Hitler

by Peter Longerich

  That evening he continued with his summer cultural programme: he appeared at Salzburg in order to attend the Festival production of Mozart’s Die Entführung aus dem Serail.94

  Figure 9. In August 1939 propaganda photos such as these were used by the regime to make the German population ready to accept the imminent outbreak of war. Although this ‘ethnic German’ woman and her children have supposedly fought their way through barbed wire, they are shown looking remarkably neat and tidy and are given friendly assistance by the German border police.

  Source: ullsteinbild / TopFoto

  On 11 August, in other words the day after his meeting with Burckhardt, Hitler ordered the propaganda campaign against Poland to be at ‘80% volume’, and four days later, to start the ‘final sprint’.95 Following these instructions, the German media launched strident attacks on Poland, while at the same time the German population was being persuaded that war was unavoidable.96 On 19 August, Hitler gave instructions for propaganda to be cranked up to ‘full volume’ in two days’ time.97 Now the German media concentrated on blaming the impending outbreak of war on the attitude of Poland and the western powers.98

  Meanwhile, following consultations with the Foreign Ministry, Gauleiter Forster had opened the negotiations between Danzig and Poland over the customs dispute with such provocative demands that the Poles broke them off, as he had intended.99

  On 24 August, Forster had the Danzig Senate declare him ‘Head of State’, a unilateral promotion, intended to provoke the Poles and underline the fact that the Germans considered the position of the League of Nations High Commissioner of no importance.100 On the same day, Forster got Hitler to approve further provocations. They were contemplating removing the Polish customs officials from the city and the customs border between Danzig and East Prussia. If this proved insufficient to provoke the Poles into taking counter measures, the next step would be to ‘deal with the Westerplatte’.101

  German–Soviet rapprochement

  At the end of the summer, Hitler was about to embark on a complete reorientation of his foreign policy. The Berlin–Rome–Warsaw alliance he had envisaged up to spring 1939 had not come about because of Poland’s refusal to submit to his demands. The Berlin–Rome–Tokyo alliance the Germans had sought in spring 1939 had proved abortive because of Japanese reluctance, and the alliance with Italy that finally emerged, the Pact of Steel, was extraordinarily unreliable on account of Italy’s lack of commitment to war. In the light of the whole direction of Hitler’s policy since the mid-1920s, what remained was a positively breathtaking option.

  During the spring of 1939, the Foreign Ministry had already taken note of various signals from Moscow indicating an interest in normalizing relations with Germany. Stalin’s speech to the XVIII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on 10 March 1939, in which, referring to the West, he declared that he would not ‘pull the chestnuts out of the fire’ for warmongers, could be interpreted as such a signal,102 and was followed by others.103 The replacement of the foreign minister, Maxim Litvinov, by Vyacheslav Molotov also appeared to point in the same direction. The opening of talks about a trade agreement provided the opportunity for improved relations.

  In response to the German occupation of Prague, in the middle of April the Soviet Union had offered Britain and France a tripartite pact to secure the status quo in eastern Europe, and negotiations had been continuing since May. The more the conflict between Nazi Germany and the western powers intensified, however, the more Russia was inclined to seek a separate arrangement with Germany, stay out of the impending war, and possibly use the conflict to regain former Russian territories it had lost in the First World War.104

  The Germans’ initial response to the first cautious Soviet feelers was mistrustful and reserved.105 The uncertainty stemmed from the fact that the Soviet Union was already involved in negotiations with France and Britain, which suggested that it might be planning to start talks with Germany simply in order to strengthen its negotiating position with the western powers. There was also a need for caution given the fact that Japan could regard a German agreement with the Soviet Union as a breach of the Anti-Comintern Pact.

  A change came about with Hitler’s decision at the end of May to sound out the willingness of the Soviet Union to negotiate via a meeting between Weizsäcker and the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires in Berlin.106 Although this test proved positive and further signals of the Soviet willingness to negotiate were received,107 at the end of June, Hitler suddenly decided not to pursue the trade talks any further, as the Soviet conditions attached to them were unacceptable. However, a few days later, this position was reversed and the German embassy in Moscow received detailed instructions to begin trade negotiations and, on 22 July, the Foreign Ministry informed it that the ‘pause’ that had been inserted to allow for discussion of political questions was now over.108

  Germany now became actively engaged. After the first approach by a member of the economics department of the Foreign Ministry to the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires in Berlin, Georgi Astachov, at the end of July,109 Ribbentrop told Astachov in the course of a lengthy conversation that the Germans wanted a ‘reshaping of German–Russian relations’, and, according to his own account of the meeting, he gave a ‘slight hint’ that Germany wanted to ‘reach an understanding with Russia about the fate of Poland’.110

