Hitler

by Peter Longerich

  14. ADAP D 11, No. 75.

  15. Ibid., No. 84.

  16. Gerd R. Ueberschär, ‘Die Einbeziehung Skandinaviens in die Planung ‘Barbarossa’, in Borg et al., Angriff, in particular the concluding assessment on p. 448, which strongly emphasizes Hitler’s role. For more detail see Ueberschär, Hitler und Finnland 1939–1941. Die deutsch–finnischen Beziehungen während des Hitler–Stalin-Paktes (Wiesbaden, 1978), 196ff.; see also Halder, KTB, 2, 22 August 1940.

  17. Ibid., 18 August 1940.

  18. ADAP D 10, No. 330.

  19. On the agreement see ADAP D 11, No. 86; Ueberschär, Hitler, 202ff.

  20. Donald S. Detwiler, Hitler, Franco und Gibraltar. Die Frage des spanischen Eintritts in den Zweiten Weltkrieg (Wiesbaden, 1962), 30ff.; Charles B. Burdick, Germany’s Military Strategy and Spain in World War II (Syracuse, 1968), 19ff.; KTB OKW 1, 69 and 78.

  21. Halder, KTB, 2, 14 September 1940.

  22. ADAP D 11, Nos. 63, 66f., 70, 88, 97, and 117. See Detwiler, Hitler, 37ff.; Burdick, Strategy, 43ff.

  23. Halder, KTB, 2, 4 October 1940; on the sources see Hildebrand, Reich, 678.

  24. ADAP D 11, Nos 212 and 227; Schmidt, Statist, 514ff. See Jäckel, Frankreich, 115ff.; Kershaw, Hitler, 2, 441ff.

  25. ADAP D 11, Nos. 220 and 221; see Detwiler, Hitler, 56ff.; Schmidt, Statist, 510ff.

  26. Detwiler, Hitler, documentary appendix, 118f. ADAP D 11, 394f.

  27. Goebbels TB, 31 October 1940.

  28. Halder, KTB, 2, 1 November 1940.

  29. ADAP D 11, Nos. 73, 79, and 87.

  30. Ibid., No. 87.

  31. Ibid., No. 82.

  32. Ibid., No. 118.

  33. Ibid., No. 149. According to Schmidt, Statist, 509, Hitler talked for three hours. On the meeting see also Ciano, Diary, 4 October 1940.

  34. Ibid., 12 October 1940. On Ciano’s irritation see also ADAP D 11, No. 192.

  35. Schmidt, Statist, 516. On the communications problems between the allies see ADAP D 11, Nos 383 and 199 with note 10; Erich Kordt, Wahn und Wirklichkeit (Stuttgart, 1947), 266; König, Kooperation, 34ff.

  36. ADAP D 11, No. 246.

  37. On the background see Goebbels TB, 10 and 17 July (first information on the plan to send troops to Romania), 9 October (about troop movements) and 14 October 1940 (military mission). See also König, Kooperation, 32.

  38. On the preparations for the Balkan war see KTB OKW 1, 204 and 224; Hubatsch (ed.), Weisungen, Nos 18 and 20; Detlef Vogel, ‘Das Eingreifen Deutschlands auf dem Balkan’, in Gerhard Schreiber et al., Mittelmeerraum, 422ff.

  39. Goebbels TB, 12 November 1940.

  40. Schmidt, Statist, 426. The VB (M), 13 November 1940, described the reception in Berlin as ‘solemn’ and ‘dignified’ and made no mention of the reaction of the population.

  41. Halder, KTB, 2, 4 November 1940.

  42. Hubatsch (ed.), Weisungen.

  43. ADAP D 11, No. 325.

  44. Ibid., No. 326.

  45. Schmidt, Statist, 531.

  46. Stalin’s instructions for Molotov are published in Lev Bezymenskij, ‘Der Berlin-Besuch von V. M. Molotov im November 1940 im Lichte neuer Dokumente aus sowjetischen Geheimarchiven’, in MGM 57 (1998), 199–215.

  47. Domarus, 2, 1613; Schmidt, Statist, 532 and 535.

  48. Molotov stated that they ‘envisaged sorting out the Finnish question in the same way as in the Baltic and in Bessarabia’. See ADAP D 11, No. 328.

