By the end of December, the Soviet offensive began to run out of steam, with a semblance of normality returning to the German front line. Hitler took full credit for this, increasing his already expansive self-belief in his abilities as a general. As 1941 drew to a close, Hitler could boast that his forces had inflicted terrible casualties on the Soviet armed forces and captured vast swaths of territory. Yet, with hindsight, Barbarossa must be seen as a failure. Despite the massive material damage inflicted on the Soviet Union, Germany had suffered heavily too, more than 900,000 casualties sustained in the period from 22 June 1941 to 31 January 1942.1
The German plan for Barbarossa had called for the destruction of the Red Army to the west of the Dvina-Dnieper line in the first phase of the campaign. Franz Halder, the army chief of staff, had made this clear, noting on 17 March 1941: “We must score successes from the very start. There must be no reverses.”2 And while the Germans had achieved a series of stunning encirclement victories in western Russia and the Ukraine, the Red Army had not been destroyed, remaining an effective fighting force throughout 1941.
By failing to secure victory in the opening campaign, Germany was fated to lose the war. It could never match the economic and demographic might of the Soviet Union, and the Red Army’s subsequent growth in size, confidence, and ability would coincide with the slow but inexorable decline of the Wehrmacht. And when Hitler declared war on the United States on 11 December 1941, his destruction was guaranteed.
The Führer’s contempt for the higher echelons of the German Army was now in the open. It did not, however, extend to the Waffen-SS, whose performance during Barbarossa greatly impressed him. His earlier misgivings over Himmler’s requests for the mass expansion of the Waffen-SS gave way to a new idea of inducting German youth into the organization. During 1942 discussions were initiated for the formation of two panzergrenadier divisions, to be raised from young men engaged in compulsory duty in Germany’s labor service. In December of that year the two divisions were formally authorized, eventually to become 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions. Confirming Hitler’s acceptance of Waffen-SS expansion was his decision to allow the development of an SS corps system during 1942.
On a personal level, Hitler was especially pleased with the performance of his Leibstandarte and its commander, Sepp Dietrich. In January 1942 Hitler invited him to fly to Berlin, where he personally awarded him the Oak Leaves to his Knight’s Cross. Lionized by the Nazi Party, Göring publicly applauded Dietrich during his own birthday celebrations, while Goebbels trilled that he made “one think of a Napoleonic general.”3 Hitler, for his part, described him as a “national institution.”4 A short while afterward Hitler secretly awarded Dietrich 100,000 Reichsmarks for “special services.” Hitler gave all his leading commanders lavish secret gifts to tie them to the Nazi system, and Dietrich was no exception.5
Praise for the military performance of the Waffen-SS in the Soviet Union extended beyond Nazi Party circles. The endorsement of Leibstandarte by General Kempf during the Uman encirclement battle was joined by that of General von Mackensen. He wrote an unsolicited letter to Himmler expressing his admiration for the SS formation: “Herr Reichsführer, I can assure you that Leibstandarte enjoys an outstanding reputation not only with its superiors, but also among its Army comrades. Every division wishes it had Leibstandarte as its neighbor, as much during the attack as in defense. Its inner discipline, its cool daredevilry, its cheerful enterprise, its unshakeable firmness in a crisis, its exemplary toughness, its camaraderie (which deserves special praise)—all these are outstanding and cannot be surpassed.”6
The Wiking Division was also held in high regard, not least from one of its opponents, subsequently captured by the Germans. Major General Pawel Artemenko informed his captors: “The Wiking’s fighting power was characterized as fabulous. One battalion of these SS would easily smash the [Soviet] Army’s best regiments. They breathed a sigh of relief when the SS was relieved [by other German formations].”7 This was true of the Totenkopf Division, which, according to a German staff officer, was consistently ranked at the top of the Red Army’s Capability Assessment Tables.8
These favorable assessments of the Waffen-SS came with a high price in casualties. By the beginning of December 1941, total Waffen-SS losses for the campaign had reached 38,000 killed, wounded, and missing, and at the end of the winter, even allowing for reinforcements, most frontline units were less than two-thirds of their regulation strength.
