3. Goebbels TB, 31 May–2 June 1937, on the ‘Leipzig’ incident see also 20, 23, 24 June 1937. Hans-Henning Abendroth, Hitler in der spanischen Arena. Die deutsch–spanischen Beziehungen im Spannungsfeld der europäischen Interessenpolitik vom Ausbruch des Bürgerkrieges bis zum Ausbruch des Weltkrieges 1919–1939 (Paderborn, 1973), 163ff.; Manfred Merkes, Die deutsche Politik im spanischen Bürgerkrieg (Bonn, 1969), 276. On the Condor Legion see Stefanie Schüler-Springorum, Krieg und Fliegen. Die Legion Condor im spanischen Bürgerkrieg (Paderborn, 2010).
4. ADAP D 3, No. 354.
5. ADAP C 6, No. 889, editor’s note; Henke, England, 93ff.; Merkes, Politik, 290ff.
6. Goebbels TB, 15 March 1937. That contradicts Kershaw, Hitler, 2 (Stuttgart, 2000), 85, who deduces from Goebbels’s notes that Hitler did not begin to ‘focus on Austria and Czechoslovakia’ until the summer of 1937.
7. From the end of 1936 onwards Czechoslovakia sought to stop the German press campaign. See ADAP C 6, No. 78, No. 153 and No. 239; Goebbels was not unreceptive to the idea of a press truce (Goebbels TB, 23 January), but then, at the end of March, concentrated on the Sudeten German question. See ibid., 2 and 3 March 1937. For the fundamental reorientation of German press policy towards Czechoslovakia see PA 1937, No. 550.
8. During his Italian visit in meetings on 15 and 23 January (ADAP D 1, No. 199 and No. 207f.). See also Schausberger, Griff, 377f.; Kube, Pour le mérite, 225ff.; Malcolm Muggeridge (ed.), Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers. Being a Record of Nearly 200 Conversations Held during the Years 1936–1942 with Hitler, Mussolini, Franco, Goering, Ribbentrop . . . and Many Other World Diplomatic and Military Figures (London, 1948), 80ff.
9. On Göring’s visit in April see Schmidt, Statist, 352f. On Neurath’s visit in May see ADAP D 6, No. 350.
10. Schausberger, Griff, 378f.
11. Ibid., 408ff.; Goebbels TB, 13 July 1937. The banned party was given the opportunity, among other things, to appear in public; persecuted Nazis were only to be given a light sentence or amnestied, and Mein Kampf was permitted to be sold.
12. Schausberger, Griff, 410; the appointment occurred on the occasion of an assessment of the Vienna meetings on the Obersalzberg. See Goebbels TB, 13 July 1937; ADAP D 1, No. 241; Keppler’s formal appointment only occurred in September by Hess.
13. Domarus 1, 711ff., quote, 711; VB (B), 2 August 1937, ‘Überwältigende Manifestation des deutschen Volkstums’ (headline). See also Goebbels TB, 1 and 2 August 1937.
14. Ibid., 3 August 1937.
15. Ibid., 14 September 1937.
16. Domarus 1, 726ff., quotes 729.
17. PA 1937, No. 2219. For the published text of the speech see VB (B), 10 September 1939, ‘Dr. Goebbels enthüllt die dunklen Pläne des Bolschewismus’.
18. ADAP D 1, No. 2, and C 6, No. 568.
19. On the course of the visit see VB (B), 25–29 September 1937; Domarus 1, 733ff.
20. Schmidt, Statist, 375.
21. VB, 26 and 29 September 1937, ‘Dr. Goebbels meldet den Aufmarsch von drei Millionen Menschen’; Sopade 1937, 1219.
22. ADAP D 1, No. 10; Galeazzo Ciano, Ciano’s Hidden Diary 1937–1938 (New York, 1953), 20 October 1937. On the additional protocol to the Anti-Comintern pact and other secret agreements see above p. 468.
23. ADAP D 1, No. 17.
24. Lipski, Diplomat, Doc. 73; ADAP D 5, No. 18. On the evening preceding the signing the deputy Polish foreign minister had a conversation with Göring, in which the latter once again emphasized that Germany had no territorial claims on Poland. See Wojciechowski, Beziehungen, 333f., on the basis of Polish documents.
