From October 1939 onwards, mental hospitals in the Reich were instructed to report all patients who were suffering from specific mental defects and who ‘cannot be employed in the asylum or only in purely mechanical tasks’. Furthermore, all patients, regardless of their diagnosis or employability, were to be reported if they had ‘been in asylums continuously for at least five years, are confined as criminal lunatics, or do not possess German nationality or are not of German or related blood’; this provision was directed, in particular, at Jewish patients.
To carry out the ‘euthanasia murders’ the Führer’s Chancellery constructed an elaborate cover organization with the title T4, after the Führer Chancellery’s headquarters address in Berlin, Tiergartenstrasse 4. The victims were selected through an elaborate procedure. The forms provided by the mental hospitals were examined very superficially by three assessors, and a senior assessor then gave the final verdict, on the basis of which the headquarters organized the ‘transport to transfer’ those affected. Initially, in order to cover their tracks, the patients were transferred to intermediate institutions, from where they were sent to one of six centres specially equipped to kill them. There they were murdered in gas chambers.
During the first half of 1940, the ‘euthanasia’ murders under the T4 programme were gradually extended to the various individual states and provinces within the Reich until eventually virtually the whole of the country had been included. The quota they were aiming for of 20 per cent of patients was in some places considerably exceeded and in others sometimes undershot. In autumn 1940 this prompted the planners considerably to increase and then, in April 1941, to reduce the projected total of victims, until, having reached the planned figure of 70,000 murders, in August 1941 the T4 programme was halted.123 We shall examine the reasons for this decision later.
With its mass shootings in Poland and the murder of mental patients, Hitler’s regime had already embarked on a policy of systematic, racist-motivated extermination nearly two years before the start of the mass murder of the Jews. To implement the ‘euthanasia’ programme they had devised a complex, bureaucratic procedure involving a division of labour. The key elements were the ‘selection’ of the victims, their deportation to special murder sites, gas chambers, and mass executions (Poland). The victims were misled until the very last minute, and the perpetrators were enabled to evade the issue of personal responsibility, as they appeared to be performing only limited functions in a process that was taking place under scientific auspices and made necessary by force of circumstance. As with the murder of the Jews, the ‘euthanasia’ programme can be described as an ‘open secret’. While the murder of mental patients was subject to stricter secrecy, the extent of the operation made it impossible to disguise.124 Moreover, by making barely concealed references to the ‘elimination’ of ‘inferiors’, the regime showed it had few qualms about admitting it, thereby confirming the rumours that were in circulation.125 The fact that, from the summer of 1940 onwards, all Jewish inmates of asylums, around 4,000–5,000 persons, were murdered irrespective of the state of their mental illness or their ability to work, illustrates the close connection between the ‘euthanasia’ programme and the Holocaust.126
Finally, there is a further parallel between the ‘euthanasia’ programme and the Holocaust: Hitler bore the main responsibility for both. Whereas in the case of the ‘euthanasia’ programme this is proved by the piece of personal writing paper with his signature, in that of the murder of the European Jews it can be reconstructed through a mass of detailed evidence. However, two years after the start of the ‘euthanasia’ programme and directly after it was stopped, Hitler came to prefer the ‘unwritten order’ to its written version.
