Everyone involved had high hopes for the success of the operation, including Hurlbut. “As this, if accomplished, will be a great thing,” he wrote, ending his orders, “I am specially desirous that nothing interfere with the proper execution so far as the means in our power will admit.”23
If Ulysses S. Grant had learned anything from the previous six failed attempts to reach Vicksburg, it was to think in large geographical terms. He put that philosophy into action when he began implementing the plan that would eventually result in his Army of the Tennessee crossing the Mississippi River. Orders went out authorizing the series of feints across the state of Mississippi and, in some cases, in other states as well. When considered as one, the operation was enormous, complex, and delicately interconnected. And so the Union juggernaut stirred itself into motion, slowly at first before gaining speed as a half-dozen feints peppered their way into history during April 1863.
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Grant’s farsighted use of various feints, demonstrations, and ruses to increase his chances of successfully shifting his army across the Mississippi River with as little enemy opposition as possible demonstrated a more modern handle on operational strategy than many students fully grasp. In fact, it follows in many respects the nine principles of war developed by the United States Army around 1900. Grant and company had it figured out decades earlier, even if they did not specifically say so in as many words.24
Even a rudimentary look at the principles reveals Grant’s forward thinking. According to the modern army doctrinal manual, “seizing the initiative compels an enemy to react. Commanders use initiative to impose their will on an enemy or adversary or to control a situation.” All of Grant’s proposed operations were offensive in nature. He also used the principle of economy of force, which the manual described as follows: “Commanders allocate only the minimum combat power necessary to shaping and sustaining operations so they can mass combat power for the decisive operation.” Grant’s use of maneuver was likewise exemplary, with the modern field manual describing exactly what the general had done decades before: “Maneuver concentrates and disperses combat power to keep the enemy at a disadvantage. It achieves results that would otherwise be more costly. Effective maneuver keeps enemy forces off balance by making them confront new problems and new dangers faster than they can counter them.” Grant used other principles spelled out in the army manual, including mass, unity of command, simplicity, and objective.25
When Grant sent General Sherman to feint in different places along the Mississippi River, he was maneuvering and using economy of force and the offensive to force the enemy to defend many points at once, none of which involved the true area of emphasis where Grant had massed most of his command. Similarly, the raids across northern Mississippi that pinned Confederate infantry and cavalry in specific geographical areas, or drew them away from the main area of movement, achieved the same thing. When Benjamin Grierson rode south on the morning of April 17, 1863, he was a part of a major coordinated plan of maneuver, economy of force, and offensive intended to cause Confederate heads to swivel helplessly in an effort to figure out what was happening. “No one knew my plans any more than they did those of Gen. Grant,” wrote Grierson, “nor did either of us have predetermined (or definitely detailed) plans before starting on our hazardous undertakings. [But] the two movements, though widely separate at the time, were in conjunction. . . . I simply knew from previous conversation with the general, and afterwards by letter from an officer of high rank and in close relations with him, of his general contemplated movements.”26
When Grant moved south through Louisiana below Vicksburg, two of his four corps marched with him: the XIII under Maj. Gen. John A. McClernand and the XVII under Maj. Gen. James B. McPherson. Two additional corps remained behind, at least temporarily, north of Vicksburg. One of them, the XVI Corps under Hurlbut, was spread across West Tennessee and north Mississippi to garrison Memphis, Corinth, and the railroad running between those cities. None of these troops would be involved in the initial crossing of the Mississippi River or the land campaign necessary to reach Vicksburg, but they would perform the lion’s share of the diversions that would make it easier for Grant to achieve his objectives. Grant intended something different for the XV Corps north of Vicksburg under William T. Sherman.27