  49. That is clear from Stalin’s instructions. See Bezymenskij, ‘Berlin-Besuch’.

  50. ADAP D 11, No. 328.

  51. Ibid., No. 329.

  52. Ibid., No. 404.

  53. KTB OKW 1, 179.

  54. ADAP D 11, No. 369. In reply to an earlier request to join the Tripartite Pact, Boris had replied in a letter to Hitler on 22 October that it would be better if Bulgaria continued with its existing policy for the time being (ibid., No. 217). See Hoppe, Bulgarien, 96ff.

  55. ADAP D 11, No. 378.

  56. Ibid., No. 430.

  57. Ibid., No. 384.

  58. Ibid., No. 438.

  59. Ibid., No. 352, also No. 357; see Detwiler, Hitler, 71ff.

  60. The C-in-C Army assumed that the operation would be wrapped up by the end of February and that the troops would be deployable again from the middle of May. Draft for Directive No. 19 in Hubatsch (ed.), Weisungen, 86ff.; KTB OKW 1, 203ff. See Detwiler, Hitler, 80ff.; Burdick, Strategy, 63ff.

  61. ADAP D 11, No. 414.

  62. Ibid., No. 420.

  63. Ibid., No. 369.

  64. Ibid., No. 353; Ciano, Diary, 18/19 November 1940.

  65. ADAP D 11, No. 383.

  66. Schulthess’ 1940, 227, 232, and 234.

  67. ADAP D 11, No. 380.

  68. Ibid., No. 381. See Schmidt, Statist, 523; Antonescu’s post-war statement (to the Soviet prosecutors) in IMT 7, 338f. See also ADAP D 11, Nos 387–9; Balta, Rumänien, 105ff.

  69. ADAP D 11, No. 500; KTB OKW 1, 219.

  70. ADAP D 11, Nos 479 and 497.

  71. Hubatsch (ed.), Weisungen, No. 19a; see Detwiler, Hitler, 84ff.; Burdick, Strategy, 103f.

  72. ADAP D 11, No. 477.

  73. Hubatsch (ed.), Weisungen.

  74. ADAP D 11, No. 564; see also Schmidt, Statist, 524.

  75. Hubatsch (ed.), Weisungen.

  76. Hillgruber, Strategie, 203.

  77. Halder, KTB, 2, 13 December 1940.

  The Expansion of the War

  1. Record in IMT 34, 170-C, 696.

  2. KTB OKW 1, 253ff., esp. 257f.; Halder, KTB, 2, 16 January 1941. See Hillgruber, Strategie, 364f.

  3. ADAP D 11, No. 672. On the preparations and meetings see Ciano, Diary, 18–21 January 1941; König, Kooperation, 49ff.; Hillgruber, Strategie, 347.

  4. IMT 34, 134-C, 467ff.; ADAP D 11, No. 679.

  5. Ciano, Diary, 18–21 January 1941.

  6. KTB OKW 1, 253ff.

  7. ADAP D 12, No. 22.

  8. Ibid., No. 95; Burdick, Strategy, 117ff. On 25 March Hitler told Ciano that in doing so Franco had effectively abrogated the agreement of Hendaye. See Hillgruber (ed.), Staatsmänner 1, 234ff. and 236. For details see ADAP D 11, Nos 677, 682, 692, 695, 702, 707, 718, 725, and 728.

  9. Halder, KTB, 2, 28 January 1941. According to the editor’s note these statements can be attributed to Halder.

  10. Bock, Pflicht, 173f.

  11. KTB OKW 1, 297ff.; Halder, KTB, 2, 2 and 3 February 1941, on Halder’s presentation notes and his summing up of the presentation; see also IMT 26, 872-PS, 391ff.; Klink, ‘Landkriegsführung’, 295f.; see Below, Adjutant, 261f.

  12. Gruchmann, Weltkrieg, 107.

  13. KTB OKW 1, 253ff. Two days later he confirmed these decisions in his Directive No. 22. See Hubatsch (ed.) Weisungen.

  14. KTB OKW 1, 300ff.; Hubatsch (ed.), Weisungen, No. 22d; Halder, KTB, 2, 3 February 1941; ADAP D 12, No. 17: Hitler informed Mussolini he was sending another Panzer division to North Africa, but made it a condition that the defence should be carried out offensively. See also Stegemann, ‘Kriegführung’, 600f.

  15. Domarus, 2, 1657ff.

  16. Halder, KTB 2, 4 November 1940

  17. In November, by referring to the plans for the military build-up in the East, which was already under way, Frank was able initially to prevent any further deportations from the Warthegau into his territory. See Biuletyn, Doc. 50; Aly, ‘Endlösung’, 201f.

