by Bryn Hammond
Northwood’s response was immediate – he knew it had to be. He ordered his company to turn to their flank and made ready to make a bayonet charge:
There’s no chance to take up a firing position. We could see men coming forward where this gun was obviously taking up firing positions to protect the gun, so we had to act more quickly than they were acting. So I got I’d say two platoons on a fairly good line, and the other one – 8 platoon – hadn’t much further to come round and I thought ‘I can’t wait for them to come round’. So, I thought ‘Better go in now with the bayonet’.64
Northwood’s rationale relied on the bayonet charge’s threat to morale more than its reality:
You know that if they’re in a position to run, they will. They won’t face you. Moonlight night. Moon glinting on bayonets and they know you’re charging with the bayonet and it would be a very powerful man – a person dug in in a gun position would stay there and fight but a man who’s a rifleman won’t – they’ll get up and run. Or they’ll stay with their hands up.65
His choice made, it was time for action:
I said ‘Right. Into them!’ It’s really hard to lead a bayonet charge from fellers lying on the ground. For a moment I’m the only one up. I really thought, ‘One Man Bayonet Charge’. You get that horrible feeling ‘I’m the only one. Oh, where are they?!’ I was shouting like a madman. And you shout all sorts of things. Obscenities. ‘Get the bastards,’ you say. Because you’ve got to get yourself into a state of frenzy because you can’t attack a man with a bayonet or group of them. All of a sudden I heard this noise behind me and I got the fright of my life! My hair started to stand up on the back of my neck. It’s the most frightening thing. To be in a bayonet attack and everyone else is shouting. Mind, it’s an awful noise you can make when you’re in fear – that you’re on the top of the ground and you think someone’s going to shoot you.66
His personal charge was soon brought to a halt:
Anyway, I’d only gone about 15 or 20 paces, I suppose. And first of all I got a bullet through my steel helmet. I threw my head back and then in this position I felt a cut through the top of my arm, and then WHAM! It was a compound fracture of the arm. It was four shots. A bullet went through just above my forehead and out the top. It cut my scalp – I had a big scar on my scalp for quite some time. The other one – a little bit of metal lodged in the back of my neck. I very nearly lost the arm. It was just like a kick from a horse. I have been kicked by a horse and it was ooh! The one on my helmet threw my head back and I felt stinging pain with the other two but this one, because it hit the bone, just threw me round. I was out of control – just went round and round. My rifle and bayonet flew out of my hands and I was just like a crazy thing. I just pitched to the ground… Somebody shouted out: ‘The Skipper’s been hit’ and I called back ‘I’m all right!’ because it’s fatal if someone stops so I said ‘I’m all right’. So they went on.67
Northwood, though badly wounded, lingered with the front-line troops long enough to ensure the ridge was taken before making his way back to the rear on foot.
I thought: ‘I am worried now why the vehicles are not getting through’. I waited there for a while. No ambulance came up and I said ‘I’m going back to find out why the vehicles aren’t coming through.’ Our supply vehicles. Ammunition and all the company vehicles. Bringing forward ammunition, extra weapons, anti-tank guns. One anti-tank portee came through – I saw that and I thought, ‘No, we’ve got more than that.’ We had anti-tank guns coming in to help us if we had trouble in the morning.68
One vehicle was hit and set alight and before long, the whole ridge was lit up with burning vehicles as the fires drew more fire from the 88mm guns. Alan Potter described the position:
With first light came the first German attack. They came in on armoured vehicles, which swung round and disgorged the contents – the German infantry – who advanced on us. And because at this time we had enough ammunition, we were able to repel two, perhaps three attacks. And we were pretty confident of holding our position. But the shortage of ammunition was becoming something of a problem.69
Short of ammunition and expecting armoured support, the situation seemed desperate but the arrival of tanks seemed to suggest relief. One officer raced out in a car to guide the tanks in, only to be blown up by what turned out to be German armour. From their sangars and shallow scrapes in the poor ground of the ridge, the men were rounded up. Corporal Ray Middleton was one of them:
The tanks that came through, unfortunately, had black crosses on. So, we were rounded up by a batch of 20 or 30 tanks. They cut us off. Our anti-tank guns were wiped out.
