The Real Horse Soldiers
Page 17
The scout service provided the small group of volunteers with freedom and flexibility, which was exactly what Surby desired. He was, however, “fully resolved not to abuse the confidence reposed in me.” The Canadian-born quartermaster kept his word, and he and his motley band quickly became one of Grierson’s most potent weapons.66
The Federal brigade commander needed all the weapons he could muster. A quick glance at Colton’s map clearly showed that the rest of the way to the Southern Railroad would be more difficult because of the terrain, not counting any enemy they might encounter. It was time to make the final push south to break the railroad. The next few days would be the raid’s defining hours and would determine its success, failure, or even the life or death of its participants.
1OR 24, pt. 1, 523.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
4Ibid., pt. 3, 207.
5Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 150; Orange Jackson, The History of Orange Jackson’s War Life: As Related by Himself (n.p.: n.p., n.d.), 9.
6“From One of Grierson’s Cavalry,” Union Monitor (Litchfield, IL), June 5, 1863; Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 150-51.
7OR 24, pt. 1, 523.
8Ibid.
9Ibid.; Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 151.
10OR 24, pt. 1, 521-23; Abbott, “Heroic Deeds of Heroic Men,” 274; Woodward, “Grierson’s Raid,” 691; Davis, diary, April 21, 1863, http://www.rootsweb.ancestry.com/~mscivilw/davis.htm.
11OR 24, pt. 1, 530-31.
12Ibid., 523.
13Ibid.; Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 151; Surby, Grierson Raids, 26.
14For Mississippi’s geography, see George B. Davis, Leslie J. Perry, and Joseph W. Kirkley, Atlas to Accompany the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1891-95), 154.
15OR 24, pt. 1, 522.
16Ibid., 522-23.
17Ibid., 522-23, 530; Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 151; Woodward, “Grierson’s Raid,” 691; Surby, Grierson Raids, 226-27.
18Tim Turpentine, “A History of Chickasaw County,” in James R. Atkinson, ed., Journal of Mississippi History (November 1979), vol. 41, Issue 4, 319.
19Surby, Grierson Raids, 27; 1850 Chickasaw County Population and Slave Schedules; https://www.findagrave.com/memorial/59333701/benjamin-kilgore.
20Clay County History Book Committee, History of Clay County, Mississippi (n.p.: Curtis Media Corporation, 1988), 180.
21OR 24, pt. 1, 522.
22Ibid., 534.
23James Burton to Daniel Ruggles, April 19, 1863, in Civil War Collection, Loyola Marymount University; OR 24, pt. 1, 550-51.
24Bruce S. Allardice, Confederate Colonels: A Biographical Register (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2008), 55; Dave Roth, “Grierson’s Raid, April 17-May 2, 1863: A Cavalry Raid at Its Best,” Blue & Gray Magazine (June 1993), vol. 10, Issue 5, 23.
25John Berrien, The Military Annals of Tennessee (Nashville: J. M. Lindsley & Co., 1886), 613; Rowland Dunbar and H. Grady Howell, Jr., Military History of Mississippi: 1803-1898, Including a Listing of All Known Mississippi Confederate Military Units (Madison, MS: Chickasaw Bayou Press, 2003), 427, 511, 533-34; OR 24, pt. 1, 534; Smith, The Mississippi Secession Convention; 226; Smith, Shiloh, 59, 64.
26 Berrien, Military Annals of Tennessee, 613; Rowland and Howell, Military History of Mississippi, 427, 511, 533-34; OR 24, pt. 1, 534; Smith, Mississippi Secession Convention; 226; Smith, Shiloh, 59, 64.
27OR 24, pt. 1, 534; Bearss, The Vicksburg Campaign, vol. 2, 194.
28OR 24, pt. 1, 534.
29Ibid.
30Ibid.
31Ibid., 523.
32Ibid.
33Ibid., 523, 530; OR 24, pt. 3, 232; Bearss, The Vicksburg Campaign, vol. 2, 194; Surby, Grierson Raids, 27; B. H. Grierson to Alice, April 21, 1863. The historic Montpelier is not the present-day town, which is west of the historic site.
34Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 151-52; Erastus D. Yule, Compiled Service Record, NARA.
35OR 24, pt. 1, 523, 530.
36Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 152; Pierce, History of the Second Iowa Cavalry, 49; B. H. Grierson to Alice, April 21, 1863, Benjamin H. Grierson Papers, ALPL.