THE TROOPS SHIVERING at the front were particularly unfortunate that the winter of 1941–1942 was more severe than usual, with temperatures along the entire line dropping between minus 20 and minus 40 degrees Fahrenheit on a regular basis. In early February—in positions held by the Reich Division—the temperature apparently reached an extreme low of minus 65 degrees.9
Unlike their army comrades, the Waffen-SS at least enjoyed the advantage of purloined clothing supplied from the concentration-camp system. In December Leibstandarte received a shipment of winter clothes, gathered by the SS in the Polish General Government,10 while in early January Totenkopf was provided with clothing drawn from SS warehouses in Latvia.11 But these shipments were enough to equip only relatively small numbers of troops.
Early in 1942 official measures were made to rectify the clothing shortage, but for most soldiers the winter-issue clothing arrived when the worst was over. Hendrik Verton, a Dutch volunteer in the “Westland” Regiment, recalled that “at the end of January and beginning of February, the long-promised winter clothing arrived from home. It included fabulous fur hats, padded jackets, thermal boots and warm pullovers, as well as balaclavas knitted in haste and faith by the girls and women at home. But it all arrived too late.”12
The easiest way to find suitable clothing was to improvise and take padded jackets, fur hats, and felt boots from the many Soviet corpses littering the battlefield. The Germans increasingly looked to Russian solutions to counter winter conditions. Sleighs drawn by the hardy panje pony were sometimes the only means to transport heavy goods, which included munitions and food as well as individuals. In one instance in early 1942, a panzer division had barely a serviceable vehicle in its inventory but instead relied on 2,000 panje ponies.13 The ordinary soldier dragged “Finnish” sleds behind him in the snow. They resembled small boats and could carry weapons, ammunition, and personal effects with minimal physical effort.
The sudden drop in nighttime temperatures made the acquisition of shelter essential if troops were to survive until morning. This dictated a new daily tactical cycle, as Hendrik Verton recalled: “In the afternoon we no longer fought to advance but to find a warm place for the night.”14 The artillery of both sides made a point of firing on any potential shelters the enemy might use. For those left out in the open, the consequences were often catastrophic. During his march to rejoin the “Westland” Regiment, Verton and a comrade had become separated from the main column and were struggling to find their way through thick snow:
To our relief we stumbled on a German bus. It lay slanted to one side of the road and the door was frozen, so that we could not open it. We scratched the frosty snow from the windows and looked inside. We saw German soldiers sitting in the seats, wrapped in blankets. All had their collars turned up to their ears, some sitting upright. Of the driver there was no sign. Had he sought help and returned? Was he lost in the snow? All had a somewhat strange yellow pallor and there was no sign of life. But any help that we could have given was no longer needed, for rigor mortis had set in. We slowly realized that all had died in their sleep.15
The two SS soldiers departed “the metal coffin on wheels, shaken to the core,” although they were later picked up by a German panje column delivering artillery shells to the front.
The winter of 1941–1942 placed enormous strain on Germany’s armed forces, and only the better units were able to endure these conditions and still function effectively. Erwin Bartmann of Leibstandarte certainly believed this was the case in his division: “In contrast t
o the Wehrmacht, most of our comrades were about the same age and our leaders, although often only ten years or so older than the men under their command, displayed excellent leadership abilities. This was a great advantage when things got difficult, we pulled together to overcome problems as best we could.”16
Leibstandarte did, however, have an easier time than most other formations on the Eastern Front during the 1941–1942 winter. The main weight of the Soviet offensive lay well to the north. Dietrich’s men faced only occasional local attacks to keep them on their toes, while taking part in the usual patrols and trench raids that characterized fighting from fixed positions.
