Hitler

by Peter Longerich

  2. Eichholtz, Geschichte, 3, 19.

  3. Boelcke (ed.), Rüstung, 3–5 June 1944, 20. See also Müller, ‘Speer’, 396f.

  4. Boelcke (ed.), Rüstung, 6–7 April 1944, 16. In April 1943, at an armaments meeting with Speer, Hitler had demanded that particularly vulnerable production processes should take place in plants that were fully protected by concrete. See ibid., 11 April 1943, 4; Frederic Gümmer, Die Rolle der Untertageverlagerung in der deutschen Rüstungsproduktion 1943–1945 (Munich, 2007).

  5. On the conflict between Speer and Dorsch see Janssen, Ministerium, 158ff.

  6. Ibid., 162 (based on BAB, R 3/1576).

  7. Speer, Erinnerungen, 348f.

  8. Janssen, Ministerium, 160f.; Speer, Erinnerungen, 352ff.

  9. Eichholtz, Geschichte 3, 228f.; Kroener, ‘“Menschenbewirtschaftung” ’, 906ff.; Kehrl, Krisenmanager, 344 and 346ff. BAB, R 43 II/651, Minutes of the meetings on 25 and 27 April 1944.

  10. Speer, Erinnerungen, 359.

  11. There were attacks on Cologne (Mehner (ed.), Tagesberichte, 20 and 22 April 1944), Munich on 24 April (Hans-Günter Richardi, Bomber über München. Der Luftkrieg von 1939 bis 1945, dargestellt am Beispiel der ‘Hauptstadt der Bewegung’ (Munich, 1992), 238ff.; Irmtraud Permooser, Der Luftkrieg über München 1942–1945. Bomben auf die Hauptstadt der Bewegung (Oberhaching, 1996), 198f.) and on Berlin at the end of April and in May (Mehner (ed.), Tagesberichte, 29 April, 7, 8, 19, and 24 May as well as a continuation on 25 May 1944).

  12. Boelcke (ed.), Rüstung, 22–23 May 1944; Gröhler, Bombenkrieg, 222ff.; Eichholtz, Geschichte, 3, 32ff.

  13. Ibid., 35; see also Birkenfeld, Treibstoff, 189f. and 238ff.

  14. Boog, ‘Reichsluftverteidigung’, 126ff.

  15. In autumn 1943 Hitler had decided to deploy the Me 262 above all as a bomber, and Göring had promised him that the bomber would be ready for action by May 1944. On Hitler’s decision of 26 November 1943 see Ralf Schabel, Die Illusion der Wunderwaffen. Die Rolle der Düsenflugzeuge und Flugabwehrraketen in der Rüstungspolitik des Dritten Reiches (Munich, 1994), 190; Adolf Galland, Die Ersten und die Letzten. Die Jagdflieger im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Darmstadt, 1953), 353; Below, Adjutant, 354f. According to Schabel, Illusion, 180, the demand for a fast bomber was not at all naïve or unreasonable and would have served to fill the gap before the jet bomber Ar 234 could be introduced. See ibid., 240f. At a meeting with Speer and Milch in January 1944 Hitler once again advocated the deployment of the Me 262 as a bomber. See Kershaw, Hitler, 2, 839f.; Speer, Erinnerungen, 372f.

  16. Schabel, Illusion, 226ff.; Galland, Ersten, 355; BAB, NS 6/152, Bormann note of 21 May 1944; Below, Adjutant, 370f.

  17. Boelcke (ed.), Rüstung, 3–5 June 1944, 19.

  18. Ibid., Points 21–23.

  19. Wehrmachtberichte 3, 5 June 1944.

  20. Goebbels TB, 6 June 1944.

  21. See the reflections in Frieser, ‘Der Zusammenbruch der Heeresgruppe Mitte im Sommer 1944’, in Frieser (ed.), Ostfront, 496ff.

  22. Hans Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit. Erinnerungen (Berlin, 1977), 178ff.; Below, Adjutant, 375.

  23. On 16 May Hitler ordered the ‘long-range attack’ on Britain to start in June. See Hubatsch (ed.), Weisungen, No. 55. The attack should actually have begun a few days earlier than 15 June, but had to be postponed for technical reasons. See Boog, ‘Reichsluftverteidigung’, 391.

  24. Heiber (ed.), Goebbels Reden, 2, No. 26, esp. 335. For further hints see Hölsken, V-Waffen, 100ff.; Goebbels TB, 15 and 17 January, 19 February, 9 April, and 3 June 1944; Steinert, Krieg, 433f.