Sherman was Grant’s most trusted corps commander, and the latter left the former’s corps above Vicksburg at Young’s Point and Milliken’s Bend so it could act independently as the need arose. Sherman’s role involved making two major feints to help take Confederate eyes off Grant’s movement across the river farther south. Once across on Mississippi soil, Grant intended to have Sherman rejoin him as soon as possible. Ironically, Grant’s trusted subordinate and friend was not in full agreement with his latest operational plan. That did not stop Sherman from giving Grant his full support, however, even if he did not agree with what was about to take place. “I confess I don’t like this roundabout project,” he explained, “but we must support Grant in whatever he undertakes.”28
The pair of feints Sherman was tasked with included an advance up the Yazoo River, just as he had done in late December 1862. His goal was to convince the Confederates he was going to attack up the steep bluffs he had found impossible to take the first time. In April 1863, however, there was an opportunity of another sort. “It may possibly happen that the enemy may so weaken his forces about Vicksburg and Haynes’ Bluff as to make the latter vulnerable, particularly with a fall of water to give an extended landing,” Grant wrote Sherman. However, he did not order an actual attack. Grant was well aware of the public pounding Sherman had taken months earlier after his bloody repulse at Chickasaw Bayou, and he realized that sending him back to the same place to repeat the rebuff a second time would be a public relations and political disaster for both of them. Sensitive to Sherman’s prickly personality, Grant informed his corps commander that he should make the feint only “if you think it advisable.”29
Sherman was more than happy to oblige—even if it meant another tactical defeat. He understood that his role was a necessity, part of a larger plan, and he would fully carry it out however Grant intended. “We will make as strong a demonstration as possible,” he confirmed. “The troops will all understand the purpose, and will not be hurt by the repulse. The people of the country must find out the truth as they best can; it is none of their business. You are engaged in a hazardous enterprise, and, for good reasons, wish to divert attention; that is sufficient to me, and it shall be done.” That was quite a statement given that Sherman was less than enthusiastic about Grant’s operation in the first place.30
His concerns notwithstanding, Sherman planned his part well and waited until Grant approached the actual crossing point later in April before moving. Meanwhile, another division of his corps was just finishing a similar feint almost a 100 miles to the north. Sherman had sent Frederick Steele and his division northward to Greenville, Mississippi, in mid-April, where Steele landed and marched inland, crossing Black Bayou and tramping on to Deer Creek. “My command has just returned to this place,” Steele reported to Sherman from Greenville, “having pursued the rebels . . . about 43 miles down Deer Creek.” Confederates in the area offered a semblance of a defense, but Steele’s column quickly pushed them back as he advanced along Deer Creek to a plantation owned by Confederate Maj. Gen. Samuel G. French.31
The effects of Steele’s effort rippled across the region. Confederate commanders in the area flooded the delta with troops in a desperate effort to stop the advance. One infantry brigade moved north from the Vicksburg area while another moved west from the Greenwood garrison. “The enemy is in force,” wrote a Confederate division commander, who added that the area needed infantry, artillery, and cavalry and “very much the latter.” There was little that could be done to stop Steele, who fought small skirmishes and caused as much commotion as possible as he advanced south. When he decided he had done enough and driven as deep as prudence allowed, he turned his column about and re
turned to Greenville loaded with the supplies his men had not destroyed. Slaves from nearby plantations followed the Unionists, realizing this expedition might offer their only access to freedom.32
Sherman’s dual diversions along the Mississippi River, one under Steele and the other still yet to set off, would give the Confederate high command plenty to think about. The Rebel brass had seen these types of operations before in some of Grant’s previous attempts to reach Vicksburg, and their scrambling to parry them had generated some success. John Pemberton, the Confederate commander at Vicksburg, had no way of knowing these were mere feints—small parts of a much larger operational plan. As a result, he believed the efforts to confront and repulse Steele’s expedition had been successful. He had no idea Grant was only toying with him while he orchestrated the real effort below the citadel that would spell the doom of Vicksburg.
