by Polybius
53. Meanwhile Adherbal sent the prisoners he had taken in the sea fight, and the captured vessels, to Carthage; and giving Carthalo his colleague thirty vessels, in addition to the seventy in command of which he had come, despatched him with instructions to make a sudden attack upon the enemy’s ships that were at anchor off Lilybaeum, capture all he could, and set fire to the rest. In obedience to these instructions Carthalo accomplished his passage just before daybreak, fired some of the vessels, and towed off others. Great was the commotion at the quarters of the Romans. For as they hurried to the rescue of the ships, the attention of Himilco, the commander of the garrison, was aroused by their shouts; and as the day was now beginning to break, he could see what was happening, and despatched the mercenary troops who were in the town. Thus the Romans found themselves surrounded by danger on every side, and fell into a state of consternation more than usually profound and serious. The Carthaginian admiral contented himself with either towing off or breaking up some few of their vessels, and shortly afterwards coasted along under the pretence of making for Heracleia: though he was really lying in wait, with the view of intercepting those who were coming by sea to the Roman army. When his look-out men brought him word that a considerable number of vessels of all sorts were bearing down upon him, and were now getting close, he stood out to sea and started to meet them: for the success just obtained over the Romans inspired him with such contempt for them, that he was eager to come to an engagement. The vessels in question were those which had been despatched in advance under the charge of the Quaestors from Syracuse. And they too had warning of their danger. Light boats were accustomed to sail in advance of a squadron, and these announced the approach of the enemy to the Quaestors; who being convinced that they were not strong enough to stand a battle at sea, dropped anchor under a small fortified town which was subject to Rome, and which, though it had no regular harbour, yet possessed roadsteads, and headlands projecting from the mainland, and surrounding the roadsteads, so as to form a convenient refuge. There they disembarked; and having set up some catapults and ballistae, which they got from the town, awaited the approach of the enemy. When the Carthaginians arrived, their first idea was to blockade them: for they supposed that the men would be terrified and retreat to the fortified town, leaving them to take possession of the vessels without resistance. Their expectations, however, were not fulfilled; and finding that the men on the contrary resisted with spirit, and that the situation of the spot presented many difficulties of every description, they sailed away again after towing off some few of the transports laden with provisions, and retired to a certain river, in which they anchored and kept a look out for the enemy to renew their voyage.
[1] ὁ δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς Συρακούσαις ὑπολειφθεὶς στρατηγός, ἐπεὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν πρόθεσιν ἐπετέλεσεν, κάμψας τὸν Πάχυνον ἐποιεῖτο τὸν πλοῦν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ Λιλύβαιον, οὐδὲν εἰδὼς τῶν περὶ τοὺς προπλέοντας συμβεβηκότων. [2] ὁ δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ναύαρχος, σημηνάντων τῶν σκοπῶν αὐτῷ πάλιν τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν τῶν ὑπεναντίων, ἀναχθεὶς ἔπλει μετὰ σπουδῆς, βουλόμενος αὐτοῖς ὡς πλεῖστον ἀπέχουσι τῶν οἰκείων νεῶν συμβαλεῖν. [3] ὁ δ᾽ Ἰούνιος κατιδὼν ἐκ πολλοῦ τὸν στόλον τὸν τῶν Καρχηδονίων καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν σκαφῶν, οὔτε συμβαλεῖν τολμῶν οὔτ᾽ ἐκφυγεῖν ἔτι δυνατὸς ὢν διὰ τὸ σύνεγγυς εἶναι τοὺς πολεμίους, ἐγκλίνας εἰς τόπους τραχεῖς καὶ κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἐπισφαλεῖς καθωρμίσθη, [4] κρίνων αἱρετώτερον ὑπάρχειν ὅ,τι δέοι παθεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς πολεμίοις αὔτανδρον τὸ σφέτερον στρατόπεδον ὑποχείριον ποιῆσαι. [5] συνιδὼν δὲ καὶ τὸ περὶ τούτου γεγονὸς ὁ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ναύαρχος τὸ μὲν παραβάλλεσθαι καὶ προσάγειν τοιούτοις τόποις ἀπεδοκίμασε, λαβὼν δ᾽ ἄκραν τινὰ καὶ προσορμισθεὶς ταύτῃ μεταξὺ τῶν στόλων ἐτήρει καὶ προσεῖχε τὸν νοῦν ἀμφοτέροις. [6] ἐπιγενομένου δὲ χειμῶνος καὶ περιστάσεως προφαινομένης ἐκ τοῦ πελάγους ὁλοσχερεστέρας, οἱ μὲν τῶν Καρχηδονίων κυβερνῆται διά τε τὴν τῶν τόπων καὶ τὴν τοῦ πράγματος ἐμπειρίαν προορώμενοι τὸ μέλλον καὶ προλέγοντες τὸ συμβησόμενον ἔπεισαν τὸν Καρθάλωνα φυγεῖν τὸν χειμῶνα καὶ κάμψαι τὴν ἄκραν τοῦ Παχύνου. [7] πεισθέντος δὲ νουνεχῶς, οὗτοι μὲν πολλὰ μοχθήσαντες καὶ μόλις ὑπεράραντες τὴν ἄκραν ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ καθωρμίσθησαν, [8] οἱ δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαίων στόλοι, τοῦ χειμῶνος ἐπιγενομένου καὶ τῶν τόπων εἰς τέλος ὑπαρχόντων ἀλιμένων, οὕτως διεφθάρησαν ὥστε μηδὲ τῶν ναυαγίων μηδὲν γενέσθαι χρήσιμον, ἀλλ᾽ ἀμφοτέρους αὐτοὺς ἄρδην καὶ παραλόγως ἀχρειωθῆναι.
