition (5,000 soldiers per Diodorus). Probably all mercenaries, these troops likely matched the ratio of footmen to cavalry among their foes.
The rebels deployed with Deinocrates in charge of one wing (the right?) and Philonides the other, cavalry and light infantry no doubt split off either flank. Their phalanx would have stood in files of eight. Agathocles' men must have arrayed in identical fashion to yield a matching heavy front across some 280m. Once engaged, the hoplites fought evenly, with both their strength and enthusiasm well matched. However, the dictator's phalanx eventually gained the victory (most likely on its stronger right), killing Philonides as it pushed back his wing and put it to flight. Deinocrates then had no choice but to withdraw as well lest his still resistant portion of the line be flanked. Pasiphilus commanded the successful Syracusan wing, which now slew many among its foes running from the fight. Losses among the exiles probably included better than 10 percent killed at a cost of less than 5 percent for the victors.
The Carthaginians had at this time taken a strong position on Ecnomus Hill in the vicinity of Gela. Agathocles brought the rest of his army up against them, but, being only a small force (maybe one or two 3,000-man divisions), they refused to come down and engage openly. Ravaging the surrounding area, the tyrant withdrew for the winter. In the spring, he came back with his entire host to once more offer battle; now, however, he had to face much more than the garrison that had previously held the hill, because Carthage's Hamilcar had arrived from Africa with a substantial fleet and army. He had sailed with 130 triremes that had 14,200 soldiers aboard. This indicates that most of his galleys must have been configured as troop-carriers, replacing two banks of oarsmen with passengers to allow for 120 of the latter. The remaining vessels (less than 20) acted as escorts with a full complement of rowers and only 40 marines aboard. Per Diodorus (19.106.2), his troops included 2,000 citizens, 10,000 Liby-Phoenician perioeci, 1,000 hired Greeks and 200 Etrurians - all of these using hoplite-style gear. He also had 1,000 expert slingers from the Balearic Islands to add to whatever light infantry he could g
ather once ashore. However, a storm had struck his heavily loaded fleet in route. This cost him 60 of the triremes and about half of his heavy infantry as well as 200 supply ships. Finally getting his battered armada to Sicily, he was able to restore his strength with local garrison troops, mercenaries and Sicilian allies so as to still deploy 40,000 foot soldiers and nearly 5,000 mounted men (Diodorus 19.106.5). Agathocles camped near Ecnomus Hill across the Himeras River (which was a saline estuary here) and a stand-off began with neither army willing to attack through the water. They settled instead for small raids and one of these forays then triggered a grand battle.
A contingent of Greeks crossed the Himeras and began to drive off cattle found outside the enemy fortifications. Seeing this, some of the Carthaginians came out to give chase, following the fleeing raiders over the river only to be ambushed on the far side by a picked team of Agathocles' mercenaries. The tyrant was ready to exploit this developing situation and, as the ambushers pursued their beaten foes, he brought his whole army behind them with the intent of taking the barbarians unprepared. Leading with a column of heavy infantry (perhaps 12,000 hoplites arrayed nearly 50-deep across 250m), he filled in an outer moat and pushed down the palisade beyond to gain access to the camp interior. Inside, he came up against only that part of the enemy force which could be accommodated within this single facility. We might suspect something like 4,000-7,000 heavy-armed men (the original garrison plus Hamilcar and 1,000 or so citizen soldiers from his fleet). Thrown into confusion by this sudden assault, the Carthaginians had no chance to get into a proper formation and could only fight like a mob.
The ensuing action was chaotic, swaying back and forth around the moat and point of penetration just inside the palisade. Had Agathocles gained such favorable circumstances on open ground, he would surely have notched a quick triumph; but with both sides packed into so small an area, the contest was slow and bloody going. Still, the better-ordered Greeks were making steady progress as they shoved from behind and speared ahead to force themselves ever farther within the camp perimeter. At this point, Hamilcar, who had his 1,000 Balearic slingers with him, brought those deadly missilemen into play. Able to fire from higher ground at the center of the hilltop camp, they wrought havoc among extremely long Greek files that made easy targets. Their shower of projectiles "wounded many and even killed a few," hitting with such force that "they shattered the defensive armor of most of them" (Diodorus 19.109.2). Taking fearsome damage, those in the Greek rear began to pull away, bringing their fore-rankers with them as Agathocles' array withdrew from the palisade breach. Yet his men remained game and came back to threaten the fortifications at several points. Just then, though, reinforcements arrived to rescue Hamilcar. These were Liby-Phoenician spearmen backed by allied Sicilian cavalry (each contingent around 5,000 strong), who hit the Greeks at flank and rear. (Diodorus improbably described the new arrivals as troops that had come over "from Libya ... by water" at just this key moment. However, these must have been the Libyans already on hand, marching to the sound of battle from nearby in company with the local cavalry.)
Under attack from all sides, the Greeks were routed and ran for their lives, but the level nature of the ground allowed Hamilcar's horsemen to ride down and savage them for a long distance. Just as bad, the fleeing men suffered dreadfully from thirst after their long and heated battle and many in desperation drank salty water from the Himeras as they tried to get away. The result was that just as many died from dehydration as fell to weapons in the pursuit. At day's end, 7,000 of Agathocles men (nearly 60 percent) lay dead on the field (Diodorus 19.109.5) while Carthage lost only 500 (7-12.5 percent of the heavy footmen upon Ecnomus). All the same, though much smaller than those of Agathocles, the African losses were high for a victor in this era, suggesting just how close the Greeks had come to success before Hamilcar's reinforcements turned the fight around.