  18. Goebbels TB, 5 November 1940, concerning a conversation at which, among others, Gauleiters Koch und Forster, who wanted ‘to dump their rubbish in the General Government’, were present. In fact, by the end of 1940 more than 48,000 former Polish citizens, Jews and non-Jews, from the district of Zichenau, from Gau Danzig-Westpreußen, and from Upper Silesia had been deported to the General Government. See Madajczyk, Okkupationspolitik, 356f.

  19. IMT 39, 172-USSR, 425ff.

  20. Adler, Mensch, 147ff.; Gruner, ‘Kollektivausweisung’; Gottwaldt/Schulle, ‘Judendeportationen’, 46ff.

  21. Longerich, Politik, 285ff.
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  22. Goebbels TB, 19 August 1941; see also Longerich, Holocaust, 265f.

  23. ADAP D 11, Nos 295, 345 and 556. See also Hoppe, Bulgarien, 108f.

  24. The Bulgarian prime minister had expressed these doubts to Hitler once again at a meeting at the beginning of January. See ADAP D 11, No. 606. Nevertheless, on Hitler’s instructions the military preparations were continued (ibid., No. 644).

  25. Ibid., Nos 648f., 658, and 660. See Hoppe, Bulgarien, 108ff.; Vogel, ‘Eingreifen’, 427ff.

  26. ADAP D 12, No. 51. On Hitler’s decision-making see also ADAP D 11, Nos 724 and 738. In response to Bulgaria’s request the deadlines for the invasion were once again postponed for a few days. See ADAP D 12, Nos 54 and 86.

  27. ADAP D 11, No. 714; Text of the agreement in Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik 8 (1941), 232; Vogel, ‘Eingreifen’, 429f.

  28. Hoppe, Bulgarien, 114ff.; Domarus, 2, 1671.

  29. ADAP D 12, No. 114.

  30. Domarus, 2, 1670.

  31. ADAP D 12, No. 117.

  32. Ibid., Nos 48 and 47; Vogel, ‘Eingreifen’, 438ff.

  33. On the meeting see ADAP D 12, No. 130.

  34. This was a rhetorical comeback to Paul’s statement, that, if he were to follow the Germans’ advice, he was afraid that ‘in 6 months’ time he would no longer be there’ (ibid.).

  35. Vogel, ‘Eingreifen’, 439; ADAP D 12, Nos 131, 138, 144, 175, and 205.

  36. Vogel, ‘Eingreifen’, 442ff.

  37. Domarus, 2, 1671 (according to the DNB).

  38. ADAP D 12, No. 281.

  39. IMT 28, 1746-PS, 21ff.; Halder, KTB 2, 27 March 1941; Below, Adjutant, 264; Klaus Olshausen, Zwischenspiel auf dem Balkan. Die deutsche Politik gegenüber Jugoslawien und Griechenland von März bis Juli 1941 ((Stuttgart, 1973), 50ff.

  40. Klink, ‘Landkriegsführung’, 296; Halder, KTB 2, 17 March 1941; KTB OKW 1, 360f.

  41. Hubatsch (ed.), Weisungen, 106ff.

  42. ADAP D 12, No. 215.

  43. Ibid., No. 215f.; Olshausen, Zwischenspiel, 52f.

  44. ADAP D 12, No. 227f.

  45. Ibid., Nos 261, 264, 267, 282, 287, 296, and 307; Olshausen, Zwischenspiel, 65ff.

  46. Ibid., 74ff.

  47. IMT 28, 1835-PS, 565ff.

  48. ADAP D 12, Nos 224, 226, 281, and 289.

  49. Hubatsch (ed.), Weisungen, No. 26.

  50. ADAP D 12, Nos 235 and 237.

  51. Ibid., No. 265.

  52. Goebbels TB, 6 April 1941.

  53. Ibid., 8, 9, and 30 April 1941.

  54. Ibid., 8 April 1941.

  55. Martin L. van Creveld, Hitler’s Strategy 1940–1941. The Balkan Clue (Cambridge, 1973), 154ff.; Vogel, ‘Eingreifen’, 458ff.; Olshausen, Zwischenspiel, 97ff. On the direct involvement of the ‘Reich Chancellery’ in the bombing of Belgrade see KTB OKW 1, 375.