54. In complete ignorance of what had happened to his advanced squadron, the Consul, who had remained behind at Syracuse, after completing all he meant to do there, put to sea; and, after rounding Pachynus, was proceeding on his voyage to Lilybaeum. The appearance of the enemy was once more signalled to the Carthaginian admiral by his look-out men, and he at once put out to sea, with the view of engaging them as far as possible away from their comrades. Junius saw the Carthaginian fleet from a considerable distance, and observing their great numbers did not dare to engage them, and yet found it impossible to avoid them by flight because they were now too close. He therefore steered towards land, and anchored under a rocky and altogether dangerous part of the shore; for he judged it better to run all risks rather than allow his squadron, with all its men, to fall into the hands of the enemy. The Carthaginian admiral saw what he had done; and determined that it was unadvisable for him to engage the enemy, or bring his ships near such a dangerous place. He therefore made for a certain headland between the two squadrons of the enemy, and there kept a look out upon both with equal vigilance. Presently, however, the weather became rough, and there was an appearance of an unusually dangerous disturbance setting in from the sea. The Carthaginian pilots, from their knowledge of the particular localities, and of seamanship generally, foresaw what was coming; and persuaded Carthalo to avoid the storm and round the promontory of Pachynus. He had the good sense to take their advice: and accordingly these men, with great exertions and extreme difficulty, did get round the promontory and anchored in safety; while the Romans, being exposed to the storm in places entirely destitute of harbours, suffered such complete destruction, that not one of the wrecks even was left in a state available for use. Both of their squadrons in fact were completely disabled to a degree past belief.
[1] τούτου δὲ συμβάντος τὰ μὲν τῶν Καρχηδονίων αὖθις ἀνέκυψε καὶ πάλιν ἐπιρρεπεστέρας εἶχε τὰς ἐλπίδας, [2] οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι πρότερον μὲν ἐπὶ ποσὸν ἠτυχηκότες τότε δ᾽ ὁλοσχερῶς ἐκ μὲν τῆς θαλάττης ἐξέβησαν, τῶν δ᾽ ὑπαίθρων ἐπεκράτουν: Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ τῆς μὲν θαλάττης ἐκυρίευον, τῆς δὲ γῆς οὐχ ὅλως ἀπήλπιζον. [3] μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάντες ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ὅλοις ἐσχετλίαζον, ο
ἵ τ᾽ ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸ Λιλύβαιον στρατόπεδα, διὰ τὰ προειρημένα συμπτώματα: [4] τῆς γε μὴν προθέσεως οὐκ ἀφίσταντο τῆς κατὰ τὴν πολιορκίαν, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ μὲν ἐχορήγουν κατὰ γῆν ἀπροφασίστως, οἱ δὲ προσεκαρτέρουν ταύτῃ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. [5] ὁ δ᾽ Ἰούνιος ἀνακομισθεὶς ἐπὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐκ τῆς ναυαγίας καὶ περιπαθὴς ὤν, ἐγένετο πρὸς τὸ καινοτομῆσαί τι καὶ πρᾶξαι τῶν δεόντων, σπουδάζων ἀναμαχέσασθαι τὴν γεγενημένην περιπέτειαν. [6] διὸ καὶ βραχείας αὐτῷ παραπεσούσης ἀφορμῆς, καταλαμβάνει πραξικοπήσας τὸν Ἔρυκα καὶ γίνεται τοῦ τε τῆς Ἀφροδίτης ἱεροῦ καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἐγκρατής. [7] ὁ δ᾽ Ἔρυξ ἔστι μὲν ὄρος παρὰ θάλατταν τῆς Σικελίας ἐν τῇ παρὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν κειμένῃ πλευρᾷ μεταξὺ Δρεπάνων καὶ Πανόρμου, μᾶλλον δ᾽ ὅμορον καὶ συνάπτον πρὸς τὰ Δρέπανα, μεγέθει δὲ παρὰ πολὺ διαφέρον τῶν κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν ὀρῶν