168. Goebbels TB, 28 August 1939.
169. ADAP D 7, No. 350; see also Ciano, Diary, 27 August 1939. According to Ciano’s notes the Italians were surprised to hear from the British about the German proposal of a treaty.
170. Goebbels TB, 28 August 1939.
171. Dahlerus, Versuch, 75ff.
172. ADAP D 7, No. 384; Henderson, Fehlschlag, 302f.; Weinberg, Foreign Policy, 777.
173. Halder, KTB, 1, 28 August 1939; Hill (ed.), Weizsäcker-Papiere, 31 August 1939, documents Weizsäcker’ continuing irritation at Hitler’s policy.
174. ADAP D 7, No. 421.
175. Goebbels TB, 30 August 1939.
176. Henderson, Fehlschlag, 304ff.; Schmidt, Statist, 464f.; DBFP 3/7, No. 455; Halder, KTB, 1, 28 August 1939: ‘Account: We demand Danzig, a corridor through the Corridor and a plebiscite on the lines of the Saar one. England may accept. Poland probably not. Split!’ See ibid., 29 August 1939, on Poland: ‘Führer wants to receive them tomorrow. Basic idea: set out a whole lot of demographic and democratic demands. Plebiscite within 6 months under international guarantee’. Halder noted a further schedule: ‘30. 8. Poles in Berlin. 31. 8. Break down. 1. 9. Use of force.’ See also Weinberg, Foreign Policy, 777ff.
177. ADAP D 7, No. 417f.; Ciano, Diary, 29 August 1939; Schmidt, Statist, 465.
178. Dahlerus, Versuch, 92ff.
179. RGBl. 1939 I, 1539f.
180. ADAP D 7, No. 450; DBFP 3/7, Nos 504, 520, and 570f.
181. ADAP D 7, No. 461.
182. Ibid., No. 493; Halder, KTB, 1, 30 and 31 August 1939: Preparations for the attack on 1 September.
183. ADAP D 7, Nos 476 and 482; Goebbels TB, 1 September 1939; Hill (ed.), Weizsäcker-Papiere, 31 August 1939; Schmidt, Statist, 469.
184. ADAP D 7, 390 (note).
185. Goebbels TB, 1 September 1939.
186. The argument that Hitler was forced to act was put forward above all by Tim Mason and has been largely rejected by other scholars. The dynamic created by rearmament played a role in ‘accelerating his aggressive policy’ but it did not by any means compel him to start a world war in summer 1939. See Richard Overy, ‘Hitler’s War Plans and the German Economy’, in Robert W. D. Boyce and Esmonde M. Robertson (eds), Paths to War. New Essays on the Origins of the Second World War (Basingstoke and London, 1989), 96–127; for Mason’s final position see Timothy W. Mason, ‘The Domestic Dynamics of Nazi Conquests. A Response to Critics’ in Mason, Nazism, Fascism and the Working Class, ed. Jane Caplan (Cambridge and New York), 295–322.
The Outbreak of War
1. Jürgen Runzheimer, ‘Die Grenzzwischenfälle am Abend vor dem deutschen Angriff auf Polen’, in Wolfgang Benz and Hermann Graml (eds), Sommer 1939. Die Großmächte und der Europäische Krieg (Stuttgart, 1979), 107–40; Stjernfelt/Böhme, Westerplatte, 78ff.; Horst Rohde, ‘Hitlers erster Blitzkrieg und seine Auswirkungen auf Nordosteuropa’, in Klaus A. Maier et al., Die Errichtung der Hegemonie auf dem europäischen Kontinent (Stuttgart, 1979), 111ff.
2. Domarus, 2, 1307.
3. Ibid., 1312ff., quotes 1315.
4. Ibid., 1314.
5. Ibid., 1316.
6. Law concerning the Reunification of the City of Danzig with the Reich, 1 September 1939 (RGBl. 1939 I, 1547f.).
7. ADAP D 7, No. 504.
8. Dahlerus, Versuch, 125ff.
9. ADAP D 7, Nos 513 and 515.
10. Ibid., Nos 535, 539, 541, 554, and 558. See also Goebbels TB, 4 September 1939, on Hitler’s reaction. According to Goebbels, on 2 September Hitler would still have been prepared to agree to an international conference (without preconditions), provided that he had the ‘security’ of a territorial gain (ibid., 3 September 1939).
