The Real Horse Soldiers

by Timothy B Smith

  Surby continued disarming and capturing Confederates in front of the column. “I thought of the delay I had occasioned the column so many times, knowing how tired and sleepy the men were, how they must have cursed me,” Surby later admitted. “But they were ignorant of the proceeding in front, and as the prisoners continued to be sent back they began to realize the importance of the scouts.” When Trafton’s column finally eased into the rear of the Confederates northeast of Union Church, the enemy quickly realized their position had been compromised. As one participant described it, “Both Federal and Confederate, were thus cut in two, each by the other.”35

  Even though still separated from Grierson’s main command, Trafton’s appearance unnerved the Confederates. Adams blinked first. The last thing he had expected was the enemy showing up behind him. The Confederate colonel ordered those of his companies that had reached him to ride west with haste to escape the sudden threat of Federals in both his front and rear. “Turning to the right,” Grierson later reported with much relief, “he flanked off and took the direct road towards Port Gibson.” Captain Trafton’s appearance “with a force in his rear changed his [Adams’s] purpose,” he added. The rank and file remained mostly unaware of what was transpiring. In an effort to describe what happened, one trooper related, “For reasons better known to themselves they turn off of the road & did not give us a fight.”36

  The arrival of Trafton’s battalion shook Grierson from his sleep, and he called in Colonel Prince and Lieutenant Colonel Loomis to consult about the latest intelligence Trafton had gleaned during his perilous ride to and from the railroad. The council also included Adjutant Woodward, who, Surby confirmed, “He consulted on all such occasions.” It was time for the officers to ponder their next move.37

  ***

  Trafton’s timely arrival and the resulting Confederate stampede meant Grierson did not have to fight his way out of a desperate place at Union Church when daylight appeared on April 29. The “dangerously complicated situation,” however, gave him pause and taught him a lesson. Why was he moving west toward the river and Grant’s supposed crossing point when he had heard nothing from or about that general’s status? Serious fighting would have erupted by April 28 if the Army of the Tennessee had crossed the river and marched inland. Grierson would have heard about it from his scouts.38

  In fact, Grant was not yet on Mississippi soil. “I had hurried forward fearing that I might be too late,” Grierson later wrote, “but unfortunately had traveled a little too fast and was a few days ahead of time.” Grant had scheduled an April 29 crossing once the navy silenced the Grand Gulf batteries to allow his army a safe passage and a zone in which to land troops. Admiral Porter’s lengthy bombardment opened that day about 8 a.m. and lasted for more than five hours. It failed to knock out the enemy guns, however, leaving Grant no choice but to delay the crossing. By this time fewer than 30 miles separated the Army of the Tennessee from Grierson’s raiders, so when Porter’s guns opened fire, the faint thunder of the guns reached their ears. But what did the firing mean?39

  “It was impossible to wait or remain quietly there,” Grierson explained, “for the rebels were all round us.” The Confederates had many advantages by this point in the raid, including “a knowledge of the country; of every road, public or private, every stream of water, large or small, with its fords and bridges,” added the Federal commander. “They had forces above and below on the railroad, in front from Port Hudson to Vicksburg on the river, and in rear everywhere in all directions. Their scouts were watching; their couriers flying; their troops concentrating to capture us.” What, Grierson wondered, “should hinder them from annihilating myself and small command[?]” He replied to his own rhetorical question: “Only one thing was in the way, and that was there were two parties to that little transaction. I, too, understood the runways and the shortest route to reach them. I also knew the rebels, their whereabouts, and the surest ways to blind and lead them astray.”40

  Grierson thought long and hard as he considered what “Generals Gardner and Pemberton and other rebel commanders would do as capable military men, and what they would expect me to do.” He had been riding toward the Mississippi River, and the Confederates in the area surely expected him to continue moving in that direction. Wirt Adams’s Mississippians, after all, had fallen back in that direction after Trafton’s appearance in order to defend against further Union incursion. Grierson had no firm information about Grant. Unless circumstances changed and he received proof of his crossing soon, moving his command closer to the river was not worth the risk. Grierson finally decided “not do what was expected of me.” Instead, he intended to feint west toward Fayette and Natchez and then move east in a direction the Confederates would least expect. Even his own men “supposed we were going to the Mississippi,” Grierson later revealed, though “none but myself and my adjutant were in [on] the secret.”41

  The Federal raiders moved out on the morning of April 29, twisting and turning to confuse the enemy. “I do not think we missed traveling toward any point on the compass,” concluded Surby, who used some trickery to help improve their chances. A “prominent citizen who had been taken prisoner” rode with the colonel’s entourage. Grierson did not let on that he knew “how great a rebel he was or how much he was devoted to the Southern cause.” Once they stopped for a rest, Grierson placed the man “rather carelessly” in a room next to where he and Woodward discussed plans a little more loudly than they otherwise would have, the colonel “clearly articulat[ing] the remark that I was determined to go to Natchez and then across the Mississippi.” With the fake intelligence seed firmly planted, the civilian was allowed to “slyly” escape without having to give his oath of parole so he could carry the information to the closest Confederate officials.42

