On the evening of 9 March, Goebbels and Göring were summoned to Hitler’s presence. Goebbels noted: ‘We consider either abstention or 1,000 planes dropping leaflets over Austria and then actively intervening.’ Later that evening, – in the meantime Glaise-Horstenau, on a visit to south Germany, had been hurriedly summoned to Berlin,59 and Bürckel, who, after the Saar plebiscite was considered an Anschluss expert, had also arrived – Goebbels noted the following remarks by Hitler: ‘Italy and England won’t do anything. France might, but probably won’t. Risk isn’t as great as during the Rhineland occupation’. The impending ‘action’ would, ‘if it happened at all, be very brief and drastic’.60
On the following day, 10 March, Hitler had still not managed to come to a decision. Goebbels noted several options. They could either recommend the Nazi supporters to take part and vote ‘yes’, in order to devalue Schuschnigg’s referendum. Or, they could demand an electoral law along the lines of the Saar plebiscite of 1935 (which could not be achieved quickly and would give the Austrian Nazis more time to prepare). If Schuschnigg refused to agree, the Nazi ministers, Glaise-Horstenau and Seyss-Inquart, could resign, and they could call for an uprising by dropping massive numbers of leaflets from German planes and then, in order to clarify the situation, march into the country.61 Goebbels’s report shows that Schuschnigg’s surprise move had taken Hitler off-guard.62 After overcoming the Blomberg–Fritsch crisis in February, he had been trying to make significant progress towards solving the Austrian question through ‘coordination’. In November 1937, in his address to the heads of the Wehrmacht he had made any use of force against Germany’s neighbours, Austria and Czechoslovakia dependent on France being neutralized, and, in March 1938, this was not the case, nor had Mussolini agreed to German military intervention in Austria. In view of the new situation, Hitler hesitated; he considered various options, wavering between them. His regime’s failed interventions in Austria in 1933 and 1934 and the diplomatic risks were arguments against taking precipitate action. However, in the final analysis, his concern that Schuschnigg’s surprise plebiscite could seriously damage his prestige proved decisive. It prompted him to adopt the most radical solution, finally solving the Austrian question through a triumphant victory over Schuschnigg and his supporters. It was only now that he abandoned his previous ‘evolutionary’ policy of a gradual coordination of Austria. He needed two full days before he reached his decision.
He informed his Propaganda Minister of it around midnight on 10 March; the invasion would take place on Saturday, 12 March.63 That night two army corps stationed in Bavaria were hurriedly mobilized in order to be able to cross the border in the early morning of the 12th. The way in which the Anschluss, which had been proclaimed for so long by the Nazis, actually took place clearly demonstrated the extent to which the whole undertaking was improvised. Thus, the precipitate mobilization of Wehrmacht units resulted in numerous breakdowns and hold-ups during the occupation of Austria, making it clear to the military leadership that the Wehrmacht was not remotely ready for action and in no fit state to wage war in spring 1938.64
On 11 March, the day before the invasion, a number of leading Nazi politicians arrived in Vienna: Bürckel, Hitler’s deputy Rudolf Hess, as well as Keppler, who was so active in this critical phase. They immediately began negotiations with senior Austrian politicians, increasing German pressure on the spot.65 With Göring issuing massive threats and ultimatums to Vienna by telephone, on 11 March Schuschnigg decided to resign. Late that evening, the Austrian Federal President Wilhelm Miklas finally yielded to strong pressure from Berlin and the Austrian Nazis, appointing Seyss-Inquart as the new Austrian Chancellor.66 Although it looked as if all German demands were going to be fulfilled, Hitler did not want to dispense with the military invasion. An Austrian ‘appeal for assistance’ was concocted, which Göring dictated over the telephone to Keppler for transmission to Seyss-Inquart, who then confirmed the content of the telegram by word of mouth.67
