Like other Confederates in the north Mississippi region, Barteau kept a close eye on the several Federal movements, including those to the west as well as Dodge’s eastward move into Alabama. The raid that posed the most danger to him was Grierson’s thrust, which his scouts had reported on April 18 as a force “variously estimated in strength.” When he learned the enemy column was moving south from La Grange toward New Albany, Barteau assumed—as Grierson hoped he would— that the Federal riders were after the Confederate camps at Chesterville. Barteau concentrated his scattered companies and was moving north by the night of April 19. Other Southern cavalry units also concentrating to stop Grierson joined Barteau, including the 2nd Mississippi Cavalry State Troops under Col. J. F. Smith, four companies of the 16th Battalion State Troops under Capt. T. W. Ham, and two companies of partisan rangers from northeast Mississippi under Maj. William M. Inge.25
William Inge, a staunch secessionist from a cooperationist county, was a Corinth native who had run for a seat at the Mississippi Secession Convention and lost. When Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston had arrived in Corinth in late March 1862, Inge was home on leave from Virginia and offered the Southern commander the use of his home. Johnston spent his last night in Corinth at the Inge home, planning his attack on the Federal army gathered at Shiloh. He was killed there on April 6 and his body brought back to the same house and cleaned by Mrs. Inge. Johnston’s corpse lay in state for a short time and was then shipped to New Orleans for burial. Major Inge witnessed none of this, however, because he was still at the Shiloh battlefield, serving as a volunteer staff officer for Mississippi Brig. Gen. Charles Clark.26
One of Barteau’s first decisions as he set after Grierson was a serious tactical mistake. By the night of April 19, Grierson had moved south and around Barteau’s concentration at Chesterville, through Pontotoc, and on to Daggett’s plantation. Colonel Hatch’s thrust toward the Confederate training camp had lured Barteau out of the path of the main Federal column, allowing Grierson to slip past Barteau’s command and get ahead of it. That put Barteau nearly 15 miles out of position, and it would take him hours to correct his error, even if the Federals dallied, which Grierson was not apt to do. Grierson had made it through the initial line of resistance and had confused the lone large body of cavalry that could have contested his advance. The small triumph bought Grierson several hours to move even deeper into Mississippi.27
Out of position to block Grierson, Barteau convinced himself the Federals were moving toward the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, and so he tried to reposition his command to get between the enemy and the railroad. He moved through the night, giving his troopers only a couple of hours of rest after an already long day. Barteau rode toward Pontotoc, where he hoped to catch the Federals. By the time he approached the town soon after daylight on April 20, Grierson was already well down the Houston road. Word arrived that a part of the Federal force had moved west toward Oxford. In Pontotoc, Barteau learned the smaller group of Federals (the Quinine Brigade) had not ridden toward Oxford at all but north to New Albany. If Grierson had delayed sending Love’s group back north, the ill men would have been gobbled up rather easily by Barteau’s force. As it was, the Quinine Brigade barely escaped before the Confederates reached Pontotoc.28
Barteau realized his mistake when he learned the main body of Federal raiders were three hours south of him. “I immediately gave pursuit,” he remembered, setting out toward Houston and pushing his men hard. That night (April 20), while Grierson camped at the Kilgore plantation, Barteau called a halt north of Houston to allow his famished and exhausted troopers and horses to rest for the night. The Tennesseans and Mississippians had been moving nonstop for a couple of days, “an almost continuous march of 67½ miles.” Despite Barteau’s best effort, Grierson had managed to maintain a nearly 15-mile lead.29
Like Grierson, Barteau was up early the next morning, and the Confederates reached Kilgore’s by 11:00 a.m. The Federals had moved out that morning, but Barteau had cut the lead down to only some two hours. They ran up on a rear guard and exchanged several shots. However, the Confederates soon realized something was amiss. When they reached the point where the Starkville and Columbus roads divided, the mystery deepened. The tracks indicated the Federal column had split. Which road had the main force taken? When it became clear the bulk of the tracks pointed east, Barteau followed, hoping this time he was making the right choice.30
