by Polybius
47. This was the origin of what is called the Cleomenic war. At first the Achaeans were for depending on their own resources for facing the Lacedaemonians. They looked upon it as more honourable not to look to others for preservation, but to guard their own territory and cities themselves; and at the same time the remembrances of his former services made them desirous of keeping up their friendship with Ptolemy, and averse from the appearance of seeking aid elsewhere. But when the war had lasted some time; and Cleomenes had revolutionised the constitution of his country, and had turned its constitutional monarchy into a despotism; and, moreover, was conducting the war with extraordinary skill and boldness: seeing clearly what would happen, and fearing the reckless audacity of the Aetolians, Aratus determined that his first duty was to be well beforehand in frustrating their plans. He satisfied himself that Antigonus was a man of activity and practical ability, with some pretensions to the character of a man of honour; he however knew perfectly well that kings look on no man as a friend or foe from personal considerations, but ever measure friendships and enmities solely by the standard of expediency. He, therefore, conceived the idea of addressing himself to this monarch, and entering into friendly relations with him, taking occasion to point out to him the certain result of his present policy. But to act openly in this matter he thought inexpedient for several reasons. By doing so he would not only incur the opposition of Cleomenes and the Aetolians, but would cause consternation among the Achaeans themselves, because his appeal to their enemies would give the impression that he had abandoned all the hopes he once had in them. This was the very last idea he desired should go abroad; and he therefore determined to conduct this intrigue in secrecy.
The result of this was that he was often compelled to speak and act towards the public in a sense contrary to his true sentiments, that he might conceal his real design by suggesting one of an exactly opposite nature. For which reason there are some particulars which he did not even commit to his own commentaries.
[1] εἰδὼς δὲ τοὺς Μεγαλοπολίτας κακοπαθοῦντας μὲν τῷ πολέμῳ διὰ τὸ παρακειμένους τῇ Λακεδαίμονι προπολεμεῖν τῶν ἄλλων, οὐ τυγχάνοντας δὲ τῆς καθηκούσης ἐπικουρίας ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν διὰ τὸ κἀκείνους δυσχρηστεῖσθαι θλιβομένους ὑπὸ τῆς περιστάσεως, [2] σαφῶς δὲ γινώσκων οἰκείως διακειμένους αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὴν Μακεδόνων οἰκίαν ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὸν Ἀμύντου Φίλιππον εὐεργεσιῶν, [3] διειλήφει διότι ταχέως ἂν ὑπὸ τοῦ Κλεομένους πιεζόμενοι καταφύγοιεν ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀντίγονον καὶ τὰς Μακεδόνων ἐλπίδας: [4] κοινολογηθεὶς οὖν δι᾽ ἀπορρήτων περὶ τῆς ὅλης ἐπιβολῆς Νικοφάνει καὶ Κερκιδᾷ τοῖς Μεγαλοπολίταις, οἵτινες ἦσαν αὐτοῦ πατρικοὶ ξένοι καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐπιβολὴν εὐφυεῖς, [5] ῥᾳδίως διὰ τούτων ὁρμὴν παρέστησε τοῖς Μεγαλοπολίταις εἰς τὸ πρεσβεύειν πρὸς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς καὶ παρακαλεῖν πέμπειν πρὸς τὸν Ἀντίγονον ὑπὲρ βοηθείας. [6] οἱ μὲν οὖν Μεγαλοπολῖται κατέστησαν αὐτοὺς τοὺς περὶ τὸν Νικοφάνη καὶ τὸν Κερκιδᾶν πρεσβευτὰς πρός τε τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς κἀκεῖθεν εὐθέως πρὸς τὸν Ἀντίγονον, ἂν αὐτοῖς συγκατάθηται τὸ ἔθνος. [7] οἱ δ᾽ Ἀχαιοὶ συνεχώρησαν πρεσβεύειν τοῖς Μεγαλοπολίταις. [8] σπουδῇ δὲ συμμίξαντες οἱ περὶ τὸν Νικοφάνη τῷ βασιλεῖ διελέγοντο περὶ μὲν τῆς ἑαυτῶν πατρίδος αὐτὰ τἀναγκαῖα διὰ βραχέων καὶ κεφαλαιωδῶς, τὰ δὲ πολλὰ περὶ τῶν ὅλων κατὰ τὰς ἐντολὰς τὰς Ἀράτου
48. It did not escape the observation of Aratus that the people of Megalopolis would be more ready than others to seek the protection of Antigonus, and the hopes of safety offered by Macedonia; for their neighbourhood to Sparta exposed them to attack before the other states; while they were unable to get the help which they ought to have, because the Achaeans were themselves hard pressed and in great difficulties. Besides they had special reasons for entertaining feelings of affection towards the royal family of Macedonia, founded on the favours received in the time of Philip, son of Amyntas. He therefore imparted his general design under pledge of secrecy to Nicophanes and Cercidas of Megalopolis, who were family friends of his own and of a character suited to the undertaking; and by their means experienced no difficulty in inducing the people of Megalopolis to send envoys to the league, to advise that an application for help should be made to Antigonus. Nicophanes and Cercidas were themselves selected to go on this mission to the league, and thence, if their view was accepted, to Antigonus. The league consented to allow the people of Megalopolis to send the mission; and accordingly Nicophanes lost no time in obtaining an interview with the king. About the interests of his own country he spoke briefly and summarily, confining himself to the most necessary statements; the greater part of his speech was, in accordance with the directions of Aratus, concerned with the national question.
