Diary of a Combatant
Page 18
1958
April 1958
Notebook VII
18
I received Fidel’s order entrusting me with certain duties in the area that he controlled, one of which I still can’t put in the diary, the others are: to oversee the training of 200 new recruits, to help with the planta [radio equipment] and the newspaper1 that are being moved here, to help in the task of collecting taxes and to work with Sorí Marín2 (who had been transferred) on the agrarian reform. We then set out before dawn. I was somewhat dejected to leave the area that I’d had under my control for almost a year at a very critical time because Sánchez Mosquera’s troops are around and more active and the area will be abandoned [to Batista’s army].3
We walked quite a way from well before dawn until 3:00 in the afternoon, when we reached Providencia where we rested. There’s no news from Fidel, who remained behind.
19
I went in the jeep to Las Vegas, where the high command was. The pilots I had to talk to were there. From our conversation it became evident that we need to go together to look for a landing strip. The best place seemed to be the facility at La Plata River, identifiable by its proximity to Turquino and where there are some good open areas. We left that same afternoon, heading toward Mario Sorial’s house in Las Minas de Frío, where Evelio Laferté4 has his school. He’s an ex-prisoner who was promoted to captain and named director of the school for recruits. We spent the night there.
20
We walked all day, arriving at the beach just as the sun was setting. We slept there. A good landing strip was found some two kilometers from the coast. We slept in La Plata.
21
The pilots gave the pertinent orders to Rico Hidalgo, the person in charge of that area, to clean it up and then to make a tunnel. We kept walking and saw the new hospital, and later made it to Las Vegas, where Fidel was waiting.
22
We spent the day in discussions about the best way to coordinate what was to be sent.
23
We continued our discussions and established our code system, in perfect agreement about the tasks.
24
Marcelo (Zoilo) arrived, admitting frankly that mistakes in evaluation were to blame for the failure of the strike.5
25
I made a visit to see first hand what landing possibilities there could be in other areas. In Cayo Espino there’s a good spot, although very rocky. The runway in Cerro, besides being not very good, is completely vulnerable to enemy action, as it’s scarcely two kilometers from Estrada Palma.
26
Nothing new.
27
The pilots are called urgently to the radio station to listen to the important message from Caracas.6 Pedro Miret also. Commander G.7 is at the radio transmitter. I go up to Las Minas de Frío to visit the work that is way behind due to a lack of materials. When I go back down, I have to look for Pedrito Miret in Las Mercedes, who is there under the command of [Delio Gómez] Ochoa.
28
This morning we engaged in a battle with dubious results; on our side, there was one wounded. This was in a place called Nagua. The same day, but at night, I climbed up to see the commander, who had gone down to hear personally about the results of the battle.
29
This morning the C.G. [Fidel] went up and there was an extended exchange of opinions. At night we listened to a broadcast from Caracas in which Justo Carrillo8 spoke, promising a long list of things based on the support of the military, but at the same time asking Fidel to release a manifesto praising them and commenting on the three revolts by the “pure” military men,9 namely: the one led by Barquín,10 [the revolt in Cienfuegos] on September 511 and the one that resulted in the imprisonment of Lieutenant Chinea. Fidel replied that this could be done, but that we were impeded by the feeling of hostility toward “those who had daily committed infamous crimes.” He also spoke with [Manuel] Llerenas and Urrutia,12 calling for unity to avoid discord.
30
We left mid-morning heading toward the beach where we are to prepare a landing field. We arrived at nightfall. The group was composed of Pedrito Miret, some men from the recruits’ school and myself.
1. The planta refers to a makeshift shortwave radio transmitter used for Radio Rebelde (Rebel Radio); the newspaper was El Cubano Libre (The Free Cuban), both created by Che in his area of operation. In the appendices there are facsimiles of some articles written by Che in El Cubano Libre.