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Sherman’s diversions were intended to last only until he could disengage at each point and move swiftly south to join the other two corps of the Army of the Tennessee below Vicksburg. This was not the case with the other corps in West Tennessee and north Mississippi. Grant never intended to have General Hurlbut’s XVI Corps make the crossing or join in the fight for the city. Rather, Hurlbut was tasked with holding the line from Memphis to Corinth. But just because they were garrison troops holding a leg while the other three corps flayed the Confederate main body did not mean they would not play a major role in the larger operational scheme. In fact, Hurlbut’s contribution was vital, because it provided the major feints Grant needed to take Confederate eyes off the potential crossing point and the army marching through Louisiana to get there.33
Hurlbut had four basic movements underway just before or during Grant’s crossing, each designed to tie up most of the Confederates in northern Mississippi and, in combination with Sherman’s efforts, force Pemberton to focus in exactly the opposite direction from where Grant would cross the river. “The cavalry dash I desire to time so as to cooperate with what I suppose to be your plan,” Hurlbut wrote Grant, “to land below Vicksburg, on [the] south side of Black River, silencing the Grand Gulf batteries. By cutting the road, I shall, as I think, materially aid in the movement, as well as by shoving the heads of infantry columns as low as the Tallahatchie.”34
Most of the diversion required would come from Hurlbut’s XVI Corps. Accordingly, he dispatched several raids into northwestern Mississippi from his Memphis headquarters, intended to operate together for larger effect, “making a strong diversion in his [Grierson’s] favor,” recalled General Smith. Two raids left the Memphis area in the middle part of April. Colonel George E. Bryant of the 12th Wisconsin marched with three regiments of infantry and an artillery battery, later joined by cavalry, and moved across Nonconnah Creek toward Hernando. There the command broke up a Confederate camp and skirmished with enemy forces. Bryant’s column pressed on to the Coldwater River but met firm resistance there and did not press the issue. Still, he gathered numerous prisoners as well as horses and mules, arms, and a large stash of supplies. “In killed and wounded,” Bryant reported, “I know the enemy has suffered more than we have, and the captures, at least, are clear profit.”35
A second raid, a cavalry force under William Sooy Smith himself, probed south at the same time toward Holly Springs and the Tallahatchie River. Smith rode from La Grange through Holly Springs, Sardis, and Senatobia before making his way back north. He never met up with Bryant, as Hurlbut intended, but he did come away with prisoners, horses, and other supplies. Hurlbut admitted to Grant that the efforts did not achieve everything he had hoped they might. After noting the failure of the columns to link up, he added that “the expedition against [the enemy] . . . suffered the misfortune of most combined movements.” Nevertheless, the joint raids into northwestern Mississippi effectively pinned down much of the Confederate force in that area under district commander Gen. James R. Chalmers. The Southern commander regularly informed Pemberton of the enemy advance, writing “can you give me more cavalry?” and “unless I get help, I must fall back to Panola, and that gives up the provision region.”36
Hurlbut utilized much of his force nailing down the Confederates in northwestern Mississippi, but he did not ignore the enemy garrisoning the northeastern portion of the state. As noted, his commander there, Grenville Dodge, coordinated his efforts with neighboring department commander Rosecrans. The Union command situation in the Western Theater in April 1863 was a divided affair, unlike what it had been earlier in the war when Henry W. Halleck had been in charge of the entire theater. After being called to Washington D.C. at Lincoln’s behest to serve as general-in-chief of the Union armies, Halleck refused to leave anyone to command in his place. Perhaps he believed no single officer could handle the job he was leaving, but whatever the reason, he broke the theater apart—which was precisely the opposite of what he had argued so vehemently for when he was seeking the command in early 1862. As a result, in early 1863 the Western Theater was cut up into different departments, most notably Grant’s in the Mississippi Valley and Rosecrans’s in Middle Tennessee.37
Dodge, one of Grant’s subordinates, was more than willing to coordinate with Rosecrans, especially when a joint raid would aid both. In mid-April, Dodge marched from Corinth across north Mississippi into north Alabama to provide a firm location from which to launch this raid. Colonel Abel D. Streight, who had mounted his men on mules, led the expedition. The famous “Mule March,” as it became known, was a developing disaster in many ways, not the least of which revolved around the ornery mules themselves.38
