by Peter Yule
a rigid adherence to the contract. Some of the stuff was
undeliverable but the Commonwealth would not relent. In
my years at Boeing I fought for some flexibility, but I could
not get the specifications changed – even though the head of
the navy agreed that it would be a good idea.
Don Chalmers, who was the assistant chief of development
in defence from mid-1995 until early 1997, had sympathy for
Boeing’s position. He recalls that David Gray, the chief executive
of Boeing Australia, came to see him and
T H E C O M B A T S Y S T E M 1 9 9 3 – 9 7
251
pointed out that the contract was almost preventing them
from producing a combat system that would work. It was to
be a fully integrated system, but the problem with the
contract was that although it was purported at the time to be
an output oriented contract, in fact there were a lot of inputs.
They were constrained as to the languages they could use and
in fact the capacity of the computers they could use . . . They
believed they couldn’t develop the combat system at the time
and they were asking for the department to set aside some of
the requirements and allow them not to make the next step
but to go back and restart the thing as a whole. I think
personally that we should have done that. But the attitude in
the acquisition organisation at that stage was that: ‘These
people have never performed. Let’s make them perform and
get this thing to work and then we’ll look at improving it.’
This view is also supported by Chris Miller of Computer Sciences.
He believes that by 1995 Computer Sciences knew how to fix the
problems and make the tactical data handling system work, but
‘we were not able to do it for contractual reasons’. The system had
become far too complicated and the solution lay in simplification,
but the company was not allowed to do this because of the need to
meet the exact contractual requirements. It was not until the next
phase of the project that a settlement of these issues was reached.
The project office was unable to resolve the contractual grid-
lock. Colin Cooper recalls arguing ‘long and hard’ for the removal
of unwanted or low priority requirements in return for a resolu-
tion of basic requirements. However, he says that ‘Boeing refused
to accept any changes because of their contractual impasse with
Computer Sciences’.
With the benefit of hindsight it is notable that even after a
decade of work on the combat system there was no agreement
between those most closely involved as to whether the main prob-
lem was the fundamental architecture, over-optimistic require-
ments, poorly designed contracts, Rockwell’s management of the
project, the use of obsolete technology, lack of operator input
during building or any combination of these.
In the early days of the new submarine project DSTO had
little involvement with the combat system, although the pos-
sibly unfortunate choice of Ada as the preferred programming
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language was the result of a DSTO study. As the project pro-
gressed DSTO was interested in contributing but was discouraged
because it was thought that the fixed-price contract would force
the commercial participants to carry the risk and responsibilities
of their undertakings.8
However, in 1994 the submarine project requested assistance
with analysis of the target motion analysis algorithms used by
the Rockwell system. Dr Roger Creaser, chief of Maritime Oper-
ations Division, which contained the nucleus of DSTO’s informa-
tion technology systems expertise, soon recognised that the project
had greater troubles ahead and in 1996 established the Combat
Systems Research Centre. The centre built a ‘virtual Collins’ that
emulated the submarines’ computer systems, enabling it to evalu-
ate specific elements of the combat system. This became a powerful
tool for identifying where the problems of the combat system lay.
From early 1995 Bob Clark and Colin Cooper in the project
office had established close working relationships with the US
Naval Undersea Warfare Centre and the British submarine com-
bat system teams. They were able to compare the lessons from
the US Navy’s AN/BSY1 combat system and the British SMCS
projects, both of which had experienced problems similar to those
encountered in the Collins combat system. In 1999 and 2000 this
knowledge greatly facilitated the combat system augmentation
activities under the ‘fast-track’ program to overcome some of the
major shortcomings of the combat system.
The project team also planned options should the combat sys-
tem software not provide the promised functionality. These were
the Scylla open architecture interface to the sonar designed and
developed by DSTO and Thales,9 an open architecture port to the
tactical data handling system, and an industry-supported study on
how to open up the combat system to the newly emerging open
system technologies. These initiatives subsequently allowed the
combat system augmentation equipment to be rapidly incorpo-
rated into the submarines, as part of the original augmentation of
Collins (for her first deployment to Hawaii) and then as part of
‘fast track’.