2. Humberto Sorí Marín, a member of Fidel’s Column One, was promoted to commander and worked as auditor in the Sierra Maestra. After the triumph of the revolution he was named agriculture minister, but later joined the counterrevolutionary bands and was captured, tried and executed in 1961.
3. For Che’s account of this period, see “Interlude” in Reminiscences… in which he explains his new responsibilities in the school for recruits, directed by Evelio Laferté, with the purpose of training new guerrillas to carry out Fidel’s future plans, which were first to participate in the counteroffensive against Batista’s army and later what is usually referred to as the “invasion” of the eastern and western part of the country beyond the Sierra Maestra.
4. Evelio Laferté was captured in the battle of Pino del Agua, and decided to join the rebel ranks. Che, on Fidel’s orders, began to organize the training school for new recruits, in addition to other responsibilities, and to prepare for Batista’s expected offensive against the rebels.
5. A reference to the failed general strike called for April 9 by the leadership of the llano wing of the July 26 Movement based in Havana.
6. After the downfall of the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship in January 1958, Caracas (Venezuela) became an organizing center for revolutionaries.
7. Commander G[eneral] refers to Fidel, shortened to “C.G.”
8. Justo Carillo was the organizer of the group that included army officers who opposed Batista.
9. The “puros” or “Pure Ones” were a group of dissident army officers who organized a revolt on April 4, 1956. The principal leaders were arrested and court-martialed.
10. Ramón Barquín López later became one of the United States’ key leaders against the revolution.
11. An insurrectional movement emerged on September 5, 1957, in the city of Cienfuegos, Las Villas province.
12. Manuel Urrutia Lleó was a magistrate from the province of Oriente. He acted with integrity in the trial of the Granma expeditionaries. Named as president of the republic in January 1959, he resigned on July 17 the same year as he increasingly resisted the laws of the revolutionary government.
May 1958
1
We looked for a house where the group could stay and gave a little talk about their duties. We spent the day without doing anything.
2
This morning I received a note from Fidel in which he told me that the entire D.N. [Directorio Nacional, the national leadership of the July 26 Movement] was meeting and that Faustino [Pérez] and Daniel [René Ramos Latour] thought that I should be present. I walked there [Mompié], arriving at night.
3
The meeting took the entire day. Fidel stated the need to make some changes due to the failure [of the general strike].1 Faustino believes that nobody in particular should be blamed for the failure, and Daniel feels the same. I made a brief analysis of the situation, noting the reality of two antagonistic political lines, that of the sierra and that of the llano, expressing the validity of the sierra policy and that we were right to fear the outcome of the strike. I summarized the reasons for the defeat of the strike, highlighting its putschist character, being based on the idea that an armed action would unleash the mass struggle. I expressed the opinion that those responsible for the failure were the leader of the workers, the main leader of the brigades and on the [movement] chief in Havana, that is, Mario, Daniel and Faustino,2 and I said that they should resign. The entire day was spent in discussions, with everyone clarifying their positions and or doubts that others had
in this regard.
During the evening Fidel stated the need to make the three changes I had suggested and Marcelo proposed a series of changes in the structure of the national leadership. In the end it was agreed that: Yeyé [Haydée Santamaría] would go to the United States to be in charge of supplying arms, that Ochoa would be chief [of the movement] in Havana and Aníbal3 would become chief in Santiago. Faustino and Daniel were to join the troops [in the mountains] as commanders, and Mario would be the workers’ delegate. Zoilo and Déborah would retain their posts, Ñico4 would become the leader of the workers’ section; the national leadership would move to the Sierra Maestra, where Fidel would occupy the post of general secretary [of the entire movement]. There would also be a secretariat of finances, political affairs and workers’ affairs. In Santiago a delegation would be set up for communication with the Sierra Maestra. The supply of weapons and everything concerning foreign relations would pertain to the general secretary. Everybody agreed except Faustino, who reacted stubbornly to the proposal for his transfer. Fidel is now also commander-in-chief of all the militias.5
4
This morning, while the recent agreements were being finalized, Faustino again protested his transfer, with Zoilo then presenting a motion that Faustino be left in Havana, with [Delio Gómez] Ochoa as his second-in-command. Fidel was inflexible in his decision. People were progressively leaving [Mompié] and heading toward their posts, some to dedicate themselves to new responsibilities.
