by Polybius
72. As soon as Tiberius saw the Numidian horse approaching, he immediately sent out his cavalry by itself with orders to engage the enemy, and keep them in play, while he despatched after them six thousand foot armed with javelins, and got the rest of the army in motion, with the idea that their appearance would decide the affair: for his superiority in numbers, and his success in the cavalry skirmish of the day before, had filled him with confidence. But it was now mid-winter and the day was snowy and excessively cold, and men and horses were marching out almost entirely without having tasted food; and accordingly, though the troops were at first in high spirits, yet when they had crossed the Trebia, swollen by the floods which the rain of the previous night had brought down from the high ground above the camp, wading breast deep through the stream, they were in a wretched state from the cold and want of food as the day wore on. While the Carthaginians on the contrary had eaten and drunk in their tents, and got their horses ready, and were all anointing and arming themselves round the fires. Hannibal waited for the right moment to strike, and as soon as he saw that the Romans had crossed the Trebia, throwing out eight thousand spearmen and slingers to cover his advance, he led out his whole army. When he had advanced about eight stades from the camp, he drew up his infantry, consisting of about twenty thousand Iberians, Celts, and Libyans, in one long line, while he divided his cavalry and placed half on each wing, amounting in all to more than ten thousand, counting the Celtic allies; his elephants also he divided between the two wings, where they occupied the front rank. Meanwhile Tiberius had recalled his cavalry because he saw that they could do nothing with the enemy. For the Numidians when attacked retreated without difficulty, scattering in every direction, and then faced about again and charged, which is the peculiar feature of their mode of warfare. But he drew up his infantry in the regular Roman order, consisting of sixteen thousand citizens and twenty thousand allies; for that is the complete number of a Roman army in an important campaign, when the two Consuls are compelled by circumstances to combine forces. He then placed the cavalry on either wing, numbering four thousand, and advanced against the enemy in gallant style, in regular order, and at a deliberate pace.
[1] καὶ βάδην ποιούμενος τὴν ἔφοδον. ἤδη δὲ σύνεγγυς ὄντων ἀλλήλοις, συνεπλέκησαν οἱ προκείμενοι τῶν δυνάμεων εὔζωνοι. [2] τούτου δὲ συμβάντος οἱ μὲν Ῥωμαῖοι κατὰ πολλοὺς τρόπους ἠλαττοῦντο, τοῖς δὲ Καρχηδονίοις ὑπερδέξιον γίνεσθαι συνέβαινε τὴν χρείαν, [3] ἅτε δὴ τῶν μὲν Ῥωμαίων πεζακοντιστῶν κακοπαθούντων ἐξ ὄρθρου καὶ προεμένων τὰ πλεῖστα βέλη κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς Νομάδας συμπλοκήν, τῶν δὲ καταλειπομένων βελῶν ἠχρειωμένων αὐτοῖς διὰ τὴν συνέχειαν τῆς νοτίδος. [4] παραπλήσια δὲ τούτοις συνέβαινε καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἱππεῖς γίνεσθαι καὶ περὶ τὸ σύμπαν αὐτοῖς στρατόπεδον. [5] περί γε μὴν τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ὑπῆρχε τἀναντία τούτων: ἀκμαῖοι γὰρ παρατεταγμένοι καὶ νεαλεῖς ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ δέον εὐχρήστως καὶ προθύμως εἶχον. [6] διόπερ ἅμα τῷ δέξασθαι διὰ τῶν διαστημάτων τοὺς προκινδυνεύοντας καὶ συμπεσεῖν τὰ βαρέα τῶν