11. ADAP D 7, Nos 560–63.
12. Schmidt, Statist, 472f.; Ribbentrop, London, 202, on the same situation: ‘Hitler didn’t say a word, he had reckoned with them declaring war.’ See Goebbels TB, 4 September 1939.
13. Ibid., 15 September, see also 9 September 1939.
14. Below, Adjutant, 208; Jochen von Lang, Der Adjutant. Karl Wolff: Der Mann zwischen Hitler und Himmler (Munich, 1985), 133ff.; Otto Dietrich, Auf den Straßen des Sieges. Erlebnisse mit dem Führer in Polen (Munich, 1940), 27ff.
15. Keitel, Leben, 253f.; Franz W. Seidler and Dieter Zeigert, Die Führerhauptquartiere. Anlagen und Planungen im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Munich, 2000), 124f.; BAF, RW 47/4 KTB, Führerhauptquartier. To begin with, the train was in Bad Polzin and Plietznitz stations, then at the army training ground in Groß-Born. On 8 September it travelled to Ilnau, on the 12th to Gogolin (both in Upper Silesia). On the 17th Hitler was in Berlin and then set off for Danzig on the 18th. On the inspection trips he made from his mobile headquarters see Domarus, 2, 1347ff. See also the propaganda publications by Dietrich, Straßen (with a map of the ‘front trips’) and Heinrich Hoffmann (ed.), Hitler in Polen (Berlin, 1939), and the daily press reports, for example in the VB.
16. See ADAP D 7, No. 567.
17. Domarus, 2, 1354ff.
18. Ibid., 1368.
19. Helmut Krausnick, ‘Die Einsatzgruppen vom Anschluß Österreichs bis zum Feldzug gegen die Sowjetunion. Entwicklung und Verhältnis zur Wehrmacht’, in Krausnick and Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges. Die Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD 1938–1942 (Stuttgart, 1981), 33ff. For a detailed account of the leadership cadre see Alexander B. Rossino, Hitler Strikes Poland. Blitzkrieg, Ideology and Atrocity (Lawrence, 2003), 29ff. On the German terror in Poland during the war see Czeslaw Madajczyk, Die Okkupationspolitik Deutschlands in Polen 1939–1945 (Berlin, 1987), 14ff.
20. BAB, R 58/241, Directives for the External Deployment of the Security Police and the SD, 31 July 1939; see Krausnick, ‘Einsatzgruppen’, 36.
21. Dorothee Weitbrecht, ‘Ermächtigung zur Vernichtung. Die Einsatzgruppen in Polen im Herbst 1939’, in Backes, Jesse and Zitelmann (eds), Schatten, 59ff.
22. Krausnick, ‘Einsatzgruppen’, 44.
23. BAB, R 58/825, 8 September 1939.
24. Ibid., 14 October 1939.
25. Halder, KTB 1, 19 September 1939. Generalquartiermeister Eduard Wagner reports in his diary (Elizabeth Wagner (ed.), Der Generalquartiermeister. Briefe und Tagebuchaufzeichnungen des Generalquartiermeisters des Heeres. General der Artillerie Eduard Wagner (Munich and Vienna, 1963)), for 19 September 1939 an ‘important, necessary, and forthright conversation’ with Heydrich.
26. Krausnick, ‘Hitler und die Morde in Polen. Ein Beitrag zum Konflikt zwischen Heer und SS um die Verwaltung der besetzten Gebiete’, in VfZ 11 (1963), 196–209.
27. Ibid.
28. Christian Jansen and Arno Weckbecker, Der ‘volksdeutsche Selbstschutz’ in Polen 1939/40 (Munich, 1992), 27ff.; Wlodzimierz Jastrzębski, Der Bromberger Blutsonntag. Legende und Wirklichkeit (Poznan, 1990). In fact, 4,500–5,000 ethnic Germans were killed during the war. See Jansen and Weckbecker, ‘Selbstschutz’, 28; Madajczyk, Okkupationspolitik, 13.
29. Jansen and Weckbecker, ‘Selbstschutz’, 82ff.
30. On the role of the uniformed police see Klaus-Michael Mallmann, ‘ “. . . Mißgeburten, die nicht auf dieser Welt gehören”. Die deutsche Ordnungspolizei in Polen 1939–1941’, in Mallmann and Bogdan Musial (eds), Genesis des Genozids. Polen 1939–1941 (Darmstadt, 2004).
