by Polybius
14. For as in this instance, under the influence of Aratus, Philip refrained from actually breaking faith with the Messenians in regard to the citadel; and thus, to use a common expression, poured a little balm into the wide wound which his slaughters had caused: so in the Aetolian war, when under the influence of Demetrius, he sinned against the gods by destroying the objects consecrated to them, and against man by transgressing the laws of war; and entirely deserted his original principles, by showing himself an implacable and bitter foe to all who opposed him. The same remark applies to the Cretan business. As long as he employed Aratus as his chief director, not only without doing injustice to a single islander, but without even causing them any vexation, he kept the whole Cretan people under control; and led all the Greeks to regard him with favour, owing to the greatness of character which he displayed. So again, when under the guidance of Demetrius, he became the cause of the misfortunes I have described to the Messenians, he at once lost the goodwill of the allies and his credit with the rest of Greece. Such a decisive influence for good or evil in the security of their government has the choice by youthful sovereigns of the friends who are to surround them; though it is a subject on which by some unaccountable carelessness they take not the smallest care....
THE WAR OF ANTIOCHUS WITH ACHAEUS (See 5, 107)
15. Round Sardis ceaseless and protracted skirmishes were taking place and fighting by night and day, both armies inventing every possible kind of plot and counterplot against each other: to describe which in detail would be as useless as it would be in the last degree wearisome. At last, when the siege had already entered upon its second year, Lagoras the Cretan came forward. He had had a considerable experience in war, and had learnt that as a rule cities fall into the hands of their enemies most easily from some neglect on the part of their inhabitants, when, trusting to the natural or artificial strength of their defences, they neglect to keep proper guard and become thoroughly careless. He had observed too, that in such fortified cities captures were effected at the points of greatest strength, which were believed to have been despaired of by the enemy. So in the present instance, when he saw that the prevailing notion of the strength of Sardis caused the whole army to despair of taking it by storm, and to believe that the one hope of getting it was by starving it out, he gave all the closer attention to the subject; and eagerly scanned every possible method of making an attempt to capture the town. Having observed therefore that a portion of the wall was unguarded, near a place called the Saw, which unites the citadel and city, he conceived the hope and idea of performing this exploit. He had discovered the carelessness of the men guarding this wall from the following circumstance. The place was extremely precipitous: and there was a deep gully below, into which dead bodies from the city, and the offal of horses and beasts of burden that died, were accustomed to be thrown; and in this place therefore there was always a great number of vultures and other birds collected. Having observed, then, that when these creatures were gorged, they always sat undisturbed upon the cliffs and the wall, he concluded that the wall must necessarily be left unguarded and deserted for the larger part of the day. Accordingly, under cover of night, he went to the spot and carefully examined the possibilities of approaching it and setting ladders; and finding that this was possible at one particular rock, he communicated the facts to the king.
16. Antiochus encouraged the attempt and urged Lagoras to carry it out. The latter promised to do his best, and desired the king to join with him Theodotus the Aetolian, and Dionysius the commander of his bodyguard, with orders to devote them to assist him in carrying out the intended enterprise. The king at once granted his request, and these officers agreed to undertake it: and having held a consultation on the whole subject, they waited for a night on which there should be no moon just before daybreak. Such a night having arrived, on the day on which they intended to act, an hour before sunset, they selected from the whole army fifteen of the strongest and most courageous men to carry the ladders, and also to mount with them and share in the daring attempt. After these they selected thirty others, to remain in reserve at a certain distance; that, as soon as they had themselves climbed over the walls, and come to the nearest gate, the thirty might come up to it from the outside and try to knock off the hinges and fastenings, while they on the inside cut the cross bar and bolt pins. They also selected two thousand men to follow behind the thirty, who were to rush into the town with them and seize the area of the theatre, which was a favourable position to hold against those on the citadel, as well as those in the town. To prevent suspicion of the truth getting about, owing to the picking out of the men, the king gave out that the Aetolians were about to throw themselves into the town through a certain gully, and that it was necessary, in view of that information, to take energetic measures to prevent them.
17. When Lagoras and his party had made all their preparations, as soon as the moon set, they came stealthily to the foot of the cliffs with their scaling ladders, and ensconced themselves under a certain overhanging rock. When day broke, and the picket as usual broke up from that spot; and the king in the ordinary way told off some men to take their usual posts, and led the main body on to the hippodrome and drew them up; at first no one suspected what was going on. But when two ladders were fixed, and Dionysius led the way up one, and Lagoras up the other, there was excitement and a stir throughout the camp. For while the climbing party were not visible to the people in the town, or to Achaeus in the citadel, because of the beetling brow of the rock, their bold and adventurous ascent was in full view of the camp; which accordingly was divided in feeling between astonishment at the strangeness of the spectacle, and a nervous horror of what was going to happen next, all standing dumb with exulting wonder. Observing the excitement in the camp, and wishing to divert the attention both of his own men and of those in the city from what was going on, the king ordered an advance; and delivered an attack upon the gates on the other side of the town, called the Persian gates. Seeing from the citadel the unwonted stir in the camp, Achaeus was for some time at a loss to know what to do, being puzzled to account for it, and quite unable to see what was taking place. However he despatched a force to oppose the enemy at the gate; whose assistance was slow in arriving, because they had to descend from the citadel by a narrow and precipitous path. But Aribazus, the commandant of the town, went unsuspiciously to the gates on which he saw Antiochus advancing; and caused some of his men to mount the wall, and sent others out through the gate, with orders to hinder the approaching enemies, and come to close quarters with them.