Hitler still had some concerns about the response of the Italian government. The SA leader and Oberpräsident [provincial governor] Prince Philipp of Hesse, a son-in-law of the Italian king, was dispatched as a special courier to Rome with a message for Mussolini. Mussolini should regard Hitler’s intervention in Austria as ‘an act of national emergency’. He assured Mussolini that his basic stance vis-à-vis Italy had not changed: ‘The frontier is the Brenner’.68 The prince was able to inform Hitler on the evening of 11 March by telephone of Mussolini’s positive response. Hitler was hugely relieved and repeatedly asked Philipp to assure the Duce ‘that he would never forget’ his action; he would be prepared ‘to go through thick and thin with him’.69
The following morning, German troops crossed the frontier as planned. German propaganda portrayed an overwhelming image of ‘an invasion garlanded with flowers’, an impression which still to this day dominates the public perception of the Austrians’ contemporary response to the Anschluss. In fact, however, right to the last minute, the issue was so controversial in Austria that Hitler regarded Schuschnigg’s plebiscite project as a serious threat to his own plans. He feared a considerable number of Austrians would support their country’s independence. Thus, the pictures of the jubilant reception of the invasion are above all the result of the dominance of German propaganda, which was able to establish itself very rapidly with the aid of the Austrian Nazis; they are by no means a faithful reflection of reality.70
Around midday on 12 March, Goebbels read out a ‘proclamation’ from Hitler over the radio. In it Hitler announced that because of the unstable situation he had decided ‘to provide help from the Reich for the 12 million Germans in Austria’. The Reich itself was ordered to ‘hang out the flags for a period of three days’.71 Before Hitler left Berlin on 12 March, he appointed Göring to be his deputy during his period of absence, in order to underline the fact that he was conducting the operation in Austria in person. Hitler then flew to Munich, from where he continued his journey in a procession of cars. In the afternoon they crossed the Austrian border with their first stop a visit to his birthplace, the town of Braunau, where he was greeted by a large crowd.72 It was not surprising that there was also great enthusiasm among the supporters of Anschluss in Linz, where Hitler arrived in the evening. Here he gave a speech from the balcony of the town hall, declaring that ‘providence’ had ‘long ago singled him out to come from this city to rule the Reich’.73
On the morning of the following day, while still in Linz, Hitler signed the Law for the Reunification of Austria with the German Reich, which he had unexpectedly given instructions to be drafted.74 It made Austria ‘a state [Land] within the German Reich’ and decreed that a plebiscite on the Anschluss should be held on 10 April. In addition, Hitler appointed Bürckel ‘acting head’ of the Austrian NSDAP.75
Hitler’s decision formally to annex Austria, rather than simply coordinating it by appointing a Nazi government or taking over the Austrian presidency in personal union with the Reich,76 was evidently made spontaneously only a few hours before he signed the law.77 His proclamation of 12 March mentioned only a plebiscite, in which the future of the country would be decided. Also, in his short address to the population of Linz on the evening of 12 March he had indicated that the timing of the Anschluss was still uncertain. Thus, not only did he make his decision to occupy the country to a large extent in response to the actual situation at the time, but the same was true of his decision on what constitutional form the Anschluss would take. It demonstrated how, after Schuschnigg’s plebiscite initiative had set the ball rolling in the Austrian question, Hitler was then in a position to drive things forward, creating a dynamic, unstoppable train of events, while at the same time managing to keep it under his personal control. His actions were decisively influenced by the impetus given by the opportunity of solving a question that had preoccupied him since his earliest years in a positively triumphant way through a bold coup.
Since 1933, the Nazi government had worked towards the Ansch
luss with Austria, which was popular in both countries. It appeared essential for strategic, military, economic, and other reasons; the creation of a ‘Greater Germany’ was, after all, one of Nazism’s main aims. However, the precipitate way in which Austria was annexed cannot be interpreted as simply the cumulative outcome of various attempts to achieve Anschluss; on the contrary, it shows how decisive were Hitler’s motivation, initiative, and actions in the actual situation as it evolved.
