by Polybius
4. The fight between the rest of the fleet, however, was an undecided one; for the superiority in the numbers of Philip’s galleys was compensated for by Attalus’s superiority in the number of his decked ships. Thus on the right wing of Philip’s fleet the state of things was that the ultimate result was doubtful, but that, of the two, Attalus had the better hope of victory. As for the Rhodians, they were, at first starting, as I have said, far behind the enemy, but being much their superiors in speed they managed to come up with the rear of the Macedonians. At first they charged the vessels on the stern as they were retiring, and broke off their oars; but upon Philip’s ships swinging round and beginning to bring help to those in danger, while those of the Rhodians who had started later than the rest reached the squadron of Theophiliscus, both parties turned their ships in line prow to prow and charged gallantly, inciting each other to fresh exertions by the sound of trumpets and loud cheers. Had not the Macedonians placed their galleys between the opposing lines of decked ships, the battle would have been quickly decided; but, as it was, these proved a hindrance to the Rhodians in various ways. For as soon as the first charge had disturbed the original order of the ships, they became all mixed up with each other in complete confusion, which made it difficult to sail through the enemy’s line or to avail themselves of the points in which they were superior, because the galleys kept running sometimes against the blades of their oars so as to hinder the rowing, and sometimes upon their prows, or again upon their sterns, thus hampering the service of steerers and rowers alike. In the direct charges, however, the Rhodians employed a particular manœuvre. By depressing their bows they received the blows of the enemy above the water-line, while by staving in the enemy’s ships below the water-line they rendered the blows fatal. Still it was rarely that they succeeded in doing this, for, as a rule, they avoided collisions, because the Macedonians fought gallantly from their decks when they came to close quarters. Their most frequent manœuvre was to row through the Macedonian line, and disable the enemy’s ships by breaking off their oars, and then, rowing round into position, again charge the enemy on the stern, or catch them broadside as they were in the act of turning; and thus they either stove them in or broke away some necessary part of their rigging. By this manner of fighting they destroyed a great number of the enemy’s ships.
5. But the most brilliant and hazardous exploits were those of three quinqueremes: the flagship on which Theophiliscus sailed, then that commanded by Philostratus, and lastly the one steered by Autolycus, and on board of which was Nicostratus. This last charged an enemy’s ship, and left its beak sticking in it. The ship thus struck sank with all hands; but Autolycus and his comrades, as the sea poured into his vessel through the prow, was surrounded by the enemy. For a time they defended themselves gallantly, but at last Autolycus himself was wounded, and fell overboard in his armour, while the rest of the marines were killed fighting bravely. While this was going on, Theophiliscus came to the rescue with three quinqueremes, and though he could not save the ship, because it was now full of water, he yet stove in three hostile vessels, and forced their marines overboard. Being quickly surrounded by a number of galleys and decked ships, he lost the greater number of his marines after a gallant struggle on their part; and after receiving three wounds himself, and performing prodigies of valour, just managed to get his own ship safely off with the assistance of Philostratus, who came to his aid and bravely took his share of the danger. Having thus rejoined his own squadron, he darted out once more and ran in upon the enemy, utterly prostrated in body by his wounds, but more dashing and vehement in spirit than before.
So that there were really two sea-fights going on at a considerable distance from each other. For the right wing of Philip’s fleet, continually making for land in accordance with his original plan, was not far from the Asiatic coast; while the left wing, having to veer round to support the ships on the rear, were engaged with the Rhodians at no great distance from Chios.
6. As the fleet of Attalus, however, was rapidly overpowering the right wing of Philip, and was now approaching the small islands, under cover of which Philip was moored watching the result of the battle, Attalus saw one of his quinqueremes staved in and in the act of being sunk by an enemy’s ship. He therefore hurried to its assistance with two quadriremes. The enemy’s ship turning to flight, and making for the shore, he pursued it somewhat too eagerly in his ardent desire to effect its capture. Thereupon Philip, observing that Attalus had become detached a considerable distance from his own fleet, took four quinqueremes and three hemioliae, as well as all the galleys within reach, and darting out got between Attalus and his ships, and forced him in the utmost terror to run his three ships ashore. After this mishap the king himself and his crew made their way to Erythrae, while Philip captured his vessels and the royal equipage on board them. For in this emergency Attalus had employed an artifice. He caused the most splendid articles of the royal equipage to be spread out on the deck of his ship; the consequence of which was that the first Macedonians who arrived on the galleys, seeing a quantity of flagons and purple robes and such like things, abandoned the pursuit, and turned their attention to plundering these. Thus it came about that Attalus got safe away to Erythrae; while Philip, though he had distinctly got the worst of it in the general engagement, was so elated at the unexpected reverse which had befallen Attalus, that he put to sea again and exerted himself strenuously in collecting his ships and restoring the spirits of his men by assuring them that they were the victors. For when they saw Philip put to sea towing off the royal ship, they very naturally thought that Attalus had perished. But Dionysodorus, conjecturing what had really happened to the king, set about collecting his own ships by raising a signal; and this being speedily done, he sailed away unmolested to their station in Asia. Meanwhile those Macedonians who were engaged with the Rhodians, having been for some time past in evil case, were gradually extricating themselves from the battle, one after the other retiring on the pretence of being anxious to support their comrades. So the Rhodians, taking in tow some of their vessels, and having destroyed others by charging them, sailed away to Chios.