25. See below, p. 600f.
26. This applied to the territory of the kingdom of Bohemia. See Günter Wollstein, Das ‘Großdeutschland’ der Paulskirche. Nationale Ziele in der bürgerlichen Revolution von 1848/49 (Düsseldorf, 1977) 189ff.
27. Smelser, Sudetenproblem, 132ff.
28. PA 1937, Nos 2496, 2502, 2506, 2512, 2523, and 2530.
29. Goebbels TB, 4 November 1937. On the halt to the campaign see ADAP D 2, No. 11; PA 1937, Nos 2687 and 2702.
30. Schwarzenbeck, Pressepolitik, 247ff.; ADAP D 2, Nos 12 and 15–18.
31. Ibid., No. 29; Report of the German ambassador about the success of the Czech measures against the émigré press in ibid., No. 47. On the ‘press truce’ see Schwarzenbeck, Pressepolitik, 247ff.
32. Smelser, Sudetenproblem, 178ff.; Rolf Gebel, ‘Heim ins Reich!’ Konrad Henlein und der Reichsgau Sudetenland (1938–1945) (Munich, 1999), 55.
33. Recorded as IMT 25, 386-PS, 402–13. On the history of its survival see Walter Bussmann, ‘Zur Enstehung und Überlieferung der “Hoßbach Niederschrift” ’, in VfZ 16 (1968), 373–84. Bradley F. Smith, ‘Die Überlieferung der Hoßbach-Niederschrift im Lichte neuer Quellen’, in VfZ 38 (1990), 329–36.
34. Thomas Sarholz, ‘Die Auswirkungen der Kontingentierung von Eisen und Stahl auf die Aufrüstung der Wehrmacht von 1936 bis 1939’, Dissertation, Technical University, Darmstadt, 1983, 249ff. See also BAF, RH 15/149, General Army Office, Fromm’s speaker’s notes concerning the effects of the shortage of raw materials, to C in C Army 29 October 1937.
35. Goebbels TB, 23 February 1937.
36. This context has been overlooked by some authors in their interpretation of the Hossbach memorandum so that, as a result, they reach the erroneous conclusion that, on 5 November, Hitler revealed his plans for the establishment of an empire covering eastern Europe (living space) during the period 1943–45. Hildebrand, Vergangene Reich, 741, refers to the years 1943–45 as the deadline he had set for the campaign to conquer eastern Europe. See also Richard Overy, ‘Hitler’s War Plans and the German Economy’, in Robert W. D. Boyce and Esmonde M. Robertson (eds), Paths to War. New Essays on the Origins of the Second World War (London, 1989), 107.
37. IMT 25, 386-PS, 402–13.
38. BAF, RL 3/201, note; Sarholz, ‘Auswirkungen’, 255ff.; Hossbach, Wehrmacht, 120.
39. IMT 34, 175-C, 734ff.
40. ADAP D 7, Appendix. III, K. In the appendix of 7 December 1937 to the directive for the uniform preparations for war by the Wehrmacht of 24 June 1937 Blomberg had announced that, if the political situation during 1938 did not change to Germany’s disadvantage, he would no longer work on the scenario of a two-front war with the main focus on the West. See IMT 34, 175-C, 745ff. On this see Müller, Heer, 247ff.
41. Interpreter Schmidt emphasizes in his account (Statist, 385) that Hitler had adopted an arrogant tone demonstrating his increased self-confidence vis-à-vis Britain.
42. ADAP D 1, No. 31.
43. This is also clear from the assessment of the meeting by foreign minister, Neurath, who was present on 19 November. See ibid., No. 33.
44. Henke, England, 67f.; Schmidt, Statist, 383.
45. Ribbentrop, London, 91ff.
46. ADAP D 1, No. 93.
47. Michalka, Ribbentrop, 215ff.; Henke, England, 69ff.
48. ADAP D 5, No. 149. See Jörg K. Hoensch, Der ungarische Revisionismus und die Zerschlagung der Tschechoslowakei (Tübingen, 1967), 51. Hoensch assumes that Hitler revealed his plans to his Hungarian guests to a far greater extent than is suggested by the minutes. This is also indicated by the Hungarian note on the meetings between Göring, Darányi, and Kánya on 2 November 1937, which has survived. See Lajos Kerekes (ed.), Allianz Hitler–Horthy–Mussolini. Dokumente zur ungarischen Außenpolitik (Budapest, 1966), No. 19. On 31 March 1938, the Hungarian ambassador in Berlin told state secretary von Weizsäcker that Hitler had promised to return to Hungary the territories ceded to Czechoslovakia. See ADAP D 2 No. 114.