18. Meanwhile Lagoras, Theodotus, Dionysius, and their men had climbed the rocks and had arrived at the gate nearest them; and some of them were engaged in fighting the troops sent from the citadel to oppose them, while others were cutting through the bars; and at the same time the party outside told off for that service were doing the same. The gates having thus been quickly forced open, the two thousand entered and occupied the area round the theatre. On this all the men from the walls, and from the Persian gate, to which Aribazus had already led a relieving force, rushed in hot haste to pass the word to attack the enemy within the gates. The result was that, the gate having been opened as they retreated, some of the king’s army rushed in along with the retiring garrison; and, when they had thus taken possession of the gate, they were followed by an unbroken stream of their comrades; some of whom poured through the gate, while others employed themselves in bursting open other gates in the vicinity. Aribazus and all the men in the city, after a brief struggle against the enemy who had thus got within the walls, fled with all speed to the citadel. After that, Theodotus and Lagoras and their party remained on the ground near the theatre, determining with great good sense and soldier-like prudence to form a reserve until the whole operation was completed; while the main body rushed in on every side and occupied the town. And now by dint of some putting all they met to the sword, others setting fire to the houses, others devoting themselves to plunder and taking booty, the destr
uction and sacking of the town was completed. Thus did Antiochus become master of Sardis....
BOOK VIII
THE NECESSITY OF CAUTION IN DEALING WITH AN ENEMY
1. Tiberius a Roman Proconsul fell into an ambuscade, and, after offering with his attendants a gallant as he was advancing from Lucania to Capua, by the treachery of the Lucanian Flavius, B.C. 212. Livy, 25, 16.] resistance to the enemy, was killed.
Now in regard to such catastrophes, whether it is right to blame or pardon the sufferers is by no means a safe matter on which to pronounce an opinion; because it has happened to several men, who have been perfectly correct in all their actions, to fall into these misfortunes, equally with those who do not scruple to transgress principles of right confirmed by the consent of mankind. We should not however idly refrain from pronouncing an opinion: but should blame or condone this or that general, after a review of the necessities of the moment and the circumstances of the case. And my observation will be rendered evident by the following instances. Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, alarmed at the love of power which he observed in Cleomenes, fled from Sparta; but being not long afterwards persuaded to return, put himself in the power of the latter. The consequence was that he lost his kingdom and his life together, and left a character not to be defended before posterity on the score of prudence; for while affairs remained in the same state, and the ambition and power of Cleomenes remained in exactly the same position, how could he expect to meet any other fate than he did, if he put himself in the hands of the very men from whom he had before barely escaped destruction by flight? Again Pelopidas of Thebes, though acquainted with the unprincipled character of the tyrant Alexander, and though he knew thoroughly well that every tyrant regards the leaders of liberty as his bitterest enemies, first took upon himself to persuade Epaminondas to stand forth as the champion of democracy, not only in Thebes, but in all Greece also; and then, being in Thessaly in arms, for the express purpose of destroying the absolute rule of Alexander, he yet twice ventured to undertake a mission to him. The consequence was that he fell into the hands of his enemies, did great damage to Thebes, and ruined the reputation he had acquired before; and all by putting a rash and ill advised confidence in the very last person in whom he ought to have done so. Very similar to these cases is that of the Roman Consul Gnaeus Cornelius who fell in the Sicilian war by imprudently putting himself in the power of the enemy. And many parallel cases might be quoted.
2. The conclusion, then, is that those who put themselves in the power of the enemy from want of proper precaution deserve blame; but those who use every practicable precaution not so: for to trust absolutely no one is to make all action impossible; but reasonable action, taken after receiving adequate security, cannot be censured. Adequate securities are oaths, children, wives, and, strongest of all, a blameless past. To be betrayed and entrapped by such a security as any of these is a slur, not on the deceived, but on the deceiver. The first object then should be to seek such securities as it is impossible for the recipient of the confidence to evade; but since such are rare, the next best thing will be to take every reasonable precaution one’s self: and then, if we meet with any disaster, we shall at least be acquitted of wrong conduct by the lookers on. And this has been the case with many before now: of which the most conspicuous example, and the one nearest to the times on which we are engaged, will be the fate of Achaeus. He omitted no possible precaution for securing his safety, but thought of everything that it was possible for human ingenuity to conceive: and yet he fell into the power of his enemies. In this instance his misfortune procured the pity and pardon of the outside world for the victim, and nothing but disparagement and loathing for the successful perpetrators....
