Grierson returned from Memphis to La Grange, Tennessee, the next day to begin preparing for his part in the plan. He immediately had his men paid and sent much of his own money home. Requests for clothing and equipment, however, were delayed. Worse, the February weather was awful and the hospitals were rapidly filling with sick men. “Under all the circumstances,” Grierson explained, “I came about as near having the blues as I wished to, and a trifle nearer, and earnestly hoped that it would dry or freeze up, or that the sun would shine long enough to drive dull care away.” Orders arrived for him on February 14 to “hold my whole effective force in readiness for a long and dangerous trip.” Three days later, “eight tons of quartermaster stores” arrived for the troops. It appeared as though the raiders would finally be off.6
Hamilton, however, concerned by the prospect of failure, called off Colonel Hatch’s participation “on account of intelligence received here.” The loss of the 2nd Iowa Cavalry effectively canceled the entire operation. The “intelligence” was culled from a report by a Federal scout who had ventured as far south as Jackson. According to the reconnaissance, Confederate infantry was camped near the city, several hundred more were at Meridian, and, most concerning, a brigade of Confederate cavalry was at Grenada and a regiment at Okolona. Hamilton, who commanded a portion of the forces at Corinth, was concerned that a Union cavalry regiment sweeping down between the Confederate cavalry positions in north Mississippi would easily alert enemy troops farther south. If that occurred, there would be little chance of their riding out of the closing net of gray troops. The news disappointed Grierson, who viewed it within a larger context of Union high command favoritism. He long believed Hamilton favored Colonel Hatch and other commanders over him. “General Hamilton apparently hoped by a little delay to get me out of the way,” Grierson concluded.7
Hurlbut, who was anything but pleased by Hamilton’s decision, informed Grant that since Hamilton was holding his troops back, “I have considered it prudent, under this information, to withhold the cavalry dash.” The frustrated Grant responded, “I was a good deal disappointed that Genl Hamilton should have countermanded the order of the expedition which you had fitted out for the purpose of cutting the road east from Vicksburg[,] particularly on such flimsy grounds. We do not expect the Miss Central and Mobile and Ohio road to be left entirely unprotected and the number of troops shown to be there by Genl Dodge[’s] dispatch is as few as could be expected at any time.” The manner in which “you had the expedition fitted out I think it must have succeeded,” concluded the general, who demonstrated his iron determination to press on when he added, “I wish you would try it again unless your information is such that you would deem it an act of folly to send them.”8
In hindsight, Hamilton’s decision to call off the raid proved fortuitous to Union arms. Regardless of his reasons not to participate, his decision delayed the operation to a time when it would have the most desirable effect. Grant later admitted as much and noted that heavy rains and bad weather had inundated the area the cavalry was to have ridden through. “I regret that the expedition you had fitted out was not permitted to go,” he wrote Hurlbut on March 9, “the weather, however, has been intolerably bad ever since that it might have failed.”9
***
The plan for a major cavalry raid into Mississippi continued to simmer during the weeks that followed. Hurlbut addressed problems that existed between Grierson and Hamilton and set the groundwork for Grierson’s full involvement by transferring that officer out of Hamilton’s sphere of authority and directly into his own. Grant, meanwhile, continued to chew on the general idea of a large-scale cavalry thrust. In early March, after weeks of rain and bad weather, he sent Hurlbut a new plan. The Yazoo Pass effort was fully underway by this time, and contrary to what Grant later wrote in his memoirs, he was enthusiastic at the time about its success. “I had made so much calculation upon the expedition down Yazoo Pass . . . that I have made really but little calculation upon reaching Vicksburg by any other than Haynes’ Bluff,” he wrote Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman, who led one of Grant’s army corps. Another indication was his presumed success in reaching Yazoo City, which he envisioned as a jumping-off point for at least a portion of this new cavalry raid: “My plan is to have the cavalry force you command cooperate with the cavalry it is in contemplation to start from some point on the Yazoo, either Yazoo City or Liverpool.” A cavalry raid from any location along the lower Yazoo between Fort Pemberton at Greenwood and Haynes’ Bluff near the mouth of the river could only have been possible if the Federals had success at one end or the other. Grant presumed the success would come from the north via the Yazoo Pass. He would be sorely disappointed.10
