The Education of an Idealist

by Samantha Power

  From the way bodies were positioned, it was clear that parents had lost their lives while trying to shield their kids from the poison. Several of the girls captured in the videos were dressed in polka-dotted pants like those I had dressed Rían in the day before. In one clip, I saw twelve bodies of all ages lying side by side—victims from a single family, the narrator said.

  After what felt like an eternity, I turned off my computer and put my BlackBerry aside. Ireland was five hours ahead of Washington, so I knew it would take some time before Susan would gather the President’s national security team. Obama had warned the Syrian government not to use chemical weapons. Now, the whole world was waiting to see how the United States would respond.

  IN 2011, THE SYRIAN REVOLUTION had begun like the other uprisings across the Arab world—with jubilant, largely peaceful protests. Given the earth-shattering developments taking place in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, Syrians believed they were riding a wave of history that would soon wash away their oppressive and corrupt government, which had been led by the Assad family since 1970.

  During this early stage of the revolution, I was still working at the White House and had the chance to meet Syrian opposition and civil society leaders who traveled to Washington seeking US support. Often wielding large maps, they excitedly pointed out the towns that were no longer controlled by the Syrian authorities, and they described voting for the first time in free elections to choose the local committees that would govern newly liberated areas. But within a matter of months, the bright future had darkened. The Syrian regime, run since 2000 by President Bashar al-Assad, responded to the opposition’s progress with violent tactics more inhumane than anything I had seen since researching the Rwandan genocide for “A Problem from Hell.”

  Initially, the Syrian police rounded up critics, while government snipers shot at protesters. Before long, Syrian forces began firing on the funerals of those killed. They also filmed the mourners so that they could identify more opposition supporters to arrest. Many of those detained were tortured and some were executed. Assad’s army soon increased its firepower, shelling neighborhoods thought to be sympathetic to the opposition. The military used anti-aircraft guns and incendiary weapons to destroy apartment buildings and schools. And from low-flying aircraft, they dropped large containers packed with explosives and chunks of metal, known as “barrel bombs.” Before long, regime soldiers and militia were killing hundreds of people each week.

  By 2012, as Assad intensified his bombardment of civilian neighborhoods, the same local committees that initially symbolized Syria’s democratic flowering had taken on the task of creating impromptu field hospitals to treat the wounded. Some had also begun caring for the growing number of orphaned children.

  I was in awe of the bravery of the Syrian people, remembering the vulnerability I felt trying to shelter in the bathtub in Sarajevo while the Bosnian Serb Army shelled the neighborhood where I slept. After feeding Rían one night, I wrote in my journal, “Where would I be if I were Syrian? Risking my life to try to win freedom for my family or keeping my head down so as to try not to lose my family?”

  In July of 2012, President Obama received reports that the Syrian military was preparing to escalate further—this time using chemical weapons. In a speech to veterans on July 23rd, he included a carefully prepared warning that the Syrian government would “be held accountable by the international community and the United States should they make the tragic mistake of using those weapons.” US diplomats also fanned out to deliver private messages of this nature to the Syrian government and its backers in Russia and Iran.

  At a White House press conference the following month, the President significantly sharpened his warning. After being asked a question about Syrian chemical weapons, Obama said extemporaneously, “We have communicated in no uncertain terms with every player in the region that that’s a red line for us and that there would be enormous consequences if we start seeing movement on the chemical weapons front or the use of chemical weapons. That would change my calculations significantly.”

  ASSAD WASTED LITTLE TIME before crossing this red line. The US government began receiving information in late 2012 that the Syrian government had begun using chemical weapons. When I saw these reports while working at the White House, I was stunned that Assad seemed to have defied such a specific warning from Obama—so stunned that I even wondered whether the allegations were true. But then, when we received reports of further attacks in the early months of 2013, my incredulity turned to a fervent hope that Obama would respond forcefully.25

  Before anything else, the President needed to be certain that the claims were indeed accurate. Because the Syrian opposition tended to be the first to disseminate information about chemical attacks, we had to be careful. The false statements prior to the invasion of Iraq about Saddam Hussein possessing weapons of mass destruction also gave US officials pause. The intelligence community had no intention of rushing to judgment, especially knowing that their assessment of whether the Assad regime had used chemical weapons could conceivably set the United States on a path to military confrontation.

  Finally, on April 25th, 2013—four months before the attack that would kill 1,400 people—the White House sent a letter to Congress reporting the intelligence community’s findings. The Syrian government, the letter confirmed, had used the odorless and extremely deadly nerve agent sarin “on a small scale.”*

  Taken together, these chemical weapons strikes were estimated to have killed between 100 and 150 people. These fatalities did not generate significant public uproar in the context of a war that had already taken more than 90,000 lives by the spring of 2013. Still, the findings called into question whether Obama had been serious when he warned of “enormous consequences.”