  25. Goebbels TB, 18 June 1944.

  26. BAK, ZSg. 109/50, 17 June 1944, TP 1, and 20 June 1944, TP 1.

  27. Ibid., 24 June 1944, TP 1, Introduction of the term V1; Hölsken, V-Waffen, 106. Goebbels claimed to have been responsible for the term (TB, 22 June 1944).

  28. Ibid. For the statistics on successful hits see Boog, ‘Reichsluftverteidigung’, 397.

  29. Goebbels TB, 18 June 1944. This is clear, first, from the reports of the Reich propaganda offices (ibid., 30 June, also 1 and 7 July 1944), and, secondly, from the reports from the SD regions (Meldungen, 17, 6595ff. and 6613ff.). See also Hölsken, V-Waffen, 197.

  30. Goebbels TB, 6 June 1944 (concerning the meeting on the previous day).

  31. Ibid., 22 June 1944.

  32. Ibid.

  33. Thus, at the beginning of July, Goebbels instructed the media ‘to emphasize even more than before the retributive character of our weapon’ (ibid., 2 July 1944). See also his article in Das Reich, 23 July 1944, on the ‘Issue of Retribution’. He tried to sustain the hope that the new technology would produce a decisive change in the war by announcing further V weapons in his radio address of 26 July. See Heiber (ed.), Goebbels Reden, 2, No. 27, 356f. A few days later he published another article in Das Reich on the theme of ‘Catching Up and Overtaking’. On the V weapons propaganda in July see also Hölsken, V-Waffen, 107f.

  34. Goebbels TB, 22 June 1944.

  35. Frieser, ‘Zusammenbruch’, esp. 537ff.

  36. Guderian, Erinnerungen, 302f.

  37. Detlef Vogel, ‘Deutsche und alliierte Kriegführung im Westen’, in Boog et al. (eds), Das Deutsche Reich, 549.

  38. Ibid., 479; Hendrik Thoss, ‘Sperrle, Hugo Wilhelm’, in Neue Deutsche Biographie, 24 (2010), 671f.

  39. Below, Adjutant, 378; Guderian, Erinnerungen, 318ff.; on the reshuffle in July see Kershaw, Hitler, 2, 857f.

  40. On 27–28 June 1944. See Wolf Keilig, Die Generale des Heeres (Friedberg, 1983), 57 and 228.

  41. KTB OKW 4, 1572f. The letter is a reconstruction produced by Speidel (Zeit, 187). The telex was sent by the c-in-c West, Kluge, who supported Rommel’s initiative (KTB OKW 4, 1574ff.).

  42. Führer edict concerning the Establishment of Civil Administration in the Occupied Territories of Belgium and Northern France (‘Führer-Erlasse’, No. 338).

  43. Hubatsch (ed.), Weisungen, No. 57.

  44. Below, Adjutant, 380.

  45. BAB, R 3/1551; Speer, Erinnerungen, 359f.

  46. Müller, ‘Speer’, 399ff., Eichholtz, Geschichte 3, 38ff. (text of edict, 39).

  47. Edict concerning the Intermediate Level Authorities (Mittelinstanz), 22 June 1944, and supplementary edict, 14 July 1944 (Nachrichten des Reichsministeriums für Bewaffnung und Kriegsproduktion, 21 July 1944).

  48. According to Speer, Erinnerungen, 369ff., the speech was ‘proof of his shocking state of exhaustion’; Kehrl, Krisenmanager, 395ff., claims that the audience had generally gained the impression that Hitler was no longer capable of governing.

  49. Speech of 26 June at the Plattlerhof, published in ‘Es spricht’, 335ff. (dated there as 4 July 1944). On the meetings in Essen and Linz see Eichholtz, Geschichte, 3, 42ff.; on Hitler’s speech in detail see Herbst, Krieg, 333ff.

  50. Boelcke (ed.), Rüstung, 3–5 June 1944, 23.

  51. IMT 34, 4006-PS, 44f.; on Sauckel’s subordination to Speer see Eichholtz, Geschichte, 3, 231ff.

  52. BAB, R 43 II/651, Sauckel to Hitler.

  53. IMT 33, 3819-PS, 186ff.; BAB, R 43 II/651, Sauckel report, 17 July 1944, and minutes; Kroener, ‘“Menschenbewirtschaftung” ’, 913f.