49. ADAP D 5, No. 29; Wojciechowski, Beziehungen, 386f.; Hoensch, Revisionismus, 58f. and 66f.
50. Ibid., 60f.; Wojciechowski, Beziehungen, 404f.
51. ADAP D 5, No. 163.
From the Blomberg–Fritsch Crisis to the Anschluss
1. Sopade 1937, 9ff. (Fear of war), 33ff. (Food supplies), 53ff. (Raw materials crisis), 216ff. (Church struggle), 371ff. ((Food supplie
s), 480ff. (general mood, various factors), 533ff. (Corruption in the Party), 597ff. (Discontent among businessmen), 641ff. (Raw materials shortages) and 659ff. (Food shortages). The discontent continued into the second half of the year.
2. Ibid., 763 (Revival of the fear of war), 919. ‘People are concerned about the threat of war, partly for fear of it, partly, in the case of young people, in the hope of becoming heroes’, 1085ff. (Fear of war, but also hope for war), 1365ff. (‘War is increasingly seen as unavoidable, some people are afraid, others are looking forward to it.’ ‘This is true both of supporters and of opponents.’)
3. Ibid, 1527ff.
4. A ‘Schacht crisis’ had been rumbling on since March 1937. See Goebbels TB, 19 and 21 March, 12 and 14 August, 5, 9, and 10 September, and 27 October 1937; Kopper, Schacht, 312ff.
5. Goebbels TB, 29 October, 2, 3, 4, and 6 November 1937.
6. Willi A. Boelcke, Die deutsche Wirtschaft 1930–1945. Interna des Reichswirtschaftsministeriums (Düsseldorf, 1983), 178ff.
7. On the Blomberg–Fritsch Crisis see Müller, Heer, 255ff.; Karl Heinz Janssen and Fritz Tobias, Der Sturz der Generäle. Hitler und die Blomberg–Fritsch-Krise (Munich, 1994); Kirstin A. Schäfer, Werner von Blomberg. Hitlers Erster Feldmarschall. Eine Biographie (Paderborn, 2006), 180ff.
8. On the secretiveness surrounding the wedding see Hossbach, Wehrmacht, 105f.; Goebbels TB, 13 January 1938.
9. Goebbels TB, 26 and 27 January 1938.
10. Kube, Pour le mérite, 197. However, there is no firm proof of a plot by Göring against Blomberg.
11. Janssen and Tobias, Sturz, 86ff.
12. Ibid., 104ff.
13. Goebbels TB, 26 January and 1 February 1938; various similar entries between 26 January and 2 February 1938.
14. Wiedemann, Mann, 112; Nikolaus von Below, Als Hitlers Adjutant 1937–1945 (Mainz, 1980), 67.
15. Goebbels TB, 1 February 1938; Hossbach, Wehrmacht, 111; Wiedemann, Mann, 113; Below, Adjutant, 67.
16. See the worried entries in Goebbels TB, 28 January, 2, 3, and 4 February 1938.
17. Ibid., 2–5 February 1938.
18. Domarus, 1, 781.
19. BAB, R 43 II/1660, Führer edict, 23 April 1938.
20. Edict concerning the Command of the Wehrmacht (RGBl. 1938 I, 111); for the announcement of the various appointments see Domarus, 1, 783ff.
21. For the details of the reshuffle see Janssen and Tobias, Sturz, 148ff.; PA 1938, Nos 359 and 361.
22. As Hitler put it in his article ‘Die Reichskanzlei’, although in it he maintained that he had assigned the whole project to Speer on 10 January, whereas, in fact, the latter had been working on it for two years. For Hitler’s order for the completion of the building dated 27 January 1938 see Schönberger, Reichskanzlei, 176, sourced in BAB, R 43 II/1052; see also 46ff. Hitler retrospectively gave as his motive for speeding up the construction his ‘decision’ to incorporate Austria and establish the ‘Greater German Reich’.