As part of a general upgrading of the elite Waffen-SS formations from motorized to panzergrenadier divisions, Dietrich was informed that Leibstandarte would be receiving a new tank battalion to be crewed by volunteers recruited from the Hitler Youth. Leibstandarte’s fifth battalion, based in Berlin for ceremonial duties, was now assigned a combat role and dispatched to the Eastern Front. During the late spring of 1942, as OKH prepared for a resumption of offensive operations, Hitler decided to withdraw Leibstandarte for a complete reorganization, and in July it entrained for France.
Steiner’s Wiking Division, deployed a little farther north on the Mius Line, repulsed a number of minor enemy attacks in January and February. More serious was a Soviet breakthrough on 18 January on either side of Isjum, close to the key city of Kharkov. A Kampfgruppe based around “Germania’s” I Battalion was dispatched northward to help contain the Soviet threat. It was joined by a battery of artillery and the newly arrived assault-gun battery. Under the command of Sturmbannführer August Dieckmann, the battle group was battered by repeated Soviet attacks. The StuG IIIs were destroyed by vastly superior tank forces, while the “Germania” battalion was virtually annihilated in a series of defensive actions that ended on 25 February. On its return to the Wiking Division in March 1942, what remained of the Kampfgruppe was rebuilt, with reinforcements arriving from Germany.
FARTHER NORTH, THE Reich Division improved its defenses around Ruza. “Where shovels and picks failed against the hard-frozen ground,” wrote “Der Führer’s” regimental history, “excavation was done with blasting cartridges and anti-tank mines. After three days of indescribably hard work, which was repeatedly interrupted by the need to repel enemy attacks, the regiment was ready to defend the Ruza position.” The defenses were sufficient to deter further Red Army assaults, which by 24 December had petered out into long-range artillery bombardments. The regimental history described conditions for the troops: “So the regiment approached Christmas of 1941—frozen pea soup, frozen bread, boots and socks almost completely worn out, supply very much in question on account of a shortage of locomotives able to operate in cold weather, and huge snow drifts on all main and secondary roads. Nevertheless, at this point the regiment finally received some winter equipment: fur-lined parkas and pants, fur-lined boots and fur coats. Transport aircraft of the Luftwaffe (Ju 52s) dropped extra rations for Christmas, however most landed in enemy territory.”17
In mid-January the Reich Division was withdrawn from Ruza to new positions around Rzhev, soon to be the focus for a renewal of the Soviet winter offensive. The SS soldiers were immediately thrown into a counterattack, and despite the fact that they had had almost no rest since the start of Operation Barbarossa, they fought with their customary tigerish determination. Morale had slumped when the division had been ordered to abort its attack on Moscow, but the resumption of active operations led to a resurgence in fighting spirit, with the “Deutschland” Regiment noting that there was “a fabulous feeling among the troops.”18
The division was spread in a line, with “Der Führer”—just 650 active infantrymen under the command of Obersturmbannführer Otto Kumm—deployed close to the frozen River Volga by the village of Klepino. That the regiment was defending a key position was confirmed by regular inspection visits from the Ninth Army commander, Colonel General Model. At the end of January the Red Army launched its offensive, which would last for three weeks. Fortunately for the SS defenders, they would face not a concentrated assault but rather a succession of uncoordinated attacks that were repulsed with relative ease.
On 17 February Kumm was informed by Gruppenführer Kleinheisterkamp, who had succeeded Bittrich as Reich’s commander, that his battered regiment was to be relieved the following day. Of Kumm’s small force, 150 had been killed and most of the rest either wounded or incapacitated by frostbite. When Kumm reported back to divisional headquarters, General Model was present and asked for the strength of “Der Fuhrer.” Kumm replied that his regiment was outside the HQ office, and when Model looked through the window he could see just thirty-five men standing on the parade ground.19
Meanwhile, the remainder of the Reich Division continued its defense of the Rzhev salient. There was little letup in the renewed Soviet attacks until the end of March. Some idea of the toughness of the ordinary soldier and the close officer-man relationship of the Waffen-SS can be gleaned in this account from Georg Schwinke during the battle for “Jackboot Wood” on 23 March:
I was feeling terrible. My head buzzed like a bee-hive from where I had been buried when a heavy shell scored a direct hit on our dug-out. I had been slightly wounded in the head but had pulled the shrapnel fragment out of my skull. In addition, a bullet had wounded me slightly in the right leg during the day’s attack. When I reached Company HQ my officer asked why I was limping. He tried to take off my jackboot but the leg was too swollen. He cut the boot off, and pus and blood poured out from a leg which was now colored dark-blue and black . . . frostbite. Frost had got into the wound on my leg, entering a wound so slight that normally a sticking plaster would have covered it.20
The remnants of the division remained in place until 1 June, when they received orders to withdraw from the front and return to Germany for a complete overhaul.