***
The decision Barteau faced at the crossroads was the result of more deception on Grierson’s part. With the Confederates hot on his trail, Grierson gave serious thought on the night of April 20 about how to manage his troops and when to send a regiment to the east. He had already decided not to dispatch a regiment west toward the Mississippi Central, but that was because the line was already broken. There was no such indication about the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. Grierson decided one regiment could do the job, but which regiment and when to send it?31
The sooner Grierson dispatched the regiment the better. A quick thrust would allow the detachment to make its way east and hit the railroad, hopefully before the Confederates realized what was happening. It would also give the regiment a better chance of making it safely back to Tennessee. Grierson decided to send Hatch’s 2nd Iowa Cavalry to do the work. Whether it was because Hatch was an accomplished warrior in his own right and could handle the job or because the Iowa colonel was already miffed about not getting the command himself and that Grierson had sent a large chunk of his regiment back the day before is unknown. What is known, however, is that it would not be the last time Hatch would be unhappy in Mississippi.32
The 7th Illinois Cavalry took the lead when the brigade began marching southeast around 6:00 a.m. on April 21. The column moved a few miles toward Starkville and, at about 8:00 a.m., reached the split in the road just north of Montpelier. The right fork led to Montpelier and Starkville; the left fork pointed toward Columbus and the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. Grierson sent Hatch to the rear with orders to peel off to the left with his Iowans and one of Smith’s cannons. Grierson ordered Hatch to strike the railroad somewhere in the vicinity of West Point, tear up the rails and cut the telegraph wires, and ride south along the railroad—if possible as far as Macon—ripping up the line and causing as much confusion as possible. Once that had been accomplished, the Iowans were to ride back along the railroad, hit Columbus if possible, and then break for La Grange “by the most practicable route.” It was a tall order for Hatch, but he was more than capable of executing it. Despite the importance of the damage he might inflict, Hatch’s effort was little more than a bold decoy. While he was smashing the railroad, Grierson would be riding south to success and glory if he succeeded or death and/or capture if he did not. The soldier in Hatch wanted to be part of the main ride, but orders were orders.33
Grierson explained to Hatch that, while he had every confidence in him and his men, the logistics for the overall raid were not in their favor. “I looked upon him as a brave, discreet, and capable officer,” Grierson said of Hatch, adding, “and, although I regretted to part with him and his gallant regiment of officers and men, yet his horses, on account of the hard and constant work they had been performing, were not in my judgment as suitable as those of the 7th Illinois Cavalry.” State pride and familiarity also played a role. There was never any doubt Grierson would take his own 6th Illinois Cavalry with him, and the choice between the other two was not a difficult one. The officers and men of the 2nd Iowa Cavalry, he explained, were not “so well known to me at that time as those of the 7th Illinois, which was from my own state.”34
Grierson’s explanation may have soothed Hatch’s hurt feelings, but the pilfering of Dr. Erastus D. Yule of the 2nd Iowa Cavalry (the only surgeon with the brigade) to accompany the main ride south likely did not sit well. More concerning to Hatch was that he would not leave immediately for his objective, but instead follow Grierson’s Illinoisans south toward Starkville about four miles and then double back “to obliterate the tracks of Colo
nel Grierson,” explained Hatch. The intent was to confuse any pursuing Confederates as to which way Grierson’s main body was heading. Grierson hoped the enemy would pick up Hatch’s movement instead of his own. “These detachments were intended as diversions,” reported Grierson, “and even should the commanders not have been able to carry out their instructions, yet, by attracting the attention of the enemy in other directions, they assisted us much in the accomplishment of the main object of the expedition.”35