37Pierce, History of the Second Iowa Cavalry, 49.
38OR 24, pt. 1, 530; Woodward, “Grierson’s Raid,” 692.
39OR 24, pt. 1, 534.
40Ibid., 530.
41Ibid., 534; Pierce, History of the Second Iowa Cavalry, 49; Roth, “Grierson’s Raid,” 24.
42OR 24, pt. 1, 530, 534-35; Pierce, History of the Second Iowa Cavalry, 50; R. R. Hancock, Hancock’s Diary: Or, A History of the Second Tennessee Confederate Cavalry, with Sketches of First and Seventh Battalions; also, Portraits and Biographical Sketches (Nashville: Brandon Printing Company, 1887), 239.
43OR 24, pt. 1, 534-35; Hancock, Hancock’s Diary, 239; Company C, 2nd Iowa Cavalry, Muster Roll, RG 94, E 57, NARA.
44OR 24, pt. 1, 530, 534-35; Pierce, History of the Second Iowa Cavalry, 50, 54; Ruth White Williams, On the Map 145 Years: The History of West Point, Mississippi, 1846-1991 (West Point, MS: City of West Point, 1996), 54.
45OR 24, pt. 1, 530, 534-35; Pierce, History of the Second Iowa Cavalry, 50, 54.
46Berrien, Military Annals of Tennessee. 613; James H. Rives to John J. Pettus, May 2, 1863, in John J. Pettus Correspondence, MDAH.
47OR 24, pt. 1, 530; Forbes, “Grierson’s Raid,” 10; Pierce, History of the Second Iowa Cavalry, 51.
48Forbes, “Grierson’s Raid,” 10; Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 152; OR 24, pt. 1, 531.
49OR 24, pt. 1, 534; “Skirmish in Chickasaw County,” Jackson Daily Mississippian, April 23, 1863.
50Curtiss, diary, April 21, 1863, Wisconsin Historical Society; Surby, Grierson Raids, 28.
51OR 24, pt. 1, 523; Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 152; A. K. Brantley to John J. Pettus, April 24, 1863, in John J. Pettus Correspondence, MDAH; Daniel E. Robbins to Parents, May 5, 1863.
52Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 154.
53Forbes, “Grierson’s Cavalry Raid,” 130.
54OR 24, pt. 1, 523.
55Ibid.
56George B. Davis, Leslie J. Perry, and Joseph W. Kirkley, Atlas to Accompany the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1891-1895),154.
57OR 24, pt. 1, 523; Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 152.
58Woodward, “Grierson’s Raid,” 692; Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 154.
59OR 24, pt. 1, 523; Thomas Battle Carroll, Historical Sketches of Oktibbeha County (Mississippi) (Gulfport: Dixie Press, 1931), 77; Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 152-53; “The Grierson Raid,” Weekly Register (Canton, IL), September 7, 1863; Surby, Grierson Raids, 31; Joey Partridge, “Grierson Raided Here 130 Years Ago,” Winston County Journal, April 21, 1993.
60Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 154.
61Surby, Grierson Raids, 29; Roth, “Grierson’s Raid,” 23, 62. For Surby’s accounts, see Richard W. Surby, Two Great Raids: Col. Grierson’s Successful Swoop Through Mississippi, Morgan’s Disastrous Raid Through Indiana and Ohio, Vivid Narratives of Both These Great Operations, with Extracts from Official Records, John Morgan’s Escape, Last Raid, and Death (Washington, DC: National Tribune, 1897) and Surby’s multi-issue account in the National Tribune, starting with “The Grierson Raid,” July 12, 1883, National Tribune. Surby’s Compiled Service Record indicates he was born in Canada according to one document and Kinston, Ohio, in another (Richard W. Surby, Compiled Service Record, NARA).
62Surby, Grierson Raids, 29; Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 153.
63Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 153-54; Woodward, “Grierson’s Raid,” 687.
64Surby, Grierson Raids, 29, 89.
65Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 154; Surby, Grierson Raids, 42, 52-53.
66Surby, Grierson Raids, 29-30; OR 24, pt. 3, 215; Grierson, A Just and Righteous Ca
use, 151.
