The propaganda war
Apart from conducting military operations in the East and establishing the guidelines for Germany’s future occupation policy, during the summer of 1941 Hitler was preoccupied to a considerable extent with the repercussions of the extension of the war for the ‘home front’. From the very beginning, he kept a careful eye on the development of the ‘mood’ in Germany and maintained personal control over the main themes of propaganda. He was able to do both through more or less continuous contact with Goebbels, his Propaganda Minister. At the start of the campaign, the propaganda machine was in a precarious state. The German population was not in the least prepared for the ‘Eastern Campaign’; to begin with, the unexpected extension of the war provoked anxiety and concern.121 Moreover, for reasons of secrecy, during the first days after the launch of the invasion, the OKW report contained no concrete details about military developments.122 This propaganda blackout soon produced exaggerated rumours about the Wehrmacht’s success.123 After urgent representations from Goebbels, Hitler gave instructions124 that, on Sunday 29 June, a week after the start of the campaign, a series of special announcements should be made about German military successes.125 They did not, however, match up to expectations; many people had assumed that the Wehrmacht’s spearheads had penetrated even further into the Soviet Union.126
On 4 July, Hitler instructed Goebbels ‘to begin the great anti-Bolshevist campaign’.127 The media were told ‘to launch a big attack’, with the ‘conspiracy between Bolshevism and the Jews’ as its main theme.128 This was prompted by the discovery of a massacre of political prisoners and Ukrainian insurgents that the Soviets had carried out in the local prison on their withdrawal from Lemberg [Lvov].129 On 8 July, Hitler received Goebbels in the Führer headquarters for the first time since the start of the campaign against the Soviet Union. The ‘Führer’ told him he was convinced that ‘two thirds of the Bolshevik armed forces had already been destroyed or severely damaged’. He used this opportunity to order his propaganda minister to focus even more on anti-Semitism in his propaganda, ‘to reveal the cooperation between Bolshevism and plutocracy, and also to emphasize more and more the Jewish character of this alliance’.130 On the following day, therefore, Goebbels instructed the press to make ‘the Jews are to blame’ ‘the main theme of the German press’.131 The press, but also the other media, now began a hitherto unexampled chorus of anti-Jewish hatred. As ordered by Hitler, the aim was to include the war against ‘Bolshevik’ Russia and against ‘plutocratic’ Great Britain in a single propaganda slogan, and to portray it as the decisive struggle against the ‘Jewish world conspiracy’.132
The United States was also increasingly described in German propaganda as the puppet of Jewish world domination and prophylactically included among the Reich’s enemies. In this way the leadership thought they had invented a convincing slogan to prepare the German people for the entry of the United States into the war. ‘Churchill – Stalin – Roosevelt : The Pan-Jewish Triple Star’* was, for example, the Völkischer Beobachter’s headline on 13 July. The Atlantic Charter of 14 August, in which Roosevelt and Churchill had established common principles for the peaceful coexistence of nations, following ‘the final destruction of National Socialist tyranny’, provided a further target for propaganda attacks. Although Hitler mocked it as a cheap propaganda trick by the western powers,133 this overt gesture of solidarity by the United States towards Britain was interpreted by German propaganda as confirming its claim of a Jewish world conspiracy. In the summer of 1941, Hitler’s regime was already engaged in a global propaganda ‘war against the Jews’.
