The campaign against the Berlin Jews
Hitler’s move towards an aggressive foreign policy, which he had outlined to the military leadership in November 1937, for which he had created the essential preconditions through his personnel changes in March 1938, and which was now geared to the plan for an attack on Czechoslovakia in autumn 1938, was accompanied by a radicalization of Jewish persecution. This had already been foreshadowed in his anti-Semitic speech at the Party Rally.85 At the end of November 1937, Hitler had told Goebbels: ‘The Jews must get out of Germany, in fact, out of the whole of Europe. That will take some time, but it will and must happen.’86 Since the start of 1938, the ministerial bureaucracy had once again begun to prepare more anti-Jewish regulations.87 In spring 1938, in the wake of the Anschluss, the Austrian Nazis began to take a very tough line towards the 200,000 Jews living in the country,88 and this immediately resulted in an increase in Jewish persecution in the Reich. The hard-line anti-Semites among the Party’s rank and file invested great hopes in this wave of violence. In April 1938, encouraged by Hitler,89 Goebbels started a major campaign against the Berlin Jews. His declared aim was to drive them out of the city through systematic chicanery. To achieve this, he had the police chief in Berlin, Wolff-Heinrich von Helldorf, prepare a comprehensive catalogue of anti-Semitic measures that aimed to exclude the Jews to a large extent from public life.90 Hitler specifically approved this project, but wanted its start postponed until after his return from his trip to Italy. According to Goebbels’s account of Hitler’s further plans, he wanted ‘all the Jews to be gradually deported’. They must negotiate with Poland and Romania. ‘Madagascar would be the best place for them.’91 In fact, as early as May, Party activists began to vandalize Jewish businesses and synagogues in Berlin. Goebbels now used these expressions of ‘popular anger’ in order to win Hitler’s support for his ‘Jewish programme for Berlin’.92 On 31 May, the police arrested 300 people, mainly Jews, during a big raid on a café on the Kurfürstendamm and Goebbels urged the police to undertake further measures.93
Goebbels had Hitler’s full support for his radical policy. The ‘Führer’ ordered that, as part of the Reich-wide campaign against ‘asocials’, beginning on 13 June, a large number of ‘criminal’ and ‘asocial’ Jews should be arrested.94 In Berlin alone, which was the main focus of this special initiative, 1,000 people were involved, among them those who had previous convictions for only minor infringements. Hitler soon found himself obliged to change course, however. In view of the serious international tension caused by the Sudeten crisis, he could not afford to have more negative headlines in the international press, which was following the Berlin events closely. Thus, on 22 June he personally ordered a provisional halt to the police action against the Berlin Jews.95 However, it is clear from Goebbels’s diary that he was simultaneously encouraging Goebbels96 to continue his anti-Semitic policy of using the Berlin authorities to cause administrative problems for the Jews.97
Hitler also did not prevent the anti-Semitic campaign from continuing outside Berlin. For in the wake of the Berlin excesses, similar attacks by Party activists took place in a number of other cities, while the Party press once again stepped up its anti-Semitic propaganda.98 Moreover, at the beginning of June, the Bavarian Interior Ministry ordered the main Munich synagogue to be pulled down. It was not until September, when the Sudeten crisis came to a head, that further anti-Jewish measures were, for the time being, curtailed.99
Discontent among the military leadership
Hitler spent the summer as usual in a relaxed atmosphere. After attending German Art Day and Bayreuth, he went to the Obersalzberg.100 In the meantime, however, it was becoming clear that his current political objective of crushing Czechoslovakia by military means and so risking a major war was faced with a military leadership that was hesitant, if not resistant; in particular, the Chief of the General Staff, Ludwig Beck, was actively opposing him. Beck, in turn, was in contact with the head of the Abwehr [Military Intelligence], Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, and the state secretary in the Foreign Ministry, Ernst von Weizsäcker, both of whom, like Beck, were not opposed to the dismantling of Czechoslovakia in principle, but nevertheless wished at all costs to avoid a war at this point.101