  54. Müller, ‘Speer’, 399.

  55. Das Reich, 2 July 1944, ‘Führen wir einen Totalen Krieg?’.

  56. VB (B), 9 July 1944, ‘Mit allen Mitteln gegen den Feind’ (headline); Goebbels TB, 8 July 1944; on total war, in particular his comments on the reports on the content of letters, see also 15 July 1944.

  57. Boelcke (ed.), Rüstung, 6–8. July 1944, 2.

  58. Goebbels TB, 11 July 1944. On the following day Speer gave him the memorandum to read, in which, on 30 July, he had drawn Hitler’s attention to the catastrophic effect of the air raids on the hydrogenation plants. See Birkenfeld, Treibstoff, 238ff. His increasing closeness to Speer is evident in his diaries: 11 May, 6, 27, 29, and 30 June 1944.

  59. Both published in Wolfgang Bleyer, ‘Pläne der faschistischen Führung zum totalen Krieg im Som
mer 1944’, in Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 17 (1969), 1317ff. and 1320ff.

  60. Longerich, ‘Joseph Goebbels und der Totale Krieg. Eine unbekannte Denkschrift des Propagandaministers vom 18. Juli 1944’, in VfZ 35 (1987), 289–314.

  20 July 1944

  1. In explaining the remarkable ability of the regime to sustain itself primarily in terms of the ‘structures of National Socialist rule’, Ian Kershaw (in Das Ende. Kampf bis in den Untergang. NS-Deutschland 1944/45 (Munich, 2011), 541) in my view underestimates Hitler’s independent role. This example shows the inadequacy of an explanation that sees Hitler’s personality and structure as antipodes.

  2. For the resistance to Hitler (a selection) see Jürgen Schmädeke and Peter Steinbach (eds), Der Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus. Die deutsche Gesellschaft und der Widerstand gegen Hitler (Munich, 1994); Hoffmann, Widerstand; Joachim Fest, Staatsstreich. Der lange Weg zum 20. Juli (Berlin, 1994); Peter Steinbach and Johannes Tuchel (eds), Widerstand gegen die nationalsozialistische Diktatur 1933–1945 (Bonn, 2004); Ger van Roon, Widerstand im Dritten Reich. Ein Überblick (Munich, 1990); Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (ed.), ‘Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung’. Die Opposition gegen Hitler und der Staatsstreich vom 20. Juli 1944 in der SD-Berichterstattung. Geheime Dokumente aus dem ehemaligen Reichssicherheitshauptamt, 2 vols (Stuttgart, 1984); Eberhard Zeller, Geist der Freiheit. Der zwanzigste Juli (Berlin, 2004).

  3. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 329ff. Among the sympathizers were von Kleist, von Gersdorff, von Hardenberg, von Lehndorff, and von Schlabrendorff.

  4. Parssinen, Oster.

  5. Helena P. Page, Friedrich Olbricht. Ein Mann des 20. Juli (Bonn, 1992).

  6. Günter Brakelmann, Der Kreisauer Kreis. Chronologie, Kurzbiographien, und Texte aus dem Widerstand (Münster, 2003).

  7. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 337f.; Fabian von Schlabrendorff, Offiziere gegen Hitler (Berlin, 1994), 56ff. and 61.

  8. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 343, 350, and 374ff.

  9. See Hoffmann’s reconstruction in ibid., 348f.

  10. Ibid., 350f.; Schlabrendorff, Offiziere, 66ff.

  11. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 360ff.

  12. Ibid., 396. On Stauffenberg see Hoffmann, Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg. Die Biographie (Munich, 2007)

  13. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 429ff. and 439ff.

  14. Ibid., 396ff.

  15. Ibid., 469; Zeller, Geist, 367.

  16. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 469; Jacobsen (ed.), ‘Spiegelbild’, 121 and 130; Schlabrendorff, Offiziere, 118f.

  17. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 471ff.; Schlabrendorff, Offiziere, 119.

  18. On the assassination attempt see Hoffmann, Widerstand, 486ff.; Fest, Staatsstreich, 258ff.; Kershaw, Hitler, 2, 882ff.; Below, Adjutant, 381ff.; Schroeder, Chef, 147f.

  19. Domarus, 2, 2127.

  20. On the events in Berlin see Hoffmann, Widerstand, 506ff.; Kershaw, Hitler, 2, 885ff.; Fest, Staatsstreich, 262ff.; Zeller, Geist, 397f.; Speer, Erinnerungen, 381ff.

  21. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 540ff.