  After Molotov too had signalled his willingness to negotiate,111 on 14 August, Ribbentrop instructed his ambassador, Count Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg, to arrange a meeting with Molotov and inform him that the Reich government considered ‘that there was no issue between the Baltic and the Black Sea that could not be arranged to the entire mutual satisfaction of both countries’, including, in particular, ‘the Baltic, the Baltic states, Poland, and south-eastern issues’. He, Ribbentrop, was willing to come to Moscow for a lengthy visit.112 Ribbentrop felt under pressure, not least because, two days earlier, a Franco–British military delegation had begun further discussions in Moscow about the project for a trilateral pact with the Soviet Union, which was still a live issue.113 On 16 August, Schulenburg reported to Berlin that Molotov had specifically asked about the possibility of a non-aggression pact.114 Ribbentrop told Schulenburg that Germany was prepared to enter such a pact and to guarantee the Baltic states jointly with the Soviet Union. And Ribbentrop then passed on the message that was decisive for Molotov: ‘The Führer believes that, in view of the present situation and the possibility of serious events occurring (please explain to Herr Molotov that Germany is not prepared to go on putting up with Polish provocations indefinitely), a fundamental and rapid clarification of German–Russian relations and of the attitude of both countries to current issues would be desirable.’115

  Molotov replied that they welcomed Germany’s ‘reorientation’ and, to begin with, wanted a trade and credit agreement that could smooth the way for a non-aggression pact.116 Ribbentrop’s reply of 18 August revealed Germany’s impatience: ‘German–Polish relations were deteriorating every day. We believed that incidents could happen at any time, leading inevitably to the outbreak of hostilities.’ Thus, Hitler considered it necessary to clarify German–Soviet relations before the outbreak of a German–Polish war. Once again, Ribbentrop made clear his wish to visit Moscow, sketched out the non-aggression pact that was envisaged, and proposed a special ‘protocol’ in which, for example, ‘the spheres of influence in the Baltic region, the question of the Baltic states etc.’ could be clarified.117 The following day, 19 August, a credit agreement was signed,118 and Ribbentrop was invited to Moscow.119 The Soviets also presented a draft agreement with an attached protocol ready for signature.120

  The following day, Ribbentrop delivered a letter from Hitler addressed to ‘Herr Stalin, Moscow’.121 Hitler ‘warmly’ welcomed the signing of the trade agreement ‘as the first step in the reshaping of German–Soviet relations’. A non-aggression pact would represent for him ‘a long-term commitment of German policy. Germany was once again adopting a po
litical approach, which in past centuries had been beneficial to both countries’. He accepted the Soviet draft and was convinced that the attached protocol could ‘be substantially agreed in a very short time’. Hitler continued: the ‘tension between Germany and Poland’ had ‘become intolerable’. Germany was determined, ‘in view of this unreasonable behaviour, from now onwards to defend the Reich’s interests with all means at its disposal’. Hitler now proposed that they should ‘lose no more time’ and that Ribbentrop should go to Moscow as soon as possible. His foreign minister would be bringing ‘full and comprehensive powers to draw up and sign a non-aggression pact as well as the protocol’.

  The following day, Stalin telegraphed his agreement and, late in the evening of 21 August, Germany was able to announce to the world – including its astonished allies, Italy and Japan122 – the surprising news that it was about to sign a non-aggression pact.123

  War aim: ‘The destruction of Poland’

  Assuming that there would shortly be an agreement with the Soviet Union that would seal Poland’s fate, on 22 August Hitler once again spoke to around fifty high-ranking officers he had summoned specially to the Berghof. We do not have an actual copy of Hitler’s speech, which was of vital importance for the outbreak of the Second World War,124 but its contents can be reconstructed from the notes made by various members of his audience.125

  Hitler explained to the generals that he had already taken the decision to attack Poland in the spring following the occupation of Memel. At first, he had thought that in few years’ time he would first move against the West and only after that against the East. But then he had realized that, in the event of a conflict with the western powers, Poland would attack Germany. He had to preempt that.126

  He justified his decision to go to war at this particular point in time by explaining that both Germany and Italy currently had exceptional leaders. His own supreme self-confidence is revealed in one of the transcripts of the speech: ‘Essentially, everything depends on me, on my existence, because of my political talents. Also, the fact that probably no one will ever again have the confidence of the whole of the German people in the way that I have. In future, there will probably never again be a man who has more authority than I have. Thus, my existence is a factor of great value. But I can at any time be eliminated by a criminal or a lunatic.’ After praising Mussolini and Franco in a similar fashion and declaring that Italy’s loyalty as an ally and Spain’s neutrality depended on these friendly leaders, he went on to mention another key point: ‘as a result of the constraints on us, our economic situation is such that we can only hold out for a few more years . . . we have no other choice, we must act.’

  The ‘political situation’ also made it advisable to act now. ‘In the Mediterranean rivalries between Italy, France, and England, in East Asia tension between Japan and England, in the Middle East tension that is alarming the Moslem world.’ Another factor was that the position of the [British] Empire and France had deteriorated since the end of the First World War. In addition, in the Balkans, ‘since Albania . . . [there was] a balance of power’. Yugoslavia and Romania were in an extremely weak position, Turkey was ruled by ‘weak and feeble men with small minds’. ‘In two or three years’ time’ all these ‘favourable circumstances [will] no longer’ prevail. ‘And no-one knows how much longer I shall live. So, it’s better to have a conflict now.’127 The founding of Greater Germany, Hitler continued, was ‘politically a great achievement, but militarily it was questionable, as it was achieved through bluffing by the political leadership’. It was now necessary ‘to test the military’ by ‘getting it to carry out individual tasks’.128

  The relationship with Poland had become ‘intolerable’. It was Britain’s fault for intervening and blocking his initiative in the Danzig and Corridor question. It was time to act, he repeated, as ‘it was still highly probable’ that the West would not intervene. In any event, they would be taking ‘a great risk’ that would demand ‘iron nerves’ and an ‘iron resolve’.

