by Polybius
15. The writers whom I have named exemplify the truth of these remarks. Philinus, for instance, commencing the narrative with his second book, says that the “Carthaginians and Syracusans engaged in the war and sat down before Messene; that the Romans arriving by sea entered the town, and immediately sallied out from it to attack the Syracusans; but that after suffering severely in the engagement they retired into Messene; and that on a second occasion, having issued forth to attack the Carthaginians, they not only suffered severely but lost a considerable number of their men captured by the enemy.” But while making this statement, he represents Hiero as so destitute of sense as, after this engagement, not only to have promptly burnt his stockade and tents and fled under cover of night to Syracuse, but to have abandoned all the forts which had been established to overawe the Messenian territory. Similarly he asserts that “the Carthaginians immediately after their battle evacuated their entrenchment and dispersed into various towns, without venturing any longer even to dispute the possession of the open country; and that, accordingly, their leaders seeing that their troops were utterly demoralised determined in consideration not to risk a battle: that the Romans followed them, and not only laid waste the territory of the Carthaginians and Syracusans, but actually sat down before Syracuse itself and began to lay siege to it.” These statements appear to me to be full of glaring inconsistency, and to call for no refutation at all. The very men whom he describes to begin with as besieging Messene, and as victorious in the engagements, he afterwards represents as running away, abandoning the open country, and utterly demoralised: while those whom he starts by saying were defeated and besieged, he concludes by describing as engaging in a pursuit, as promptly seizing the open places, and finally as besieging Syracuse. Nothing can reconcile these statements. It is impossible. Either his initial statement, or his account of the subsequent events, must be false. In point of fact the latter part of his story is the true one. The Syracusans and Carthaginians did abandon the open country, and the Romans did immediately afterwards commence a siege of Syracuse and of Echetla, which lies in the district between the Syracusan and Carthaginian pales. For the rest it must necessarily be acknowledged that the first part of his account is false; and that whereas the Romans were victorious in the engagements under Messene, they have been represented by this historian as defeated. Through the whole of this work we shall find Philinus acting in a similar spirit: and much the same may be said of Fabius, as I shall show when the several points arise.
I have now said what was proper on the subject of this digression. Returning to the matter in hand I will endeavour by a continuous narrative of moderate dimensions to guide my readers to a true knowledge of this war.
[1] προσπεσόντων γὰρ εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην ἐκ τῆς Σικελίας τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἄππιον καὶ τὰ στρατόπεδα προτερημάτων, καταστήσαντες ὑπάτους Μάνιον Ὀτακίλιον καὶ Μάνιον Οὐαλέριον τάς τε δυνάμεις ἁπάσας ἐξαπέστελλον καὶ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ἀμφοτέρους εἰς τὴν Σικελίαν. [2] ἔστι δὲ παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις τὰ πάντα τέτταρα στρατόπεδα Ῥωμαϊκὰ χωρὶς τῶν συμμάχων, ἃ κατ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν προχειρίζονται: τούτων ἕκαστον ἀνὰ τετρακισχιλίους πεζούς, ἱππεῖς δὲ τριακοσίους. [3] ὧν παραγενομένων ἀπό τε τῶν Καρχηδονίων αἱ πλείους ἀφιστάμεναι πόλεις προσετίθεντο τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ἀπό τε τῶν Συρακοσίων. [4] ὁ δ᾽ Ἱέρων θεωρῶν τὴν διατροπὴν καὶ κατάπληξιν τῶν Σικελιωτῶν, ἅμα δὲ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὸ βάρος τῶν Ῥωμαϊκῶν στρατοπέδων, ἐκ πάντων συνελογίζετο τούτων ἐπικυδεστέρας εἶναι τὰς τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἢ τὰς τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἐλπίδας. [5] διόπερ ἐπὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ὁρμήσας τοῖς λογισμοῖς διεπέμπετο πρὸς τοὺς στρατηγούς, ὑπὲρ εἰρήνης καὶ φιλίας ποιούμενος τοὺς λόγους. [6] οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι προσεδέξαντο, καὶ μάλιστα διὰ τὰς χορηγίας: [7] θαλαττοκρατούντων γὰρ τῶν Καρχηδονίων εὐλαβοῦντο μὴ πανταχόθεν ἀποκλεισθῶσι τῶν ἀναγκαίων διὰ τὸ καὶ περὶ τὰ πρὸ τοῦ διαβάντα στρατόπεδα πολλὴν ἔνδειαν γεγονέναι τῶν ἐπιτηδείων. [8] διόπερ ὑπολαβόντες τὸν Ἱέρωνα μεγάλην εἰς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος αὑτοῖς παρέξεσθαι χρείαν ἀσμένως προσεδέξαντο τὴν φιλίαν. [9] ποιησάμενοι δὲ συνθήκας ἐφ᾽ ᾧ τὰ μὲν αἰχμάλωτα χωρὶς λύτρων ἀποδοῦναι τὸν βασιλέα Ῥωμαίοις, ἀργυρίου δὲ προσθεῖναι τάλαντα τούτοις ἑκατόν, λοιπὸν ἤδη Ῥωμαῖοι μὲν ὡς φίλοις καὶ συμμάχοις ἐχρῶντο τοῖς Συρακοσίοις. [10] ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς Ἱέρων ὑποστείλας ἑαυτὸν ὑπὸ τὴν Ῥωμαίων σκέπην καὶ χορηγῶν ἀεὶ τούτοις εἰς τὰ κατεπείγοντα τῶν πραγμάτων ἀδεῶς ἐβασίλευε τῶν Συρακοσίων τὸν μετὰ ταῦτα χρόνον, φιλοστεφανῶν καὶ φιλοδοξῶν εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας. [11] ἐπιφανέστατος γὰρ δὴ πάντων οὗτος δοκεῖ καὶ πλεῖστον χρόνον ἀπολελαυκέναι τῆς ἰδίας εὐβουλίας ἔν τε τοῖς κατὰ μέρος καὶ τοῖς καθόλου πράγμασιν.