I said ‘Stick your head out, Jack, and tell me if it’s clear.’ He stood up and Jack never swore much and he said ‘Christ! Corp!’ ‘What is it, Jack?’ And so I climbed out and stood up. We’d had to remove our equipment and rifles to get into this little sangar and there was a German half-track a few yards from me, in front of me, and a German standing up on it with a machine-gun aimed at me and a 2-pounder gun aimed at me. And all he said was ‘Come on out, Aussie’. And I didn’t have a darned thing except a rifle down there. So I came on out. One or two of the men bending down to pick up equipment got shot at so I’m glad I didn’t bend down. We just left everything behind. The food we had. Even our change of socks – I’d taken to filling my clutches with spare socks and chocolate and things of use and I had to leave it all behind.70
The 2/28th, without support from 50th RTR, which had been unable to get through, were rounded up as POWs. But disasters occurred elsewhere in the attack too.
The plan had called for 69th Brigade to pass through the ‘South African’ gap and clear any further minefield gaps beyond to allow 2nd Armoured Brigade’s advance. But there was confusion over the work completed and once more the armoured advance was delayed. Such delays in operations at night when only a limited period of covering darkness was available would always prejudice operations of this type. The consequences were great on this occasion as both 6th Durham Light Infantry and 5th East Yorkshire Battalions were cut off and overrun by a counter-attack.
Auchinleck’s last attempt at a major operation in July 1942 had ended in ignominious failure. Whilst operations in the first half of the month had shown his and Dorman-Smith’s sure command of the situation and Auchinleck’s intelligent analytical mind backed by good intelligence information received via Ultra and the Y Service, operations in the second half of the month (with one or two notable exceptions) had been rushed, increasingly desperate in their intentions and badly executed by his subordinates – especially his corps commanders. Most noticeable was the poor co-operation between tanks and infantry on which all the operations of late July depended. Only in defence had Eighth Army demonstrated its abilities and effectiveness to advantage – circumstances unlikely to win over Churchill. The victor of the ‘Defence of Egypt’ stood, perhaps unknowingly, on the edge of the abyss with his political masters considering whether they should force him to jump. However, it remained to be seen how his military superior, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, would react with better understanding of the realities of military command.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE LITTLE MAN WITH WHITE KNOBBLY KNEES
The right opportunity for the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) arrived on the evening of 15 July in the garden of 10 Downing Street. It was a lovely evening and Alan Brooke found the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, in a pleasant mood. Choosing his moment carefully, Brooke asked Churchill for permission to visit the Middle East as soon as possible to ascertain for himself how matters stood with Eighth Army.
I knew that the odds would be heavily against getting his sanction; that he would say he could not spare me, whilst in the back of his mind the real reason would be that he would hate me to go off on my own without him. Meanwhile the situation in the Middle East was not improving; the Auk was suggesting giving the Eighth Army to Corbett. It was essential that I should go out to see for myself wha
t was really wrong, and for that job I did not want Winston treading on my heels!1
Surprisingly, Churchill acceded to the request but Brooke was still wary that ‘there was always the danger of Winston changing his mind or deciding to come with me’.