[1] καὶ τὰς ὑποθέσεις. αὗται δ᾽ ἦσαν ὑποδεικνύναι τὴν Αἰτωλῶν καὶ Κλεομένους κοινοπραγίαν τί δύναται καὶ ποῖ τείνει, καὶ δηλοῦν ὅτι πρώτοις μὲν αὐτοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς εὐλαβητέον, ἑξῆς δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον Ἀντιγόνῳ. [2] τοῦτο μὲν γάρ, ὡς Ἀχαιοὶ τὸν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν πόλεμον οὐκ ἂν ὑπενέγκαιεν, εὐθεώρητον εἶναι πᾶσι, τοῦτο δ᾽, ὡς Αἰτωλοὶ καὶ Κλεομένης κρατήσαντες τούτων οὐκ εὐδοκήσουσιν οὐδὲ μὴ μείνωσιν ἐπὶ τῶν ὑποκειμένων, ἔτι τοῦ πρόσθεν ῥᾷον εἶναι τῷ νοῦν ἔχοντι συνιδεῖν. [3] τήν τε γὰρ Αἰτωλῶν πλεονεξίαν οὐχ οἷον τοῖς Πελοποννησίων ὅροις εὐδοκῆσαί ποτ᾽ ἂν περιληφθεῖσαν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τοῖς τῆς Ἑλλάδος, [4] τήν τε Κλεομένους φιλοδοξίαν καὶ τὴν ὅλην ἐπιβολὴν κατὰ μὲν τὸ παρὸν αὐτῆς ἐφίεσθαι τῆς Πελοποννησίων ἀρχῆς, τυχόντα δὲ ταύτης τὸν προειρημένον κατὰ πόδας ἀνθέξεσθαι τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμονίας. [5] ἧς οὐχ οἷόν τε καθικέσθαι μὴ οὐ πρόσθεν καταλύσαντα τὴν Μακεδόνων ἀρχήν. [6] σκοπεῖν οὖν αὐτὸν ἠξίουν, προορώμενον τὸ μέλλον, πότερον συμφέρει τοῖς σφετέροις πράγμασι μετ᾽ Ἀχαιῶν καὶ Βοιωτῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ πρὸς Κλεομένη πολεμεῖν ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμονίας ἢ προέμενον τὸ μέγιστον ἔθνος διακινδυνεύειν ἐν Θετταλίᾳ πρὸς Αἰτωλοὺς καὶ Βοιωτούς, ἔτι δ᾽ Ἀχαιοὺς καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους, ὑπὲρ τῆς Μακεδόνων ἀρχῆς. [7] ἐὰν μὲν οὖν Αἰτωλοὶ τὴν ἐκ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν εἰς αὐτοὺς γεγενημένην εὔνοιαν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ Δημήτριον καιροῖς ἐντρεπόμενοι τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν ὑποκρίνωνται, καθάπερ καὶ νῦν, πολεμήσειν αὐτοὺς ἔφασαν τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς πρὸς τὸν Κλεομένη: κἂν �
�ὲν ἡ τύχη συνεπιλαμβάνηται, μὴ δεῖσθαι χρείας τῶν βοηθησόντων: ἂν δ᾽ ἀντιπίπτῃ τὰ τῆς τύχης, [8] Αἰτωλοὶ δὲ συνεπιτίθωνται, προσέχειν αὐτὸν παρεκάλουν τοῖς πράγμασιν, ἵνα μὴ πρόηται τοὺς καιρούς, ἔτι δὲ δυναμένοις σῴζεσθαι Πελοποννησίοις ἐπαρκέσῃ: [9] περὶ δὲ πίστεως καὶ χάριτος ἀποδόσεως ῥᾳθυμεῖν αὐτὸν ᾤοντο δεῖν: τῆς γὰρ χρείας ἐπιτελουμένης αὐτὸν εὑρήσειν τὸν Ἄρατον εὐδοκουμένας ἀμφοτέροις ὑπισχνοῦντο πίστεις. [10] ὁμοίως δ᾽ ἔφασαν καὶ τὸν καιρὸν τῆς βοηθείας αὐτὸν ὑποδείξειν.
