History of Florence and of the Affairs of Italy

by Niccolo Machiavelli

his ungrateful design, they sent ambassadors to see with what kind of

  color he would invest his unprincipled proceedings, and being admitted

  to his presence, one of them spoke to the following effect;--"It is

  customary with those who wish to obtain a favor, to make use either of

  prayers, presents, or threats, that pity, convenience, or fear, may

  induce a compliance with their requests. But as with cruel,

  avaricious, or, in their own conceit, powerful men, these arguments

  have no weight, it is vain to hope, either to soften them by prayers,

  win them by presents, or alarm them by menaces. We, therefore, being

  now, though late, aware of thy pride, cruelty, and ambition, come

  hither, not to ask aught, nor with the hope, even if we were so

  disposed, of obtaining it, but to remind thee of the benefits thou

  hast received from the people of Milan, and to prove with what

  heartless ingratitude thou hast repaid them, that at least, under the

  many evils oppressing us, we may derive some gratification from

  telling thee how and by whom they have been produced. Thou canst not

  have forgotten thy wretched condition at the death of the duke

  Filippo; the king and the pope were both thine enemies; thou hadst

  abandoned the Florentines and the Venetians, who, on account of their

  just indignation, and because they stood in no further need of thee,

  were almost become thy declared enemies. Thou wert exhausted by thy

  wars against the church; with few followers, no friends, or any money;

  hopeless of being able to preserve either thy territories or thy

  reputation. From these circumstances thy ruin must have ensued, but

  for our simplicity; we received thee to our home, actuated by

  reverence for the happy memory of our duke, with whom, being connected

  by marriage and renewed alliance, we believed thy affection would

  descend to those who had inherited his authority, and that, if to the

  benefits he had conferred on thee, our own were added, the friendship

  we sought to establish would not only be firm, but inseparable; with

  this impression, we added Verona or Brescia to thy previous

  appointments. What more could we either give or promise thee? What

  else couldst thou, not from us merely, but from any others, have

  either had or expected? Thou receivedst from us an unhoped-for

  benefit, and we, in return, an unmerited wrong. Neither hast thou

  deferred until now the manifestation of thy base designs; for no

  sooner wert thou appointed to command our armies, than, contrary to

  every dictate of propriety, thou didst accept Pavia, which plainly

  showed what was to be the result of thy friendship; but we bore with

  the injury, in hope that the greatness of the advantage would satisfy

  thy ambition. Alas! those who grasp at all cannot be satisfied with a

  part. Thou didst promise that we should possess the conquests which

  thou might afterward make; for thou wert well aware that what was

  given at many times might be withdrawn at once, as was the case after

  the victory at Caravaggio, purchased by our money and blood, and

  followed by our ruin. Oh! unhappy states, which have to guard against

  their oppressor; but much more wretched those who have to trust to

  mercenary and faithless arms like thine! May our example instruct

  posterity, since that of Thebes and Philip of Macedon, who, after

  victory over her enemies, from being her captain became her foe and

  her prince, could not avail us.

  "The only fault of which we are conscious is our over-weening

  confidence in one whom we ought not to have trusted; for thy past

  life, thy restless mind, incapable of repose, ought to have put us on

  our guard; neither ought we to have confided in one who betrayed the

  lord of Lucca, set a fine upon the Florentines and the Venetians,

  defied the duke, despised the king, and besides all this, persecuted

  the church of God, and the Divinity himself with innumerable

  atrocities. We ought not to have fancied that so many potentates

  possessed less influence over the mind of Francesco Sforza, than the

  Milanese; or that he would preserve unblemished that faith towards us

  which he had on so many occasions broken with them. Still this want of

  caution in us does not excuse the perfidy in thee; nor can it

  obliterate the infamy with which our just complaints will blacken thy

  character throughout the world, or prevent the remorse of thy

  conscience, when our arms are used for our own destruction; for thou

  wilt see that the sufferings due to parricides are fully deserved by

  thee. And though ambition should blind thine eyes, the whole world,

  witness to thine iniquity, will compel thee to open them; God himself

  will unclose them, if perjuries, if violated faith, if treacheries

  displease him, and if, as ever, he is still the enemy of the wicked.

  Do not, therefore, promise thyself any certainty of victory; for the

  just wrath of the Almighty will weigh heavily upon thee; and we are

  resolved to lose our liberty only with our lives; but if we found we

  could not ultimately defend it, we would submit ourselves to anyone

  rather than to thee. And if our sins be so great that in spite of our

  utmost resolution, we should still fall into thy hands, be quite

  assured, that the sovereignty which is commenced in deceit and

  villainy, will terminate either in thyself or thy children with

  ignominy and blood."