William T. Sherman. Major General William T. Sherman was a staunch Grierson supporter and pushed for his promotion. His scout’s report gave Grierson much-needed information about the area he would soon raid. Library of Congress
Grant’s latest plan informed Hurlbut that he wanted multiple cavalry raids conducted at the same time. One would leave from La Grange, Tennessee, and cross the Tallahatchie River near New Albany, destroying the bridge there before moving “East of South so as to head Black River, or strike it where it can be crossed.” At the same time, a force from the Yazoo River would ride south to destroy the Mississippi Central Railroad bridge over the Big Black River at Canton, while a third cavalry force would ride due east toward the Mobile and Ohio Railroad to threaten that line. “In reality,” Grant explained, the purpose of all these forays was “to cover a[nother] move.” While these three cavalry commands were riding across north Mississippi, a small contingent would branch off from the northernmost force and dash south. The others were simply to cover “a select portion of the Cavalry which will go South, and attempt to cut the Railroad east of Jackson.” Grant believed the plan offered large dividends. “It is hoped by these moves of large forces of cavalry to cover the smaller party sufficiently to insure their success in reaching the [rail]road east of Jackson, and to do what they are sent for and return to the main body.”11
By this time it was mid-March, and Grant’s efforts in the Yazoo Pass were not producing the desired results (and Admiral David D. Porter had not yet mentioned the Steele’s Bayou possibility to him). By this time Grant was thinking in larger terms. He hoped for success on the Yazoo Pass route, but if that failed, he was determined to move south of Vicksburg through Louisiana and approach the enemy stronghold from that direction. In that case, a cavalry raid east of Jackson would make even more sense. “I received notice that day [March 15] to hold my entire command in readiness for speedy and heavy service on which we were to be sent by order of General Grant,” Grierson reported.12
As his operations in the bayous continued to flounder, however, Grant put several caveats on the plan he had described to Hurlbut. First, he wanted to see how the Yazoo Pass affair would turn out, which in turn would determine whether he would need to move his army south through Louisiana. “The date when the expedition should start will depend on movements here,” he told Hurlbut. “You will be informed of the exact time for them to start.” Digging down into the details of the raid, Grant ordered that “no vehicles should be taken along except ambulances, and they should have an extra pair of horses each.” The troopers, he added, “should be instructed to keep well together, and let marauding alone for once and thereby better secure success.” Last and perhaps most important, Grant once again recommended who he thought was the best officer for the dangerous job. “I look upon Grierson as being much better qualified to command this expedition than either Colonel Lee or Colonel John K. Mizner.” Still, he left the decision to Hurlbut’s discretion: “I do not dictate, however, who shall be sent.”13
***
Hurlbut, who could read as well as anyone and better than most, understood Grant’s intention and began working on the new plan with Grierson as its leader. Nothing was yet set in stone, and many aspects would change before the raid began, including some of its various commanders. Hamilton
would resign on April 13 over a nasty controversy regarding rank. Grierson was glad of it. “General Hamilton was the most disagreeable man I had served under,” he exclaimed. “He lacked many things which I had been taught to believe were essential to a gentleman. He was tyrannical, dogmatic, and repulsive in his manner and seemed to arrogate to himself the assumption of being one of the great men of the age.” His place was assumed by William “Sooy” Smith, a graduate of West Point and a brigadier general who led a division at La Grange. Grierson found Smith to be “a very intelligent and agreeable gentleman.” Smith, however, could do no more with the current situation than Grant, Hurlbut, or Hamilton. He complained of the Confederates having the initiative in raiding the Memphis and Charleston Railroad he was tasked with guarding, noting that “their cavalry was better mounted (on better bred horses) than ours and they generally got a day or two start of us when we pursued them.” More disconcerting was the painfully obvious conclusion that no Federal cavalry was going to depart from any points on the Yazoo River remotely close to Yazoo City because Grant’s Yazoo Pass operation was about to be deemed a waste of time and resources.14