In the middle of June, Beck returned to his criticism of ‘Case Green’, producing a lengthy memorandum for the commander-in-chief of the army, Brauchitsch. In it he restated his view that a ‘military move by Germany against Czechoslovakia [would] automatically lead to a European or a world war’, which would ‘end not only [in] a military but a general catastrophe for Germany’.102 In a note for Brauchitsch Beck proposed that, in order to persuade Hitler to change his mind, ‘the most senior Wehrmacht commanders’ should threaten to resign en bloc. However, Beck then went a step further. In an addendum to his note – the meeting with Brauchitsch took place on 19 July – he stated that he also wanted to bring about ‘a confrontation with the SS and the [Party] bigwig bureaucrats that was unavoidable if proper legal conditions were to be restored’, at the same time explaining that ‘this struggle will be fought for the Führer’. At the end of this document Beck wrote a number of pithy sentences that indicate he was anticipating a domestic political conflict in which they would have to appeal directly to the people with popular slogans.103
Ten days later, Beck had another meeting with Brauchitsch. On the previous day, he had learnt from Hitler’s adjutant, Fritz Wiedemann, that Hitler was arguing that they ‘would have to fight a war with Czechoslovakia, even if France and England intervene’, although Hitler was not anticipating this. Beck also told Brauchitsch on 29 July that a major conflict with domestic political opponents was on the cards. The army must prepare for ‘an internal conflict, which need only take place in Berlin’.104 Thus, Beck appears to have envisaged a power struggle with certain radical elements in the regime, but probably not to the extent of carrying out a coup. In particular, Hitler’s position was not to be affected.105 Beck also presented Brauchitsch with a draft speech, persuading the generals to refuse absolutely to accept a war with Czechoslovakia.106 However, when he met the top generals on 4 August, Brauchitsch was simply not prepared to follow this script, although he did permit Beck to read out his 16 July memorandum. While concern about an impending war with Czechoslovakia was expressed in the subsequent discussion, there was no mention of their agreeing to a joint intervention with Hitler.107
Hitler, who was making increasingly negative remarks about Beck,108 learnt about the meeting and summoned Brauchitsch to the Obersalzberg, where he subjected him to a tongue-lashing.109 On 10 August, he gave a speech to a number of general staff officers of the army and Luftwaffe, whom he had invited to the Berghof, in order to convince them that, contrary to Beck’s view, the western powers would not intervene if Germany moved against Czechoslovakia. However, Beck had talked to the officers beforehand, convincing them that the views contained in his memorandum were correct, with the result that, on 10 August, Hitler was forced to listen to them expressing Beck’s concerns. Hitler was furious and reprimanded them for contradicting him.110 On 15 August, he gave another speech to generals in the mess at the Jüteborg military training area, reassuring them that an intervention by the western powers was not going to happen. It was very clear that he was implicitly criticizing the Chief of the General Staff, who was not present.111 Beck responded by submitting his resignation, which Hitler accepted three days later, insisting that it should not be made public ‘for foreign policy reasons’.112
Beck’s successor as Chief of the General Staff, Franz Halder, shared the concerns of his predecessor about military action against Czechoslovakia, wishing at all costs to avoid the risk of a general war. Apart from his attempts to block Hitler’s move towards war, carried out in cooperation with Weizsäcker, Canaris, Schacht, and other top functionaries, in other words through opposition and obstruction from within the regime’s power structure, Halder was also involved in plans for a coup, although he and his fellow-conspirators regarded this as
a last resort. These plans were being put forward, above all, by members of the Abwehr associated with Lieutenant-Colonel Hans Oster. They also involved a number of Wehrmacht commanders, the head of the Reich criminal police, Arthur Nebe, as well as the Berlin police chief, Helldorff, and his deputy, Fritz-Dietlof von der Schulenburg. These plans centred on removing Hitler, in order to prevent a war with the western powers, and beyond that, the elimination of Nazism. It is very difficult to assess how realistic they were, as our knowledge of them largely depends on the post-war statements of participants who survived. Reviewing the whole ‘September conspiracy’, one must conclude that, for a short time during summer 1938, various groups and individuals came together for whom the lowest common denominator was their hostility to the impending war, but who were divided about their intentions beyond that. It was typical of the heterogeneity and lack of commitment of these plotters that they failed to agree on whether they should arrest Hitler and put him on trial or simply kill him. When as a result of the Munich conference war was, for the time being, avoided, the network of conspirators rapidly disintegrated.113