23. Goebbels TB, 6 February 1938. Regierung Hitler, 5, No. 35, notes the address without giving further details. The communiqué about the meeting, which was issued in the evening is in BAB, R 43 II/1477.
24. Janssen and Tobias, Sturz, 173ff.
25. Domarus, 1, 842.
26. Ibid., 881.
27. On Göring’s initiatives in 1933 see above p. 366. In 1936, he once again made a number of such statements. ADAP D 1, No. 169, contains details of the meeting between Göring and Schuschnigg on 10 October. On the following day Göring told the Hungarian foreign minister Austria must sooner or later join up with Germany. See Kerekes (ed.), Allianz, No. 14. On 26 October Göring explained his plans for their future relationship to the Austrian ambassador. The latter concluded that the Germans ‘had not yet given up their plans for a Greater Germany’. See Der Hochverratsprozess gegen Dr. Guido Schmidt vor dem Wiener Volksgericht. Die gerichtlichen Protokolle, mit den Zeugenaussagen, unveröffentlichen Dokumenten, sämtlichen Geheimbriefen und Geheimakten (Vienna, 1947), 489ff. In January and April 1937 Göring launched initiatives with Mussolini, see above p. 528. See also Hochverratsprozess, 299ff., where Göring, during his interrogation by the Austrian judicial authorities in 1946, emphasized that he had always been assertive in his demand for Anschluss with Austria. See also Kube, Pour le mérite, 215ff.; Martens, Göring, 114ff.
28. Goebbels TB, 13 July 1937; PA 1937, No. 1729.
29. ADAP D 1, Nr. 256.
30. See Göring’s statement of 6 July 1946 to the Austrian judge, Sucher, in Nuremberg in Hochverratsprozess, 299ff. As a starting point for the conversation he had shown Mussolini a fresco-style map of central Europe in which Austria was already included as part of the Reich.
31. ADAP C 6, No. 568.
32. In November 1937 Göring made it very clear to the US ambassador in Paris, William Bullitt, that Austria and the Sudetenland had to be included in the Reich. See Foreign Relations of the United States 1937 I, 171ff., and IMT 37, 151-L 152ff. During the same month he showed the same map to the Austrian foreign minister, Schmidt, during his visit to Carinhall that he had shown to Mussolini in September. See Hochverratsprozess, 300; Kube, Pour le mérite, 238f. See also Kerekes (ed.), Allianz, No. 19.
33. Weinberg, Foreign Policy, 502f.
34. Schausberger, Griff; Dokumentationsarchiv des österreichischen Widerstandes (ed.), ‘Anschluß’ 1938 Eine Dokumentation, compiled by Heinz Arnberger et al. (Vienna, 1988); Anschluss 1938. Protokoll des Symposiums in Wien am 14. und 15. März 1978 (Vienna, 1981); Gerhard Botz, Die Eingliederung Österreichs in das Deutsche Reich. Planung und Verwirklichung des politisch-administrativen Anschlusses (1938–1940) (Vienna, 1976); Botz, Nationalsozialismus in Wien. Machtübernahme, Herrschaftssicherung, Radikalisierung 1938/39 (Vienna, 2008); Werner Welzig (ed.), ‘Anschluss’. März/April 1938 in Österreich (Vienna, 2010); Gerhard Stourzh and Brigitta Zaar (eds), Österreich, Deutschland und die Mächte. Internationale und österreichische Aspekte des ‘Anschlusses’ vom März 1936 (Vienna, 1990); Weinberg, Foreign Policy, 484ff.
35. Schausberger, Griff, 496ff.
36. Goebbels TB, 15 December 1937.
37. Karl Stuhlpfarrer, ‘Der deutsche Plan einer Währungsunion mit Österreich’ in Anschluss 1938, 290.
38. ADAP D 1, No. 80.
39. Ibid., No. 280; Schausberger, Griff, 507ff.
40. On Göring’s plan for a currency union see Kube, Pour le mérite, 238ff.; Stuhlpfarrer, ‘Plan’. There is important information in the Reich Finance Ministry file BAB, R 2/14.599, which contains, in particular, the minutes of an inter-ministerial meeting on 21 February held to discuss this matter. See also the minute of the RFM on this discussion on 23 February 1938: ‘President Keppler and his assistant Dr. Wesemaier [Veesenmayer, P.L.] stated that the Führer and Field-Marshal Göring want a complete currency union’. On the same day Göring also advocated the project in a meeting with Hitler (see below p. 547).