  Grierson employed additional deceit by sending “a strong demonstration toward Fayette, with a view of creating the impression that we were going toward Port Gibson or Natchez.” The decision made sense. Other similar detachments had been effective, and there was every indication that this one would work just as well. While a small portion of the column moved toward Fayette 15 miles to the west, gobbling up some of Adams’s pickets along the way posted to help facilitate a Confederate ambush, Grierson “quietly took the opposite direction, taking the road leading southeast to Brookhaven, on the railroad.” In an effort to remain unseen, the column occasionally moved off the road. Grierson later boasted that while Adams’s men waited in vain to spring an ambush on the Federals, his own pickets “were riding along with our column [as] prisoners of war.” Adams’s game, he added, “was ‘over the hills and far away.’”43

  Grierson’s new feint worked to perfection. Colonel Richardson at Hazlehurst received reports of Trafton’s attack at Bahala as well as the fighting at Union Church and, with three companies of Confederate mounted infantry, drove west. “So far as I could judge,” Richardson later reported, “he was leaving the line of the railroad and was going to Natchez.” Captain Cleveland had also assumed the raiders would continue toward Natchez and had so warned everyone who would listen. “Tell the operator at Natchez they may look out for them there,” he had written while skirmishing with Grierson’s Illinoisans on April 28. Adams, who had moved his command toward Fayette to reorganize and hit the Federals the next morning in an ambush, assumed the same thing. “Thinking it was his intention to reach Rodney or Natchez,” Adams wrote from Fayette, “I marched my command to this point, where I have been joined by five companies.” When Adams realized his error the next morning, he admitted his mistake by writing, “Found he had marched rapidly in direction of Brookhaven.”44

  While every Confederate in the area waited for the westward Union thrust, the column made good time trotting east toward the New Orleans, Jackson, and Great Northern Railroad. One trooper marveled at Grierson’s ability to fool the enemy. “Many times,” he later recalled, “he came in contact with two or three times his number and when he could not whip the Johnnies he seemed to know how to g
et out of the snap and was able to outgeneral the rebels at every point.” With the 7th Illinois Cavalry in the lead, the column met wagons loaded with goods rolling in their direction, removed from idle railcars or stockpiles to keep it from falling into Federal hands. One wagon was filled with “hogsheads of sugar . . . of course it was destroyed but not before the men replenished their haversacks.” Grierson viewed the affair as a good sign of just how “bewildered were the people of the country.”45

  The trek to the New Orleans, Jackson, and Great Northern Railroad was more than 20 miles, so Grierson kept up the pace as best he could, because he had no time to spare. When he drew close to Brookhaven, he learned its citizens, like those at Garlandville and elsewhere, were organized and prepared to fight him. Rumor had it that an armed mob of 500 men was willing to defend the town. If true, this news was rather surprising. Southwest Mississippi was populated with a large percentage of Union sympathizers, similar to the counties in the northeast corner of the state and some along the Mississippi River. Adams, Franklin, and Amite Counties had all sent cooperationist delegates to the state secession convention, and all of them had voted against secession. Although Brookhaven was in neighboring Lawrence County, which had toed the secessionist line the entire way, there was good reason to expect at least some Confederate disloyalty inhabited the area.46

  Grierson was in no mood to take any chances, and he could not afford to waste time outside the town deciding what to do. As the column approached Brookhaven, Grierson ordered his leading units to form in a column of fours and charge directly into the village. Someone fired a warning shot, but one Illinois trooper later reported that “’ere the echo of the report dies away we were in and among them.” It was all “terror and confusion,” confirmed Grierson. The civilians, armed and otherwise, were “running and yelling as our cavalry dashed into the place,” with the 7th Illinois Cavalry troopers bursting into town at a full gallop. The defenders were “citizens and conscripts,” and thus no match for the hardy Illinoisans bearing down on them. Grierson likely expected as much because the same thing had happened elsewhere, although these defenders did not disperse quite as peacefully as the others had done. At Garlandville, for example, Grierson made friends and left the townspeople in peace. At Brookhaven, the Illinois troopers captured about 200 conscripts who had stood their ground a bit too long.47

  Soldier Letter. One of Grierson’s raiders, Daniel Robbins, took letterhead from a New Orleans, Jackson, and Great Northern Railroad train station and wrote a letter home on it after reaching Baton Rouge. Steve Hicks

  Once the Federals took control of the town, a palpable relief spread through the citizenry when it became obvious the blue enemy did not intend to destroy the settlement. Grierson described their demeanor as “almost a welcome.” As they had at Garlandville, the Federals made a few friends, often via dollar diplomacy. When the raiders paid the hotel owner for his food in large amounts of Confederate money gathered along the way, he became quite friendly and remarked that it would be fine with him if “the Yanks would come every day, if they paid like you uns do.” Grierson installed guards to protect homes and made sure nothing but military stores were confiscated or burned. When a fire began to spread, troopers used buckets and pails to keep it from burning other buildings. According to Surby, “The saving of the property was personally superintended by Colonel Grierson.”48

