By this time Hatch knew he was no longer in a position to carry out Grierson’s orders. Even though he was miffed at Grierson, Hatch was a patriot and a career officer first. Accordingly, the Maine native fell back to the northeast. “From that time until dark it was a constant skirmish,” he reported, “the enemy having taken me for the main column. Believing it was important to divert the enemy’s cavalry from Colonel Grierson, I moved slowly northward, fighting by the rear, crossing the Houlka River, and drawing their forces immediately in my rear.” When an impediment appeared, the men swiftly vaulted over it. At times, they even lifted the little cannon by hand or took it apart to more easily move it. “The naked gun weighed 140 pounds,” recalled an Iowan, “and the carriage could be so taken apart that the gun was heavier than any piece about it.”47
Captain Henry Forbes of the 7th Illinois was riding with Grierson’s column and praised Hatch for his accomplishment, concluding, “The enemy left 25 of their men on the field and Hatch had the right of way.” Grierson admitted Hatch had successfully diverted Confederate attention. “It had lately rained considerable throughout that section of the country,” he explained, “and the fact that the freshest tracks pointed northward led the rebels, when they examined the trail three hours afterwards, to believe that the whole command had marched eastward.” However, the brigade commander was not completely satisfied with Hatch’s performance. The regimental commander, he argued, had been taken “somewhat by surprise” at Palo Alto. “The colonel did not follow up his advantage and reach Macon as I had hoped and directed.” After recovering from the appearance of the enemy, continued Grierson, “It would appear . . . he might have dashed down to Macon.” Ultimately, Grierson gave Hatch the benefit of the doubt, writing that “he, however, no doubt did what he deemed best, considering the condition of his horses and the distance he had to march through the enemy’s country.” He also praised Hatch for making “a skillful retreat . . . doing what damage he could by the way and drawing the enemy after him as far north as practicable.” In fact, Hatch had played his role perfectly and with a willingness to sacrifice his command, if necessary, to further the overall objective. “The Fight at Palo Alto, and diverting the enemy from Colonel Grierson,” he wrote as Grierson continued southward, “has undoubtedly given him thirty-six hours’ head start.” Such selflessness was the mark of a true patriot.48
By that evening, Ruggles knew of Barteau’s fight and Hatch’s escape. The enemy had gotten away, he reported, and the smaller forces that had ridden down the Starkville road had returned and rejoined the troops he had fought earlier in the day. Barteau was ashamed to admit he had not fully taken care of either enemy force, but he assured Ruggles that he hoped to do just that the next day—especially with reinforcements from Lt. Col. James Cunningham’s 2nd Alabama Cavalry, which was expected that night from Okolona. Barteau also called on Ruggles to send more mounted troops to West Point. “We will not, if possible, allow the enemy to reach the railroad,” he assured the district commander. “I do not know whether we can succeed in gobbling up this force as I desire to do,” he added, but he reassured Ruggles that the enemy would not make any farther penetration south, because all of the Federals were riding hard north again. As Barteau wrote these words, Grierson steadily moved south through Starkville and beyond with the bulk of his command.49
***
While Hatch was riding west and fighting for his life around Palo Alto, Grierson was making a swift and unobserved getaway south on April 21. One Illinois man remembered that, despite approaching bad weather, the men “were cheerful and enlivened the march with songs and jokes.” Questions, however, coursed through the ranks. Why had an entire regiment broken off the main column? Why were they still moving southward? “Various were the opinions by the men as to our destination,” admitted one trooper.50
Grierson’s main column now consisted of two regiments and the four remaining pieces of Smith’s Illinois artillery battery, about 950 men in all. He allowed the troopers half an hour to rest and then rode hard for Starkville. The Illinois soldiers passed through Tampico, where they saw evidence of what trooper Daniel Robbins described as “the R. R. through there [which] is not completed.” Next up was Starkville, which Grierson reached late in the afternoon. The column entered without opposition because no one there knew Grierson was coming until just minutes before he and his men arrived. According to one Mississippian at nearby Mayhew Station, the Federals loudly proclaimed that “every citizen caught showing that he was a Combatant would be hung immediately.” It is highly unlikely Grierson would have hanged anyone under those circumstances, but the threat surely discouraged opposition. Grierson captured a good deal of mail and “government property,” all of which the Illinoisans destroyed.51