It was natural that Brooke should wish to visit Britain’s main theatre of land operations in mid-1942. Victory there had been a cornerstone of his strategy since he had become CIGS and with agreement over Anglo-American strategy being forged in July that included commitment to joint military landings in French North Africa, Brooke was more keenly aware than ever of the need not just to hold, but to defeat, the Axis forces attacking in Egypt:2
From the moment I took over the job of CIGS I was convinced that the sequence of events should be: a) liberate North Africa; b) open up Mediterranean and score a million tons of shipping; c) threaten Southern Europe by eliminating Italy; d) then, and only then, if Russia is still holding, liberate France and invade Germany.3
His anxiety about North Africa may have been increased the following day when he had dinner with Neil Ritchie, who had returned to Britain after his dismissal from command of Eighth Army. Perhaps as a consequence, Brooke wrote a long letter to Auchinleck on 17 July offering sympathy, support, advice and information. The sympathy and practical support came first:
You have constantly been in my thoughts since Rommel started his attacks, and I have so well realized the difficult and anxious times that you have been through. I only wish that it was possible to do more to help you from this distance. It is such a joy to see you gradually regaining the mastery over the enemy. I do hope that this heavier equipment in the shape of 6-pounder tanks, and the latest American tanks, will arrive soon enough to provide the additional striking power you require.4
This was followed by advice concerning Churchill’s character:
It is his confidence that is the important factor. You know how temperamental he is apt to be at times, so I hope you do not attach too much importance if occasionally his telegrams are not quite as friendly as they might be. I can assure you that I do all that is within my power to guard you against unnecessary repercussions from outside, and to let you carry on with the least possible interference.5
Both Brooke and Auchinleck knew that the latter’s responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C), Middle East extended far beyond the ‘western front’ of Egypt and Libya and much of the letter concerned the provision of adequate numbers of divisions to cover any collapse by the Russians in the Caucasus. Brooke ended with a hint regarding his plan to visit Auchinleck at the earliest opportunity.
His letter, which reached the C-in-C on 23 July, elicited an extensive reply on 25 July which demonstrated Auchinleck’s unfortunate tendency to report honestly on the state of affairs in his command. Such correspondence was not private – Auchinleck undoubtedly knew it would be referred to by Brooke when asked by Churchill about the Middle East situation. Instead of comprising platitudinous statements designed to mollify the Prime Minister, however, the letter was full of hopes and disappointments rather than confident statements of how victory would be achieved, and quickly, as Churchill wished:
I was disappointed when our big effort of July 21–22 came to nothing, as I had great hopes of it. I still do not know the full story of the battle in the centre, but it does seem as if the 23rd Armoured Brigade, though gallant enough, lost control and missed direction. The infantry, too, seem to have made some avoidable mistakes. Perhaps I asked too much of them, but one can only plan on the information available. Well, there it is; we undoubtedly gave the enemy a rude shock, judging from the many intercepted messages from various enemy units, but we failed to get our object, which was to break through.6
He continued in the same vein. He was ‘not too hopeful’ about the possibility of getting around his opponents’ southern flank. He was grateful for the support of Brooke and Churchill, doing his utmost to repay their faith in him and remove the threat to Egypt but ‘I do not want to hold out hopes of an early decision’. Perhaps most damaging to himself were the details he provided concerning his contingency plans for the defence of Egypt which began ‘We may yet have to face a withdrawal from our present forward positions, but I hope this will not be necessary’.7
The factual content of this letter was not at issue; the problem was the manner in which Auchinleck explained his extensive preparations and understated how Eighth Army under his command had defeated the Axis forces during First Alamein. It was probably receipt of this letter late on 28 July or early the next morning, together with news of the failure of Operation Manhood, that prompted frustration on Brooke’s part, expressed in his diary:
PM in very depressed mood as result of Auk’s second attack being repulsed. Pouring out questions as to why Auk could not have done this or that and never giving him the least credit for doing the right thing. He is quite heart-breaking to work for. It is very trying having to fight battles to defend the Auk, when I am myself doubtful at times why on earth he does not act differently.8
Churchill, meanwhile, had had enough. It was time for him to step in to galvanize Middle East Command.9 An invitation to visit Russia from Stalin sent via the British Ambassador in Moscow provided the opportunity. Brooke had feared the possibility, but was still caught by surprise:
29 July. At 6.30 pm PM sent for me to 10 Downing Street where I spent an hour with him in the garden discussing the points he wishes me to look to whilst in the Middle East, Persia, Iraq, India etc. He is evidently very intent on following along close behind me if possible and wishes me to report what journey is like.