41. Schausberger, Griff, 498f. and 519ff.; ADAP D 1, No. 273; Papen, Wahrheit, 458ff.
42. Schausberger, Griff, 514f.; ADAP D 1, No. 293.
43. Ibid., No. 294f.; Schausberger, Griff, 519ff.; Kershaw, Hitler, 2, 116ff.; Weinberg, Foreign Policy, 506ff.; Kurt Schuschnigg, Im Kampf gegen Hitler. Die Überwindung der Anschlussidee (Munich and Vienna, 1969), 233ff., on the encounter. On the presence of the generals see Below, Adjutant, 84f.; Werner Maser (ed.), Wilhelm Keitel, Mein Leben: Pflichterfüllung bis zum Untergang. Hitlers Generalfeldmarschall und Chef des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht in Selbstzeugnissen (Berlin, 1998), 217.
44. Goebbels TB, 21 February 1938.
45. Ibid., 19 and 20 February 1938; PA 1938, No. 444; Ralf Richard Koerner, So haben sie es damals gemacht. Die Propagandavorbereitungen zum Österreichanschluss durch das Hitlerregime 1933–1938. Die publizistische Behandlung der Österreichfrage und die Anschlussvorbereitungen in der Tagespresse des Dritten Reiches (1933–1938) (Vienna, 1958), 68ff.
46. IMT 28, 1780-PS, 367; Erwin A. Schmidl, März 38. Der deutsche Einmarsch in Österreich (Vienna,
1987), 31f.
47. Peter Broucek (ed.), Ein General im Zwielicht. Die Erinnerungen Edmund Glaises von Horstenau, 3 vols (Vienna, 1980–88), 2, 238ff.
48. Schausberger, Griff, 535ff.
49. Domarus, 1, 792ff., quotes 801 and 803; see Kershaw, Hitler, 1, 118f.
50. ADAP D 1, No. 318.
51. Schausberger, Griff, 542f.; Weinberg, Foreign Policy, 510ff.
52. PA 1939, Nos 557, 564, and 618: ‘Zurückhaltung’ und ‘Vorsicht’; Goebbels TB, 1 March 1938; Koerner, Propagandavorbereitungen, 75ff.
53. ADAP D 1, No. 328; Schausberger, Griff, 543f.; Kershaw, Hitler, 1, 118f.
54. BAB, R 2/14.599, Minute, 1 March 1938, on Keppler’s statement.
55. ADAP D 1, No. 138; Nevile Henderson, Fehlschlag einer Mission. Berlin 1937–1939 (Zurich, 1940), 129ff.
56. This is the apt summing up of the situation in Schuschnigg, Kampf, 295.
57. On Keppler’s activities see his reports in ADAP D 1, Nos 333–35. See also Schuschnigg, Kampf, 289ff.; Schausberger, Griff, 549ff.
58. Ibid., 552f.
59. IMT 28, 1780-PS, 371.
60. Goebbels TB, 10 March 1938.
61. Ibid., 11 March 1938.
62. Schuschnigg too reached this conclusion – retrospectively: ‘In fact the events of 10 March were provoked by the planned referendum’. See Schuschnigg, Kampf, 296.
63. Goebbels TB, 11 March 1938. On the propaganda measures then initiated by Goebbels see PA 1938, Nos 724 and 727.
64. See Schmidl, März 38; IMT 28, 1780-PS, 371.
65. Domarus, 1, 809f.
66. IMT 31, 2949-PS, 354ff. According to Goebbels TB, 12 March 1938, on the afternoon of 11 March the invasion was still ‘uncertain’. A few hours later the situation had changed: ‘We dictate [sic!] a telegram for Seiss-Inquart [sic!] in which he requests aid from the German government’. The support by Kube, Pour le mérite, 245f., among others, for Göring’s claim at the Nuremberg trial (IMT 9, 296f.) that he had seized the initiative lacks sufficient evidential proof. In fact, it is clear from the entry in Goebbels’ diary for 13 March that the leadership was acting in concert.
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