7. In the battle with Attalus Philip had had destroyed a ten-banked, a nine-banked, a seven-banked, and a six-banked ship, ten other decked vessels, three triemioliae, twenty-five galleys and their crews. In the battle with the Rhodians ten decked vessels and about forty galleys. While two quadriremes and seven galleys with their crews were captured. In the fleet of Attalus one triemiolia and two quinqueremes were sunk, while two quadriremes besides that of the king were captured. Of the Rhodian fleet two quinqueremes and a trireme were destroyed, but no ship was taken. Of men the Rhodians lost sixty, Attalus seventy; while Philip lost three thousand Macedonians and six thousand rowers. And of the Macedonians and their allies two thousand were taken prisoners, and of their opponents six hundred.
8. Such was the end of the battle of Chios; in which Philip claimed the victory on two pretexts. First, because he had driven Attalus ashore and had captured his ship; and secondly, because, as he had anchored at the promontory of Argennum, he had the credit of having taken up his anchorage where the wrecks were floating. He acted in accordance with this assertion next day by collecting the wrecks, and causing the corpses which could be recognised to be picked up for burial, all for the sake of strengthening this pretence. For that he did not himself believe that he had won was shortly afterwards proved by the Rhodians and Dionysodorus. For on that very next day, while he was actually engaged on these operations, after communication with each other they sailed out to attack him, but, on nobody putting out to meet them, they returned to Chios. Philip indeed had never before lost so many men either by land or sea at one time, and was extremely mortified at what had happened and had lost much of his spirit for the enterprise. To the outside world, however, he tried to conceal his real sentiments: though this was forbidden by facts. Besides everything else, what happened after the battle impressed all who saw it too strongly. For the slaughter
and destruction was so great that, on the day of battle itself the whole strait was filled with corpses, blood, arms, and wrecks; while on the subsequent days the strands might be seen piled up with all these together in wild confusion. Hence the extreme consternation of the king could not be confined to himself, but was shared by all his Macedonians.
9. Theophiliscus survived for one day; and then having written a despatch home with an account of the battle, and appointed Cleonaeus to succeed him in his command, died from his wounds. He had shown great valour in the engagement, and his far-sighted policy deserves to be remembered. If it had not been for his boldness in attacking Philip in time, all the allies would have let the opportunity pass, in terror at Philip’s audacity. But by beginning the war as he did he forced his countrymen to seize the opportunity, and compelled Attalus not to lose time in mere preparatory measures for war, but to go to war energetically and grapple with the danger. The Rhodians, therefore, were quite right to pay him, even after his death, such honours as were incentives, not only to men living at the time, but to future generations also, to prompt service in their country’s cause....
THE INDECISIVE BATTLE OF CHIOS WAS FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER OFF LADE, IN WHICH PHILIP WAS PARTLY SUCCESSFUL
10. After the battle of Lade, the Rhodians being out of his way, and Attalus not having yet appeared on the scene, it is clear that Philip might have accomplished his voyage to Alexandria. And here we have evidence stronger than any other of Philip’s infatuation in acting as he did. What, then, prevented his design? Nothing in the world but what always occurs in the natural course of affairs. For at a distance many men at times desire the impossible from the extravagant prospects it holds out, their ambition over-mastering their reason; but when they approach the moment of action they quite as irrationally abandon their purpose, because their calculations are obscured and confused by the embarrassments and difficulties which meet them....
PHILIP’S OPERATIONS IN CARIA, B.C. 201
11. Having made some assaults which proved abortive owing to the strength of the place, Philip went away again, plundering the forts and villages in the country. Thence he marched to Prinassus and pitched his camp under its wall. Having promptly got ready his pent-houses and other siege artillery, he began to attempt the town by mines. This plan proving impracticable, owing to the rocky nature of the soil, he contrived the following stratagem. During the day he caused a noise to be made under ground, as though the mines were being worked at; while during the night he caused earth to be brought and piled up at the mouth of the mine, in order that the men in the city, by calculating the quantity of earth thrown up, might become alarmed. At first the Prinassians held out bravely: but when Philip sent them a message informing them that he had underpinned two plethra of their walls, and asking them whether they preferred to march out with their lives, or one and all to perish with their town when he set fire to the props, then at last, believing that what he said was true, they surrendered the city.