  With the possibility of linking up with Grant still in the back of his mind, Grierson ordered his troopers to destroy Brookhaven as a rail and Confederate concentration center. The railroad was the top priority, and the men destroyed a long stretch of track at Brookhaven to add to the destruction already done at Hazlehurst and again at Bahala. The telegraph wire was severed, and government property was destroyed. The latter proved quite extensive, because the state used Brookhaven as an induction center for conscripted troops. The 6th Illinois troopers, Grierson reported, found “a large and beautiful camp of instruction, comprising several hundred tents.” The site also held large quantities of quartermaster and commissary supplies as well as arms and ammunition. It was a good haul in the midst of a quiet day of escape.49

  Although the camp of instruction was basically empty, there was still hundreds of prisoners to parole. Pemberton had instructed officers to scatter their conscripts rather than have them captured, but as the Federals approached and offered paroles that would get the conscripts out of the war for a while, Confederates emerged from the woods to take advantage of the offer. “It was surprising to see the eagerness with which every man liable for military duty, sought one of the papers which exempted him until exchanged. Many who had escaped and were hiding out were brought in by their friends to obtain one of the valuable documents,” confirmed Grierson. All this made a long day for staff officer Woodward, who had to write hundreds of paroles by hand. One of them was for “a newly fledged lieutenant in a bright new uniform bedizened with gold.” The officer was home, visiting the ladies, and was less than pleased to be apprehended.50

  Once finished with Brookhaven, Grierson left the paroled prisoners and mostly thankful citizens and moved on. “No private property was disturbed,” confirmed Colonel Prince, “leaving the inhabitants with a much more favorable opinion of us than they formerly had.” It was nearly dark by the time the troopers finished their work. Grierson had little interest in another night march, but he needed to get away from the scene of destruction. The colonel marched his column south about eight miles along the railroad “over the worst kind of road” to a small plantation on Gill’s Creek owned by 60-year-old Uriah T. Gill. The native South Carolinian’s real estate was valued at only $1,500, but his nine slaves, who made up the bulk of his wealth, were worth $20,000. Grierson’s men camped there for the night, satisfied with their work of destruction and escape from watching Confederates closer to Port Gibson. In a day full of trickery and destruction, the brigade had still managed to cover nearly 30 miles.51

  ***

  As daylight spread across the Mississippi Valley on April 30, one of the climactic moments of the Vicksburg campaign and, in fact, of the entire war arrived: Grant’s army began crossing the Mississippi River below Vicksburg. The failure to silence the Grand Gulf batteries the day before had forced Grant to push farther south along the river to Disharoon’s Plantation, where he ordered a crossing below Bayou Pierre at Bruinsburg. The first Federal soldiers plunged ashore around dawn without opposition. Grant wasted no time shoving one division after another into the Magnolia State. Five divisions from two different corps would be marching inland by nightfall to occupy the hills overlooking the valley, and the vanguard of the Army of the Tennessee would not meet a single Confederate soldier until deep in the night, when troops approached the A. K. Shaifer house near Port Gibson. At that time, Grierson was 50 miles to the southeast. In all likelihood, Grant gave some thought about Grierson’s efforts and their positive effect on the conditions of his crossing.52

  While Grant’s troops hustled across the river and organized for invasion, Grierson woke his men at the Gill plantation. He still held out a faint hope of hearing something from Grant. That fact that he remained in the dark about the crossing was, in large part, due to his own success. A serious Confederate defensive effort to stop Grant would have triggered fighting and alerted Grierson to the crossing. The Army of the Tennessee spent all of April 30 moving inland without any serious opposition, something Grierson did not learn until after his raid.53

  Grierson’s order to mount up interrupted breakfast. Orange Jackson of the 6th Illinois Cavalry had just put his dough into a pan borrowed from a comrade when “the regimental bugle blew to mount. I just knocked the dough out of the skillet and cleaned it as best I could and gave it back,” explained the aggravated and hungry trooper. With the 6th Illinois Cavalry riding in advance, the column set off south along the New Orleans, Jackson, and Great Northern Railroad. Grierson wanted to inflict more damage to the railroad while remaining fairly close to the Mississippi River. The troopers destroyed every
bridge they came across as they approached Bogue Chitto, especially where the line crossed the Bogue Chitto River just north of the village, which consisted, wrote one Illinoisan, “of not more than a dozen houses.” More destruction took place as the column entered Bogue Chitto itself early that morning. When the Illinois troopers came across a train with 15 cars, they sent it down a slight grade and torched it for good measure. They also burned the depot and, as Grierson described it, “captured a very large secession flag” emblazoned with “God and our rights” and the names Fort Donelson and Shiloh stitched on it. Captain Joseph R. Herring took his company of the 7th Illinois Cavalry farther south along the track to destroy more bridges, but he soon sent word that he needed help because there were too many to destroy and not enough time to do it. Grierson sent Lieutenant Colonel Loomis and 100 men to help finish the job.54