The troopers made quite a stir in each town they rode through, and the chaos amused the fun-loving colonel. “Upon entering a town,” Grierson recalled in reference to their entrance into Starkville, “we were surprised to find ourselves at times ahead of information and were, therefore, often taken for Confederate soldiers going to intercept the Yankees, of whom all had received more or less exaggerated reports. The consternation occasioned by the sudden appearance of our detachments in conjunction with the main column,” he continued, “apparently so widely scattered and traveling in opposite directions, caused reports of our force to be greatly overestimated.”52
The Illinois troopers had what fun they could while abiding by the strict rules Grierson laid down. Generally, they adhered to them. When opportunities arose, the troopers could not resist being kind to the slaves they encountered. One newspaper reported what happened when “Hale and Murdock’s hat wagon, loaded with wool hats,” passed through town at the wrong time. The soldiers confiscated the hats, distributed them to the slaves, “and took the mules.” The nearby Columbus Republic sarcastically editorialized, “Starkville can boast of better head covering for its Negroes than any other town in the state.” In a show of mercy, troopers going through the captured Confederate mail “handed back a letter from a soldier to his wife, containing $50.00, and ordered the postmaster to give it to her.” The Federals left almost all property intact because, as the newspaper explained, “They stated that they were not destroying property; that they were gentlemen.”53
Having no reason to remain in town and an urgent reason to be on his way, Grierson took a doctor as a temporary prisoner and the column moved south on the Louisville Road. The western skies grew dark and foreboding soon after the ride was renewed. A major storm was approaching. By nightfall, the heavens opened, dumping what Grierson described as “a violent rain.”54
This storm was not the only thing Grierson and his men had to endure. Four or five miles south of Starkville, a series of tributaries threading out from a large river system slowed their progress. The Noxubee River’s headwaters were west, on the high ridge dividing the watersheds of the Tombigbee River and its tributaries from the watersheds of the Big Black and Pearl Rivers farther west. The Noxubee River flowed generally southeast between Starkville and Louisville, through Macon, and into Alabama, where it entered the Tombigbee River near Gainesville. Numerous feeder creeks and branches flowed roughly parallel with the main channel, all of which is now a part of the Noxubee National Wildlife Refuge and the Tombigbee National Forest. The road from Starkville to Louisville crossed each ribbon of water. This made it difficult to move quickly, especially during storms and particularly after a heavy rainfall.55
Grierson had been fortunate thus far, putting his copy of Colton’s pocket map to good use. After crossing the Tallahatchie River rather easily three days earlier on April 18, the brigade had not encountered any significant obstacles. He had ridden his men along the high Pontotoc Ridge southeast as it formed the high headwaters region of most of the nearby major streams flowing east and west. This route through Pontotoc, Houston, and nearly to Starkville had allowed Grierson to bypass the headwaters and channel of the Big Black River off to his west and also avoid the lowlands flood
ed by the tributaries of the Tombigbee River to the east (the same ones Hatch had encountered). Now that Grierson was off the Pontotoc Ridge, he needed to negotiate several waterways, including the Noxubee and the upper reaches of the larger Pearl River, to reach the Southern Railroad of Mississippi nearly 100 miles farther south.56
Grierson had little choice but to plunge ahead. Every major raid faced obstacles, but how he and his men and animals managed these challenges would determine success or failure. The Federal commander pushed his men into the Noxubee River swamps, crossing the muddy tributaries before negotiating the main channel the next day. It was a difficult journey. Grierson described the area as “a dismal swamp nearly belly-deep in mud.” His men had no choice but to push ahead, “sometimes swimming our horses to cross streams.” Somehow the column managed to cover almost 40 miles that day before Grierson finally called a halt to allow his wet and exhausted troopers to find a suitable campsite amid the swamps around Talking Warrior Creek, one of the Noxubee River’s major tributaries. “We encamped for the night in the midst of a violent rain,” Grierson reported, his column having finally reached “high and suitable ground.”57