Hatch expressed concern about the condition of his regiment, the additional eight miles of riding, and what Grierson expected from his Iowans. The pair of officers “were bidding each other good-bye,” recalled Grierson, when Hatch suggested that, instead of the entire regiment, “the sending of one battalion [toward Starkville and back] would afford more rest for his tired animals, and I assented to the proposition.” Major Datus Coon, whom Grierson declared to be a “brave and most gallant officer,” was selected to lead the lone Iowa battalion and a single cannon. While Hatch and the rest of the regiment waited, Coon followed Grierson down the Starkville road. Several miles below, at Montpelier, Grierson stopped to bid the Iowans a final adieu. “I well remember the look of regret he [Coon] gave me,” Grierson recalled, “as he warmly shook my hand when the column halted to enable him to counter-march his command. I would gladly have taken him and his brave troops with me, if it had been practicable to do so.” Hoping the Iowans would return safely, Grierson wrote a quick note to Alice that he had been through Montpelier: “Dear Alice—All well. Apl 21st Tuesday—6 O’clock a.m.”36
Coon’s returning Iowans played their role perfectly, if not gladly. The troopers formed into a column of fours and, together with the lone gun, made wide tracks northward to confuse the enemy. To add a little more trickery, when Coon arrived back at the fork in the road, he ordered the men to make multiple tracks with the artillery piece so it looked as though the column had multiple guns. As one man put it, “The cannon was turned in the road in four different places, thus making their tracks correspond with the four pieces of artillery which Grierson had with the expedition.” Hopefully, any pursuing Confederates would think the main force had turned east toward Columbus.37 Hatch and his regiment, meanwhile, waited for Coon’s return. “In this way I was delayed three hours,” reported the colonel, “thus enabling the enemy’s cavalry, which had been concentrating for some days in anticipation of a movement on Columbus, to fall upon me.” And fall upon him they would.38
At this point in the raid, Confederate Lieutenant Colonel Barteau made his third serious mistake. Once he reached the fork in the road southeast of Kilgore’s plantation, he examined the tracks and concluded, “The enemy had divided, 200 going to Starkville and 700 continuing their march on the West Point road.” In reality, it was exactly the opposite: Grierson’s larger force had moved south to Starkville. As a result, Barteau and his men set out in pursuit of what they considered to be the larger of the two Federal forces, spurring their mounts east after Hatch’s Iowans, taking Grierson’s bait just as he intended.39
***
Colonel Hatch knew the closer he rode to the Mobile and Ohio Railroad the sooner trouble would find him. He had not ridden very far when reports of enemy cavalry on his rear and flanks reached him. When he was within a few miles of the railroad, he learned an Alabama regiment with artillery was between him and West Point. Confederate district commander Ruggles was sending regular Confederate units and Mississippi state troops under former Federal judge Samuel J. Gholson to either catch the enemy cavalry or protect the railroad, which Ruggles concluded was the raid’s primary target. Hatch was beginning to feel boxed in, and he abandoned the plans to move south to Macon or Columbus. His primary concern was to get out of the closing enemy trap, for which he blamed his immediate superior: “[The] delay in time . . . was fatal to carrying out Colonel Grierson’s order.”40
The small community of Palo Alto, less than 10 miles from the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, had once been a thriving community. When the railroad route to the east left it behind, however, its population declined along with its economic vitality. Hatch and his Iowans were approaching the small town just as a group of Confederate cavalry under Barteau, including Smith’s partisan rangers (whom Hatch had met earlier around Pontotoc), caught up with them. The result was a running affair beyond the Palo Alto church. Barteau’s Tennessee regiment and its allies, including Inge’s battalion, were overtaking the rear of the Federal column, which had been delayed in its effort to help Grierson get off on a firm footing down the Starkville road. The pursuing Confederates knew the relative strength of the enemy because, as one Iowan reported, “Our column had been inspected at every house we passed by women and old men,” none of whom were bashful about providing information to Barteau. As a result, Hatch could not make it safely through Palo Alto before the Confederate pursuit caught up with him. He had no choice but to deploy and prepare for a fight.41
Palo Alto Cemetery. Much of the battle at Palo Alto took place near the church and cemetery. The church is no longer standing, but the cemetery is still active. Author