16. When news came to Rome of the successes of Appius and his legions, the people elected Manius Otacilius and Manius Valerius Consuls, and despatched their whole army to Sicily, and both Consuls in command. Now the Romans have in all, as distinct from allies, four legions of Roman citizens, which they enrol every year, each of which consists of four thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry: and on their arrival most of the cities revolted from Syracuse as well as from Carthage, and joined the Romans. And when he saw the terror and dismay of the Sicilians, and compared with them the number and crushing strength of the legions of Rome, Hiero began, from a review of all these points, to conclude that the prospects of the Romans were brighter than those of the Carthaginians. Inclining therefore from these considerations to the side of the former, he began sending messages to the Consuls, proposing peace and friendship with them. The Romans accepted his offer, their chief motive being the consideration of provisions: for as the Carthaginians had command of the sea, they were afraid of being cut off at every point from their supplies, warned by the fact that the legions which had previously crossed had run very short in that respect. They therefore gladly accepted Hiero’s offers of friendship, supposing that he would be of signal service to them in this particular. The king engaged to restore his prisoners without ransom, and to pay besides an indemnity of a hundred talents of silver. The treaty being arranged on these terms, the Romans thenceforth regarded the Syracusans as friends and allies: while King Hiero, having thus placed himself under the protection of the Romans, never failed to supply their needs in times of difficulty; and for the rest of his life reigned securely in Syracuse, devoting his energies to gaining the gratitude and good opinion of the Greeks. And in point of fact no monarch ever acquired a greater reputation, or enjoyed for a longer period the fruits of his prudent policy in private as well as in public affairs.
[1] Ἐπανενεχθεισῶν δὲ τῶν συνθηκῶν εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην, καὶ προσδεξαμένου τοῦ δήμου καὶ κυρώσαντος τὰς πρὸς Ἱέρωνα διαλύσεις, λοιπὸν �
�ὐκέτι πάσας ἔκρινον ἐξαποστέλλειν οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι τὰς δυνάμεις, ἀλλὰ δύο μόνον στρατόπεδα, [2] νομίζοντες ἅμα μὲν κεκουφίσθαι τὸν πόλεμον αὐτοῖς προσκεχωρηκότος τοῦ βασιλέως, ἅμα δὲ μᾶλλον ὑπολαμβάνοντες οὕτως εὐπορήσειν τὰς δυνάμεις τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις. [3] οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι θεωροῦντες τὸν μὲν Ἱέρωνα πολέμιον αὑτοῖς γεγονότα, τοὺς δὲ Ῥωμαίους ὁλοσχερέστερον ἐμπλεκομένους εἰς τὰ κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν ὑπέλαβον βαρυτέρας προσδεῖσθαι παρασκευῆς, δι᾽ ἧς ἀντοφθαλμεῖν δυνήσονται τοῖς πολεμίοις καὶ συνέχειν τὰ κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν. [4] διὸ καὶ ξενολογήσαντες ἐκ τῆς ἀντιπέρας χώρας πολλοὺς μὲν Λιγυστίνους καὶ Κελτούς, ἔτι δὲ πλείους τούτων Ἴβηρας, ἅπαντας εἰς τὴν Σικελίαν ἀπέστειλαν. [5] ὁρῶντες δὲ τὴν τῶν Ἀκραγαντίνων πόλιν εὐφυεστάτην οὖσαν πρὸς τὰς παρασκευὰς καὶ βαρυτάτην ἅμα τῆς αὑτῶν ἐπαρχίας εἰς ταύτην συνήθροισαν τά τε χορήγια καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις, ὁρμητηρίῳ κρίνοντες χρῆσθαι ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον. [6] τῶν δὲ Ῥωμαίων οἱ μὲν πρὸς τὸν Ἱέρωνα ποιησάμενοι στρατηγοὶ τὰς συνθήκας ἀνακεχωρήκεισαν: οἱ δὲ μετὰ τούτους κατασταθέντες Λεύκιος Ποστόμιος καὶ Κόιντος Μαμίλιος ἧκον εἰς τὴν Σικελίαν μετὰ τῶν στρατοπέδων. [7] θεωροῦντες δὲ τὴν τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἐπιβολὴν καὶ τὰς περὶ τὸν Ἀκράγαντα παρασκευὰς ἔγνωσαν τολμηρότερον ἐγχειρεῖν τοῖς πράγμασιν: [8] διὸ καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα μέρη τοῦ πολέμου παρῆκαν, φέροντες δὲ παντὶ τῷ στρατεύματι πρὸς αὐτὸν Ἀκράγαντα προσήρεισαν: καὶ στρατοπεδεύσαντες ἐν ὀκτὼ σταδίοις ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως συνέκλεισαν ἐντὸς τειχῶν τοὺς Καρχηδονίους. [9] ἀκμαζούσης δὲ τῆς τοῦ σίτου συναγωγῆς, καὶ προφαινομένης χρονίου πολιορκίας, ὥρμησαν ἐκθυμότερον τοῦ δέοντος οἱ στρατιῶται πρὸς τὸ σιτολογεῖν. [10] οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι κατιδόντες τοὺς πολεμίους ἐσκεδασμένους κατὰ τῆς χώρας, ἐξελθόντες ἐπέθεντο τοῖς σιτολογοῦσιν. τρεψάμενοι δὲ τούτους ῥᾳδίως οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ χάρακος ἁρπαγὴν ὥρμησαν, οἱ δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὰς ἐφεδρείας. [11] ἀλλ᾽ ἡ τῶν ἐθισμῶν διαφορὰ καὶ τότε καὶ πολλάκις ἤδη σέσωκε τὰ Ῥωμαίων πράγματα. τὸ γὰρ πρόστιμον παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς θάνατός ἐστι τῷ προεμένῳ τὸν τόπον καὶ φυγόντι τὸ παράπαν ἐξ ἐφεδρείας. [12] διὸ καὶ τότε πολλαπλασίους ὄντας τοὺς ὑπεναντίους ὑποστάντες γενναίως πολλοὺς μὲν τῶν ἰδίων ἀπέβαλον, ἔτι δὲ πλείους τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἀπέκτειναν. [13] τέλος δὲ κυκλώσαντες τοὺς πολεμίους ὅσον οὔπω διασπῶντας τὸν χάρακα, τοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν διέφθειραν, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἐπικείμενοι καὶ φονεύοντες συνεδίωξαν εἰς τὴν πόλιν.
17. When the text of this treaty reached Rome, and the people had approved and confirmed the terms made with Hiero, the Roman government thereupon decided not to send all their forces, as they had intended doing, but only two legions. For they thought that the gravity of the war was lessened by the adhesion of the king, and at the same time that the army would thus be better off for provisions. But when the Carthaginian government saw that Hiero had become their enemy, and that the Romans were taking a more decided part in Sicilian politics, they conceived that they must have a more formidable force to enable them to confront their enemy and maintain their own interests in Sicily. Accordingly, they enlisted mercenaries from over sea — a large number of Ligurians and Celts, and a still larger number of Iberians — and despatched them to Sicily. And perceiving that Agrigentum possessed the greatest natural advantages as a place of arms, and was the most powerful city in their province, they collected their supplies and their forces into it, deciding to use this city as their headquarters for the war.
On the Roman side a change of commanders had now taken place. The Consuls who made the treaty with Hiero had gone home, and their successors, Lucius Postumius and Quintus Mamilius, were come to Sicily with their legions. Observing the measure which the Carthaginians were taking, and the forces they were concentrating at Agrigentum, they made up their minds to take that matter in hand and strike a bold blow. Accordingly they suspended every other department of the war, and bearing down upon Agrigentum itself with their whole army, attacked it in force; pitched their camp within a distance of eight stades from the city; and confined the Carthaginians within the walls. Now it was just harvest-time, and the siege was evidently destined to be a long one: the soldiers, therefore, went out to collect the corn with greater hardihood than they ought to have done. Accordingly the Carthaginians, seeing the enemy scattered about the fields, sallied out and attacked the harvesting-parties. They easily routed these; and then one portion of them made a rush to destroy the Roman entrenchment, the other to attack the pickets. But the peculiarity of their institutions saved the Roman fortunes, as it had often done before. Among them it is death for a man to desert his post, or to fly from his station on any pretext whatever. Accordingly on this, as on other occasions, they gallantly held their ground against opponents many times their own number; and though they lost many of their own men, they killed still more of the enemy, and at last outflanked the foes just as they were on the point of demolishing the palisade of the camp. Some they put to the sword, and the rest they pursued with slaughter into the city.