It was a miserable night despite the “high and suitable ground.” There was little shelter for man and beast and precious little for either to eat. According to Adjutant Woodward, the men without tents huddled in any outbuildings they could find. This was the first night of the raid the troopers had not encamped at a plantation, where enormous amounts of forage and provisions were always within reach. In a sense, it was the first time Grierson had failed to find his men suitable accommodations. He may have been better off stopping a few miles back, closer to Starkville, but the urgency to keep moving had pressed him on. As Grierson later explained, “I always had rather a remarkable faculty for judging correctly as to where supplies could be obtained, readily determining from the character of the country where a large plantation or mill ought to be located, and was sure to reach them unerringly.” Occasionally, “after a hard day’s ride in a desolate looking country,” he added, “night would approach with no apparent prospect of supplies or food for men or animals. But, by what seemed to the men an unfailing instinct, orders would be given to flank off some by-road or across a field to an unknown or unsuspected foraging place, till the command learned to trust to my discretion or judgment without complaint.” Regardless of Grierson’s good instincts, they failed him this night as his tired command huddled on the only high ground discernable in the Noxubee River bottoms.58
***
As it turned out, the miserable day was not over for a few unlucky companies of the 7th Illinois Cavalry. Scouts brought Grierson news of a “tannery and shoe manufactory in the service of the rebels” near Longview, just three miles to the northwest. The place was a novelty in the area because its owners, Roderick Green and Dossey A. Outlaw, operated the first steam engine in the county. The engine powered not only the manufactory but also a saw, grist, and flour mill, which meant grateful farmers no longer had to go all the way to the Noxubee River mills farther to the south to process their harvests. Grierson was more interested in the tannery, and he sent a battalion of the 7th Illinois under Major Graham to destroy it. Graham’s troopers caught the tannery workers unaware and “accomplished the work most effectually,” Grierson happily reported. The small raid destroyed a large number of shoes, leather, and the machinery needed to make them, “in all amounting, probably, to $50,000, and captured a rebel quartermaster from Port Hudson, who was there laying in a supply for his command.” The officer, a member of a Tennessee regiment, had no idea any enemy was operating in the vicinity. The battalion returned without any trouble other than battling heavy rain and tried to get what rest they could before heading out the next morning.59
The mini-raid to destroy the tannery was but one of many raids, scouts, and smaller detachments Grierson dispatched from the main body as he drove deeper into Mississippi. Some were to reconnoiter, some to destroy significant local establishments such as the tannery, and others to gather supplies. By this time, Grierson’s men had exhausted the five-day supply of food they had taken with them when they left La Grange. The colonel had opted to spend most of the raid living off the country, and he was fortunate to find sufficient provisions at most of the plantations. “We were getting a long way from our own base of supplies,” he admitted, “but managed to live quite well off the products of the country.” Still, “living quite well” took work. “Foraging parties became a necessity,” he reported, “and besides, when we stopped at a plantation for the night or to feed during the day, a detail for guard was immediately placed at the smokehouses, kitchens, and dwellings, with instructions not to allow anything to be taken without permission of a commissioned officer.” Meanwhile, the quartermaster and commissary issued the items evenly to the troops “pro-rate to the various companies,” and if there was not enough, squads rode to neighboring plantations to fill in the balance. “Still,” Grierson confessed, “the rapid marches made were such that the command seldom got more than one good meal per day.”60
Grierson also used the scouts and mini-raids as his eyes and ears. “Occasional small detachments sent out as foragers and select scouts for special services managed to obtain all necessary information of the country and the movements of the enemy,” he confirmed. Eventually, Grierson decided to institute a more formal scouting effort, one based on the idea of Canadian Richard W. Surby of the 7th Illinois Cavalry. “Possessed of a venturesome disposition I naturally wanted to be in the front,” recalled Surby. After thinking on the subject, “It occurred to me I could do so.” Surby sought out Lt. Col. William Blackburn, his former captain and now the impetuous 26-year-old lieutenant colonel of the regiment, and told him of his idea of dressing scouts in civilian clothes and sending them out to gather intelligence. An enthusiastic Blackburn carried the idea to Grierson.61