  The count, though not insensible to the just reproaches of the

  Milanese, did not exhibit either by words or gestures any unusual

  excitement, and replied, that "He willingly attributed to their angry

  feelings all the serious charges of their indiscreet harangue; and he

  would reply to them in detail, were he in the presence of anyone who

  could decide their differences; for it would be evident that he had

  not injured the Milanese, but only taken care that they should not

  injure him. They well knew how they had proceeded after the victory of

  Caravaggio; for, instead of rewarding him with either Verona or

  Brescia, they sought peace with the Venetians, that all the blame of

  the quarrel might rest on him, themselves obtaining the fruit of

  victory, the credit of peace, and all the advantages that could be

  derived from the war. It would thus be manifest they had no right to

  complain, when he had effected the arrangements which they first

  attempted to make; and that if he had deferred to do so a little

  longer, he would have had reason to accuse them of the ingratitude

  with which they were now charging him. Whether the charge were true or

  false, that God, whom they had invoked to avenge their injuries, would

  show at the conclusion of the war, and would demonstrate which was

  most his friend, and who had most justice on their side."

  Upon the departure of the ambassadors, the count determined to attack

  the Milanese, who prepared for their defense, and appointed Francesco

  and Jacopo Piccinino (attached to their cause, on account of the

  ancient feud of the families of Braccio and Sforza) to conduct their

  forces in support of liberty; at least till they could deprive the

  count of the aid of the Ve
netians, who they did not think would long

  be either friendly or faithful to him. On the other hand, the count,

  perfectly aware of this, thought it not imprudent, supposing the

  obligation of the treaty insufficient, to bind them by the ties of

  interest; and, therefore, in assigning to each their portion of the

  enterprise, he consented that the Venetians should attack Crema, and

  himself, with the other forces, assail the remainder of the territory.

  The advantage of this arrangement kept the Venetians so long in

  alliance with the count, that he was enabled to conquer the whole of

  the Milanese territory, and to press the city so closely, that the

  inhabitants could not provide themselves with necessaries; despairing

  of success, they sent envoys to the Venetians to beg they would

  compassionate their distress, and, as ought to be the case between

  republics, assist them in defense of their liberty against a tyrant,

  whom, if once master of their city, they would be unable to restrain;

  neither did they think he would be content with the boundaries

  assigned him by the treaty, but would expect all the dependencies of

  Milan.

  The Venetians had not yet taken Crema, and wishing before they changed

  sides, to effect this point, they PUBLICLY answered the envoys, that

  their engagements with the count prevented them from defending the

  Milanese; but SECRETLY, gave them every assurance of their wish to do

  so.

  The count had approached so near Milan with his forces, that he was

  disputing the suburbs with the inhabitants, when the Venetians having

  taken Crema, thought they need no longer hesitate to declare in favor

  of the Milanese, with whom they made peace and entered into alliance;

  among the terms of which was the defense of their liberty unimpaired.

  Having come to this agreement, they ordered their forces to withdraw

  from the count's camp and to return to the Venetian territory. They

  informed him of the peace made with the Milanese, and gave him twenty

  days to consider what course he would adopt. He was not surprised at

  the step taken by the Venetians, for he had long foreseen it, and

  expected its occurrence daily; but when it actually took place, he

  could not avoid feeling regret and displeasure similar to what the

  Milanese had experienced when he abandoned them. He took two days to

  consider the reply he would make to the ambassadors whom the Venetians

  had sent to inform him of the treaty, and during this time he

  determined to dupe the Venetians, and not abandon his enterprise;

  therefore, appearing openly to accept the proposal for peace, he sent

  his ambassadors to Venice with full credentials to effect the

  ratification, but gave them secret orders not to do so, and with

  pretexts or caviling to put it off. To give the Venetians greater

  assurance of his sincerity, he made a truce with the Milanese for a

  month, withdrew from Milan and divided his forces among the places he

  had taken. This course was the occasion of his victory and the ruin of

  the Milanese; for the Venetians, confident of peace, were slow in

  preparing for war, and the Milanese finding the truce concluded, the

  enemy withdrawn, and the Venetians their friends, felt assured that

  the count had determined to abandon his design. This idea injured them

  in two ways: one, by neglecting to provide for their defense; the

  next, that, being seed-time, they sowed a large quantity of grain in

  the country which the enemy had evacuated, and thus brought famine

  upon themselves. On the other hand, all that was injurious to his

  enemies favored the count, and the time gave him opportunity to take

  breath and provide himself with assistance.

  The Florentines during the war of Lombardy had not declared in favor

  of either party, or assisted the count either in defense of the

  Milanese or since; for he never having been in need had not pressingly

  requested it; and they only sent assistance to the Venetians after the

  rout at Caravaggio, in pursuance of the treaty. Count Francesco,

  standing now alone, and not knowing to whom else he could apply, was

  compelled to request immediate aid of the Florentines, publicly from

  the state, and privately from friends, particularly from Cosmo de'