Deployed close to the Reich Division was Hermann Fegelein’s SS Cavalry Brigade, engaged in antipartisan duties since the autumn of 1941. Before the Red Army’s winter offensive Fegelein had been in a positive mood, especially after the arrival of reinforcements and supporting units, which included signals and medical companies and an antiaircraft battery. His optimism reached new heights in a report written in December 1941: “The Brigade with its current equipment and armament and in its actual strength has the value of 1–2 front-line divisions.”21
When the Soviet armored thrust broke into the Cavalry Brigade’s lines on 17 January, the SS troopers were swept aside. They lacked the experience, numbers, and firepower to have any hope of defending their positions. In an attempt to hold the village of Basry, the brigade rounded up Soviet prisoners from a nearby holding camp and sent them forward as human shields, all killed in the Soviet advance.22
In March 1942 Fegelein was withdrawn from the front to take up a new role as an inspector for mounted troops. The remainder of the brigade was left at the front as a battalion-size Kampfgruppe under a new commander, Sturmbannführer August Zehender. By 1 April the brigade’s strength was down to 421 men, although plans were being made to reform and expand the formation into a full SS cavalry division for further service on the Eastern Front.
THE SOVIET STORM fell upon Army Group North on 7 January 1942. The Totenkopf Division was spread across a relatively wide area, and as the Red Army offensive developed it was divided in two: one smaller element—including infantry, engineer, reconnaissance, and artillery units—was based at Staraya Russa, the rest of the division stationed farther east around Demyansk. The SS troops holding Staraya Russa took the brunt of the opening attack but defended the position so firmly that they pushed the Soviet advance farther east. They would cling to their positions throughout the entire offensive. Hauptsturmführer Max Seela—one of the heroes of the battle for Lushno back in September—was again an inspiration for the defenders.
While the Germans clung to Demyansk, the Red Army surged forward on either side of the position. By 12 January Demyansk was increasing
ly isolated, and Field Marshal von Leeb, Army Group North commander, asked OKH for permission to withdraw the troops to a safer and better-defendable position. Hitler refused any retreat whatsoever, and after some strained exchanges Leeb’s resignation was accepted (replaced by Colonel General von Küchler). Leeb’s departure on 17 January marked the demise of the last of the three army group commanders who had led the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941.
Küchler, however, lacked the reserves to help the defenders of Demyansk. On 20 January advance units from the two Soviet pincers met, and by 8 February the Soviet encirclement was complete. As well as most of Eicke’s Totenkopf, the trapped forces included the bulk of five army divisions, totaling 95,000 troops with as many as 10,000 auxiliaries in addition. The Red Army had turned the tables on the Germans, who, for the first time, would be involved in a Kesselschlacht (cauldron battle).
Hitler ordered the men in the pocket to stand their ground, promising them resupply from the air while a relief force was assembled. The pocket contained two usable airfields, and with a short gap of between thirty and fifty miles separating the pocket from the main German lines, the Luftwaffe was able to conduct a fairly regular shuttle service to Demyansk. Supplies and reinforcements were flown in and the wounded taken out.
All the while, the Soviets maintained a tight grip around Demyansk. Much to Eicke’s irritation, his force was divided in two, one group under the command of Max Simon, assigned to stiffen the line in the east of the pocket, while Eicke led the slightly larger group on the western side. As the days turned to weeks, the SS troops repulsed the Soviet attacks with a determination that earned them the respect of their army comrades.
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