30
Resistance
During the months following his rapid victory over Poland, Hitler gradually adjusted to what was a completely changed situation. He was now the ally of his arch-enemy, the Bolshevik Soviet Union, and found himself at war with Britain, which, since the 1920s, he had regarded as his ideal partner. Failure to bring the war to a rapid conclusion on the basis of the new status quo would mean a renewal of hostilities by the western powers, and yet he lacked the resources for a lengthy war. Thus, without waiting for the response of the British government to his ‘peace offer’ of 6 October, Hitler pressed forward energetically with his plan to attack in the West that autumn. A day after the speech, he told Halder that ‘when the autumn mists arrive’ Belgium would appeal to France for help and they must preempt that with a ‘decisive operation’.1
On 9 October, he prepared a memorandum, setting out in detail his reasons for an attack in the West. The following day, he read out and commented on this document at a meeting with Brauchitsch and Halder. His basic ideas were then incorporated in his ‘Directive No. 6 for the Conduct of the War’. He told the generals that, if the western powers did not soon indicate a willingness to make peace, he would attack France through the Netherlands and Belgium, if possible during the autumn, in order to smash the French armed forces and those of her allies. He would then establish a base within the conquered territory for a war on land and sea against Britain. Hitler claimed that, as far as could be seen, Russia would remain neutral; however, this could change in ‘8 months, in a year, let alone in a few years’ time’.2
When Chamberlain rejected Hitler’s proposals of 6 October in a speech on 12 October, the ‘Führer’ immediately responded with an exceptionally polemical government statement claiming that the Prime Minister had spurned ‘the hand of peace’.3 As a result, for the time being, all further attempts at mediation were pointless. While, at the end of September, he had appeared outwardly optimistic about Britain’s willingness to negotiate, he now went to the other extreme. He even told Goebbels that he was now glad that ‘we can go for England’.4 His rapid change of stance indicates that the peace offer was made primarily for domestic political reasons, and Hitler now regarded its rejection as an opportunity to place the blame for the continuation of the war on Britain and France.
Hitler’s determination to extend the war met with some reservations among members of the regime. Apart from Göring, the army leadership in particular was sceptical. The generals considered the prospects of success as minimal; in their view, the state of the armaments economy alone sufficed to rule out another major offensive. During October, for a short time, the opponents of the regime within the government machine were boosted by the continuing anti-war mood among the population. They once again established contact with one another and even contemplated a coup. At the centre of the conspiracy was a group of young officers within the army leadership, who looked to Franz Halder, the Chief of the General Staff, for support. He does appear to have considered a violent change of regime as a last resort if the war in the West could not be prevented.5
On 14 October, Halder discussed the situation with Brauchitsch, who suggested three options: ‘Attack, wait and see, fundamental changes’, although it was clear that none of these possibilities offered ‘certain prospects of success’. ‘Fundamental changes’ evidently meant a coup d’état, an idea the two generals considered the least attractive of the three options, ‘because basically it would have negative and damaging repercussions’.6 On 16 October, Hitler told Brauchitsch that he had given up hope of an agreement with the West, and fixed the period from 15 to 20 November as the earliest possible date for an attack.7
Hitler’s Directive No. 7 of 18 October permitted, for the time being, the ‘crossing of the French frontier by reconnaissance units’ and the over-flying of French territory by fighters.8 The Directive Yellow, issued by the commander-in-chief of the army on 19 October, reflected Hitler’s plans for the campaign. The aim was to defeat the Allied forces with an offensive through Belgium and the Netherlands and, ‘at the same time, to capture as much Dutch, Belgian, and northern French territory as possible in order to provide a base for an effective sea and air campaign against England’.9
In view of the widespread scepticism (to put it m
ildly) within the military about his plans for an attack, Hitler tried to convince the civilian and military leadership through a series of speeches and interviews. On 21 October, he made a speech lasting several hours to the Party’s Reichsleiters and Gauleiters. He told them he was determined to conduct the war, which he now considered ‘almost unavoidable’, ‘ruthlessly and with all means until victory has been achieved’. According to another record of the meeting, Hitler had told them he would launch a major offensive in the West in about 14 days’ time. Then, when he ‘had forced England and France to their knees’ he would ‘once again turn to the East and sort things out there, for at the moment, as a result of the present difficulties, the situation had become disordered and confused. It had become clear that the Russian Army was not up to much, that its soldiers were badly trained and armed. Once he had achieved this goal, then he would create a Germany as of old, in other words, he would incorporate Belgium and Switzerland.’10