The Sudeten Crisis intensifies
On 22 August, the Regent of Hungary, Admiral von Horthy, arrived in Germany for a five-day state visit. The ostensible occasion for his visit was the launching of a German cruiser in Kiel, which was to be given the name ‘Prinz Eugen’. During the course of his career, Horthy, the last commander-in-chief of the Austro-Hungarian navy, had commanded a battleship with the same name. After a programme in north Germany with a strongly naval flavour, the state visit ended in Berlin. However, the real aim of the visit was to get the Hungarian delegation, which included prime minister Béla Imrédy and foreign minister Kánya to support a German intervention in Czechoslovakia. Göring, with his usual insouciance, had already sounded out the Hungarian ambassador during June and July.114 Slovakia, which contained a large Hungarian minority, had been part of the Kingdom of Hungary until 1918 and was the target of Hungarian revisionism. During their visit the Hungarians appeared somewhat hesitant about supporting a German move against Czechoslovakia. However, in response to Hitler’s clear comment that ‘he was not expecting anything from Hungary in the affair . . . but those who want to sit at the table must also join in the cooking’, Kánya finally stated that Hungary would be prepared to participate in such a move from 1 October onwards.115
During Horthy’s visit the vicious propaganda attacks on Czechoslovakia temporarily ceased; afterwards, however, the German press campaign began again in earnest.116 The negotiations being carried on by Lord Runciman were accompanied by sensationally blown-up reports of incidents allegedly provoked by the Czechs. He had been sent to Prague by the British government as a mediator to try to persuade the government to concede most of the SdP’s demands.117
On 1 and 2 September, Hitler received Henlein on the Obersalzberg; he had already met him during the summer in Bayreuth and presumably also in Breslau.118 Henlein now informed the ‘Führer’ about the state of the negotiations with the Prague government. Hitler favoured a continuation of the negotiations, but with the aim of demonstrating the Czech government’s unwillingness to compromise and so providing a pretext for attacking.119 Significantly, on 3 September, Hitler conferred with Brauchitsch and Keitel on the plans for the attack on Czechoslovakia.120
A few days earlier, on 26 August, Hitler had assigned Henlein’s deputy, Karl Hermann Frank, the task of organizing ‘incidents’ in Czechoslovakia.121 Some days later, when, on 7 September, the Prague government had largely conceded the SdP’s demands with its so-called Fourth Plan, the Party provoked a large-scale confrontation with the police in Mährisch-Ostrau, as a pretext for breaking off negotiations. The incident came, as Goebbels noted, ‘just at the right time’.122 The German press were instructed by the Propaganda Ministry to play down the Prague offer and concentrate on the events in Mährisch-Ostrau.123
The Reich Party Rally from 6 to 13 September, which this year was held under the slogan ‘Greater Germany’, provided Hitler with a suitable backdrop for making further threats concerning the Sudeten question. The Nuremberg Rally, with its numerous special trains for the participants, also served to conceal the military build-up,124 which Hitler discussed intensively with his top generals during the rally, giving them precise directives for the attack.125 To begin with, Hitler adopted a moderate tone in his usual speeches at the rally before declaring in his final speech that the Sudeten Germans were being ‘intentionally ruined’ by Czechoslovakia ‘and thereby subjected to gradual extermination’; the Czechs wanted to ‘destroy’ them. ‘Herr Beneš’, Hitler declared, ‘has no right to bestow presents on these Sudeten Germans; they have the right to live their own lives just like any other nation.’ But if the democracies were convinced that they had ‘to shield the suppression of the Germans, using every means at their disposal’, then this would have ‘serious consequences’. Hitler refrained from making concrete demands of the Prague government and intentionally left open what he might be planning to do next. Goebbels’s comments reveal Hitler’s thinking: ‘Herr Beneš should ensure justice. How he does it is up to him. He won’t be told what justice means. But if he doesn’t deliver it, and we’re the ones who’ll decide on that, then we’ll intervene.’126