Barteau and company first hit the Union rear guard some two miles northwest of the Palo Alto church and steadily pushed east, “skirmishing for advantage of ground,” explained the Confederate officer. The Confederates managed to cut off one company of Iowans trying to hold back the Confederate onslaught. Hatch, meanwhile, one company short, took up a position in a hedge-lined roadbed near the church, deploying his lone cannon to best advantage. Despite being lined with trees, the position offered an open field of fire. Other Confederates were farther east, including the Alabama regiment. Fortunately for the Iowans, a formidable valley and the channel of Tibbee Creek protected them from that direction.42
The next two hours were filled with fitful skirmishing while Barteau decided how best to get at the Federals. “Finding that the enemy would not come out from his position,” Barteau had to come up with a different scheme. He still thought the Federals were moving to strike the railroad, so its defense played a large role in his thinking. He also did not know whether General Ruggles at Columbus had been able to forward troops into the area. Left to his own devices, Barteau figured out a way to both fight Hatch and protect the railroad. His biggest problem was that the railroad was behind the Federals. Barteau decided to split his force. Colonel Smith’s and Captain Ham’s units would deploy in Hatch’s front to hold the Iowans in place, “dismounted, and, protected by the church, a small number of trees, and the brow of a slight eminence.” Meanwhile, Barteau would take his own 2nd Tennessee under Maj. George H. Morton, together with Major Inge’s Mississippians, around Hatch’s flank to get between the Iowans and the railroad. The move would allow Barteau to protect the Mobile and Ohio and attack Hatch in the rear. “Should the enemy advance on them,” he ordered Smith and Ham, they were “to reserve their fire until he should arrive close enough to make it destructive and deadly, and to hold the position until a charge should be made fully in his rear.” With that, Barteau took his men and rode off to implement his bold plan.43
The Confederates under Smith and Ham implemented some deception of their own, despite Barteau’s orders to stand fast and wait for an attack on the rear of the enemy. The holding force used flags of truce to move closer to Hatch’s position in order to launch an attack. When the Mississippians edged a little too close for the comfort of the Iowans holding the lane, Hatch’s “dismounted and well covered” troopers used their Colt revolving rifles to good effect in unison with the small two-pound cannon. Some of the Confederates later bragged that they “wanted but three minutes in which to capture it,” but the barking mobile piece turned the tide, with one shot smashing into the nearby Calvert house. The fire routed the Rebels. According to Barteau’s report, “The enemy . . . poured a rapid fire upon Colonel’s Smith’s regiment and Captain Ham’s four companies, before which the men retreated in the utmost disorder, although everything was done which could have been by these two officers to make
them stand and at least give the enemy one fire.”44
The rout of the Mississippians prompted Hatch to order a pursuit westward that covered some three miles. The fortuitous counterthrust recovered his lost company and captured several horses and weapons. Barteau knew from the sound of the fading gunfire that his plan had gone awry, but he achieved one important goal by placing part of his command between the enemy and the railroad. With the battle moving away from him, Barteau wheeled his troopers about and followed the running combat as best he could. “Had not the troops given way so soon in front,” he complained in his report, “I should have cut to pieces or captured the entire force of the enemy.” Colonel Smith and Captain Ham tried to reform their men in the midst of the chaos. Even Barteau admitted that they “acted gallantly, and took the post of danger, endeavoring by their example to inspire confidence and insure success.” There was no inspiring the beaten state troops, however, and Hatch now had an open corridor out of the well-conceived trap. Even better, one Iowan remembered, “Not a drop of Yankee blood was shed.”45
Recriminations for the failure to trap Hatch came thick and fast. One of Barteau’s Tennesseans later complained, “Our attack would have been complete, and we would have captured his whole command, had not a battalion of Mississippi State troops, which had joined us on the march, given way in disorder on one side as we charged on the other.” A local citizen agreed with that assessment when he informed Governor John J. Pettus, “From the best information I can obtain one Regiment of our newly organized state cavalry (Smith’s Regt) behaved very badly in the late skirmishes with the Yankees. Indeed, many of the men shamefully threw away their arms and ran away.” In fairness, little could be expected from fresh state troops, but the civilian had little better to say about the regular Confederates when he added, “Barteau’s Cavalry is a nuisance.”46
The Real Horse Soldiers Page 15