30 July. A short COS* at which Portal broke the news that Winston had decided to follow me at once to the Middle East! I was sent for by him at 12 noon and told that after I left him yesterday he decided at dinner that he would fly out on Friday! He called War Cabinet meeting immediately after dinner and obtained their approval. Since then wire from Ambassador in Moscow had been received suggesting visit from Winston to Stalin was advisable! He was therefore contemplating going on to Russia and wanted me to go with him!! All my plans upset.10
It was decided, therefore, that Brooke would travel out via Gibraltar and Malta, where he was anxious to visit the Governor, General the Viscount Gort, whilst Churchill would follow the day after, but arrive on the same day. Churchill’s frequent expressions of impatience with Auchinleck had finally culminated in action.
Focusing solely on the negative tone of Auchinleck’s letter to Brooke of 25 July ignores a great deal of other information it contained concerning developments in Eighth Army and Middle East Command at this time. Firstly, concerning Panzerarmee tactics, he wrote:
The enemy has now got his German infantry, irrespective of what formation or unit they belong to, sandwiched in between the remnants of his Italian divisions along the whole front, so that we can no longer fall on Italians and put them in the bag as easily as we did at first. I feel that owing to the great length of front he is holding the enemy can not have much depth to his position, except in the centre, where he holds his German armour in reserve.11
This policy became known as ‘corseting’ – a term devised at this time by a brilliant young Captain ‘Bill’ Williams of the staff of the Director of Military Intelligence, Brigadier Freddie de Guingand.12 Recognition of its existence was to prove important for later operations.
Auchinleck was also at pains to mention the important changes in Eighth Army’s artillery tactics organized by his Brigadier-General Royal Artillery (BGRA), Brigadier Noel Martin:
The troops have recovered themselves wonderfully, I think, and have acquired a new tactical technique, based really on the proper use of artillery and the retention of mobility, remarkably quickly. They have still a great deal to learn of course, but the gunners have been very good indeed, and the Boche does not like our shell-fire at all, now that it is centrally controlled and directed.13
Auchinleck’s correspondence with Brooke also contained several references to his subordinate comman
ders. He singled out Lieutenant-General Tom Corbett, his Chief of General Staff (CGS) in Cairo, for particular praise for the support he continued to give, without which Auchinleck would not have been able to function in his dual role. He suggested Lieutenant-General William ‘Strafer’ Gott as a possible future army commander – perhaps replacing General Sir Maitland ‘Jumbo’ Wilson, Ninth Army’s commander.
He also indicated one important change that he had decided was necessary. This was the replacement of Brigadier John ‘Jock’ Whiteley as Brigadier General Staff (BGS) of Eighth Army with de Guingand. Whiteley, in Auchinleck’s view, was not cut out for staff work in a field formation but would be worth promoting to a senior staff job at a General Headquarters. These changes give the lie to the suggestion that Auchinleck was a poor judge of men, as both had very successful wartime careers.14
Auchinleck’s letter did not detail other changes he was planning. On 29 July, he met Major-General Richard McCreery, his adviser as C-in-C on armour, and Major-General John Harding, the Director of Military Training, to discuss a reorganization of British armour. His intention was ‘To find the correct organization for the fighting troops to enable them to defeat the enemy under the peculiar conditions of mechanised war in the desert’. In an official dispatch, he noted that:
At the conclusion of the Eighth Army’s offensive in Cyrenaica it was plain to me that our existing divisional and brigade organisation did not allow of that very close co-operation on the battlefield between the armoured corps, the artillery and the infantry which was to my mind essential to success. The Germans had reached a very high standard of co-operation between the three arms and I felt that we must try at least to equal and, if possible, surpass them. There was no doubt, too, that as a result of the recent fighting an impression had been created in the minds of some junior leaders and soldiers, other than those of the Royal Armoured Corps, that our armour had not altogether pulled its weight in the battle. It was very necessary to eradicate any such feeling, and I felt that the best way to do this was to associate the three arms more closely at all times and in all places.15