DSTO became more deeply involved in the combat system in
1998 when Boeing was attempting to deliver its release 2.0 soft-
ware. Dr Todd Mansell, who had just taken charge of DSTO’s
combat systems research, was asked to determine whether the
T H E C O M B A T S Y S T E M 1 9 9 3 – 9 7
253
software would meet the operational requirements of the navy.
He concluded that release 2.0 would not deliver the capability
Boeing had promised because the software could not overcome
the monolithic nature of the system, which was the primary rea-
son for its erratic performance. For example, a fault in the tacti-
cal data handling system would close down the sonar, navigation
and fire control subsystems because they could not be operated in
isolation.
By the end of 1998 it was clear that the original Rockwell
combat system would never work as intended. Collins and Farn-
comb were at sea with systems cobbled together from the function-
ing parts of the Rockwell system supplemented with stand-alone
‘black boxes’. Further ‘drops’ arrived from time to time but the
improvement in performance was marginal. However, neither the
project office nor the navy had yet faced the reality that the system
would never work effectively, and the political consequences that
flowed from that. Should the system be abandoned? Would the
politicians agree to pay for a replacement?
P A R T 4
R E S O L U T I O N
C H A P T E R 22
‘Hardly a day went by without the
project getting a hammering in the
press’: the project in crisis 1997–98
The year 1997 marked a turning point in the new submarine
project. Up until then the problems of the submarines had been
debated between the main parties involved – ASC, Rockwell,
Kockums, the navy and the Defence Department – with an occa-
sional burst of media criticism, but during that year a significant
new factor was added when the politicians joined in the fray. The
‘strange sense of unease’ that hung over the project in the mid-
1990s soon became a major crisis that destroyed many careers
and even threatened the future of the submarines themselves.
By the end of June 1997 the first three submarines were ‘struc-
turally complete’. Of the remaining three, Dechaineux was 94 per
cent complete, Sheean 88 per cent, and Rankin 83 per cent.1 ASC
and its major sub-contractors had been working on the project for
10 years, but now the end of the construction phase was clearly in
sight. Barring orders for more submarines from either the Aus-
tralian navy or a foreign navy, submarine construction would
inevitably wind down and the future of ASC would depend on
either reconstructing itself as a general shipbuilder and engineer-
ing contractor or securing its role in the long-term support and
maintenance of the submarines.
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Even though one of the strongest arguments for building the
submarines in Australia had been that it would give the skills and
knowledge needed to support the submarines throughout their
life, the navy seems to have given remarkably little thought to
putting this admirable theory into practice and the early arrange-
ments for supporting the submarines were totally inadequate. This
appears to have been at least partly due to an unrealistic require-
ment that maintenance costs for the new submarines were to be
significantly lower than for the Oberon class. In practice it turned
out that the design aspects of Collins that reduced maintenance
requirements compared with Oberons were offset by complexity
of many of the systems, while issues like corrosion and marine
growth were no different for the new submarines.2
In one of many examples of largely wasted effort during the
course of the submarine project, in the early 1990s the project
office prepared detailed plans for the support and maintenance of
the submarines. Peter Hatcher and Paul Greenfield as ‘acceptance
into service and transition managers’ developed in-service support
plans and a contract and acquisition strategy, and tried to explain
to various navy organisations what it would take to support the
Collins class after delivery. In 1993 Greenfield briefed the navy
support command on the in-service support plans. The response
was: ‘Thanks very much, Paul, we’ll handle it from here.’3
The project office plans were ignored by the navy, and subma-
rine support became a series of ad hoc arrangements referred to
by the project office as ‘competitive at all costs’ because the work
always went to the cheapest bidder. ASC’s tenders were normally
uncompetitive (because its costs were higher) and it was called
in only when a problem was serious. Paul Greenfield recalls that
Hans Ohff kept some badly welded pipes on his desk at ASC to
show the poor quality of ‘back yard’ workmanship which pre-
vailed under the ‘competitive at all costs’ regime.
In January 1998 the navy support command finally gave ASC
a contract to maintain the submarines at their base in Western
Australia. This was a ‘time and materials’ contract and was only
sufficient to support a small team of engineers. There was no blue
collar workforce, with tradesmen being brought in on a contract
basis as required. Martin Edwards of ASC recalls that:
The navy was still coming to terms with what it meant to
have a submarine service, the crews were still learning about
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259
the submarines and money was very short in the support
organisation. We were still having challenging technical
problems . . . and also the naval spares system was short of a
lot of Collins spares . . . I think there was also a lack of
understanding of the complexity of the Collins class
submarine compared to the Oberon class.