William D. Blackburn. Lieutenant Colonel William D. Blackburn, who oversaw the selection of the scouts, was a brave but rash officer, second in command of the 7th Illinois Cavalry. His rash action resulted in his mortal wounding at Wall’s Bridge. Steve Hicks
The idea of a more muscular group dedicated to the task of scouting appealed to Grierson, especially as “we approached the heart of the rebel country.” He discussed the idea with his officers, and a jocular competition to obtain “the most venturesome and daring soldiers” emerged. Grierson stipulated they be chosen “with great care” and that they volunteer for the duty because it was “so hazardous and the difficulties so great.” The group needed “men of nerve, untiring energy and steadfast integrity,” thought Adjutant Woodward. Some of the first volunteers stepped forward so they could steal for personal gain. “The detachment was thoroughly purged of this class,” wrote a disgusted Woodward. Blackburn “entered into the spirit of the thing at once,” claiming he knew exactly what men to choose. Blackburn, described as a “very energetic and capable officer,” recommended the regiment’s quartermaster sergeant, Richard W. Surby, to lead the scouts.62
Surby took to his new duty with gusto, and soon he had a small group of nine scouts equipped and ready for service. Grierson ordered him to stay “in advance and upon the flanks of the column to gain information as to the movements of the enemy, the character of the country, the different roads, streams, bridges, the products of the country, the whereabouts of forage and other supplies. In short,” continued the Federal commander, “anything which would be of interest or importance to know was to be promptly reported.” In order to make his task easier, although much more dangerous, Surby acquired civilian and Confederate attire, including butternut uniforms in which the scouts dressed to quickly blend into the countryside. Their appearance, thought Grierson, “was well calculated to deceive. In fact, they were for some days taken for rebels by our own men and presumed to be prisoners, as they would at times pass the column to the rear or front. But the officers and soldiers soon came to know them.” Grierson remembered the scouts many years later when he recalle
d how “their singular appearance always brought forth smiles . . . their quaint citizen’s dress, saddles, long rifles, shotguns, pouches, and general make up completing their admirable disguise.” Surby and his scouts soon came to be known as the Butternut Guerrillas.63
The scouts looked so benign that some were taken to be clergymen. Samuel Nelson, for example, was “slightly deformed,” with one leg shorter than the other, “so that he was not suspected of being in any way connected with the army.” The scouts carried weapons under their clothes and out of sight until they were needed. If they were discovered dressed in civilian or Confederate clothing, however, they would be treated as spies and likely executed. Surby pondered that possibility. “I began to reflect; what, if we should be detected, our fate was certain death—we would be treated as spies. Then imagination pictured home with all its inducements, and I could see many sad countenances and bitter tears.”64
Richard W. Surby. As commander of the scouts, Sergeant Richard W. Surby was instrumental in many of the more delicate and daring events of the raid. His coolness allowed Grierson to slip out of several tight spots. Surby was wounded as a result of Blackburn’s rashness at Wall’s Bridge and fell into enemy hands as a prisoner. M. K. Surbey
To avoid being fired upon by their own men, the scouts worked out a system of signals so the rest of Grierson’s troops would recognize them. Unfortunately, this did not always work, and even Surby came under friendly fire, particularly at night when it was hard to distinguish friend from foe. In fact, a ball fired by one of his own comrades in the 7th Illinois Cavalry grazed his hip. The scouts quickly showed their mettle, capturing a Confederate officer just below Starkville even before going into camp during the miserable night of April 21. The enemy soldier was “a lieutenant from Vicksburg with a spanking team of gray horses with which he was cutting a dash with his lady love while home on leave,” Grierson explained. He had no sympathy for either the lieutenant or the woman, and “the horses were turned over . . . to the battery.”65
The Real Horse Soldiers Page 16