In the meantime, as a result of the military successes against the Soviet Union, the German population was coming to expect victory within a matter of weeks, and thus a relatively calm atmosphere prevailed during July. Significantly, during the course of the month the situation on the eastern front took up less and less space in the SD reports on the public mood.134 Instead, complaints about the everyday difficulties of life in wartime took centre-stage. People were worried about problems in the supply of food and about the British air raids on the cities in western Germany,135 while ‘vacation evacuees’ (better-off people escaping the cities and seeking refuge in holiday resorts) damaged the image of a national community totally committed to the war.136 In addition, there was the fear that the war could go on indefinitely.137
Towards the end of the month, when, despite all the military successes, victory was still not yet in sight, the mood deteriorated sharply.138 Goebbels felt obliged to take a ‘tougher’ line in his propaganda.139 Apart from the negative influences on the public mood already referred to,140 the growing concern, in particular among churchgoers, about the arbitrary expropriation of Church property was having a negative impact on morale. In July, therefore, Hitler decided officially to halt the expropriation,141 although in practice this was widely ignored.142 In addition, information and rumours were being spread about the so-called euthanasia programme.143
The situation changed in August when radio broadcast a series of special announcements about important successes on the eastern front, producing a generally very positive picture and resulting in the ‘reports on morale’ once more becoming optimistic in tone. This high point in morale was not, however, destined to last long.144
* Translators’ note: The term ‘triple star’ (Dreigestirn) derived from the ‘rulers’ of the annual Cologne Carnival festivities: a prince, a peasant, and a maiden.
35
The Radicalization of Jewish Policy
Meanwhile, it had become clear that the mood of the German population was subject to major fluctuations depending on the course of the war in the East and that people were acutely sensitive to domestic political issues; trust in the regime’s conduct of the war was distinctly lacking. The German people had gone to war without enthusiasm and, after the successes of the first twenty months, had hoped it would end rather than be extended. Lack of reports of successes from the front line was sufficient to produce a mood of pessimism, concern, and anxiety. In addition, Hitler, who was running the war from the isolation of his East Prussian headquarters, had not appeared in public for months, with the result that the propaganda machine could not deploy the usual ritual of mass support for the ‘Führer’s’ policies.
In this difficult situation, during the course of two weeks in the second half of August, Hitler took two decisions with significant domestic political repercussions: the introduction of a Jewish badge and a halt to the ‘euthanasia’ programme. Both decisions affected the core of his ideological concerns and could not have been more different in their implications. Jewish persecution was to be further radicalized, while the ‘elimination’ of so-called ‘life unworthy of life’ was – officially at least – to be stopped. As the regime had entirely geared its propaganda to the campaign against a Jewish world conspiracy that was allegedly uniting Germany’s enemies, it made sense to extend this campaign to the Jews still living in Germany, dubbing them the enemy within. This would underline the radical ‘ideological’ character of the war. The message that Germany was engaged in an existential struggle against the Jewish ‘world enemy’ was to dominate a ‘public opinion’ that was controlled by the regime, thereby pushing into the background the day-to-day worries and burdens of the war. Shortages, air raids, and fears about the military situation had to be borne stoically in the face of this life-and-death struggle.
The marking of German Jews with a yellow star represented the start of this campaign. The initiative came from Goebbels, who revived suggestions that had come from the security police and the Party leadership after ‘Kristallnacht’ and again during 1940.1 In Poland the marking of Jews had already been compulsory since November 1939. On 15 August, Goebbels held an inter-ministerial conference in the Propaganda Ministry at which, among other things, the marking of the Jews was discussed.2 When Goebbels, while visiting Hitler at his headquarters on 18 August, suggested marking the Jews so that they could no longer avoid detecti
on as ‘grumblers and fault-finders’, the dictator immediately agreed both to that and to a reduction in their food rations. Moreover, he now reassured Goebbels ‘that the Berlin Jews [are to be] deported from Berlin to the East as quickly as possible as soon as transport becomes available. They will be worked over in the harsher climate there’.3 However, Hitler insisted that this should not happen until the campaign in the East had come to an end.4
In the course of the discussion Hitler also told Goebbels that his prophecy of 30 January 1939 that a new world war would end in the ‘annihilation’ of the European Jews was now becoming true during these weeks and months with a certainty that was almost uncanny. For ‘the Jews in the East must pay the bill; in Germany they have already paid part of it and in the future they will have to pay more.’ This statement makes it clear that, under the impression of the mass murder in the occupied eastern territories, Hitler was now prepared to take a tougher line with the Jews in Germany itself. His ‘global war against the Jews’ was not simply a propaganda fantasy; it was increasingly becoming reality.