31. Martin Cüppers, ‘ “. . . auf eine so saubere und anständige SS-mäßige Art”. Die Waffen SS in Polen 1939–1941’, in Mallmann and Musial, Genesis, 90–110.
32. Joachim Böhler, Auftakt zum Vernichtungskrieg. Die Wehrmacht in Polen 1939 (Frankfurt a. M., 2006).
33. Madajczyk, Okkupationspolitik, 12.
34. Groscurth, Tagebücher, 202 (private diary), on this information from Halder.
35. Krausnick, ‘Einsatzgruppen’, 49.
36. Groscurth, Tagebücher, 357ff.
37. Müller, Heer, Appendix, No. 45.
38. Krausnick, ‘Einsatzgruppen’, 80ff.
39. RGBl. 1939 I, 2017f. See in detail Bianca Vieregge, Die Gerichtsbarkeit ei
ner ‘Elite’. Nationalsozialistische Rechtsprechung am Beispiel der SS-und-Polizei-Gerichtsbarkeit (Baden-Baden, 2002).
40. Meldungen, 2, 330f., 347 (‘General desire for peace’), 356, 364 (‘Confidence’), 372 (‘Good mood’) and 381 (‘Mood calm. Desire for peace’). Goebbels TB, 22 and 24 September 1939. Sopade 1939, 975ff. (Inconsistent mood) and 980ff. (No enthusiasm for war. People don’t believe in war against the western powers).
41. Domarus, 2, 1317.
42. Willi A. Boelcke (ed.), Kriegspropaganda 1939–1941. Geheime Ministerkonferenzen im Reichspropagandaministerium (Stuttgart, 1966), 26 October 1939, 2 and 3 November 1939, 7.
43. See below p. 837.
44. Michael Wildt, Generation der Unbedingten. Das Führungskorps des Reichssicherheitshauptamtes (Hamburg, 2003), 259ff.
45. Decree concerning Exceptional Radio Measures, 2 September 1939 (RGBl. 1939 I, 1683); see Michael P. Hensle, Rundfunkverbrechen. Das Hören von ‘Feindsendern’ im Nationalsozialismus (Berlin, 2003).
46. RGBl. 1939 I, 1609ff.
47. Ibid., 1679.
48. Ibid., 2378.
49. Martin Broszat, ‘Zur Perversion der Strafjustiz im Dritten Reich’, in VfZ 6 (1958), 390–443; Hans-Joachim Heuer, Geheime Staatspolizei. Über das Töten und die Tendenzen der Entzivilisierung (Berlin, 1995); Longerich, Himmler, 489f.
50. Himmler minute, 20 November 1939, quoted in Ulrich Herbert, Fremdarbeiter. Politik und Praxis des ‘Ausländer-Einsatzes’ in der Kriegswirtschaft des Dritten Reiches (Bonn, 1999), 91.
51. The provision and distribution of food supplies was governed by a total of nine decrees issued on 7 September on the basis of the Decree for the Provisional Securing of Supplies Vital for the German People of 27 August 1939 (RGBl. 1939 I, 1498ff.; for supplementary decrees see 1705ff.).
52. See Hubert Schmitz, Die Bewirtschaftung der Nahrungsmittel und Verbrauchsgüter 1939–1950. Dargestellt an dem Beispiel der Stadt Essen (Essen, 1956).
53. On the population’s concern see Meldungen, 2, 339ff. (esp. 345f.), 347ff. (esp. 355f.), 364ff. (esp. 368ff.), 381ff. (esp. 387). These reactions prompted the propaganda minister to make objections. See Goebbels TB, 13 (plant closures, wages) 19, 20, 21, and 23 September (all entries on wages policy of the Economics Ministry), and 8 (‘luxury shoes without coupons’) and 10 October 1939 (on the ‘awful mistakes of the Economics Ministry’).