πλὴν τῆς Αἴτνης. [8] τούτου δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῆς μὲν τῆς κορυφῆς, οὔσης ἐπιπέδου, κεῖται τὸ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης τῆς Ἐρυκίνης ἱερόν, ὅπερ ὁμολογουμένως ἐπιφανέστατόν ἐστι τῷ τε πλούτῳ καὶ τῇ λοιπῇ προστασίᾳ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν ἱερῶν: [9] ἡ δὲ πόλις ὑπ᾽ αὐτὴν τὴν κορυφὴν τέτακται, πάνυ μακρὰν ἔχουσα καὶ προσάντη πανταχόθεν τὴν ἀνάβασιν. [10] ἐπί τε δὴ τὴν κορυφὴν ἐπιστήσας φυλακήν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ Δρεπάνων πρόσβασιν ἐτήρει φιλοτίμως ἀμφοτέρους τοὺς τόπους καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι τὸν τῆς ἀναβολῆς, πεπεισμένος οὕτως καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀσφαλῶς καὶ τὸ σύμπαν ὄρος ὑφ᾽ αὑτὸν ἕξειν.
55. This occurrence caused the Carthaginian interests to look up again and their hopes to revive. But the Romans, though they had met with partial misfortunes before, had never suffered a naval disaster so complete and final. They, in fact, abandoned the sea, and confined themselves to holding the country; while the Carthaginians remained masters of the sea, without wholly despairing of the land.
Great and general was the dismay both at Rome and in the camp at Lilybaeum. Yet they did not abandon their determination of starving out that town. The Roman government did not allow their disasters to prevent their sending provisions into the camp overland; and the besiegers kept up the investment as strictly as they possibly could. Lucius Junius joined the camp after the shipwreck, and, being in a state of great distress at what had happened, was all eagerness to strike some new and effective blow, and thus repair the disaster which had befallen him. Accordingly he took the first slight opening that offered to surprise and seize Eryx; and became master both of the temple of Aphrodite and of the city. This is a mountain close to the sea-coast on that side of Sicily which looks towards Italy, between Drepana and Panormus, but nearer to Drepana of the two. It is by far the greatest mountain in Sicily next to Aetna; and on its summit, which is flat, stands the temple of Erycinian Aphrodite, confessedly the most splendid of all the temples in Sicily for its wealth and general magnificence. The town stands immediately below the summit, and is approached by a very long and steep ascent. Lucius seized both town and temple; and established a garrison both upon the summit and at the foot of the road to it from Drepana. He kept a strict guard at both points, but more especially at the foot of the ascent, believing that by so doing he should secure possession of the whole mountain as well as the town.
[1] οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι μετὰ ταῦτα στρατηγὸν καταστήσαντες αὑτῶν Ἀμίλκαν τὸν Βάρκαν ἐπικαλούμενον, τούτῳ τὰ κατὰ τὸν στόλον ἐνεχείρισαν: [2] ὃς παραλαβὼν τὰς ναυτικὰς δυνάμεις ὥρμησεν πορθήσων τὴν Ἰταλίαν. ἔτος δ᾽ ἦν ὀκτωκαιδέκατον τῷ πολέμῳ. [3] κατασύρας δὲ τὴν Λοκρίδα καὶ τὴν Βρεττιανὴν χώραν, ἀποπλέων ἐντεῦθεν κατῆρε παντὶ τῷ στόλῳ πρὸς τὴν Πανορμῖτιν καὶ καταλαμβάνει τὸν ἐπὶ τῆς Εἱρκτῆς λεγόμενον τόπον, ὃς κεῖται μὲν Ἔρυκος καὶ Πανόρμου μεταξὺ πρὸς θαλάττῃ, πολὺ δέ τι τῶν ἄλλων δοκεῖ διαφέρειν τόπων ἐπιτηδειότητι πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν στρατοπέδων καὶ χρονισμόν. [4] ἔστι γὰρ ὄρος περίτομον ἐξανεστηκὸς ἐκ τῆς περικειμένης χώρας εἰς ὕψος ἱκανόν. τούτου δ᾽ ἡ περίμετρος τῆς ἄνω στεφάνης οὐ λείπει τῶν ἑκατὸν σταδίων, ὑφ᾽ ἧς ὁ περιεχόμενος τόπος εὔβοτος ὑπάρχει καὶ γεωργήσιμος, πρὸς μὲν τὰς πελαγίους