During 13 March, Hitler remained in Linz; he interrupted his stay for a trip to Leonding, where he laid flowers on his parents’ graves.78 On 14 March, he travelled on to Vienna, once again greeted with jubilation. In the meantime, events there had been occurring thick and fast. On the previous day, the Seyss-Inquart government had ordained ‘reunification’ with the Reich through a federal constitutional law, prompting the resignation of President Miklas. The Austrian armed forces swore loyalty to Hitler.79 At the same time, the regime’s propaganda machine began to take over the Austrian capital; Goebbels established a Reich Propaganda Office and sent his state secretary, Otto Dietrich, to Vienna with instructions for the ‘reform of the Austrian press’.80
The Anschluss was accompanied by mass arrests, directed in the first instance at members of the left-wing opposition, senior officials, functionaries of the Fatherland Front, and legitimists, who favoured a restoration of the monarchy. During March between 10,000 and 20,000 people were arrested.81 Attacks on Jews represented a particularly striking development. In the wake of the jubilation at the Anschluss many were publicly humiliated; in particular, they were forced to wash off by hand the slogans on walls and streets painted by supporters of the plebiscite. Throughout the country Jewish homes and businesses were plundered, money was extorted from Jews, their cars were ‘confiscated’, they were forced to give up their homes, while Jewish firms were taken over by self-appointed ‘commissars’ from the ranks of the Austrian NSDAP. In Vienna alone several hundred of those affected committed suicide.82
On 15 March, a mass demonstration attended by several hundred thousand people was held in the Heldenplatz in front of the Hofburg. The Austrian Nazis had managed to bus in numerous supporters from all over the country in a very short time, while the declaration of a school holiday and an early end to the working day in Vienna increased the numbers who turned up.83 In his address Hitler announced a new ‘mission’ for the ‘Eastern Marches’, which ‘from now onwards [were] to be the German nation’s, and so the German Reich’s, youngest bulwark’. At the end of this speech he declared: ‘As the Führer and Chancellor of the German nation and Reich I hereby announce before history the entry of my homeland into the German Reich.’ During the afternoon there was a military parade of German and Austrian troops round the Ring lasting several hours.84 Afterwards, Hitler received the Archbishop of Vienna, Cardinal Theodor Innitzer in his quarters in the Imperial Hotel; hitherto, Innitzer had been a supporter of Schuschnigg. He now told Hitler of his satisfaction with recent events and assured him of the loyalty of the Catholic population. Hitler was delighted with this response and began to wonder whether he could not harness the Catholic Church in Austria for his regime rather more easily than the one in the Reich.85
During the following days, Bürckel was able to persuade Innitzer and the Catholic bishops to issue a declaration in support of the new regime and to advocate a ‘yes’ vote in the coming plebiscite. This statement, together with Innitzer’s use of the phrase ‘Heil Hitler’ in his official communication to Bürckel, then did indeed play an important role in the Nazi propaganda for the plebiscite to confirm the Anschluss. Although, during a visit to Rome in April, Innitzer was ordered by the Vatican to partially distance himself from the declaration, and to demand the upholding of the Concordat with Austria, at the same time he endeavoured to maintain contact with the Nazi leadership.86
Meanwhile, in Berlin Goebbels had been preparing a ‘triumphal reception’ for Hitler. As was usual for such major receptions for the ‘Führer’ in ‘his’ capital city, Goebbels used an announcement in the Völkischer Beobachter to instruct Berliners to close factories and businesses, to put up flags on their houses, and to arrive punctually at the meeting points, where they were to join the marching columns of the Party or the DAF. ‘Everyone must be on the streets when the Führer’s coming.’87