54. Dietrich Eichholtz, Geschichte der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft 1939–1945, 3 vols (Munich, 2003), 1, 70ff.; Rolf-Dieter Müller, ‘Die Mobilisierung der deutschen Wirtschaft für Hitlers Kriegführung’, in Bernhard R. Kroener, Müller, and Hans Umbreit (eds), Organisierung und Mobilisierung des deutschen Machtbereichs, 1 (Stuttgart, 1988), 375ff.; Mason, Arbeiterklasse, 1136ff.; Tooze, Ökonomie, 410ff.
55. Führer Edict concerning the Creation of a Ministerial Council for the Defence of the Reich (RGBl. 1939 I, 1639); Müller, ‘Mobilisierung’, 366; Rebentisch, Führerstaat, 117ff., on the Reich Defence Commissioners, 132ff.
56. On Hitler’s exercise of control see Rebentisch, Führerstaat, 122f.; according to a post-war statement of Lammers, Hitler generally required the decrees of the Ministerial Council to be submitted to him for approval. See If Z, MB 26, Fall XI (Wilhelmstrasse trial), Prot., 20034 and 20156. See also IMT 31, 2852-PS, 224ff.
57. Petzina, Autarkiepolitik, 135; Tooze, Ökonomie, 389.
58. Goebbels TB, 24 September 1939; see also 27 September 1939.
59. ADAP D 8, No. 138. See also Bernd Martin, ‘Britisch–Deutsche Friedenskontakte in den ersten Monaten des Zweiten Weltkrieges. Eine Dokumentation über die Vermittlungsversuche von Birger Dahlerus’, in Zeitschrift für Politik, new series 19 (1972), 206–22.
60. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Fall Gelb. Der Kampf um den deutschen Operationsplan zur Westoffensive 1940 (Wiesbaden, 1957), 7.
61. Halder, KTB 1, 27 September 1939; Below, Adjutant, 210f.; Walter Warlimont, Im Hauptquartier der deutschen Wehrmacht 1939–1945. Grundlagen, Formen, Gestalten (Augsburg, 1990), 51; Jacobsen, Fall Gelb, 8f.
62. Halder, KTB, 1, 28 September 1939.
63. Müller, Heer, 474ff. See also the entries in Halder, KTB, 1, 28 September 1939, according to which Halder was collecting relevant material for a fundamental confrontation with Hitler about what was possible; ibid., 4 October 1939, where he noted Göring’s opinion that ‘we can’t mount an offensive now’. Wilhelm von Leeb, Tagebuchaufzeichnungen und Lagebeurteilungen aus zwei Weltkriegen (Stuttgart, 1976), 3 and 9 October 1939, was also critical of the continuation of the war; according to Fedor von Bock, Zwischen Pflicht und Verweigerung. Das Kriegstagebuch (Munich, 1995), 11 October 1939, generals Reichenau and Kluge rejected an offensive ‘at this juncture’. In view of these contradictory views Jodl feared a ‘very serious crisis’ at the beginning of October. See Halder, KTB, 1, 4 October 1939.
64. Ibid., 7 September 1939: On 7 September Hitler stated that if Poland indicated it was willing to negotiate, he would be contented with territorial concessions. He would also demand that Warsaw abandoned its treaties with France and Britain and he wanted an independent West Ukraine. However, with the Soviet invasion on 17 September this idea was no longer viable. Five days later, Keitel stated in a meeting that ‘an independent rump Poland’ was ‘the Führer’s preferable solution because he could then negotiate peace in the East with a Polish government’. On the same day Hitler expressed to Brauchitsch relatively modest ambitions for annexations in Poland (‘eastern Upper Silesia and the Corridor if the West stays out of it’). See Groscurth, Tagebücher, 357; Halder, KTB, 1, 12 September 1939. In his Artushof speech on 19 September Hitler also left open the future status of Poland. See Domarus, 2, 1354ff. Hitler also referred to the ‘creation of a Polish state’ in his speech of 6 October, although by then he was already making plans for a German occupation regime in central Poland. See Kershaw, Hitler, 2, 331f.
65. Goebbels TB, 30 September 1939. Rosenberg’s notes from the same day make very similar comments about Hitler’s plans for Poland. See Rosenberg, Tagebücher, 29 September 1939.