ὅπλων ἀλλήλοις, οἱ μὲν ἱππεῖς οἱ τῶν Καρχηδονίων εὐθέως ἀπ᾽ ἀμφοῖν τοῖν κεράτοιν ἐπίεζον τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, ὡς ἂν τῷ πλήθει πολὺ διαφέροντες καὶ ταῖς ἀκμαῖς αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἵππων διὰ τὴν προειρημένην ἀκεραιότητα περὶ τὴν ἔξοδον: [7] τοῖς δὲ Ῥωμαίοις τῶν ἱππέων ὑποχωρησάντων καὶ ψιλωθέντων τῶν τῆς φάλαγγος κεράτων, οἵ τε λογχοφόροι τῶν Καρχηδονίων καὶ τὸ τῶν Νομάδων πλῆθος ὑπεραίροντες τοὺς προτεταγμένους τῶν ἰδίων καὶ πρὸς τὰ κέρατα προσπίπτοντες τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις πολλὰ καὶ κακὰ διειργάζοντο καὶ μάχεσθαι τοῖς κατὰ πρόσωπον οὐκ εἴων. [8] οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς βαρέσιν ὅπλοις παρ᾽ ἀμφοῖν τὰς πρώτας ἔχοντες καὶ μέσας τῆς ὅλης παρεμβολῆς τάξεις ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἐμάχοντο συστάδην, ἐφάμιλλον ποιούμενοι
73. When the two forces came within distance, the light-armed troops in front of the two armies closed with each other. In this part of the battle the Romans were in many respects at a disadvantage, while the Carthaginians had everything in their favour. For the Roman spearmen had been on hard service ever since daybreak, and had expended most of their weapons in the engagement with the Numidians, while those weapons which were left had become useless from being long wet. Nor were the cavalry, or indeed the whole army, any better off in these respects. The case of the Carthaginians was exactly the reverse: they had come on the field perfectly sound and fresh, and were ready and eager for every service required of them. As soon, therefore, as their advanced guard had retired again within their lines, and the heavy-armed soldiers were engaged, the cavalry on the two wings of the Carthaginian army at once charged the enemy with all the effect of superiority in numbers, and in the condition both of men and horses secured by their freshness when they started. The Roman cavalry on the contrary retreated: and the flanks of the line being thus left unprotected, the Carthaginian spearmen and the main body of the Numidians, passing their own advanced guard, charged the Roman flanks: and, by the damage which they did them, prevented them from keeping up the fight with the troops on their front. The heavy-armed soldiers, however, who were in the front rank of both armies, and in the centre of that, maintained an obstinate and equal fight for a considerable time.
[1] τὸν κίνδυνον. ἐν ᾧ καιρῷ διαναστάντων τῶν ἐκ τῆς ἐνέδρας Νομάδων καὶ προσπεσόντων ἄφνω κατὰ νώτου τοῖς ἀγωνιζομένοις περὶ τὰ μέσα, μεγάλην ταραχὴν καὶ δυσχρηστίαν συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι περὶ τὰς τῶν Ῥωμαίων δυνάμεις. [2] τέλος δ᾽ ἀμφότερα τὰ κέρατα τῶν περὶ τὸν Τεβέριον πιεζούμενα κατὰ πρόσωπον μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν θηρίων, πέριξ δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐκ τῶν πλαγίων ἐπιφανείας ὑπὸ τῶν εὐζώνων, ἐτράπησαν καὶ συνωθοῦντο κατὰ τὸν διωγμὸν πρὸς τὸν ὑποκείμενον ποταμόν. [3] τούτου δὲ συμβάντος οἱ κατὰ μέσον τὸν κίνδυνον ταχθέντες τῶν Ῥωμαίων οἱ μὲν κατόπιν ἐφεστῶτες ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ τῆς ἐνέδρας προσπεσόντων ἀπώλλυντο καὶ κακῶς ἔπασχον, [4] οἱ δὲ περὶ τὰς πρώτας χώρας ἐπαναγκασθέντες ἐκράτησαν τῶν Κελτῶν καὶ μέρους τινὸς τῶν Λιβύων καὶ πολλοὺς αὐτῶν ἀποκτείναντες διέκοψαν τὴν τῶν Καρχηδονίων τάξιν. [5] θεωροῦντες δὲ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων κεράτων ἐκπεπιεσμένους, τὸ μὲν ἐπιβοηθεῖν τούτοις ἢ πάλιν εἰς τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀπιέναι παρεμβολὴν ἀπέγνωσαν, ὑφορώμενοι μὲν τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἱππέων, κωλυόμενοι δὲ διὰ τὸν ποταμὸν καὶ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν καὶ συστροφὴν τοῦ κατὰ κεφαλὴν �
�μβρου. [6] τηροῦντες δὲ τὰς τάξεις ἁθρόοι μετ᾽ ἀσφαλείας ἀπεχώρησαν εἰς Πλακεντίαν, ὄντες οὐκ ἐλάττους μυρίων. [7] τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν οἱ μὲν πλεῖστοι περὶ τὸν ποταμὸν ἐφθάρησαν ὑπό τε τῶν θηρίων καὶ τῶν ἱππέων, [8] οἱ δὲ διαφυγόντες τῶν πεζῶν καὶ τὸ πλεῖστον μέρος τῶν ἱππέων πρὸς τὸ προειρημένον σύστημα ποιούμενοι τὴν ἀποχώρησιν ἀνεκομίσθησαν ἅμα τούτοις εἰς Πλακεντίαν. [9] τὸ δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατόπεδον ἕως τοῦ ποταμοῦ καταδιῶξαν τοὺς πολεμίους, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ χειμῶνος οὐκέτι δυνάμενον πορρωτέρω προβαίνειν ἐπανῆλθε πάλιν εἰς τὴν παρεμβολήν. [10] καὶ πάντες ἐπὶ μὲν τῇ μάχῃ περιχαρεῖς ἦσαν, ὡς κατωρθωκότες: συνέβαινε γὰρ ὀλίγους μὲν τῶν Ἰβήρων καὶ Λιβύων, τοὺς δὲ πλείους ἀπολωλέναι τῶν Κελτῶν: [11] ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ὄμβρων καὶ τῆς ἐπιγινομένης χιόνος οὕτως διετίθεντο δεινῶς ὥστε τὰ μὲν θηρία διαφθαρῆναι πλὴν ἑνός, πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀπόλλυσθαι καὶ τῶν ἵππων διὰ τὸ ψῦχος.
74. Just then the Numidians, who had been lying in ambush, left their hiding-place, and by a sudden charge on the centre of the Roman rear produced great confusion and alarm throughout the army. Finally both the Roman wings, being hard pressed in front by the elephants, and on both flanks by the light-armed troops of the enemy, gave way, and in their flight were forced upon the river behind them. After this, while the centre of the Roman rear was losing heavily, and suffering severely from the attack of the Numidian ambuscade, their front, thus driven to bay, defeated the Celts and a division of Africans, and, after killing a large number of them, succeeded in cutting their way through the Carthaginian line. Then seeing that their wings had been forced off their ground, they gave up all hope of relieving them or getting back to their camp, partly because of the number of the enemy’s cavalry, and partly because they were hindered by the river and the pelting storm of rain which was pouring down upon their heads. They therefore closed their ranks, and made their way safely to Placentia, to the number of ten thousand. Of the rest of the army the greater number were killed by the elephants and cavalry on the bank of the Trebia; while those of the infantry who escaped, and the greater part of the cavalry, managed to rejoin the ten thousand mentioned above, and arrived with them at Placentia. Meanwhile the Carthaginian army pursued the enemy as far as the Trebia; but being prevented by the storm from going farther, returned to their camp. They regarded the result of the battle with great exultation, as a complete success; for the loss of the Iberians and Africans had been light, the heaviest having fallen on the Celts. But from the rain and the snow which followed it, they suffered so severely, that all the elephants except one died, and a large number of men and horses perished from the cold.