12. The town of Iassus is situated in Asia on the gulf between the temple of Poseidon, the territory of Miletus, and the city of Myndus, called the gulf [of Iassus by some], but by most the gulf of Bargylia, from the names of the cities built upon its inner coast. The Iassians boast of being originally colonists from Argos, and more recently from Miletus, their ancestors having invited to their town the son of Neleus, the founder of Miletus, owing to their losses in the war with the Carians. The size of the town is ten stades. Among the people of Bargylia it is a common report widely believed that the statue of the Kindyan Artemis, though in the open air, is never touched by snow or rain; and the same belief is held among the Iassians as to the Artemis Astias. All these stories have been repeated by certain historians. But, for my part, I have in the whole course of my work set myself against such statements of our historiographers and have had no toleration for them. For it appears to me that such tales are only fit to amuse children, when they transgress not only the limits of probability but even those of possibility. For instance, to say that certain bodies when placed in full light cast no shadow argues a state of quite deplorable folly. But Theopompus has done this; for he says that those who enter the holy precinct of Zeus in Arcadia cast no shadow, which is on a par with the statements to which I have just referred. Now, in so far as such tales tend to preserve the reverence of the vulgar for religion, a certain allowance may be made for some historians when they record these miraculous legends. But they must not be allowed to go too far. Perhaps it is difficult to assign a limit in such a matter; still it is not impossible. Therefore, in my judgment, such displays of ignorance and delusion should be pardoned if they do not go very far, but anything like extravagance in them should be rejected....
AFFAIRS IN GREECE
13. I have already described the deliberate policy of Nabis, tyrant of the Lacedaemonians; how he drove the citizens into exile, freed the slaves, and gave them the wives and daughters of their masters. How also, by opening his kingdom as a kind of inviolable sanctuary for all who fled from their own countries, he collected a number of bad characters in Sparta. I will now proceed to tell how in the same period, being in alliance with Aetolians, Eleans, and Messenians, and being bound by oaths and treaties to support one and all of those peoples in case of any one attacking them, he yet in utter contempt of these obligations determined to make a treacherous attack on Messene....
DIGRESSION ON THE MERITS OF THE HISTORIANS ZENO AND ANTISTHENES OF RHODES
14. As some episodical historians have written on the period which embraces the affair at Messene and the sea-fights already described, it is my intention to discuss them briefly. I will not however speak of them all, but only those whom I suppose to be worthy of commemoration and full discussion. These are the Rhodian writers Zeno and Antisthenes, whom I judge to deserve this distinction, for more than one reason. They were contemporary with the events, and were engaged in practical politics; and, lastly, they composed their histories with no view to gain, but for the sake of fame, and as part of the business of politicians. Since then they write of the same events as myself, I cannot omit mentioning them; lest, from the reputation of their country, and the idea that naval affairs are peculiarly the province of Rhodians, some students may prefer their authority to mine where I differ from them.
Now both these writers, to begin with, describe the battle of Lade as not less severe than that of Chios, but more fiercely and daringly contested, both in detail and as a whole, and finally assert that the victory was with the Rhodians. For my part I should be inclined to allow that historians must show some partiality to their own countries; not however that they should state what is exactly opposite to the facts regarding them. There are quite enough mistakes which writers make from ignorance, and which it is difficult for poor human nature to avoid: but if we deliberately write what is false for the sake of country, friends, or favour, how do we differ from those who do the same to get a living? For as the latter, by measuring everything by the standard of private gain, ruin the credit of their works, so your politicians often fall into the same discredit by yielding to the influence of hatred or affection. Therefore readers ought to be jealously watchful on this head; while writers ought to be on their guard for their own sakes.
15. The present matter is an example. When coming to details of the battle of Lade, these writers confess that in it “two quinqueremes of Rhodes were captured by the enemy; and that upon one ship raising its studding-sail to escape from the conflict, owing to its having being staved in and shipping sea, many of the vessels near it did the same and made for the open sea; and that at last the admiral, being left with only a few vessels, was forced to follow their example. That for the present they were forced by unfavourable winds to drop anchor on the territory of Myndus, but next day put to sea and crossed to Cos; while the enemy, having secured the quinqueremes, landed at Lade and took up their quarters in the Rhodian camp: that, moreover, the Milesians, deeply impressed by what had taken place, presented not only Philip, but Heracle
ides also, with a garland of victory on his entrance to their territory.” And yet, though they give all these particulars, which all evidently indicate the losing side, they still declare the Rhodians to have been victorious both in particular combats and in the whole battle; and that too in spite of the fact that the original despatch from the admiral concerning the battle, sent to the Senate and Prytanies, still exists in their Prytaneium, which testifies to the truth, not of the statements of Antisthenes and Zeno, but of mine.