πνοιὰς εὐφυῶς κείμενος, θανασίμων δὲ θηρίων εἰς τέλος ἄμοιρος. [5] περιέχεται δὲ κρημνοῖς ἀπροσίτοις ἔκ τε τοῦ κατὰ θάλατταν μέρους καὶ τοῦ παρὰ τὴν μεσόγαιαν παρήκοντος, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ τούτων ἐστὶν ὀλίγης καὶ βραχείας δεόμενα κατασκευῆς. [6] ἔχει δ᾽ ἐν αὑτῷ καὶ μαστόν, ὃς ἅμα μὲν ἀκροπόλεως, ἅμα δὲ σκοπῆς εὐφυοῦς λαμβάνει τάξιν κατὰ τῆς ὑποκειμένης χώρας. [7] κρατεῖ δὲ καὶ λιμένος εὐκαίρου πρὸς τὸν ἀπὸ Δρεπάνων καὶ Λιλυβαίου δρόμον ἐπὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν, ἐν ᾧ πλῆθος ὕδατος ἄφθονον ὑπάρχει. [8] προσόδους δὲ τὰς πάσας ἔχει τριττὰς δυσχερεῖς, δύο μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας, μίαν δ᾽ ἀπὸ τῆς θαλάττης. ἐν ᾧ καταστρατοπεδεύσας παραβόλως Ἀμίλκας, [9] ὡς ἂν μήτε πόλεως οἰκείας μήτ᾽ ἄλλης ἐλπίδος μηδεμιᾶς ἀντεχόμενος, εἰς μέσους δὲ τοὺς πολεμίους ἑαυτὸν δεδωκώς, ὅμως οὐ μικροὺς οὐδὲ τοὺς τυχόντας Ῥωμαίοις ἀγῶνας καὶ κινδύνους παρεσκεύασεν. [10] πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἐντεῦθεν ὁρμώμενος κατὰ θάλατταν τὴν παραλίαν τῆς Ἰταλίας ἐπόρθει μέχρι τῆς Κυμαίων χώρας, [11] δεύτερον δὲ κατὰ γῆν παραστρατοπεδευσάντων αὐτῷ Ῥωμαίων πρὸ τῆς Πανορμιτῶν πόλεως ἐν ἴσως πέντε σταδίοις πολλοὺς καὶ ποικίλους ἀγῶνας συνεστήσατο κατὰ γῆν σχεδὸν ἐπὶ τρεῖς ἐνιαυτούς. περὶ ὧν οὐχ οἷόν τε διὰ τῆς γρα
56. Next year, the eighteenth of the war, the Carthaginians appointed Hamilcar Barcas general, and put the management of the fleet in his hands. He took over the command, and started to ravage the Italian coast. After devastating the districts of Locri, and the rest of Bruttium, he sailed away with his whole fleet to the coast of Panormus and seized on a place called Hercte, which lies between Eryx and Panormus on the coast, and is reputed the best situation in the district for a safe and permanent camp. For it is a mountain rising sheer on every side, standing out above
the surrounding country to a considerable height. The table-land on its summit has a circumference of not less than a hundred stades, within which the soil is rich in pasture and suitable for agriculture; the sea-breezes render it healthy; and it is entirely free from all dangerous animals. On the side which looks towards the sea, as well as that which faces the central part of the island, it is enclosed by inaccessible precipices; while the spaces between them require only slight fortifications, and of no great extent, to make them secure. There is in it also an eminence, which serves at once as an acropolis and as a convenient tower of observation, commanding the surrounding district. It also commands a harbour conveniently situated for the passage from Drepana and Lilybaeum to Italy, in which there is always abundant depth of water; finally, it can only be reached by three ways — two from the land side, one from the sea, all of them difficult. Here Hamilcar entrenched himself. It was a bold measure: but he had no city which he could count upon as friendly, and no other hope on which he could rely; and though by so doing he placed himself in the very midst of the enemy, he nevertheless managed to involve the Romans in many struggles and dangers. To begin with, he would start from this place and ravage the seaboard of Italy as far as Cumae; and again on shore, when the Romans had pitched a camp to overawe him, in front of the city of Panormus, within about five stades of him, he harassed them in every sort of way, and forced them to engage in numerous skirmishes, for the space of nearly three years. Of these combats it is impossible to give a detailed account in writing.