On 22 October, Halder, who was in a state of anxiety about the, in his view, insoluble task he had been set, learnt that Hitler wanted to attack on 12 November.11 On 25 October, Hitler discussed his plans for the offensive with his military chiefs and found himself confronted with the concerns of the professionals.12 He ordered that the commander-in-chief’s Directive ‘Yellow’ of 19 October should once more be revised. The occupation of the Netherlands, originally in the plan, was dropped; the directive now envisaged ‘destroying’ (and no longer ‘defeating’) the Allied forces north of the Somme, and driving through to the Channel coast. In other words this meant no longer forcing the enemy out of Belgium, but surrounding them through an advance reaching deep into northern France.13
Hitler placed the military leadership under pressure not only as far as the launch of the attack was concerned. In contrast to his lack of interference in operational matters during the Polish war, he now began increasingly to intervene actively in the purely military planning of the attack. On 27 October, Brauchitsch once again tried to get Hitler to agree to change the date for the attack to the end of November; however, the ‘Führer’ insisted on sticking to 12 November.14
In the meantime, Halder tried to recruit opponents of the attack. At the end of October, he sent his deputy, Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel, to the commanders of the three army groups in the West, to secure their backing in the event of an open conflict with Hitler. Only General Wihelm von Leep, the commander of Army Group C, responded positively. However, the generals all shared Brauchitch’s and Halder’s critical assessment of an attack in the West. After a trip to Army Groups A and B, undertaken with Brauchitsch at the beginning of November, Halder concluded from his meetings: ‘We cannot anticipate a decisive success in a land war.’15
On 5 November, a serious confrontation occurred between Hitler and Brauchitsch. Hitler was furious when, in order to justify his doubts about a western offensive, Brauchitsch referred, among other things, to certain weaknesses shown by the infantry in Poland. Hitler demanded proof of this assertion, declaring that he would fly to the front himself in order to assess the troops’ morale. After this confrontation Brauchitsch left, totally demoralized.16
The combination of Brauchitsch’s evident weakness, Hitler’s threat that he would soon deal with the ‘spirit of Zossen’ (the headquarters of OKH), and his order now definitely fixing the date of the attack as the 12 November, sufficed to persuade Halder, who feared the exposure of his soundings about a coup, to cease his opposition. From now onwards he concentrated solely on his military duties. The real regime opponents, basically the group of youngish officers in the OKH, who were much more committed to acting, then abandoned their plans. The result of this confrontation had shown that Hitler had no challenger among the military leadership who could mount a serious opposition to his war plans, and was prepared to act to prevent him from implementing what was regarded as a catastrophic policy. Thus, autumn 1939 can be considered only with reservations as the second phase of the conspiracy against Hitler.
On 8 November, Hitler appeared at the celebrations in the Bürgerbräukeller, which had been significantly curtailed as a result of the war, in order to give his usual speech.17 This time the speech was dominated, above all, by an attack on Britain and designed to spread confidence in victory. However, it was much shorter than expected because Hitler had been forced at short notice to alter his plans for the return to Berlin, and had to catch the regular night train, to which his special train was attached. During the stop in Nuremberg a message was passed to the train, which to begin with Hitler simply could not believe. Shortly after he had left the Bürgerbräukeller, there had been a big explosion resulting in eight deaths and sixty injured.18
Hitler immediately agreed with Goebbels, who was accompanying him, that had he not left early he would certainly have been assassinated.19 German propaganda began immediately to blame the British Secret Service for the attack.20 For days, Hitler and his entourage speculated about who could have done it, without having any definite information.21 When, after a few days, the culprit was revealed to be a carpenter, Georg Elser, Hitler and Goebbels were convinced that he was merely the ‘creature’ of the Nazi Party renegade, Otto Strasser, who was living in Switzerland, and who, in turn, had been acting at the behest of the British Secret Service.22 Hitler then took a few days before deciding to issue a communiqué about Elser’s arrest. German propaganda now attempted to establish a connection between Elser, Strasser, and the Secret Service by including ‘revelations’ about two British agents, Richard Stevens and Sigismund Payne Best, who had been abducted from Venlo in Holland on 9 November.23 Naturally, the fact that a single individual had almost succeeded in assassinating Hitler and important members of the Nazi leadership could not be revealed in the media, nor be allowed to become public through a court case. The same was true of Elser’s motives. For this loner was not acting on behalf of any political organization and was simply aiming to get rid of Hitler as the main cause of the war. Elser was by no means alone in his conviction that, if this war were not quickly brought to an end, it would be fatal for Germany.