  I had taken a short leave from the Obama administration in late March of 2013 in order to prepare for what I thought was my next assignment as Undersecretary of State. When Ben Rhodes convened a conference call with the press to discuss the letter to Congress and field questions about the administration’s next steps, I combed over the transcript posted online, looking for clues.

  Ben’s main message surprised me. President Obama’s response to Assad’s use of chemical weapons was to propose that the UN now undertake an inquiry into the allegations. Obama knew that some around the world would not trust American intelligence findings. He reasoned that an on-the-ground UN investigation “above and beyond” what the United States had conducted would be accepted as more independent and objective.

  Removed from the internal debates, I was disoriented. The Syrian regime had used chemical weapons. Assad was extremely unlikely to allow UN inspectors anywhere near evidence of his culpability. Was the White House in denial that the red line had been crossed? Or had President Obama decided not to enforce his threat?

  A reporter on the call asked Ben the obvious question of whether or not the White House believed that Assad had violated Obama’s red line. He gave a forced answer, saying, “We are continuing to do further work to establish a definitive judgment as to whether or not the red line has been crossed.”

  This White House language recalled the Clinton administration’s hesitation in calling the slaughter of 800,000 Tutsis in Rwanda “genocide,” an evasive tactic I had criticized in my writing. In both cases, an American administration had resisted making a clear determination for fear that doing so would oblige the President to undertake actions that he hoped to avoid.

  Ben also delivered a new warning to Assad on behalf of the administration, but it sounded like the kind of official US statement I would have skewered in my past life. “President Assad and those around him should know that the world is going to continue to carefully monitor this issue and bring forward information as we have it,” Ben said. “Were he to undertake any additional use [of chemical weapons], he would be doing so under very careful monitoring from us and the international community.”

  I emailed Ben afterward, knowing he had been put in a tough spot bec
ause he had nothing concrete to announce. He wrote back simply, “You have no idea.”

  As the senior White House national security official responsible for press engagement, Ben was what was called the “stuckee”—the person stuck publicly defending what other senior officials wisely avoided discussing.

  Four days after Ben’s April press briefing, the Syrian regime struck again with chemical weapons. And unsurprisingly, when the UN attempted to deploy its investigators to look into the reported attacks, Assad refused to allow them into the country.

  Finally, on June 13th, a week after my nomination as UN ambassador was announced, the White House acknowledged that the red line had been crossed.

  This time, Ben issued a statement saying that the intelligence community had now gathered enough evidence to have “high confidence” that the Assad regime had carried out “multiple” chemical weapons attacks. In response, Ben said, the President had decided to provide military support to the Syrian opposition for the first time—in essence, authorizing American personnel to arm and train moderate factions among the rebels fighting the Syrian government.

  Ben could not offer specifics about the impact of this US policy shift because the details were highly classified. So while administration officials could say they had imposed consequences on Assad’s regime for crossing the red line, they could not specify the nature of these consequences in any detail. Since even Assad didn’t know the particulars of the cost he would be bearing, he seemed unlikely to be deterred from carrying out further attacks.

  This remained the basic state of play on August 21st, 2013, the date of the Syrian regime’s massive early morning attack on the Damascus suburbs. Watching the footage from the apartment where we stayed in Ireland, I felt sure that Assad had chosen his timing deliberately: the attack began a year to the day, Washington time, from Obama’s red-line threat.

  “WHAT DO YOU THINK this will mean?” Cass asked.

  “Nothing,” I said testily. I was sickened by what I’d just seen, and, not for the first time, my dark mood ensnared those around me.

  While this attack was clearly an order of magnitude different from Assad’s previous chemical weapons strikes, I did not expect that the large number of fatalities would fundamentally alter our approach to Syria.

  “This won’t change things?” Cass said.

  “Nope,” I replied. “Watch.”

  I dreaded the inevitable meeting where the national security team would discuss next steps. I assumed we would do little more than denounce the atrocity and impose economic sanctions on those involved in Assad’s chemical weapons program.

  I tweeted limply: “Reports devastating: 100s dead in streets, including kids killed by chem weapons. UN must get there fast & if true, perps must face justice.”

  Looking back, I see that I was doing what I had long ridiculed others for: demanding the “UN” take action, despite knowing that Russia would prevent the Security Council from doing virtually anything.

  Later that day, however, I received a secure call from my deputy in Washington. To my shock, he said that the President had asked the Pentagon to draw up targets for air strikes.

  I spent Wednesday and Thursday in Waterville, calling in to back-to-back classified meetings with Obama and the national security cabinet—my ear essentially glued to the secure phone. Obama was enraged by Assad’s attack. Rather than debating next steps with us, as he generally did, he made clear that he had decided to punish Assad. My prediction to Cass had been wrong—the attack had brought about a major change in US policy after all.

  Administration officials who had previously argued against using military force in Syria were now in full agreement with the Commander in Chief. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey, the President’s top military adviser, told Obama in a National Security Council meeting two days after the attack, “Normally, I would want you to know what comes next. But this is not one of those times.”