On the morning of 16 March, he switched on the ‘people machine’: according to official figures, he had mobilized a total of 2.5 million people, so that Hitler could make a ‘triumphal entry’ into the city, concluding with a brief speech to the crowds from the balcony of the Reich Chancellery. ‘Germany’, he declared, ‘has become Greater Germany’.88 The organized celebrations also reflected the relief felt by the German population that the military intervention had in the end not led to bloodshed or provoked a serious international crisis, as the Western powers had been unable to decide on any counter measures. The fear of war, which had been palpable in the border regions of the Reich during 10–11 March, now turned into a wave of euphoria; since 1918, after all, the demand for unification with Austria had been a matter of course for the majority of Germans. It is, therefore, quite conceivable that Ian Kershaw is right in his speculation that the successful ‘solution’ of this problem represented ‘the absolute high point of Hitler’s prestige and popularity’.89
As a result of the Anschluss, German territory increased by 84,000 square kilometers and the population by 6.7 million. The regime acquired large amounts of gold and foreign exchange from the Austrian National Bank and from private sources; it was able to incorporate 60,000 soldiers into the Wehrmacht, utilize 400,000 unemployed, and considerably improve its trading position in south-east Europe. Germany also took over a significant amount of raw material deposits, in the form of iron ore and oil, which were increasingly exploited during the following years. However, according to a report by the War Economy Office, in the short term ‘the Greater German food and raw materials situation would deteriorate’ because consumption in ‘annexed’ Austria exceeded the supplies that had been gained, and the construction of new production capacity would initially require additional rare raw materials.90
26
The Sudeten Crisis
After the incorporation of Austria, Hitler’s next objective was the destruction of Czechoslovakia and the annexation of the Sudetenland. According to the Hossbach memorandum, in November 1937 he had only wanted to move against Czechoslovakia in the event that France was neutralized (through a civil war or a war with Italy). However, after the triumphant Anschluss, he was more and more determined to use force even without this precondition having been met.1
During these weeks, the way his mind was working gives an overwhelming impression of hubris. On 19 March, receiving Goebbels in his study, Hitler outlined his next foreign policy initiatives with the aid of a map: ‘. . . first on the list is Czechia. We shall divide it with Poland and Hungary. And we’ll do it ruthlessly at the next opportunity.’ While it is true that Hitler had already explained his intentions concerning Czechoslovakia to Goebbels in extremely aggressive terms on earlier occasions,2 now, after the Anschluss, its incorporation had acquired a much greater urgency. Hitler also told Goebbels that, as regards Memel, which was being administered by Lithuania, ‘we would want to grab it right away if Kovno got involved in a conflict with Warsaw’, but the opportunity had not yet arrived. ‘We are now a boa constrictor, which is digesting.’ But Hitler’s aims went even further: ‘the Baltic, a slice of Alsace-Lorraine. France will have to sink deeper and deeper into its crisis. Above all, no misplaced [sic!] sentimentality.’3
Hitler’s sudden interest in the Sudeten German minority was prompted by his determination to start a conflict intended to bring about the destruction of Czechoslovakia, using the pretext of the alleged threat to the existence of this ethnic group. He now recalled the offer, made in November 1937 by Henlein, leader of the Sudeten German Party [SdP], to subordinate himself to the German government. On 28 March he received Henlein, ordering him
to put a series of maximum demands to the Czech government, which Prague would be unable to accept.4 The SdP leader understood very well what was expected of him, summing it up as ‘always demanding so much that we can never be satisfied’. Ribbentrop explained to him the following day that the aim of ‘the negotiations to be pursued with the Czech government was basically to ensure that the scope of our demands, gradually spelt out in more and more detail, would prevent him from having to enter the government’.5 On 24 April, speaking in the name of the SdP at a meeting in Carlsbad, Henlein declared his support for Nazism and announced an eight-point programme. It contained such far-reaching demands on behalf of the German minority that their fulfilment within the current constitutional structure of Czechoslovakia was inconceivable and they were duly rejected by the Prague government.6
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