At the same time as dealing with the ‘Jewish question’ Goebbels focused on another issue that threatened to affect the public ‘mood’: the conflict with the Churches. The Catholic population was not only concerned about the continuing confiscation of Church property by the state,5 there was also growing opposition to the ‘euthanasia’ programme, which, despite attempts to keep it secret, was becoming known to broad sections of the population.
At the beginning of July a pastoral letter objecting to the killing of innocent people was read out in Catholic churches.6 On 3 August 1941, the Bishop of Münster, Clemens August von Galen, who had already criticized the policy of confiscating Church property, preached a sermon opposing the systematic murder of patients in mental hospitals. News of this protest quickly spread throughout the Reich during the following days.7 The fact that Münster, like other predominantly Catholic cities in north-west Germany, was a prime target for British air raids during the summer of 1941 increased the regime’s concern about the potential emergence of a particular threat to the home front, a concern heightened by the fact that Galen cleverly hinted at the raids being divine punishment.8 On 11 August, the chairman of the German Catholic Bishops’ Conference, the Breslau cardinal Adolf Bertram, wrote to the Minister for Churches, Hanns Kerrl, requesting his comments on the issue of ‘euthanasia’. Kerrl did not reply.9 Goebbels was clearly concerned about the situation.10 During his visit to the Führer headquarters on 18 August he agreed with Bormann that in future they should exercise restraint on religious issues. After he had obtained Hitler’s approval for this position, on 24 August he issued a circular to the Gauleiters and Reichsleiters to that effect.11
On the same day, Hitler finally ordered a stop to the ‘euthanasia’ murders being carried out through the T4 programme because he clearly wished to avoid further discontent among the church-going population.12 In fact, at this point the T4 programme had already achieved its original goal of killing 70,000 asylum patients,13 and the murder of patients did not then cease, but rather, from 1942 onwards, continued throughout the war in a decentralized form. In fact, during this second phase of ‘euthanasia’ more people were murdered than under the T4 programme.14 Moreover, as a direct consequence of the halt to ‘euthanasia’, Hitler decided to establish a large number of emergency hospitals near to certain areas threatened by air raids (he was naturally thinking in the first place of north-west Germany, which had been badly hit). The existing mental hospitals could be used for this purpose and their patients moved elsewhere. He put his personal physician, Karl Brandt, who had been responsible for the first case of child euthanasia, in charge of the project. The transfer of the patients was to be carried out by the Community Patients Transport Ltd, which had hitherto been involved in transferring the victims of ‘euthanasia’. The overall coordination of the transfer of patients was in the hands of a civil servant, Herbert Linde, who had been responsible for the Interior Ministry’s role in the T4 programme. As concern grew among the population that the plan for the transfers simply represented a continuation of the ‘euthanasia’ programme, they were to be reassured by, for example, the introduction of measures such as visits to the patients. Thus Hitler skilfully responded to the population’s concern, aiming to neutralize the protests against the murder of patients through targeted assistance to the cities affected by air raids, even doing so using personnel from the old T4 organization.15
In this critical phase the regime did everything possible to avoid a confrontation with the Catholic Church. During the summer, protests and even demonstrations occurred in Bavaria against the order, issued by the Bavarian Interior and Culture Minister and Gauleiter Adolf Wagner, to remove all crucifixes from schools. Wagner was forced to withdraw the edict on 28 August.16 During the following months as well, Hitler reiterated his position that there should be no conflicts with the Churches during the war. After the victorious conclusion of the war he would then set about achieving a fundamental solution to the Church problem.17
In September the war in the Soviet Union was dominated by the events in the southern sector of the front. As ordered by Hitler, elements of Army Group Centre, including Guderian’s panzer group, turned southwards and, operating together with sections of Army Group South, surrounded substantial Soviet forces east of Kiev. The city itself was conquered on 19 September. The battle in the greater Kiev area was concluded around 25 September with more than 600,000 Red Army soldiers taken prisoner. In contrast to the clashes of opinion during August, there was widespread agreement between Hitler and the army leadership concerning these operations. After their conclusion Army Group South pressed forward towards the Crimea and the Caucasus.18 These military successes were exploited by propaganda with the result that morale, which had deteriorated, not least as a result of the lack of reports from the front,19 improved once again during the second half of September.20 At the end of the month the official announcements recorded an almost euphoric mood, as reports of victories gave many people hope that the war in the East would be over before the start of the winter.21
When Hitler once more received Goebbels in his headquarters on 23 September, he assured him that, while up until around 15 October they would ‘still have serious battles to fight, from then onwards he believed he would have the Bolshevists on the run’. All necessary arrangements had been made for the troops to survive the winter; he was even contemplating disbanding a number of divisions. If Stalin were to offer him a separate peace at this stage he would of course accept such an offer. ‘For if the military power of Bolshevism is broken it will no longer pose a threat; it will then be driven back into Asia.’