Still, Hurlbut and Smith sifted through ways to cover their bases and take the fight to the enemy at the same time. Smith argued for taking the initiative and “let[ting] them [Confederate cavalry] do the chasing instead of pursuing them” and “letting them have the fun of doing the chasing.” Hurlbut and Smith (both later claimed to have come up with the initial idea) concocted a firm plan by which Smith could get everything he needed done. To carry it out, Hurlbut called upon Grant for more cavalry. “I absolutely need another regiment of cavalry at once,” he urged.15
William Sooy Smith. Brigadier General William Sooy Smith was the division commander tasked with sending Grierson south. He later tried to take much of the credit for its success. Library of Congress
In order to hammer out the details of the plan, Hurlbut called both Grierson and division commander Smith to Memphis in late March for another planning session. Smith later claimed that by this time he had convinced Grierson of the need for the raid, writing “I got Grierson full of the idea of doing this and took him with me to Memphis.” Smith went on to describe the cavalryman as “just the man to do it successfully, and that he could not have a better command for the purpose.” Grierson later disputed Smith’s claim of origination. “H - - - we made that raid ourselves, don’t let anybody steal credit for it that belongs to us.” The generals and the colonel agreed on many details at Memphis, including the supporting movements by Smith and Hurlbut from Memphis and La Grange designed to better allow Grierson, as Smith termed it, to “get the start of any cavalry force that might be sent to oppose him.” What was to be done after damaging the Southern Railroad of Mississippi, however, quickly became the most contentious issue of the meeting. According to Sooy Smith, both he and Grierson advocated riding toward Baton Rouge, Louisiana, but Hurlbut would have none of it. The Memphis commander argued the cavalry column should turn around and return north to Tennessee. If true, Hurlbut was worried about such a long ride to Louisiana and the risk of losing much or perhaps all of his cavalry, some of his best regiments, and one of his finest cavalry commanders.16
According to Smith, he and Grierson were “sorely puzzled” at Hurlbut’s insistence on returning the way they had come. Smith was so convinced his plan was the best that he took matters into his own hands. Once he returned to La Grange, he received Hurlbut’s final orders “late in an evening. I slept little that night and in the morning sent for Grierson and told him to get ready for the raid as soon as possible.” Smith recalled that Grierson “asked me which plan had been adopted and I told him he was to go to Baton Rouge” and that he would have “discretionary powers.” Grierson knew better than to believe he would have full discretion on such an important decision. Smith later admitted Hurlbut’s orders were to himself, not Grierson, and he would have the discretion to order the cavalryman where to ride. The division leader acknowledged that he “would take the responsibility” and that Grierson was not even “supposed to know what it [Hurlbut’s order] was.” If the raid was successful, there would be no questions asked. If it failed, Smith added, “I would take the consequences and should probably be cashiered for disobedience of orders.” Grierson was ready and willing to make the hazardous raid, replying to Smith “in his falsetto voice . . . ‘I’ll do it.’”17