[1] ὁ δὲ Τεβέριος εἰδὼς μὲν τὰ συμβεβηκότα, βουλόμενος δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν ἐπικρύπτεσθαι τοὺς ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ τὸ γεγονὸς ἔπεμψε τοὺς ἀπαγγελοῦντας ὅτι μάχης γενομένης τὴν νίκην αὐτῶν ὁ χειμὼν ἀφείλετο. [2] οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι παραυτίκα μὲν ἐπίστευον τοῖς προσπίπτουσιν: μετ᾽ οὐ πολὺ δὲ πυνθανόμενοι τοὺς μὲν Καρχηδονίους καὶ τὴν παρεμβολὴν τὴν αὑτῶν τηρεῖν καὶ τοὺς Κελτοὺς πάντας ἀπονενευκέναι πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνων φιλίαν, [3] τοὺς δὲ παρ᾽ αὑτῶν ἀπολελοιπότας τὴν παρεμβολὴν ἐκ τῆς μάχης ἀνακεχωρηκέναι καὶ συνηθροῖσθαι πάντας εἰς τὰς πόλεις καὶ χορηγεῖσθαι δὲ τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις ἐκ θαλάττης ἀνὰ τὸν Πάδον ποταμόν, καὶ λίαν σαφῶς ἔγνωσαν τὰ γεγονότα περὶ τὸν κίνδυνον. [4] διὸ καὶ παραδόξου φανέντος αὐτοῖς τοῦ πράγματος, περὶ τὰς λοιπὰς παρασκευὰς διαφερόντως ἐγίνοντο καὶ περὶ φυλακὴν τῶν προκειμένων τόπων, πέμποντες εἰς Σαρδόνα καὶ Σικελίαν στρατόπεδα, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις εἰς Τάραντα προφυλακὰς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τόπων εἰς τοὺς εὐκαίρους: παρεσκεύασαν δὲ καὶ ναῦς ἑξήκοντα πεντήρεις. Γνάιος δὲ Σερουίλιος καὶ Γάιος Φλαμίνιος, [5] οἵπερ ἔτυχον ὕπατοι τότε καθεσταμένοι, συνῆγον τοὺς συμμάχους καὶ κατέγραφον τὰ παρ᾽ αὑτοῖς στρατόπεδα. [6] παρῆγον δὲ καὶ τὰς ἀγορὰς τὰς μὲν εἰς Ἀρίμινον τὰς δ᾽ εἰς Τυρρηνίαν, ὡς ἐπὶ τούτοις ποιησόμενοι τοῖς τόποις τὴν ἔξοδον. [7] ἔπεμψαν δὲ καὶ πρὸς Ἱέρωνα περὶ βοηθείας, ὃς καὶ πεντακοσίους αὐτοῖς ἐξαπέστειλε Κρῆτας καὶ χιλίους πελτοφόρους: πάντα δὲ καὶ πανταχόθεν ἐνεργῶς ἡτοίμαζον. [8] τότε γάρ εἰσι φοβερώτατοι Ῥωμαῖοι καὶ κοινῇ καὶ κατ᾽ ἰδίαν, ὅταν αὐτοὺς περιστῇ φόβος ἀληθινός.
75. Fully aware of the nature of his disaster, but wishing to conceal its extent as well as he could from the people at home, Tiberius sent messengers to announce that a battle had taken place, but that the storm had deprived them of the victory. For the moment this news was believed at Rome; but when soon afterwards it became known that the Carthaginians were in possession of the Roman camp, and that all the Celts had joined them: while their own troops had abandoned their camp, and, after retiring from the field of battle, were all collected in the neighbouring cities; and were besides being supplied with necessary provisions by sea up the Padus, the Roman people became only too certain of what had really happened in the battle. It was a most unexpected reverse, and it forced them at once to urge on with energy the remaining preparations for the war. They reinforced those positions which lay in the way of the enemy’s advance; sent legions to Sardinia and Sicily, as well as garrisons to Tarentum, and other places of strategical importance; and, moreover, fitted out a fleet of sixty quinqueremes. The Consuls designate, Gnaeus Servilius and Gaius Flaminius, were collecting the allies and enrolling the citizen legions, and sending supplies to Ariminum and Etruria, with a view of going to the seat of war by those two routes. They sent also to king Hiero asking for reinforcements, who sent them five hundred Cretan archers and a thousand peltasts. In fact they pushed on their preparations in every direction with energy. For the Roman people are most formidable, collectively and individually, when they have real reason for alarm.
