by Harsh V Pant
Disarmament and Arms Control
The major issue in arms control which has had huge consequences on India’s nuclear policy is its attitude to the CTBT and the FMCT. As we have seen in the previous chapters, just like the non-proliferation regime, India’s relationship with these arms control measures has a highly chequered history. However, the nuclear weapons tests of 1998 paved the way for a qualitative shift in India’s posture on both of these arms control measures. Soon after, India declared a unilateral moratorium on further nuclear testing. India also showed certain accommodation towards the CTBT. A number of reasons explained this shift. First, India had achieved its primary security interests by exploding a series of nuclear devices. Second, a positive approach towards CTBT could also help New Delhi end its diplomatic isolation in international community. Third, there was also enormous pressure from the US for India to sign the treaty. All these factors contributed to the change in policy insofar that India now intends to wait and watch the global developments on arms control rather than actively scuttle them. Yet, this wait and watch policy is also informed by some debates within over the merits and demerits of agreeing to treaties like the CTBT and FMCT. The most significant domestic opposition to the CTBT emanates out of the controversy regarding the yield of the 1998 test. In recent years, doubts around the 1998 nuclear tests have been rekindled by testimonies of some senior nuclear scientists. In August 2009, K. Santhanam, project director of the 1998 tests, publicly declared that the thermonuclear device was a ‘fizzle’, or that it had unexpectedly underperformed compared to its planned yield. If in future India decides to set limits to its nuclear programme, warhead yields would be the first major determinant. Second, new delivery systems such as the sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) would require further miniaturization of nuclear warheads. Lastly, the confidence of the military in India’s warhead capabilities would be equally consequential, which some have argued has been rather low. All these reasons have resulted in certain internal opposition to the CTBT.
As has been the case with the CTBT, India’s position on the FMCT, in the post-1998 period, has seen a positive change. After the 1998 nuclear tests, the Vajpayee government indicated its willingness to negotiate an early conclusion of the FMCT (Talbott 2004). In 1999, India also dropped its reservation on effective, multilateral, and intrusive verification mechanism under the FMCT, which it had earlier insisted upon. Therefore, by the end of 2000, India’s position on the FMCT was aligned with that of the US and other nuclear weapon states. These changes were also evident during the negotiations on Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement. As a quid pro quo to the easing of US restrictions on nuclear trade, India committed itself on ‘working with the United States for the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty’ (MEA 2005). However, unlike other P-5 countries11 with the exception of China, India had declined to observe a unilateral moratorium on further production of fissile material. Such changes in attitude notwithstanding, the critical factor in India’s future policy on the FMCT would be defined by its deterrence requirements: how much fissile material would be needed to assure a credible deterrent posture? While some minimalists in India’s strategic community have argued for a total of around 100 nuclear warheads as providing India with sufficient capability, some maximalists have argued for a force strength of over 400 weapons.
Therefore, India’s national security interests will dictate its eventual decision on arms control issues such as the CTBT and the FMCT. These trends will continue until there is a larger movement towards nuclear disarmament globally. Under the current geopolitical scenario, where major nuclear powers such as the US, Russia, and China are laying more emphasis on their nuclear arsenals, any movement towards disarmament is hard to imagine. Lack of any major disarmament initiative on India’s part also signifies that its position on disarmament and arms control has come much closer to those of other nuclear weapon states.
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India’s nuclear policy has been driven by its quest for both security and status. The fear of China, and more so Pakistan, pushed India to cross the nuclear rubicon. Its interest in emerging as a major global power has always been a factor in its nuclear diplomacy: it first championed the cause of nuclear disarmament and having gone nuclear, today professes allegiance to the same global nuclear order it once called described as akin to ‘nuclear apartheid’. Consideration of prestige, on the other hand, did not allow India to accept the status of an NNWS and to submit to pressures and sanctions imposed by world’s nuclear elites. Today, it aspires for complete accommodation in the global nuclear order. Security and status will continue to guide India’s nuclear policy in future.
Pakistan and China will remain the two most important challenges to India’s nuclear policy, especially as they represent two distinct kinds of nuclear threats. With China, India does not face a risk-prone nuclear power, but the gap in capabilities must be reduced. For this, India would need to fully operationalize its intercontinental ballistic missiles and the SSBNs. Deterrence parity with China will help achieve stable deterrence. However, India would also need to beef up its conventional military power. Huge asymmetries in conventional forces would increase the pressure upon New Delhi to resort to nuclear first use. If India wants to maintain the present distinction between its conventional and nuclear strategy, this is a must. With Pakistan, India possesses an adequate nuclear deterrence capability. However, the problem exists in deterring Pakistan from its sub-conventional pinpricking. The Indian decision-makers and strategists have struggled to find an answer to this problem. How India responds to this unique nuclear challenge is only a matter of conjunction but it will continue to be a key factor in India’s strategic thinking.
India’s interests will also make it behave more and more as a ‘normal’ nuclear power. The revisionist agenda of its nuclear policies during the Cold War reflected its self-interests. Its post-1998 nuclear agenda reflects its comfort with the existing status quo. Non-proliferation has become a major policy objective and India has been underscoring its responsible credentials in curbing proliferation. Having gatecrashed into the club of nuclear elites, it now wants to maintain the exclusivity of the privilege and power associated with nuclear weapons. The agenda of disarmament has receded to the background, even though India may periodically trumpet its inclination for complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Its national security interests have overpowered its past moralistic approach to the problems accompanying nuclear weapons.
Finally, nuclear issue has been a major factor in India’s quest for a great power status from the very beginning. Nehru not only saw in the atom a symbol of modernity and technological progress but also understood the power which nuclear weapons bestowed upon their possessors. As nuclear weapons became central to great power identity during the Cold War, India refused to let go its strategic autonomy to possess nuclear weapons and to be counted as a great power. It is not a mere coincidence that India’s rise in the global order in the last two decades coincided with its rise as a nuclear weapons power. In the atomic age, nuclear weapons have been the prime symbol of status and India’s ambitions on the global stage require no less. This also means that India will not adopt unilateral measures to cut down on its nuclear profile until and unless there is larger trend towards delegitimization of nuclear weapons worldwide. They will continue to remain central to its identity as a major power and to its quest for emerging as a great power.
1 For perceptive discussions of 2001 Parliament attacks and India’s military response, see Sood and Shawney (2003).
2 A good discussion and analysis of the concept and practice of Cold Start can be found in Ladwig (2008).
3 A good summary of Pakistani nuclear posture is available in Karl (2015).
4 For a perceptive discussion on changing Chinese strategic profile, see Riqiang (2013).
5 Small (2015) provides a good discussion of Sino-Pak military and strategic alliance.
6 For an extensive discussion on India�
�s changing nuclear profile in the last two decades, see Joshi et al. (2016).
7 An SSBN is a nuclear-powered submarine capable of launching ballistic missiles armed with nuclear weapons. An SSN, on the other hand, is propelled by nuclear power but is armed with conventional weapons and is generally known as an attack nuclear submarine.
8 For a discussion on the impact of an SSBN on India’s nuclear capability and its strategic environment, see Joshi and O’Donnell (2014).
9 Interview with a former director of the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) project in New Delhi, 25 March 2015.
10 For a discussion of the evolving command and control structures, see Koithara (2012).
11 P-5 refers to the UN Security Council’s five permanent members, namely, China, France, Russia, the UK, and the US.
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