5
On arriving back in Las Vegas I found that not everyone had left; Faustino and Déborah were still there. A plane had arrived from Raúl’s [Castro Mercader] troop that took the pilots to Jamaica, announcing it would return in the evening. I sent a man to let Pedro Miret know urgently, and I went to Cayo Espino because there was the possibility it could land there, but it didn’t. The recruits’ school continues to be replenished with contingents coming from all over the area. I slept in Las Mercedes.
6
We left early with Ochoa, after I first talked with Lalo Roca6 about the possibility of establishing a tax on sugar, with him checking out some plantation owners to try to impose $0.50 per sack as a contribution. After a rough trip we inspected the line of defense at La Derecha, under the command of Suñol,7 who had to be replaced so he could defend Providencia. On our return we were informed that the army was going to go up to Estrada Palma, but there was no sign of anything on the way. Marcos and Cuevas were in good positions. As we reached Las Vegas at night we discovered that the army had occupied Roca and Álvarez’s rice fields, and it seems that Pepito was taken by surprise and arrested.
7
The whole day went by without any news. Plans had to be changed for the departure of Déborah and Daniel [Ramos Latour] who still hadn’t gone to their [new] posts.
8
A tour through the zones of Las Mercedes. The army landed in El Macho and probably Ocujal. Fidel sent a message to [General] Cantillo about the wife of a sergeant whose morality is reflected in the fact that she slept with a member of our troop and then insinuated that he could pass over onto the enemy side and that she had a lot of influence.
9
After a tempestuous night and morning I left for Santo Domingo, where I arrived at about 4:00 in the afternoon to talk with el Guajiro [Luis Crespo] about an extemporaneous decision he had made to leave the workshop because of an overly strong warning from Fidel. He was already in a good mood when I arrived. We returned together to Las Vegas, where we arrived around 11:00 to learn that Fidel had gone down and followed the trail to Las Mercedes, and that there would probably be a battle in La Plata. He left me orders to retreat to the lines of Blas [González] and Raúl [Castro Mercader], which I did. But on going to communicate the order to the former, I found that he was sick, his second-in-command was asleep in a house and everyone was sleeping soundly, with no one on watch. The new front line is becoming stronger in Jíbaro and Las Mercedes.
10
News arrived that the attack at La Plata had just been an airplane and frigate bombardment. We heard that a plane had been shot down there but this was not confirmed. During the night I went to check the positions. Nobody had done what they were supposed to: Raúl had dropped way behind, Sotomayor had not retreated sufficiently and Angelito [Verdecia] had remained in place. Fifteen men from the school had come and I assigned Joel’s officer candidates to dig trenches. Fonso [Alfonso Zayas]8 had taken charge of Blas’s troop until he recovered. We arrived very late at night.
11
We received a visit by Remigio Fernández, a rich but uncultured cattleman, who conversed at great length with me about diverse topics, apparently leaving convinced of the purity and justice of our intentions. Moisés, el Maestro [“the Teacher”],9 arrived.
12
I took el Maestro Moisés to introduce him to the students, who now number 150. In the afternoon I had to air an accusation against a man called Walter, jefecito [little chief] of the Bayamo group who, operating on his own, committed a series of outrages that included killing two people. At night we went to Las Mercedes with the intention of continuing further, but rain made this impossible.