49. The points suggested by Aratus for the envoy to dwell on were “the scope and object of the understanding between the Aetolians and Cleomenes, and the necessity of caution on the part primarily of the Achaeans, but still more even on that of Antigonus himself: first, because the Achaeans plainly could not resist the attack of both; and, secondly, because if the Aetolians and Cleomenes conquered them, any man of sense could easily see that they would not be satisfied or stop there. For the encroaching spirit of the Aetolians, far from being content to be confined by the boundaries of the Peloponnese, would find even those of Greece too narrow for them. Again, the ambition of Cleomenes was at present directed to the supremacy in the Peloponnese: but this obtained, he would promptly aim at that of all Greece, in which it would be impossible for him to succeed without first crushing the government of Macedonia. They were, therefore, to urge him to consider, with a view to the future, which of the two courses would be the more to his own interests, — to fight for supremacy in Greece in conjunction with the Achaeans and Boeotians against Cleomenes in the Peloponnese; or to abandon the most powerful race, and to stake the Macedonian empire on a battle in Thessaly, against a combined force of Aetolians and Boeotians, with the Achaeans and Lacedaemonians to boot. If the Aetolians, from regard to the goodwill shown them by the Achaeans in the time of Demetrius, were to pretend to be anxious to keep the peace as they were at present doing, they were to assert that the Achaeans were ready to engage Cleomenes by themselves; and if fortune declared in their favour they would want no assistance from any one: but if fortune went against them, and the Aetolians joined in the attack, they begged him to watch the course of events, that he might not let things go too far, but might aid the Peloponnesians while they were still capable of being saved. He had no need to be anxious about the good faith or gratitude of the Achaeans: when the time for action came, Aratus pledged himself to find guarantees which would be satisfactory to both parties; and similarly would himself indicate the moment at which the aid should be given.”
[1] ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἀντίγονος ἀκούσας ταῦτα καὶ δόξας ἀληθινῶς καὶ πραγματικῶς ὑποδεικνύναι τὸν Ἄρατον, προσεῖχε τοῖς ἑξῆς πραττομένοις ἐπιμελῶς. ἔγραψε δὲ καὶ τοῖς Μεγαλοπολίταις, [2] ἐπαγγελλόμενος βοηθήσειν, ἐὰν καὶ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς τοῦτο βουλομένοις ᾖ. [3] τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸν Νικοφάνη καὶ Κερκιδᾶν ἐπανελθόντων εἰς οἶκον καὶ τάς τε παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως ἐπιστολὰς ἀποδόντων καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν εὔνοιαν αὐτοῦ καὶ προθυμίαν διασαφούντων, [4] μετεωρισθέντες οἱ Μεγαλοπολῖται προθύμως ἔσχον ἰέναι πρὸς τὴν σύνοδον τῶν Ἀχαιῶν καὶ παρακαλεῖν ἐπισπάσασθαι τὸν Ἀντίγονον καὶ τὰ πράγματα κατὰ σπουδὴν ἐγχειρίζειν αὐτῷ. [5] ὁ δ᾽ Ἄρατος διακούσας κατ᾽ ἰδίαν τῶν περὶ τὸν Νικοφάνη τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως αἵρεσιν, ἣν ἔχοι πρός τε τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς καὶ πρὸς αὐτόν, περιχαρὴς ἦν τῷ μὴ διὰ κενῆς πεποιῆσθαι τὴν ἐπίνοιαν μηδ᾽ εὑρῆσθαι κατὰ τὴν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν ἐλπίδα τὸν Ἀντίγονον εἰς τέλος ἀπηλλοτριωμένον ἑαυτοῦ. [6] πάνυ δὲ πρὸς λόγον ἡγεῖτο γίνεσθαι καὶ τὸ τοὺς Μεγαλοπολίτας προθύμους εἶναι διὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν φέρειν ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀντίγονον τὰ πράγματα. μάλιστα μὲν γάρ, [7] ὡς ἐπάνω προεῖπον, ἔσπευδεν μὴ προσδεηθῆναι τῆς βοηθείας: εἰ δ᾽ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐπὶ τοῦτο δέοι καταφεύγειν, οὐ μόνον ἠβούλετο δι᾽ αὑτοῦ γενέσθαι τὴν κλῆσιν, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν Ἀχαιῶν. [8] ἠγωνία γάρ, εἰ παραγενόμενος ὁ βασιλεὺς καὶ κρατήσας τῷ πολέμῳ τοῦ Κλεομένους καὶ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἀλλοιότερόν τι βουλεύσοιτο περὶ τῆς κοινῆς πολιτείας, μή ποθ᾽ ὁμολογουμένως τῶν συμβαινόντων αὐτὸς ἀναλάβῃ τὴν αἰτίαν, [9] δόξαντος δικαίως τοῦτο πράττειν διὰ τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ προγεγενημένην ἀδικίαν περὶ τὸν Ἀκροκόρινθον εἰς τὴν Μακεδόνων οἰκίαν. [10] διόπερ ἅμα τῷ παρελθόντας τοὺς Μεγαλοπολίτας εἰς τὸ κοινὸν βουλευτήριον τά τε γράμματα τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἐπιδεικνύναι καὶ διασαφεῖν τὴν ὅλην εὔνοιαν τοῦ βασιλέως, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἀξιοῦν ἐπισπάσασθαι τὸν Ἀντίγονον τὴν ταχίστην, εἶναι δὲ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ὁρμῆς, [11] προελθὼν Ἄρατος καὶ τήν τε τοῦ βασιλέως προθυμίαν ἀποδεξάμενος καὶ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν διάληψιν ἐπαινέσας παρεκάλει διὰ πλειόνων μάλιστα μὲν πειρᾶσθαι δι᾽ αὑτῶν σῴζειν καὶ τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὴν χώραν: οὐδὲν γὰρ εἶναι τούτου κάλλιον οὐδὲ συμφορώτερον: [12] ἐὰν δ᾽ ἄρα πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ἀντιβαίνῃ τὰ τῆς τύχης, πρότερον ἔφη δεῖν ἐξελέγξαντας πάσας τὰς ἐν αὑτοῖς ἐλπίδας τότε
50. These arguments seemed to Antigonus to have been put by Aratus with equal sincerity and ability: and after listening to them, he eagerly took the first necessary step by writing a letter to the people of Megalopolis with an offer of assistance, on condition that such a measure should receive the consent of the Achaeans. When Nicophanes and Cercidas returned home and delivered this despatch from the king, reporting at the same time his other expressions of goodwill and zeal in the cause, the spirits of the people of Megalopolis were greatly elated; and they were all eagerness to attend the meeting of the league, and urge that measures should be taken to secure the alliance of Antigonus, and to put the management of the war in his hands with all despatch. Aratus learnt privately from Nicophanes the king’s feelings towards the league and towards himself; and was delighted that his plan had not failed, and that he had not found the king completely alienated from himself, as the Aetolians hoped he would be. He regarded it also as eminently favourable to his policy, that the people of Megalopolis were so eager to use the Achaean league as the channel of communication with Antigonus. For his first object was if possible to do without this assistance; but if he were compelled to have recourse to it, he wished that the invitation should not be sent through himself personally, but that it should rather come from the Achaeans as a nation. For he feared th
at, if the king came, and conquered Cleomenes and the Lacedaemonians in the war, and should then adopt any policy hostile to the interests of the national constitution, he would have himself by general consent to bear the blame of the result: while Antigonus would be justified, by the injury which had been inflicted on the royal house of Macedonia in the matter of the Acrocorinthus. Accordingly when Megalopolitan envoys appeared in the national council, and showed the royal despatch, and further declared the general friendly disposition of the king, and added an appeal to the congress to secure the king’s alliance without delay; and when also the sense of the meeting was clearly shown to be in favour of taking this course, Aratus rose, and, after setting forth the king’s zeal, and complimenting the meeting upon their readiness to act in the matter, he proceeded to urge upon them in a long speech that “They should try if possible to preserve their cities and territory by their own efforts, for that nothing could be more honourable or more expedient than that: but that, if it turned out that fortune declared against them in this effort, they might then have recourse to the assistance of their friends; but not until they had tried all their own resources to the uttermost.” This speech was received with general applause: and it was decided to take no fresh departure at present, and to endeavour to bring the existing war to a conclusion unaided.