After the conclusion of operations in the Kiev area the focus of events moved to the central part of the front. Strong Soviet forces had established themselves between Army Group Centre and Moscow.22 The Wehrmacht’s autumn offensive began on 2 October in full strength. With the conquest of Moscow the aim was to achieve a decisive success in the war against the Soviet Union before the end of the year so that during the coming year the main focus could once again be the war with Britain and, as was becoming increasingly probable, the United States.23 On the day after the start of the offensive Hitler appeared in Berlin to make a speech in the Sportpalast to open the Winter Aid campaign, his first public appearance since 4 May 1941. He used it for a series of detailed justifications of his policies. He declared theatrically that his alliance with Stalin in 1939 could only be described as the ‘biggest humiliation . . . that I have ever had to put up with’. But the decision to attack the Soviet Union had been ‘the most difficult decision of my whole life’. ‘Every such step opens a door behind which secrets are hidden and only posterity can know how it came to pass and exactly what happened’. With this he was preparing for the main point of his speech – the announcement that the military operations in the East were about to reach a decisive stage: ‘I am talking about it today because I can say today that this enemy is bro
ken and will not rise again’.24 With this statement he was disguising the fact that that, even after the impending decisive blow against the Soviet Union, the war in the East would be continued.
According to Rosenberg’s liaison officer, on his return from Berlin on 4 October Hitler was still ‘in a remarkably good mood’.25 At dinner on 8 October he referred to the ‘tremendous and decisive change in the military situation during the last three days’ and Jodl added that, in view of the great progress made by their operations ‘one could say without exaggeration that Germany had won this war’.26 Hitler ordered a special announcement to be made that in the Viasma area ‘several Soviet armies had been surrounded and faced inevitable destruction’.27 And, on 9 October, under the impression of the euphoria in the Führer headquarters, Reich Press Chief Dietrich even went so far as to call a press conference in Berlin at which he declared that the war in the East had been decided. According to both Hitler’s and Dietrich’s own statements, the ‘Führer’ had authorized him to make this announcement.28
By 12 October, in two large encirclements near Briansk and Viasma, the Wehrmacht had in fact succeeded in surrounding a significant number of Soviet divisions and taking over 600,000 prisoners. As a result, Army Group Centre calculated that there were no longer any significant concentrations of enemy forces in front of Moscow.29 On 12 October, Hitler gave instructions that any offer to surrender the city of Moscow should be rejected. German soldiers were not to set foot in either Leningrad or Moscow.30
The ‘war against the Jews’
Between the middle of September and the middle of October Hitler succeeded in encouraging his immediate entourage to believe that Germany was about to achieve a great military success, and this sense of euphoria was transferred to the media and the ‘popular mood’ as reflected in the official reports, even though Goebbels tried to counteract it with a more realistic approach.31 On 15 September, in the midst of this victorious mood, the wearing of a yellow star, ordered by Hitler a month before, became compulsory for Jews. This move was prepared by a new anti-Semitic propaganda campaign. The yellow star badge was portrayed as necessary in order to mark out the Jews as participants in an international Jewish conspiracy. It was designed to ensure that the German population kept its distance from Jews still living in the country and, thereby, publicly demonstrated its support for the radical war against the Jews.32
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