  Medici, with whom he had always maintained a steady friendship, and by

  whom he had constantly been faithfully advised and liberally

  supported. Nor did Cosmo abandon him in his extreme necessity, but

  supplied him generously from his own resources, and encouraged him to

  prosecute his design. He also wished the city publicly to assist him,

  but there were difficulties in the way. Neri di Gino Capponi, one of

  the most powerful citizens of Florence, thought it not to the

  advantage of the city, that the count should obtain Milan; and was of

  opinion that it would be more to the safety of Italy for him to ratify

  the peace than pursue the war. In the first place, he apprehended that

  the Milanese, through their anger against the count, would surrender

  themselves entirely to the Venetians, which would occasion the ruin of

  all. Supposing he should occupy Milan, it appeared to him that so

  great military superiority, combined with such an extent of territory,

  would be dangerous to themselves, and that if as count he was

  intolerable, he would become doubly so as duke. He therefore

  considered it better for the republic of Florence and for Italy, that

  the count should be content with his military reputation, and that

  Lombardy should be divided into two republics, which could never be

  united to injure others, and separately are unable to do so. To attain

  this he saw no better means than to refrain from aiding the count, and

  continuing in the former league with the Venetians. These reasonings

  were not satisfactory to Cosmo's friends, for they imagined that Neri

  had argued thus, not from a conviction of its advantage to the

  republic, but to prevent the count, as a friend of Cosmo, from

  becoming duke, apprehending that Cosmo would, in consequence of this,

  become too powerful.

  Cosmo, in reply, pointed out, that to lend assistance to the count

  would be highly beneficial both to Italy and the republic; for it was

  unwise to imagine the Milanese could preserve their own liberty; for

  the nature of their community, their mode of life, and their

  hereditary feuds were opposed to every kind of civil government, so

  that it was necessary, either that the count should become duke of

  Milan, or the Venetians her lords. And surely under such

  circumstances, no one could doubt which would be most to their

  advantage, to have for their neighbor a powerful friend or a far more

  powerful foe. Neither need it be apprehended that the Milanese, while

  at war with the count, would submit to the Venetians; for the count

  had a stronger party in the city, and the Venetians had not, so that

  whenever they were unable to defend themselves as freemen, they would

  be more inclined to obey the count than the Venetians.

  These diverse views kept the city long in suspense; but at length it

  was resolved to send ambassadors
to the count to settle the terms of

  agreement, with instructions, that if they found him in such a

  condition as to give hopes of his ultimate success, they were to close

  with him, but, if otherwise, they were to draw out the time in

  diplomacy.

  CHAPTER V

  Prosecution of the war between the count and the Milanese--The

  Milanese reduced to extremity--The people rise against the

  magistrates--Milan surrenders to the count--League between the new

  duke of Milan and the Florentines, and between the king of Naples

  and the Venetians--Venetian and Neapolitan ambassadors at Florence

  --Answer of Cosmo de' Medici to the Venetian ambassador--

  Preparations of the Venetians and the king of Naples for the war--

  The Venetians excite disturbances in Bologna--Florence prepares

  for war--The emperor, Frederick III. at Florence--War in Lombardy

  between the duke of Milan and the Venetians--Ferrando, son of the

  king of Naples, marches into Tuscany against the Florentines.

  The ambassadors were at Reggio when they heard that the count had

  become lord of Milan; for as soon as the truce had expired, he

  approached the city with his forces, hoping quickly to get possession

  of it in spite of the Venetians, who could bring no relief except from

  the side of the Adda, which route he could easily obstruct, and

  therefore had no apprehension (being then winter) of their arrival,

  and he trusted that, before the return of spring, he would be

  victorious, particularly, as by the death of Francesco Piccinino,

  there remained only Jacopo his brother, to command the Milanese. The

  Venetians had sent an ambassador to Milan to confirm the citizens in

  their resolution of defense, promising them powerful and immediate

  aid. During the winter a few slight skirmishes had taken place between

  the count and the Venetians; but on the approach of milder weather,

  the latter, under Pandolfo Malatesti, halted with their army upon the

  Adda, and considering whether, in order to succor the Milanese, they

  ought to risk a battle, Pardolfo, their general, aware of the count's

  abilities, and the courage of his army, said it would be unadvisable

  to do so, and that, under the circumstances, it was needless, for the

  count, being in great want of forage, could not keep the field, and

  must soon retire. He therefore advised them to remain encamped, to

  keep the Milanese in hope, and prevent them from surrendering. This

  advice was approved by the Venetians, both as being safe, and because,

  by keeping the Milanese in this necessity, they might be the sooner

  compelled to submit to their dominion; for they felt quite sure that

  the injuries they had received would always prevent their submission

  to the count.

  In the meantime, the Milanese were reduced to the utmost misery; and

  as the city usually abounded with poor, many died of hunger in the

  streets; hence arose complaints and disturbances in several parts,

  which alarmed the magistrates, and compelled them to use their utmost

  exertions to prevent popular meetings. The multitude are always slow

  to resolve on commotion; but the resolution once formed, any trivial

  circumstance excites it to action. Two men in humble life, talking

  together near the Porta Nuova of the calamities of the city, their own

  misery, and the means that might be adopted for their relief, others

  beginning to congregate, there was soon collected a large crowd; in

  consequence of it a report was spread that the neighborhood of Porta

  Nuova had risen against the government. Upon this, all the lower

  orders, who only waited for an example, assembled in arms, and chose

  Gasparre da Vicomercato to be their leader. They then proceeded to the

  place where the magistrates were assembled, and attacked them so

  impetuously that all who did not escape by flight were slain: among

  the number, as being considered a principal cause of the famine, and

  gratified at their distress, fell Lionardo Veniero, the Venetian