* * * * *
3. It appears to me not to be alien to my general purpose, and the plan which I originally laid down, to recall the attention of my readers to the magnitude of the events, and the persistency of purpose displayed by the two States of Rome and Carthage. For who could think it otherwise than remarkable that these two powers, while engaged in so serious a war for the possession of Italy, and one no less serious for that of Iberia; and being still both of them equally balanced between uncertain hopes and fears for the future of these wars, and confronted at the very time with battles equally formidable to either, should yet not be content with their existing undertakings: but should raise another controversy as to the possession of Sardinia and Sicily; and not content with merely hoping for all these things, should grasp at them with all the resources of their wealth and warlike forces? Indeed the more we examine into details the greater becomes our astonishment. The Romans had two complete armies under the two Consuls on active service in Italy; two in Iberia in which Gnaeus Cornelius commanded the land, Publius Cornelius the naval forces; and naturally the same was the case with the Carthaginians. But besides this, a Roman fleet was anchored off Greece, watching it and the movements of Philip, of which first Marcus Valerius, and afterward Publius Sulpicius was in command. Along with all these undertakings Appius with a hundred quinqueremes, and Marcus Claudius with an army, were threatening Sicily; while Hamilcar was doing the same on the side of the Carthaginians.
4. By means of these facts I presume that what I more than once asserted at the beginning of my work is now shown by actual experience to deserve unmixed credit. I mean my assertion, that it is impossible for historians of particular places to get a view of universal history. For how is it possible for a man who has only read a separate history of Sicilian or Spanish affairs to understand and grasp the greatness of the events? Or, what is still more important, in what manner and under what form of polity fortune brought to pass that most surprising of all revolutions that have happened in our time, I mean the reduction of all known parts of the world under one rule and governance, a thing unprecedented in the history of mankind. In what manner the Romans took Syracuse or Iberia may be possibly learned to a certain extent by means of such particular histories; but how they arrived at universal supremacy, and what opposition their grand designs met with in particular places, or what on the other hand contributed to their success, and at what epochs, this it is difficult to take in without the aid of universal history. Nor, again, is it easy to appreciate the greatness of their achievements except by the latter method. For the fact of the Romans having sought to gain Iberia, or at another time Sicily; or having gone on a campaign with military and naval forces, told by itself, would not be anything very wonderful. But if we learn that these were all done at once, and that many more undertakings were in course of accomplishment at the same time, — all at the cost of one government and commonwealth; and if we see what dangers and wars in their own territory were, at the very time, encumbering the men who had all these things on hand: thus, and only thus, will the astonishing nature of the events fully dawn upon us, and obtain the attention which they deserve. So much for those who suppose that by studying an episode they have become acquainted with universal history....
THE SIEGE OF SYRACUSE
Hieronymus succeeded his grandfather, Hiero, in B.C. 216, and was assassinated in Leontini thirteen months afterwards, in B.C. 215. His death, however, did not bring more peaceful relations between Syracuse and Rome, but only gave the Syracusans more able leaders (Livy, 24, 21). After the slaughter of Themistius and Andramodorus, who had been elected on the board of Generals, and the cruel murder of all the royal family, Epicydes and Hippocrates, — Syracusans by descent, but born and brought up at Carthage, and who had been sent to Syracuse on a special mission by Hannibal, — were elected into the vacant places in the board of Generals. They became the leading spirits in the Syracusan government, and for a time kept up an appearance of wishing to come to terms with Rome; and legates were actually sent to Marcellus, at Morgantia (near Catana). But when the Carthaginian fleet arrived at Pachynus, Hippocrates and Epicydes threw off their mask, and declared that the other magistrates were betraying the town to the Romans. This accusation was rendered more specious by the appearance of
Appius with a Roman fleet at the mouth of the harbour. A rush was made to the shore by the inhabitants to prevent the Romans landing; and the tumult was with difficulty composed by the wisdom of one of the magistrates, Apollonides, who persuaded the people to vote for the peace with Rome (B.C. 215. Livy, 24, 21-28). But Hippocrates and Epicydes determined not to acknowledge the peace: they therefore provoked the Romans by plundering in or near the Roman pale, and then took refuge in Leontini. Marcellus complained at Syracuse, but was told that Leontini was not within Syracusan jurisdiction. Marcellus, therefore, took Leontini. Hippocrates and Epicydes managed to escape, and by a mixture of force and fraud contrived soon afterwards to force their way into Syracuse, seize and put to death most of the generals, and induce the excited mob, whom they had inspired with the utmost dread of being betrayed to Rome, to elect them sole generals (Livy, 24, 29-32). The Romans at once ordered Syracuse to be besieged, giving out that they were coming not to wage war with the inhabitants, but to deliver them.