Agathocles shut himself inside Gela. Then, when Hamilcar gave up on a siege, escaped with what was left of his army to Syracuse. All had gone wrong for the tyrant so far, but he now came up with a bold plan to salvage his cause: he would leave an adequate force with his brother Antander to defend Syracuse while he invaded Africa toward drawing the Carthaginians out of Sicily.
White Tunis I (310 B.c.) and Anapus Valley and White Tunis II (309 B.c.)
Agathocles used the arrival of some cargo vessels as a diversion and broke for the open sea with 60 triremes loaded with fighting men for the assault on Carthage. Aided by the fall of night and an eclipse the next day (August 15, 310), he raced around the upper shore of Sicily to then head for North Africa. The enemy galleys followed the entire way in a close chase, but Agathocles and his entire flotilla managed to make it onto the beach at Cape Bon (the tip of the peninsula containing Carthage) just as their pursuers pulled within bowshot. (The Greek tyrant clearly hadn't set up his triremes as troop-carriers with only one bank of oars, since he never could have won the long race had his rowers been at less than full strength.) Once on dry land, Agathocles burned his ships. This had two functions. First, as a purely practical matter, he didn't have enough men to guard a grounded fleet and carry out offensive operations at the same time. Second, by destroying their sole means of escape, he was stoking his men's enthusiasm to fight. Victory was now their only way home.
At about 240 per ship, Agathocles' triremes had carried around 14,400 passengers, sailors and oarsmen. In light of the scope of his campaign, he must have used mostly combatants for the latter in order to boost his military manpower. Still, his strength was low for so grand a project. Among Agathocles' troops, Diodorus (20.11.5) listed 5,500 hired spearmen (including 2,500 under his son Agatharchus), 3,500 Syracusan militiamen, 3,000 non-Greeks (Etruscans, Samnites and Celts, perhaps 1,000 each) and a personal bodyguard of 1,000 hoplites (picked mercenaries). All of these were heavier, shielded infantry for his main line of battle. He also had 500 archers and slingers as well as 900 unarmed crewmen. He outfitted the last with shield covers stretched over sticks, which gave the appearance of being aspides so that the enemy might at a distance mistake them for hoplites.
Agathocles led his troops inland and took the Carthaginian city of Megalopolis. He then captured White Tunis (probably near the modern city of Tunis) and set up camp in the open nearby. The ruling council at Carthage appointed the fierce political foes Hanno and Bormilcar to lead a response that Diodorus put at 40,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry and 2,000 chariots (20.10.5). Justin (22.6.5) claimed they had only 30,000 men, yet this might have been solely the heavy infantry (ten 3,000-man divisions) with an additional 10,000 light-armed troops making up Diodorus' number. However, while 1,000 in cavalry seems reasonable, 2,000 chariots do not. We might suspect an inflation here of times ten the actual count of these four-horse, three-man vehicles.
The Carthaginians advanced on Agathocles, who set up in a narrow place where he could prevent overlap by the opposing infantry line as well as preclude mounted flank attack. This might have let him file at eight or more shields across a front of 1.5km while placing his missilemen on the rough ground off either flank as a further hedge against envelopment. His formation had the mercenary spearmen under his son on the right, the Syracusans at center and the non-Greeks rearward on the left behind the dictator and his elite bodyguard, who held the foremost ranks on that wing. Hanno had the chief command on the other side and appears to have been confident (due to his edge in numbers) and accepted the unfavorable setting. With Bormilcar in charge of the left wing and taking the right himself, he "made his phalanx deep since the terrain prevented him from extending it on a broader front" (Diodorus 20.10.6). At 1.5km in width, his heavy array would have been twice normal depth with 20-man files. Hanno initially had his chariots and cavalry out front, but these, having charged in turn, retired with their supporting light footmen after proving both ineffective against the well-anchored Greeks and vulnerable to bow and sling fire. Hanno's formation then advanced against the opposing heavy front to initiate a brutal shock fight.
The battle was a long one in which the Carthaginians' greater depth didn't add enough advantage to push through the stubborn Greeks. Hanno, who was fighting at the fore on his right with the crack spearmen of the 3,000-man Sacred Band, was repeatedly wounded and, utterly played out, fell dead. Morale was an important factor in such an even melee and Hanno's loss began to swing it in favor of Agathocles and his select hoplites. Still, the Sacred Band kept on battling. However, on the other end of the field, Bormilcar decided to withdraw to high ground. Diodorus suggested that this had political motivations, with Bormilcar hoping to become tyrant by blaming his fallen rival for a defeat. Yet it might merely have been a case of frustration with having to fight in a disadvantaged venue, since Hanno had indeed been foolish to engage in such a tight place. Bormilcar therefore might have pulled out toward seeking a decision another time on fairer ground. Whatever the reason, the Carthaginian ordered the men on his wing to move back; however, trying to do this from the front with what seems to have been poorly drilled troops was a grave error and those at the back of his files panicked in the mistaken belief that their front-fighters had met defeat. This turned an orderly retreat into something more resembling a rout. Over on the Carthaginian right, the Sacred Band had been holding up well, but now had to give way as those beside them fled to expose that flank. Agathocles pursued only a short distance, no doubt wary of the enemy's still intact horsemen, whom he could not match.
Greek and Macedonian Land Battles of the 4th Century BC Page 39