13
We said goodbye to Remigio who left for Havana with the idea, according to him, of collecting large sums of money for the cause. We continued in the jeep to La Montería, and from there by mule to Crescencio’s camp to discuss with him various matters, including the defense of the area and the problems that had arisen between el Galleguito [the little Spaniard] and Arsenio over questions of jurisdiction. I had the impression that the old man is sincere. He spoke to me of the problem of Bruno Acuña and his refusal to take on this matter for family reasons. He had no objection to el Galleguito being used as long as they took him off his hands.
We had thought of making a tour together but an urgent communiqué arrived from Fidel telling me to send him two 100lb bombs immediately because he had a plan with the aviator to bomb some areas. I was supposed to return immediately, but I couldn’t do anything that day due to the rain. I brought with me Dr. Fernández, a young doctor who is going to replace del Valle,10 who will go to join Camilo.
14
We left Las Mercedes, arriving without incident. We also spent the day with nothing new, except for messages received from Fidel.
15
Lidia11 leaves. She is to make contact with some of our friends in Havana, Camagüey and Manzanillo. She has to explore the possibilities of opening a sea route from Santa Cruz del Sur, a route that has been open since the new doctor had arrived that way. Lidia was to leave by way of Cayo Espino, which was partially blocked by the Jibacoa Rural Guards. Sotomayor was left in charge of establishing the contact with the religious center that would get her out.
On our return we had a visit from Rafael,12 an old acquaintance, who came with an ex-representative of the PSP [Popular Socialist Party]. They brought a proposal for a united front, despite the negative attitude of the D.N. [national leadership of the July 26 Movement] and its ramifications, and a call for joint work.
The points of unity are almost all acceptable to us from this most timid of political parties. We argued for a long time about a range of problems in Havana and elsewhere. I wasn’t quite convinced that the idea of unity would take root in the breast of the D.N.
16
Expecting that Fidel would arrive from his long journey touring the beach, we all waited, conversing at great length with an agronomist who had arrived from Camagüey with Luciano Medina. The agronomist, a sympathizer of [former President Carlos] Prío, made a call for unity on behalf of a number of people from different social classes in Camagüey. I asked them for some information about that province and about how agrarian reform might be carried out. At night we received notice of six people who had been poisoned with honey near Las Minas de Frío, and I had to go there to give them some basic treatment. By the time I arrived, however, they had already recovered.
17
I spent the day in the school seein
g how things were going there. The new North American instructor [Herman Marks] is having good results.13 There are now 160 students. I arrived in Las Vegas at night and had some conversations with the people who had just arrived there.
18
There has still been no message from Fidel, so I ordered everyone to go above. Before going up, I talked with Luis Pérez, a member of the action and sabotage section [of the July 26 Movement] from Havana, who has no political consciousness but who is also for unity. When they had already left, a counter-order came from
Fidel to send them to Mompié. In the afternoon I made a run to Marcos’s positions, telling him that Horacio would be coming to take command.
19
I left at noon, arriving at nightfall with Masetti,14 who came with the intention of doing another interview with Fidel, as he had heard that the [first] interview hadn’t been broadcast. I arrived at night and worked out solutions to a range of problems.
20
The interview was conducted (no marvel), but when it was to be broadcast word came from Radio Continental of Caracas saying that the first one had been broadcast already in Argentina. The new one is therefore of no use, as it’s the same as the first. The discussion with the other people is left until the following day.
21
Nothing can be done because it’s been raining all day. The interview is postponed because Masetti can’t leave, and it’s not worthwhile trying to listen to anything. Luciano Medina and Solema left already, the latter with the mission of making contact in Havana with the OA,15 who want to talk with us.
22
Masetti leaves, after having insisted in vain on getting a signed letter from Fidel to [President] Frondizi,16 and we talked with Rafael and Lino, who stated the need for a union of all revolutionary forces. Fidel accepts this in principle, but has some doubts about the form it would take. Although the discussion hasn’t finished, I will leave for Las Vegas. In these last few days we took charge of the radio equipment and there’s been a great improvement in its quality. Fidel personally read a piece about the assassination of the Ecuadoran journalist Carlos Bastidas.17