66. See below p. 666.
67. Goebbels TB, 1 October 1939.
68. ADAP D 8, No. 157.
69. Ibid., Nos 159 and 193.
70. Also ibid., No. 104, on Molotov’s indifference to the maintenance of a Polish state.
71. Ibid., No. 158.
72. Ibid., No. 161.
73. Walther Hubatsch (ed.), Hitlers Weisungen für die Kriegsführung 1939–1945 (Coblenz, 1983).
74. Domarus, 2, 1376; on the visit to the Belvedere see the brief DNB report in ibid.
75. Ibid., 1377ff., quote 1383; Kershaw, Hitler, 2, 364f.
76. Meldungen, 2, 339f.; Goebbels TB, 11–14 October 1939.
77. On the resistance of and protests from the military see in detail Krausnick, ‘Einsatzgruppen’, 96ff.
78. Martin Broszat, Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik 1939–1945 (Stuttgart, 1961), 32f.
79. In directive No. 5 of 30 September Hitler had already instructed that the new eastern border should include, in addition to the old areas of German settlement, ‘those territories, which are particularly valuable militarily, economically or in terms of their significance for communications’. See Hubatsch (ed.), Weisungen.
80. BAB, R 43 II/646a, Lammers at the top level meeting on 27 October 1939: Hitler ‘wants a greater subordination of the judicial and financial authorities to the Reich governors’; see ibid., Hess to Lammers, 25 October 1939; Rebentisch, Führerstaat, 172ff.
81. On 5 October 1939 Hitler agreed to Gauleiter Forster’s request for the establishment of a civilian administration in Danzig and West Prussia, but on the following day he decided to incorporate the whole of the new Reich territory in one go (BAB, R 43 II/646a und 644a, Reich Chancellery minutes). On 8 October he ordered the creation of the two new Reich Gaus in the Führer Edict concerning the Organization and Administration of the Eastern Territories (RGBl. 1939 I, 2042f.). On 9 October he told Goebbels that the Poles were to be ‘pressed into their reduced s
tate and be left entirely to themselves’ (Goebbels TB, 10 October, see also 14 October 1939). On 12 October the Führer Edict concerning the Administration of the Occupied Polish Territories was issued (RGBl. 1939 I, 2077f.), creating the General Government and appointing Frank Governor General. The Führer Edict concerning the Transfer of the Administration in the General Government to the Governor General of 19 October fixed the date for the transfer as 25 October, published in Führer-Erlasse 1939–1945 (Stuttgart, 1997). The publication of the two edicts followed on 18 and 24 October 1939. See Broszat, Polenpolitik, 26ff.; Rebentisch, Führerstaat, 163ff.
82. Führer-Erlasse No. 12; Longerich, Himmler, 449f., with an overview of the background.
83. IMT 26, 864-PS, 378ff., emphasis in the original; Halder, KTB, 1, 18 October 1939; Goebbels TB, 1 November 1939, with similar comments by Hitler; Rebentisch, Führerstaat, 172f.
84. Goebbels TB, 10 October 1939.
85. Rosenberg, Tagebücher, 29 September 1939.
86. Jansen and Weckbecker, ‘Selbstschutz’, 154ff.
87. Ibid., 96ff. and 154.
88. See in detail Volker Riess, Die Anfänge der Vernichtung ‘lebensunwerten Lebens’ in den Reichsgauen Danzig-Westpreußen und Wartheland 1939/40 (Frankfurt a. M., 1995); for the estimate of the number of victims see ibid., 355. On Pomerania see also Heike Bernhardt, Anstaltspsychiatrie und ‘Euthanasie’ in Pommern 1933–1945. Die Krankenmorde an Kindern und Erwachsenen am Beispiel der Landesheilanstalt Uekermünde (Frankfurt a. M., 1994).
89. Riess, Anfänge, 290ff.
90. Madajczyk (Okkupationspolitik), who has systematically researched the German terror (186ff.), refers to 50,000 deaths in autumn 1939 (15).
91. See Heydrich’s remarks at the meetings of the departmental heads of the security police on 14 and 21 September (BAB, R 58/825), and Heydrich’s express letter to the Einsatzgruppen, 21 September 1939 (VEJ, 4, No. 12). See also Halder, KTB, 1, 20 September 1939, on Hitler’s remarks to Brauchitsch on the same day (‘There is the general idea of a ghetto, but it’s not yet clear in detail’). Detailed account in Longerich, Politik, 251ff.; Longerich, Himmler, 455f.
Hitler Page 153