  22. Hans W. Hagen, ‘Bericht über meine Tätigkeit als Verbindungsoffizier des Wachbataillons “Großdeutschland” zum Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda am 20. Juli 1944’, in Jacobsen, ‘Spiegelbild’, 12–15; Otto-Ernst Remer, ‘Der Ablauf der Ereignisse am 20. 7. 1944, wie ich sie als Kommandeur des Wachbataillons “Großdeutschland” erlebte’, in Jacobsen, ‘Spiegelbild’, 633–645. See Hoffmann, Widerstand, 528ff. and 592ff.

  23. Kroener, Fromm, 679ff.; Hoffmann, Widerstand, 620ff.

  24. Domarus, 2, 2127ff.

  25. Ibid., 2129.

  26. Goebbels TB, 3 and 24 August 1944.

  Total War

  1. ‘Führer-Erlasse’, No. 340f.

  2. Goebbels TB, 23 July 1944; BAB, R 43 II/664a, Minutes of the Chefbesprechung of 22 July 1944.

  3. RGBl. 1944 I, 161f.; BAB, R 43 II/664a, Lammers’s note about the address on 25 July 1944, and Goebbels’s certificate of appointment, 25 July 1944; on the Führer edict see Rebentisch, Führerstaat, 516f.

  4. An appeal process was envisaged against his ‘directives’; the issuing of ‘legal provisions and basic administrative regulations’ in the sphere of total war was a matter for the highest Reich authorities. The sentence stating that Bormann would support these measures ‘by deploying the Party’ underlined the fact that Goebbels’s powers did not cover the Party. Moreover, Lammers produced a list of central Reich agencies to which the plenipotentiary’s orders did not apply. See BAB, R 43 II/664a, Lammers to Goebbels, 26 July 1944.

  5. Eichholtz, Geschichte, 3, 51.

  6. Frieser, ‘Zusammenbruch’, 572ff.

  7. Klaus Schönherr, ‘Die Kämpfe um Galizien und die Beskiden’, in Frieser, Ostfront, 712ff.

  8. Vogel, ‘Kriegführung’, 556ff.

  9. Speer: BAB R 3/1553, Transcript If Z, Fa 35/2, and final version of the manuscript; Speer, Erinnerungen, 402; Himmler, ‘Rede Himmlers’; Goebbels: Heiber (ed.), Goebbels Reden, 2, No. 28; Goebbels TB, 4 August 1944; on the meeting see Moll, ‘Steuerungsinstrument’, 265ff.

  10. Domarus, 2, 2138f.

  11. Goebbels TB, 23 July 1944.

  12. BAB, R 55/614, Circulars from the propaganda headquarters concerning these demonstrations, 23 July 1944, and directives for the events.

  13. Meldungen, 17, 6684ff.

  14. Goebbels TB, 23 July 1944.

  15. Ibid., 3 August 1944.

  16. Armin Ramm, Der 20. Juli vor dem Volksgerichtshof (Berlin, 2007), 69ff.; Guderian, Erinnerungen, 313ff.

  17. Remy, Rommel, 304ff.; Reuth, Rommel, 225ff.

  18. Goebbels TB, 3 August 1944.

  19. VB (B), 9 August 1944, ‘Acht Verbrecher vom 20. Juli traf die verdiente Strafe’ (headline).

  20. Ramm, 20. Juli, 342f.

  21. Goebbels TB, 16 August 1944.

  22. Ramm, 20. Juli, 449ff., with an overview of the trials.

  23. Vogel, ‘Kriegführung’, 581ff.

  24. On Kluge’s dismissal and suicide see Guderian, Erinnerungen, 335; Gersdorff, Soldat, 156f.; Hitler’s comments in Heiber (ed.), Lagebesprechungen, 610ff.; Schmundt, Tätigkeitsbericht, 19, 20, 22, and 28 August on the investigation into the cause of death. See also Kershaw, Hitler, 2, 938f.

  25. Vogel, ‘Kriegführung’, 556ff.

  26. Domarus, 2, 2142; Schumann (ed.), Deutschland, 5, 665.

  27. Vogel, ‘Kriegführung’, 560ff.

  28. Hubatsch (ed.), Weisungen, Nos 61–63. At the end of July he had issued similar orders for northern Italy. See ibid., Nos 60, 60a, and 60b.