The spectacular abductions at Venlo and the regime’s decision to accuse the Secret Service of carrying out the assassination attempt produced such strong responses from the western powers and the neutral states that the success of the surprise attack was put in further doubt. It had already been postponed from 12 to 15 November at the earliest, and now had to be postponed again, not for the last time that year.
Preparations for the attack in the West
On 23 November, Hitler gave a speech to the military leadership in which he made clear his determination to expand the war at all costs, even against the advice of his hesitant generals, and took the opportunity to humiliate the commander-in-chief of the army in front of the top brass.
In his speech he projected the image of a ruthless conqueror. After Munich, he said, it was clear to him ‘from the very first moment that I could not be satisfied with the Sudeten German territory. That was only a partial solution. The decision to march into Bohemia was made. There followed the establishment of the Protectorate and with that the basis for the action against Poland was laid, but I was not quite clear at the time whether I should start first against the East and then in the West or vice versa.’ Then Hitler moved on to his favourite topic: ‘the adjustment of living space to the size of population’. A solution to this problem was possible only ‘with the sword’. At this time, they were engaged in a ‘racial struggle’. Basically, he had ‘not built up the Wehrmacht in order not to fight. I always wanted to fight. I wanted to solve the problem sooner or later.’ In view of the overall situation, he had decided to attack first in the East. After the defeat of Poland, they were now in the fortunate position of not having to fight a two-front war. For the moment Russia was not dangerous; it was weakened ‘by numerous internal issues’; its army was ‘of little account’. This situation would last for one or two years. The fact that he had survived the assassination attempt had convinced him that P
rovidence had chosen him to lead the German people to victory in this war. As a result, his willingness to take a risk had considerably increased.
‘As the final factor I must in all modesty name my own person. I am irreplaceable . . . I am convinced of the power of my intellect and my determination.’ This was particularly important, for ‘wars are always ended only by the destruction of the opponent. Anyone who believes otherwise is irresponsible. Time is on the side of our adversaries. . . . The enemy will not make peace if the balance of forces is not in our favour. No compromise. We have to be tough with ourselves. I shall strike and not capitulate.’ The ‘fate of the Reich’ depends ‘on me alone’, and he would act accordingly. Their forces were still more numerous and stronger than those of their opponents in the West. They had to preempt a possible attack on the Ruhr through Belgium and the Netherlands, particularly since the occupation of both countries by German troops was an essential prerequisite for the further air and sea war against Britain. ‘My decision is unalterable. I shall attack France and England at the most favourable opportunity. Breaching the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is irrelevant. No one will question that when we’ve won’.24
Then he moved on to deal with Brauchitsch. The latter’s questioning the effectiveness of the troops, which is how Hitler interpreted the recent confrontation with his army commander-in-chief, had ‘hurt him deeply’. As far as Fedor von Bock, the commander-in-chief of Army Group B, was concerned, the whole speech was marked by ‘a certain degree of discontent with the army leadership’. According to Bock, Hitler knew ‘that, at this point, the majority of the generals did not believe the attack could achieve a decisive success.’25 Following the speech, Hitler reproached Brauchitsch and Halder for the generals’ negative attitude; however, when Brauchitsch offered his resignation, Hitler refused to accept it, and so the army commander-in-chief remained in office under a cloud.26
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