  Britain and France, he continued, were not ready for war. Neither a blockade, nor an attack from the Maginot line would be successful and an attack through neutral states was out of the question. If, contrary to expectation, the western powers did intervene, they would defend the West until they had conquered Poland.129 Hitler went on to describe his rapprochement with Russia, which excluded any risk from that quarter.130 All in all, there was only one final risk left, that some ‘chap’ (‘Schweinehund’ in another version)131 would screw it up with an offer to mediate.132

  He told the generals he would ‘provide a propaganda pretext for starting the war, however implausible. The victor is never asked afterwards whether or not he told the truth. When starting and waging a war it’s not being in the right that matters, but victory.’ And he went on: ‘Close your hearts to pity. Act brutally. 80 million people must get what is their right. Their existence must be made secure. The stronger man is in the right. The greatest harshness.’ For the generals this meant: ‘The military goal is the total destruction of Poland. Speed is of the essence. Pursuit to the point of complete annihilation.’ He announced that the war would ‘probably’ start on Saturday 26 August.133 The process of military mobilization began accordingly.134

  Hitler interrupted his speech briefly to say goodbye to Ribbentrop, who was going off on his trip to Moscow.135 His entourage consisted of some thirty persons, including, apart from the diplomats, Hitler’s personal photographer, Hoffmann.136

  Arriving in Moscow on 23 August, Ribbentrop immediately began the final stage of the negotiations with Stalin and Molotov.137 They quickly came to an agreement: the non-aggression and consultation pact was to last ten years and stated that, in the event of military measures undertaken by a third power against one of the two treaty partners – the word ‘attack’ was carefully avoided – this third power would not be supported by the other treaty partner. More important, however, was the additional secret protocol, envisaging the partition of Poland and the Baltic states into Soviet and German spheres of interest. Although he had been given plenary powers, Ribbentrop sought Hitler’s approval for a concession in the division of spheres of influence: Stalin was demanding the Latvian ports Libau (Liepaˉja) and Windau (Ventspils). The ‘Führer’ agreed and the treaty was then signed.138

  Hitler was now not only certain that, in the event of an attack on Poland, he had excluded the Soviet Union as a potential opponent, but he would also be able to let his new ally share in the spoils.139

  War or peace?

  The conclusion of the Nazi–Soviet pact was followed by a week of hectic diplomacy, involving Germany, Poland, Britain, France, and Italy: notes were exchanged, emissaries sent, and there were last-minute attempts at mediation. The decision over war and peace lay entirely in Hitler’s hands. His attitude during this last phase before the outbreak of war was contradictory and wavering, which led to speculation among his contemporaries and later historians about his motives. Had Hitler become the victim of a miscalculation arising from his own disparate aims, so that he stumbled more or less blindly through the crisis, which then ended in a two-front war he had not intended? Or had he been aiming for a war with the western powers from the very beginning, believing that it would be better to face the inevitable confrontation in 1939 rather than a few years later?

  When, immediately after the conclusion of the Hitler–Stalin pact, Chamberlain told Hitler in writing that Britain would go to war if Germany attacked Poland, Hitler responded in his written reply just as decisively: he would not withdraw his demands on Poland and if this meant war with Britain then Germany was ‘ready and determined’ to fight.140

  While Weizsäcker believed that Hitler was reckoning on a ‘localized war’,141 the latter left Goebbels the same day with a somewhat uncertain impression as to whether the western powers would intervene: ‘At the moment one can’t be sure. . . . It depends on the circumstances. London is more committed than in September 1938 .�
�. . England probably doesn’t want a war at the moment. But it has to save face.’ At present Paris was holding back, but there too ‘one can’t be absolutely certain’. Italy was not enthusiastic, ‘but it will probably have to join in; it has hardly any other choice.’ Hitler dismissed the fact that the new alliance with Stalin completely contradicted the regime’s post-1933 anti-Bolshevik policy with a terse comment: ‘The question of Bolshevism is at the moment of minor importance. Also, the Führer believes he’s in a tight spot . . .’ ‘It’s an emergency and beggars can’t be choosers’. Finally, during the night, the long-awaited communiqué arrived in the Berghof from Moscow, confirming the final version of the alliance with Stalin.142

  The following day, 24 August, Hitler flew from Berchtesgaden to Berlin,143 in order to begin the final preparations for the attack. That evening, accompanied by Göring and state secretary Weizsäcker, he met Ribbentrop, who had just returned from Moscow.144 The foreign minister declared that in Moscow ‘he had felt as if he was among old Party comrades’, and Hoffmann praised Stalin as intelligent, amiable, and cunning.145