Hurlbut could not have been happier. The effort peeled away from the tri-state area a large Confederate cavalry force under Nathan Bedford Forrest and gained the attention of Confederate commanders in northeastern Mississippi. Even Confederate theater commander Joseph E. Johnston focused on the raid, which meant fewer Confederates were watching the main Union effort under Grant in Louisiana. Grierson’s raid, which had yet to begin, was about to sow even more confusion within the Confederate ranks by plunging straight into the yawning gap created by the efforts of Smith, Bryant, and Streight.39
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Final instructions for Grierson arrived when Hurlbut informed Smith on April 15 to be prepared to send the musician-turned-officer and his men south two days later. “I wish them to start sharply at or before daylight on Friday morning, moving by the best route for Pontotoc,” ordered Hurlbut. “Rapidity is the necessity of this special duty.” Once at Pontotoc, the former plan was resurrected, calling for one of the three regiments to ride east and another west, leaving Grierson to continue riding south with the remaining regiment. The two side regiments were to “destroy wires, &c., and use up as much of the track as they can, and do it thoroughly; break up all provision depots they can find, burn tanks, and do all the damage possible; gather all the horses they can manage, and return by the best route they can select.”40
The noisy clatter to the east and west was intended as little more than a sideshow, however, for the main effort rested with Grierson. “The strongest and best mounted command,” Hurlbut continued, “will proceed with all possible speed, making direct for the Jackson and Meridian road, and break it up, either at the Chunkey Bridge or some other stream, cutting wires and destroying track in every direction, as far as they can reach.” Hurlbut also wanted other things accomplished if within reach, including “that they may be able to strike Jackson or Columbus.” He also asked that an attempt be made, if possible, to hit Canton’s rail facilities. “In all these cases they and their horses must live on the country, and horses, of course, will be taken wherever advantageous,” he explained, stipulating that “they should start with oats in the nosebags, and with four days’ provisions, cautioned when they set out to make them last.”41
Stephen A. Hurlbut. As commander of the XVI Corps with his headquarters in Memphis, Tennessee, Major General Stephen A. Hurlbut oversaw the preparation and launch of Grierson’s raid. Library of Congress
The entire
series of diversions was moving along rather well given the difficulty of coordinating such far-flung events, but one problem remained. Grant had made it clear from the start that he wanted Grierson in command of the main raid, but the former music teacher was in Illinois on a leave of absence granted earlier that month when the unfolding plan was still in development. Hurlbut informed Sooy Smith that he had “telegraphed for Grierson to return at once, and [I] expect him before Wednesday.” The afternoon of April 16 came and went and Grierson had yet to return. It was just hours before the command was set to leave at daylight the next morning. “If Grierson does not arrive in time,” commanded Hurlbut, “Hatch, who is [the] ranking officer in fact, will take command.” He added that “the force sent down on the long dash will be selected without reference to regiments, unless Grierson returns, when he had best take his own.” Hurlbut felt the need to “explain to the officers that as much credit and usefulness belongs to those who take the flank as the others.”42
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Daniel Ruggles. Brigadier General Daniel Ruggles, who had made a name for himself at Shiloh, commanded the northern-most district in Mississippi, through which Grierson first rode. Ruggles’s lethargic response allowed Grierson to continue south without much hindrance. Photographic History of the Civil War
Unbeknownst to the Confederates, Grant was planning a perfect storm. With diversion after diversion masking the main thrust, they would be hard pressed to discover and adapt to what was happening in time to do much of anything about it. Worse, the route proposed for the Union raiders happened to be along the boundary line of two districts within General Pemberton’s Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana. To the east in Mississippi, Brig. Gen. Daniel Ruggles commanded the area around Columbus, Mississippi, north to the Tallahatchie River. His main point of concern was the vital Mobile and Ohio Railroad. To the west was the district under Brigadier General Chalmers, whose line ran from the Tallahatchie River south and encompassed the Mississippi Central Railroad. Neither administrative region was properly manned, and both commanders had to depend upon Mississippi state militia units, none of which were well organized, properly armed, or even interested in serious fighting. Galloping Union cavalry bent on creating havoc along the fault line between these two districts would make organizing and coordinating an effort to stop it nearly impossible. And there was precious little in the history of either Chalmers or Ruggles that promised that such a thing was likely to occur.43
The Real Horse Soldiers Page 4