Hitler’s speech at the end of the Party Rally seems to have been intended as the signal to start, quite intentionally, ratcheting up the crisis into an open conflict. For immediately after his return from Nuremberg, Karl Hermann Frank presented the Prague government with an ultimatum. He demanded the suspension of martial law, which had been imposed on western Bohemia following the disruption caused by the Sudeten Germans.127 This manoeuvre was obviously designed to create a pretext to justify intervention by the Reich to ‘protect’ the Sudeten Germans. The German press was instructed to attack Czechoslovakia, ‘giving it a big spread and using the toughest language’.128
In the end, Hitler was not prepared to act on Frank’s provocation. Without German support and because of the tough measures taken by the Czech authorities the unrest soon collapsed.129 However, on the evening of 14 September, a sensational development occurred. The British prime minister, Neville Chamberlain, declared that he was ready to come to Germany the following day for discussions, whereupon Hitler invited him to the Obersalzberg. This was rather a mean gesture, since it meant that Chamberlain, who had never flown before, was being forced to travel to meet Hitler in the furthest corner of the Reich. In the meantime, press and radio continued to heat up the threatening atmosphere, reporting on the mood of panic that had allegedly gripped Czechoslovakia and on Prague’s military measures, to which Germany would respond.130 This formed the intimidating background to the negotiations that followed.
The Munich Agreement
Chamberlain arrived in Berchtesgaden on the afternoon of 15 September. He was received in an atmosphere of strained friendliness underlaid with tension, as what was at stake was nothing less than war or peace.131 During a conversation between the two statesmen – only the interpreter, Paul Schmidt, was present – Hitler began with a long monologue about all the humiliations that Germany had suffered since 1918 and about his foreign policy, calling into question the 1935 Naval Agreement. Given Hitler’s determination to solve the Sudeten question ‘one way or the other’, Chamberlain asked why in that case he had let him come to see him. The ‘Führer’ then adopted a more constructive tone, demanding the cession of the Sudeten territory on the basis of the right of self-determination. Chamberlain replied that he would have to refer that back to London for clarification, but basically, he personally recognized the ‘principle of the separation of the Sudeten territories’, particularly since Hitler had told him during their conversation that this was the ‘last major problem that remained to be solved’.132
After the meeting, Hitler told Weizsäcker that ‘by brutally announcing his intention of solving the Czech question now, even at the risk of a general European war, and by stating that he would then be content with the
situation in Europe’, he had achieved his main goal, namely of getting Chamberlain to declare that he would support the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany. He ‘had not been able to refuse’ a plebiscite, a logical consequence of his own demand for ‘self-determination’. If ‘Czechia’ rejected it then ‘the way would be clear for the German invasion’; if it gave in, then ‘it would be the next in line, but later, for example, next spring’. ‘The settlement of the first stage in the Sudeten German question by peaceful means had its advantages too.’ Weizsäcker noted that ‘during this confidential conversation the Führer did not disguise the fact that he was calculating on a future war and had more far-reaching plans’.133 Hitler could not have outlined more clearly his tactical calculations and the true motives concealed behind his policy purportedly designed to ‘protect’ the Sudeten Germans. He made very similar comments to Goebbels.134 Hitler’s instruction not to give the British a copy of the transcript of the meeting, prepared by the interpreter, Schmidt, was a breach of diplomatic protocol and a further example of his devious behaviour towards his British visitor. Chamberlain had correctly assessed the situation when he informed the Germans that he was ‘upset’ about this behaviour and, since he could not possibly remember all the details of this two-and-a-half-hour conversation, was left feeling ‘like someone who had been cheated’. However, despite being duped, for the sake of maintaining peace, he did not let this prevent him from continuing the negotiations with Hitler.135
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