CHAPTER SIX
The Push
John Pemberton’s attention was being pulled in several directions. While Grant showed signs of a major operation unfolding west of the Mississippi River, the raids taking place elsewhere posed serious challenges for the Confederate general. By April 22 it was obvious that Grierson’s incursion into Mississippi, which Pemberton had dismissed just two days earlier as “a mere raid,” was something much more substantial.1
“Heavy raids are making from Tennessee deep into the State,” Pemberton informed theater commander Joe Johnston at Tullahoma, Tennessee, on April 22, “and one is reported now at Starkville, 30 miles west of Columbus.” The Vicksburg commander added, “Cavalry [is] indispensable to meet these raids,” but “the little I have is in the field there, totally inadequate to prevent them.”2
Unfortunately for Pemberton, he had no mounted troops south of the Confederate cavalry chasing Colonel Hatch to meet the enemy or defend key points, including the vital Southern Railroad of Mississippi. “I have so little cavalry in this department,” he complained, “that I am compelled to direct a portion of my infantry to meet raids in Northern Mississippi,” Pemberton informed Richmond. Abraham Buford’s infantry, then in motion in Alabama, received word to halt and await further orders while other bodies of infantry were instructed to move north along the rail lines to take positions better suited to meeting or stopping the enemy raid. Eventually, most of the troops in the eastern portion of the state would end up under the command of Maj. Gen. William W. Loring. Meanwhile, additional commands also concentrated on the compromised area, including Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Featherson’s brigade, which moved to the Mississippi Central at Winona and Duck Hill, some of Loring’s brigades, which moved north along the Mobile and Ohio from Meridian to aid General Ruggles, and Brig. Gen. Lloyd Tilghman’s brigade, which moved north along the Mississippi Central from Canton. These infantry maneuvers, however, would be hard pressed to make any difference unless the Federals stumbled into an area they defended.3
Despite these hurried activities and his concern for what was unfolding in central Mississippi, Pemberton’s main attention remained focused on Grant’s operations west of the Mississippi River in Louisiana. Another movement of Federal vessels past the Vicksburg batteries on the night of April 22 was disconcerting, as were the infrequent messages reaching him concerning the Union raid. Pemberton told General Loring, who was moving troops northward from Meridian to meet Grierson, to keep him informed “hourly.” The end of his message demonstrated the concern he felt about Grant’s operation when he added that Loring’s troops may “be required here at any time. Six boats passed Vicksburg last night.”4
Pemberton’s concentration on Vicksburg, his lack of cavalry, and the need to use infantry instead of mounted troops made the Confederate pursuit of Grierson less successful than it might have otherwise been. The fractured Southern command structure also accounts for the chaotic pursuit. Ruggles was in charge of the district when Grierson rode into it, but Gen. Samuel Gholson was in command of the state troops there. These included Col. J. F. Smith’s 2nd Mississippi Cavalry State Troops, Capt. T. W. Ham’s four companies of the 16th Battalion State Troops, and two companies of partisan rangers under Maj. William M. Inge. In the field, however, these officers and commands reported not to Gholson but to Colonel Barteau. (Regular Confederate cavalry units operated under their regular commanders, such as Barteau.)5
The fact that many of the commanders did not get along only made the fluid and dangerous situation that much worse. When the troopers of Lt. Col. James Cunningham’s 2nd Alabama Cavalry heard Hatch’s small two-pounder firing the day before, the mounted outfit left camp at Okolona and rode toward the fighting. Barteau, however, was none too impressed and blamed much of the previous day’s failure on Cunningham’s tardiness in reaching the field. “The reinforcement,” Barteau reported snappily, “was too late to be of any service. In fact, the tardiness of his movements allowed the enemy to reach Okolona; for had he joined me before reaching Palo Alto, we should have routed and scattered the enemy.” Cunningham then made matters worse, Barteau reported, because “upon his late arrival he desired to assume command, which I declined to grant him.” Unsure of their relative rank status, Barteau added, “If I committed an error in this respect, I am subject to such remedy as the case may require.” With some of the Confederate officers arguing among themselves, and all of them working within a rickety system of command, the hope of actually catching Hatch, much less Grierson, became that much more difficult.6