  56. Domarus, 2, 1691; Below, Adjutant 268f. Seidler and Zeigert, Führerhauptquartiere, 130ff.

  57. IMT 27, 1192-PS, 60ff.

  58. Olshausen, Zwischenspiel, 162ff.; Hitler’s agreement (‘Führer directive’) is in ADAP D 12, No. 319.

  59. On the division in detail see Olshausen, Zwischenspiel, 174ff. During the meetings between Ribbentrop and Ciano on 21 April 1941 in Vienna, a number of points were still in dispute. See ADAP D 12, No 378.

  60. Hubatsch (ed.), Weisungen.

  61. Olshausen, Zwischenspiel, 113ff.

  62. On Hitler’s attitude see in particular Halder, KTB, 2, 21 and 22 April 1941. On Italy’s discontent see ADAP D 12, Nos 379 and 409. See Olshausen, Zwischenspiel, 120ff.; König, Kooperation, 69ff.

  63. Hubatsch (ed.), Weisungen, No. 28.

  64. Creveld, Strategy, 166ff.

  65. Stegemann, ‘Kriegführung’, 615ff.

  66. ADAP D 12, No. 423.

  67. Halder, KTB 2, 30 April 1941; Jacobsen, 1939–1945, No. 61.

  68. Domarus, 2, 1703ff., quotes pp. 1704 and 1708.

  69. Hillgruber, Strategie, 409ff.

  70. ADAP D 12, Nos 222, also 218, 230, 233, and 278; Schmidt, Statist, 536ff.

  71. ADAP D 12, No. 218, see also Nos 230 and 233, where he once again refers to Singapore.

  72. Ibid., No. 230.

  73. At the reception for Matsuoka on 28 March 1941 Hitler told Oˉshima that if the Soviet Union attacked Japan Germany for its part would not hesitate to attack the Soviet Union. Ribbentrop told Oˉshima that this promise was a binding ‘commitment’ by Hitler. See Andreas Hillgruber, ‘Japan und der Fall “Barbarossa”. Japanische Dokumente zu den Gesprächen Hitlers und Ribbentrops mit Botschafter Oshima vom Februar bis Juni 1941’, in Hillgruber, Deutsche Großmacht- und Weltpolitik (Düsseldorf, 1977), Doc. 2.

  74. ADAP D 12, No. 233.

  75. Schmidt, Statist, 541.

  76. ADAP D 12, No. 266; see Schmidt, Statist, 548.

  77. VB, 13 May 1941.

  78. Goebbels TB, 13 May 1941; the official Party communiqué was, for example, published in VB (B), 13 May 1941. On Hess’s flight see Rainer F. Schmidt, Rudolf Heß. ‘Botengang eines Toren’? Der Flug nach Großbritannien vom 10. Mai 1941 (Munich, 2000); Pätzold and Weissbecker, Heß, 261ff.

  79. BAK, ZSg. 102, 13 May 1941 (midday), TP 1.

  80. See the correspondence between Bormann and Goebbels in BAB, NS 18/211 and Bormann’s circular of 11 June 1941 in NS 18/70. On Hitler’s dispute with Hess in February 1940 see Bormann’s entries in his office for 24 and 25 February 1940 in NS 26/16. On 7 May, in other words before Hess’s flight, Bormann had already warned about these allegedly dangerous teachings in a circular to the Gauleiters, citing Hitler. In other words, he had openly adopted a different standpoint to Hess on this issue (NS 22/29). See Longerich, Stellvertreter, 153f.

  81. BAB, R 43 II/1213; Führer edict, 29 May 1941 (RGBl. 1941 I, 295).

  82. BAB, R 43 II/1660, Edict concerning the Führer’s Deputy, 29 June 1941. According to the note Lammers added the same day, this meant that the regulation of the succession made on 1 September 1939 was now redundant.

  83. Domarus, 2, 1715f.

  84. Goebbels TB, 16 May 1941, see also 17 and 18 May 1941; Boelcke (ed.), Kriegspropaganda, 19 May 1941, 1.

  85. On Hess’s flight see Longerich, Stellvertreter, 146ff.; Martin, Friedensinitiativen, 425ff.; Schmidt, Heß; David Stafford (ed.), Flight from Reality. Rudolf Hess and his Mission to Scotland 1941 (London, 2002); Peter Raina, A Daring Venture. Rudolf Hess and the Ill-fated Peace Mission of 1941 (Oxford, 2014); Hillgruber, Strategie, 514, assumes Hess had been given an assignment by Hitler.