Hurlbut’s most recent plan, which he communicated to Grant on April 1, was to send cavalry out from three locations: Corinth, Mississippi, and La Grange and Memphis, Tennessee. He hoped that raiding from three points across such a wide expanse would create an opening in the Confederate defenses of north Mississippi along the Tallahatchie River. The force from Corinth would sweep south toward Pontotoc. At the same time, the force from Memphis would occupy the Confederates in northwest Mississippi while an infantry brigade operated around Holly Springs. With the center cleared and the Confederates looking in two different directions, three cavalry regiments under Grierson would ride south out of La Grange along the Pontotoc Ridge. Once past the Tallahatchie River and the Confederate defensive cordon, one of Grierson’s regiments would split off to the east and damage the Mobile and Ohio Railroad around Okolona while another regiment rode west to damage the Mississippi Central around Oxford. Success on these fronts would disrupt rail traffic in the northern part of the state, but it would also keep Confederate eyes off the third regiment, which Grierson would lead himself. This command would continue south and hit the Southern Railroad of Mississippi. Hurlbut also mentioned Meridian or Selma, Alabama, as targets, although he noted that “to break the Chunkey River or Pearl River Bridge [in Mississippi] would be my object.”18
“I heartily approve of the move you propose,” wrote back Grant two days after receiving Hurlbut’s plans. In order to facilitate it, he sent more cavalry for Hurlbut’s use. Grant gave additional approval four days later when Hurlbut sent Col. Albert Lee of the 7th Kansas Cavalry to Grant’s headquarters to talk over the impending operation. Grant was fully agreeable, writing Hurlbut on April 10 that “the movements spoken of previously and now in your letter of the 7th, brought by Gen Lee you may make.”19
The plan remained fluid and Hurlbut continued working to refine it, especially as other factors cropped up. Grenville Dodge, who was under Hurlbut’s jurisdiction at Corinth, had been corresponding with officers from the Army of the Cumberland in Middle Tennessee about joint operations. Together they worked out a plan for Dodge to support a cavalry raid through north Alabama. That suited Hurlbut’s plans just as well as the minor cavalry dash from Corinth and could possibly draw larger Confederate units eastward, farther away from Grierson’s route. Grierson, meanwhile, bade his time scouting, raiding, and worrying over whether he would be promoted to brigadier general.20
By April 10, and with Grant’s permission in hand, Hurlbut was ready to put his preliminary plans in motion and told his subordinates to prepare for the operation. He issued orders that day to Sooy Smith, who was tasked with overseeing the plans and sending Grierson southward. “The time for our projected cavalry movement is rapidly approaching,” Hurlbut informed Smith. The evolving plan now included three parts. The first two consisted of Federal operations out of Corinth and Memphis. The cavalry force from Corinth would move east to cooperate with mounted infantry from William S. Rosecrans’s Army of the Cumberland. Together, they would attack the Western and Atlantic Railroad running south from Chattanooga to Atlanta, the main Confederate supply route to the army in Middle Tennessee. Dodge (at Corinth) would also send infantry east into northern Alabama to help pull Confederate defenders out of northeastern Mississippi. At the same time, Hurlbut would personally direct forces out of the Memphis area to attract Confederate attention in northwest Mississippi. Once all this was in motion, Grierson would drive south from La Grange. “As soon as this movement is inaugurated, and the attention of the enemy drawn to that part of our line,” Hurlbut explained, Grierson’s three cavalry regiments would
ride south with the same basic plan as before—one would split off to the east and one to the west to strike different railroads while Grierson’s regiment continued south to hit the Southern Railroad. All three commands would be involved in “cutting . . . the roads, destroying the wires, burning provisions, and doing all the mischief they can,” but only Grierson’s regiment would continue deep into Mississippi, “breaking the east and west road thoroughly, and sweeping back by Alabama.”21
Hurlbut informed Smith about the need to coordinate these widespread movements, adding that “final instructions as to the course, &c., will reach you in time.” It would indeed take good timing to pull off the complex operation in a manner that coordinated with Grant’s crossing of the Mississippi River. A possible hiccup was already in the mix, however, because Rosecrans’s force was not yet in position to cooperate from Middle Tennessee. For the time being, everything was on hold. Hurlbut ordered that the delay be used to prepare the horses and men. He wanted the cavalry in “the best order possible, both by grooming and care and by rest and feed. Let no exertion be spared in this matter,” adding, “let the horses be all carefully shod.”22
The Real Horse Soldiers Page 3