Still, Barteau had done well by staying just a few hours behind Hatch’s Iowans. Smith’s and Ham’s units had rejoined Barteau after the fighting at Palo Alto, when Barteau again divided his forces, this time sending the state troops toward Pontotoc while he moved toward Okolona with his own and Cunningham’s regiments. The latter command, however, was blocked by a flooded creek, which Barteau described as having “no bridge, and the water swimming deep,” and stopped its advance. Trouble between the lieutenant colonels, meanwhile, continued to fester. When Cunningham informed Barteau that “his command was exhausted and without rations [and] that he could not continue the pursuit,” Barteau decided he had had all he could stand of Cunningham. His own men, after all, were at the point of exhaustion and had been in the field longer than Cunningham’s troopers. Barteau accepted his explanation and simply continued on with his own command. The Alabamians’ departure weakened the pursuing force, and the Confederates left broken-down horses and men all along the road. Barteau, meanwhile, with Ham’s, Smith’s and Inge’s troops, pushed northward, hoping for a chance to catch up with the withdrawing Federal column. What they would do if they actually caught Hatch’s Iowans remained to be seen, because each Confederate had only about ten rounds of ammunition.7
***
The main beneficiaries of the Confederate chaos were Hatch’s Iowans, although Grierson also gleaned advantages from it. By the morning of April 22, Grierson was moving south toward Louisville with an extensive set of obstacles to surmount, but not a single hindrance was the result of Confederate defenders or pursuers, primarily because Hatch’s bold diversion continued to attract Barteau’s attention.8
Hatch’s Iowans avoided major trouble throughout the afternoon of April 21 and by nightfall were falling back slowly to the northeast, fighting a careful rear-guard action designed to keep the enemy in pursuit. With Barteau’s command at bay, Hatch camped for the night east of the formidable Tibbee Creek, not far from the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. It had been a hectic day and evening for the midwesterners, who at one point rode down a large watershed blocked by Confederates to find an alternate crossing point. Bonfires raged on each bank during the night as the soldiers crossed via a makeshift footbridge and the horses swam across. As one Iowan recalled, “Three or four troopers would seize each horse and throw him into the stream, when they would, by the aid of long poles, compel him to swim to the opposite bank.” The men took apart the small cannon and used ropes to haul it across.9
Hatch continued his diversion the next morning, rousting his Iowans early on April 22 and moving toward the railroad. They soon found the Confederates were still in active pursuit, and the Union cavalrymen fended off the enemy in a series of minor skirmishes that stretched for miles. This time, however, it was not just Gholson’s state troops and Barteau’s regulars in pursuit but also “citizens in the country, armed with shot-guns and hunting rifles, firing constantly on our flanks.”10
Hatch did his best to bob and weave his way through the danger while still endeavoring to confuse the enemy as to his intent and direction. “Before noon we had marched to all points of the compass,” one Iowan declared, “baffling all attempts on the part of the enemy to keep track of us.” The Federal column passed through numerous swamps, which the same Iowan declared “everywhere abounds” in central Mississippi, and came across slaves sent out by their owners to hide their horses and mules. By the time Hatch made a dash north for safety,
he and his Iowans had gathered as many as 600 horses and mules and around 200 slaves.11
Even with the larger Confederate numbers nipping at his column from various directions, Hatch was able to make good time. He was careful not to outrun his pursuers and yet make sure he was far enough ahead to avoid having to wage a pitched fight a second time. If the Confederates discovered that his was not the only Union column in central Mississippi, they might well conclude Hatch was the lesser risk and pursue Grierson. Consequently, Hatch had to make as much fuss as possible, and he reasoned Okolona was as good a place as any to do so. Whatever fuss he intended, however, would be limited, because Hatch’s Iowans had only about 21 rounds of ammunition per man themselves.12
Around 4:00 p.m. on April 22, the 2nd Iowa Cavalry rode into Okolona, a small town along the Mobile and Ohio Railroad almost midway between West Point and Tupelo. They easily dispersed the few Confederate defenders there, even though some regular cavalry was mixed in with the state troops. Once it was safe to do so, the men went to work destroying the railroad and anything else they could find of military value. A large barracks complex that could house as many as 5,000 men was torched, and a large stash of supplies and ammunition that Hatch’s men could not take with them destroyed. Some of the destruction included “about three hundred shot-guns and rifles, mostly Enfield.”13
Hatch knew he could not remain in Okolona overnight, for the railroad offered the Confederates a quick means of concentrating against him. With the sun dipping toward the western horizon and the shadows growing longer by the minute, Hatch rode his troopers northwest and camped about five miles outside town. He needed to get away from the railroad, but he still needed to play his role as bait lest his pursuers abandon him and go after bigger game.14