  86. KTB OKW 1, 341.

  87. BAF, RW 19/185.

  88. Hubatsch (ed.), Weisungen, No. 21a.

  89. KTB OKW 1, 341.

  90. Halder, KTB, 2.

  91. Ibid.

  92. Jacobsen, ‘Kommissarbefehl’, Docs 5a and 8.

  93. Ibid, Docs. 6f. and 12.

  94. Ibid., Doc. 11.

  95. Keitel statement, 4 April 1946, in IMT 10, 532; on Hitler’s address see briefly Halder, KTB, 2, 14 June 1941.

  96. Jacobsen, ‘Kommissarbefehl und Massenexekutionen sowjetischer Kriegsgefangener’, in Buchheim et al., Anatomie, Doc. 3; identical draft by the OKH of 26 March 1941 in ibid., Doc. 2.

  97. Ibid., Doc. 9.

  98. On the details of the orders see Longerich, Politik, 315ff.; for the main written orders from Heydrich see BAB, R 70/31 and 32, published in Peter Longerich (ed.), Die Ermordung der europäischen Juden. Eine umfassende Dokumentation des Holocaust 1941–1945 (Munich, 1989), 116ff.

  99. There is evidence that Chief of the General Staff, Halder, was already contemplating the conquest of Gibraltar and Malta, and an attack on Egypt from February 1941 onwards. See Halder, KTB, 2, 25 February and 16 March 1941; Schreiber, ‘Politik’, 573ff.

  100. Ibid., 576; Burdick, Strategy, 119ff.

  101. Jacobsen, 1939–1945, Nos 62a and b; Hillgruber, Strategie, 459f.; Schreiber, ‘Politik’, 541f.; Burdick, Strategy, 133ff.

  102. KTB OKW 1, 328. Halder, KTB 2, 25 February 1941: with Brauchitsch ‘operation against Afg
hanistan’, with Heusinger ‘Afghanistan – Persia’. On the background see Hillgruber, Strategie, 383ff. In 1937 Germany had made a number of secret agreements with Afghanistan concerning infrastructure projects, the Army, police and government services and had excellent relations with the Afghan economics minister, Abdul Majid Khan. On economic relations see, in particular, Inge Kircheisen, ‘Afghanistan – umkämpftes Vorfeld Indiens’, in Johannes Glasneck and Kircheisen, Türkei und Afghanistan – Brennpunkte der Orientpolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Berlin, 1968), 182ff.

  103. Halder, KTB, 2, 7 April 1941. See also Erhard Moritz, ‘Planungen für die Kriegführung des deutschen Heeres in Afrika und Vorderasien’, in Militärgeschichte 16 (1977), 323–33, with further documents of the OKH from the period April to July 1941 concerning the choice of emphasis and operations after Barbarossa.

  104. ADAP D 12, Nos 158, 467, and 598. See also the quotes from unpublished Foreign Ministry documents in Hillgruber, Strategie, 387; Kircheisen, ‘Afghanistan’, 224ff.

  105. Halder, KTB 3, 30 June 1941.

  106. Hillgruber, Strategie, 481ff.; ADAP D 12, Nos 257, 300, 323, 425, and 553; Jan Kuhlmann, Subhas Chandra Bose und die Indienpolitik der Achsenmächte (Berlin, 2003), 131ff.; Romain Hayes, Subhas Chandra Bose in Nazi Germany. Politics, Intelligence and Propaganda (London, 2011), 29ff. Hitler explained to Bose that he had withheld permission for the publication of the Indian declaration during a meeting with him on 27 May 1942 (ADAP E 2, No. 247); Kuhlmann, Bose, 227ff., Hayes, Bose, 114ff.

  107. ADAP D 12, Nos 350 and 427 (Hitler’s reply).

  108. Ibid., No. 293; ADAP D 11, No. 680.

  109. Schreiber, ‘Politik’, 547ff.; Hubatsch (ed.), Weisungen, No. 30.

  110. Ibid., No. 30. On Irak see Hillgruber, Strategie, 473ff.; Schreiber, ‘Politik’, 546ff.

  111. ADAP D 12, Nos 417, 421, 459, 462, and 475. On the whole question of Franco–German cooperation in spring 1941 see Jäckel, Frankreich, 157ff.; Hillgruber, Strategie, 451ff.; Schreiber, ‘Politik’, 532ff.

  112. ADAP D 12, No. 490f.

  113. Ibid., No. 559.

  114. Schreiber, ‘Politik’, 561ff.

  115. Lagevorträge, 22 May 1941, and appendix 2. See also Salewski, Seekriegsleitung 1, 375ff.