[1] κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς Γνάιος Κορνήλιος ὁ καταλειφθεὶς ὑπὸ τἀδελφοῦ Ποπλίου στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως, καθάπερ ἐπάνω προεῖπον, ἀναχθεὶς ἀπὸ τῶν τοῦ Ῥοδανοῦ στομάτων παντὶ τῷ στόλῳ προσέσχε τῆς Ἰβηρίας πρὸς τοὺς κατὰ τὸ καλούμενον Ἐμπόριον τόπους. [2] ἀρξάμενος δ᾽ ἐντεῦθεν ἀποβάσεις ἐποιεῖτο καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀπειθοῦντας ἐπολιόρκει τῶν τὴν παραλίαν κατοικούντων ἕως Ἴβηρος
ποταμοῦ, τοὺς δὲ προσδεχομένους ἐφιλανθρώπει, τὴν ἐνδεχομένην ποιούμενος περὶ αὐτῶν προμήθειαν. [3] ἀσφαλισάμενος δὲ τοὺς προσκεχωρηκότας τῶν παραθαλαττίων προῆγε παντὶ τῷ στρατεύματι, ποιούμενος τὴν πορείαν εἰς τὴν μεσόγαιον: [4] πολὺ γὰρ ἤδη καὶ τὸ συμμαχικὸν ἡθροίκει τῶν Ἰβήρων. ἅμα δὲ προϊὼν ἃς μὲν προσήγετο τὰς δὲ κατεστρέφετο τῶν πόλεων. [5] τῶν δὲ Καρχηδονίων, οὓς ἔχων ἐπὶ τούτων ἀπελείφθη τῶν τόπων Ἄννων, ἀντιστρατοπεδευσάντων αὐτοῖς περὶ πόλιν προσαγορευομένην Κίσσαν, συμβαλὼν ὁ Γνάιος ἐκ παρατάξεως καὶ νικήσας τῇ μάχῃ πολλῶν μὲν χρημάτων ἐγένετ᾽ ἐγκρατής, ὡς ἂν ἁπάσης τῆς ἀποσκευῆς τῶν εἰς Ἰταλίαν ὁρμησάντων παρὰ τούτοις ἀπολελειμμένης, [6] πάντας δὲ τοὺς ἐντὸς Ἴβηρος ποταμοῦ συμμάχους ἐποιήσατο καὶ φίλους, ζωγρίᾳ δὲ τόν τε τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγὸν Ἄννωνα καὶ τὸν τῶν Ἰβήρων Ἀνδοβάλην ἔλαβε. [7] τοῦτον δὲ συνέβαινε τύραννον μὲν εἶναι τῶν κατὰ τὴν μεσόγαιον τόπων, εὔνουν δὲ διαφερόντως ἀεί ποτε Καρχηδονίοις. [8] ταχὺ δὲ συνεὶς τὸ γεγονὸς Ἀσδρούβας ἧκε παραβοηθῶν διαβὰς τὸν Ἴβηρα ποταμόν. [9] καὶ καταμαθὼν ἀπολελειμμένους τοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ στόλου τῶν Ῥωμαίων, ῥᾳθύμως καὶ κατατεθαρρηκότως ἀναστρεφομένους διὰ τὸ προτέρημα τῶν πεζικῶν στρατοπέδων, [10] παραλαβὼν ἀπὸ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμεως πεζοὺς μὲν εἰς ὀκτακισχιλίους ἱππεῖς δὲ περὶ χιλίους, καὶ καταλαβὼν ἐσκεδασμένους κατὰ τῆς χώρας τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν πλοίων, πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπέκτεινεν, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἠνάγκασε φυγεῖν ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς. [11] οὗτος μὲν οὖν ἀναχωρήσας καὶ διαβὰς αὖθις τὸν Ἴβηρα ποταμὸν ἐγίνετο περὶ παρασκευὴν καὶ φυλακὴν τῶν ἐντὸς τοῦ ποταμοῦ τόπων, ποιούμενος τὴν παραχειμασίαν ἐν Καινῇ πόλει. [12] ὁ δὲ Γνάιος συνάψας τῷ στόλῳ καὶ τοὺς αἰτίους τῶν συμβεβηκότων κατὰ τοὺς παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἐθισμοὺς κολάσας, τὸ λοιπὸν ἤδη συναγαγὼν ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ τήν τε πεζὴν καὶ τὴν ναυτικὴν στρατιὰν ἐν Ταρράκωνι τὴν παραχειμασίαν ἐποιεῖτο. [13] διαδοὺς δὲ τὴν λείαν ἴσως τοῖς στρατιώταις μεγάλην εὔνοιαν καὶ προθυμίαν ἐνειργάσατο πρὸς τὸ μέλλον.