  29. Ibid., Nos 64a and 64b.

  30. Leitz, Nazi Germany, 107.

  31. Klaus Schönherr, ‘Die Rückzugskämpfe in Rumänien und Siebenbürgen’, in Frieser (ed.), Ostfront., 546ff. and 773ff.

  32. Guderian, Erinnerungen, 329f.

  33. Schönherr, ‘Rückzugskämpfe’, 773ff.

  34. Ibid., 816ff.; Hoppe, Bulgarien, 180ff.

  35. Schönherr, ‘Der Rückzug aus Griechenland’ in Frieser (ed.), Ostfront, 1089–99.

  36. Bernd Wegner, ‘Das Kriegsende in Skandinavien’ in Frieser (ed.), Ostfront, 979f. and 991ff.

  37. Speer, Erinnerungen, 405ff.; Goebbels TB, 3 and 20 September 1944.

  38. Longerich, Goebbels, 633ff.

  39. BAB, R 43 II/666b, Führerinformation, 11 August 1944. Goebbels succeeded in removing his doubts and so theatres, orchestral, and variety performances and the like were closed, ‘initially’ for six months (Goebbels TB, 24 August 1944).

  40. Ibid., 5 October 1944, also 24 August 1944.

  41. BAB, R 43 II/665, Bormann to Goebbels, 14 August 1944; R 43 II/666b, Führerinformation, 17 August 1944.

  42. Goebbels TB, 24 August 1944.

  43. Ibid., 17, and 20 September 1944.

  44. Ibid., 24 August 1944.

  45. BAB, R 43 II/1363, Minute, 20 September 1943, and further correspondence.

  46. Goebbels TB, 10 August 1944; on the economics ministry see Herbst, Krieg, 344.

  47. Goebbels TB, 24 October 1944.


  48. Schmundt, Tagesbericht, 6, 11, 14, 23, 30 October, 15 and 24 November, and 5 December 1944.

  49. Gröhler, Bombenkrieg, 371, 374, and 489.

  50. Vogel, ‘Kriegführung’, 606ff. and 615.

  51. Goebbels TB, 23 and 25 September 1944.

  52. Longerich, Goebbels, 644; Kershaw, Hitler, 2, 948ff.

  53. Frieser, ‘Rückzugskämpfe’, 642ff.

  54. Goebbels TB, 24 October 1944; Kershaw, Hitler, 2, 959.

  55. Karl-Heinz Frieser, ‘Die erfolgreichen Abwehrkämpfe der Heeresgruppe Mitte im Herbst 1944’, in Frieser, Ostfront., 612ff.

  56. Goebbels TB, 9, 11, 17, 20–22, and 29 November 1944 for particularly worried entries. On military developments see Vogel, ‘Kriegführung’, 614ff.

  57. Wehrmachtberichte 3, 8 November 1944; Hölsken, V-Waffen, 137ff.

  58. Goebbels TB, 13 November 1944.

  59. Domarus, 2, 2160ff.

  60. Below, Adjutant, 395.

  61. Kershaw, Hitler, 2, 962; Goebbels TB, 24 November 1944.

  62. For the complaints about the lack of a public statement from Hitler see ibid., 11, 12, 14, 16–18, and 30 September, 4, 9, 10, and 13 November, and 3 December 1944.

  63. Ibid., 30 September and 6 (quote), 8, 9, and 30 October 1944; Kershaw, Hitler, 2, 945.

  64. Goebbels TB, 3 December 1944.

  65. Ibid.

  66. Reproduced in Heiber (ed.), Lagebesprechungen, 713ff.; see also Below, Adjutant, 397f. He had also outlined the aims of the offensive to Goebbels in detail on 1 December (Goebbels TB, 2 December 1945).

  67. Vogel, ‘Kriegführung’, 625ff.

  68. Below, Adjutant, 398.

  The End

  1. Richard Lakowski, ‘Der Zusammenbruch der deutschen Verteidigung zwischen Ostsee und Karpaten’, in Müller, Das Deutsche Reich, 516ff.; Guderian, Erinnerungen, 345ff.

  2. Lakowski, ‘Zusammenbruch’, 524; Guderian, Erinnerungen, 357.

  3. Lakowski, ‘Zusammenbruch’, 524; Longerich, Himmler, 737ff.

  4. Frieser, ‘Rückzugskämpfe’.

  5. Wegner, ‘Kriegsende’; Lagevorträge, 10 March 1945.

  6. Guderian, Erinnerungen, 374f.; Gerhard Boldt, Die letzten Tage der Reichskanzlei (Hamburg and Stuttgart, 1947), 20. Gerhard Boldt, a cavalry captain on the general staff, accompanied Guderian.