The equipment on the submarines was often serviced by people
with no knowledge of the design or expertise for the task. Greg
Stuart recalls an incident where there was a failure with a saltwater
system and they found it was caused by a local plumber who
had used brass fittings, which should never be used in a saltwater
environment.
Poor support and maintenance contributed to the early prob-
lems of the submarines, while the lack of a long-term sup-
port contract inevitably led to concerns for the future at ASC,
with staff asking what would happen when the last submarine
was completed. In early 1997 Hans Ohff announced that about
10 per cent of the company’s workforce would be laid off by the
end of the year and more would follow unless the government
ordered more submarines.4
The uncertainty at ASC was compounded by speculation over
the company’s ownership. The Coalition government elected in
1996 was committed to the privatisation of government-owned
businesses and it seemed probable that it would try to sell its
majority shareholding in ASC. In anticipation of a sale several con-
sortia began circling. On 6 June 1997 many newspapers reported
on a possible takeover of ASC by Transfield – led by Andrew
Johnson, formerly of SWSC and Computer Sciences – and several
months later John White, another prominent figure from the early
years of the project, reappeared leading a consortium with eyes
on ASC.5
There was also speculation in 1997 that Kockums or another
European defence company might be interested in a fully priva-
tised ASC. However, in late 1997 Ian McLachlan, the Defence
Minister, decided that the government should hold off selling its
shares until the problems with the submarines were resolved.
After enjoying several highly profitable years in the early stages
of the Australian submarine project, Kockums fell on hard times
as the 1990s progressed. The end of the Cold War (‘that peace
thing’, as one Swede plaintively described it to the authors) led
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to a steep fall in Swedish defence spending, and Kockums did
not have the resources to develop new products and new ideas,
or to respond quickly to the design challenges thrown up by the
Australian submarine project. As design authority, Kockums was
required to authorise any design changes suggested to improve the
performance of the submarines, but ASC and the project office felt
constant frustration that the process was too slow.6
Like Kockums, the leader of the combat system consortium
also had se
rious problems. Rockwell’s defence business struggled
with the end of the Cold War and in 1996 it was sold to Boe-
ing. Boeing had no more success with the combat system than
Rockwell, and engaged Raytheon to give assistance. Raytheon,
which had extensive experience supplying tactical control systems
for American submarines, advised Boeing that the combat system
could only be delivered if there was significant ‘descoping of func-
tionality’. After reaching agreement with the Commonwealth on
reducing the requirements, Raytheon succeeded in stabilising the
system, allowing release 2.0 delivery to occur in late December
1999. In May 2000 Raytheon bought Boeing’s naval system divi-
sion, which included taking over the remainder of the original
combat system contract.
Under both Oscar Hughes and Geoff Rose the submarine
project office worked closely with ASC. This worked smoothly
while the navy kept its distance from the project, but from the
mid-1990s the navy became involved at two very different lev-
els. The crews were learning how to handle their new submarines
with their inadequate combat system and myriad mechanical fail-
ures, while the navy leadership was waking up to the looming
‘capability gap’ as the Oberons retired, as well as feeling the polit-
ical pressure arising from the media criticism of the submarines.
Both groups blamed ASC for their difficulties and the project
office was trapped in the crossfire. The navy saw the project as
being too close to ASC and unable to force ASC to fix the sub-
marines, while ASC did not seem to take the project office seri-
ously when it waved a big stick rather than proffering the usual
carrot.
In early 1997 Geoff Rose was peremptorily removed from
the project and retired from the navy. The new project director,
Eoin Asker, had been involved in the submarine project in its ear-
lier phases before running the successful mine-hunter project and
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261
serving as head of naval construction. He recalls that navy chief
Rod Taylor asked him if he would like to take over the submarine
project, to which he replied, ‘I’m not a volunteer’, but he had little
choice in the matter.7
As submarine project director Asker felt ‘squeezed between
ASC, which says the submarine is ready but here is a list of defects,