  The President was not enthusiastic about risking a new war in the Middle East. But, as he explained to us, “When I said that using chemical weapons was a red line, this is what I meant.” He emphasized that he saw no other way to communicate to Assad: “Don’t do this again.”

  As all this transpired, our “family vacation” in Ireland had become one of familiar dashed expectations. I was not spending time with Cass and our kids in the way we had all hoped, and at the same time, I was not serving the President as I could if I were present at the UN.

  In addition, my absence from New York had quickly become newsworthy. On the day of the attack, I had directed the Deputy US Permanent Representative to call an emergency Security Council meeting, which she then attended in my stead. Fox News contributor Richard Grenell, who would later become President Trump’s Ambassador to Germany, quickly drew attention to my whereabouts, writing, “While the White House was pretending to be in urgent mode, the new US ambassador didn’t think the meeting was worth her time.”

  When Fox reporter James Rosen grilled Jen Psaki, the spokesperson for the State Department, asking, “Where exactly was Ambassador Power?” Psaki tried to protect my privacy, saying that I was on a “pre-arranged trip” and had been in “constant contact” with the White House. But when Rosen asked if I was on vacation, she replied, “I don’t have any more details for you.” A rumor began to swirl that the President had dispatched me on a covert diplomatic mission.

  Finally, on Friday, August 23rd, having identified the itinerary that would get me back to the United States without missing an important meeting with the President while I was in the air, the kids and I flew to New York. Cass remained in Ireland to give an academic lecture that he had scheduled months before. Because María was away on vacation with her family, I desperately needed help with childcare. Mum and Eddie answered the call, as they so often did, descending on the Waldorf within hours of our arrival.

  The following day, in a meeting I attended in the Situation Room, Obama questioned Dempsey on how long it would take to launch American missiles once he officially ordered the strikes.

  “If I gave the order Sunday night,” Obama asked at one point, “could this be done as early as Monday?”

  The Chairman said yes, stressing that everything was in place.

  Obama made clear that he was likely to direct the Pentagon to commence the operation within forty-eight hours.

  Before the meeting ended, Obama turned to me. “Sam, I need you to get those UN inspectors out of Syria,” he said sharply. “That UN mission needs to be shut down now.”

  After months of being blocked by the Assad regime, twenty UN investigators had arrived in Damascus on August 18th—just three days before the massive chemical weapons attack—to investigate the allegations of chemical attacks from earlier in the year. Obama was concerned that the Assad regime, which was clearly capable of stooping to anything, would detain the UN officials and use them as human shields once US military strikes began.

  I told him I would call UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and report back.

  I HAD BEEN CAUGHT OFF GUARD by President Obama’s decisive reaction to the attack. For more than a year, he had expressed strong misgivings about using military force in Syria. Prior to August 21st, he had deemed the risks too high and the impact too uncertain. He had also focused on the fact that our administration would lack broad international support for enforcement action, and that Russia would inevitably prevent the UN Security Council from authorizing it.* After three Russian vetoes in the Council, it was obvious that this route for addressing the crisis was blocked. Russia even refused to allow the Council to issue a toothless press statement the day of the large Damascus attack.

  In our internal discussions, Secretary Kerry and I had pointed to the perverse circumstance in which the UN Charter effectively rendered President Putin the arbiter of legality. We and others had also cited NATO’s action in Kosovo as an example where government lawyers had argued that force was “legitimate” under international law despite the ab
sence of Security Council approval. Obama, however, was understandably worried about how a more expansive rationale would end up being abused by others.

  The deterioration of the situation in Libya since Qaddafi’s fall had also contributed to the President’s skepticism about whether military action would achieve the desired US objectives. And for all of its chaos, Libya actually seemed far more straightforward than Syria, which had a prewar population that was three times larger and riven by deep societal cleavages. Although Syria was 74 percent Sunni Muslim, the Assad family and much of the governing class came from the minority Alawite sect. The involvement of Iran and Hezbollah on Assad’s side, and Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, UAE, and others on the side of different opposition factions made the conflict dauntingly complex.

  Even if the Syrian landscape had been less fragmented, Obama’s actual options for responding to chemical attacks were constrained. The United States could not strike the chemical weapons storage facilities themselves; doing so would send toxic plumes into the air, risking the lives of thousands of Syrians. And since air strikes against other Syrian military targets would leave the chemical weapons intact, the Assad regime could respond to US military action by again gassing opposition-held areas—further escalating the crisis.

  In our debates, Obama had also expressed concerns that what started as a “limited” military operation in Syria would expand. The Assad regime inflicted mass casualties on a near-daily basis, using all manner of weapons. Obama knew that if he opted for targeted air strikes to punish chemical weapons use, pressure would grow for him to respond to other types of deadly attacks as well, both because they were horrific and because after US strikes, American “credibility” would be on the line.

  And finally, despite the clamor of leading Republicans for military action in the immediate aftermath of the August 2013 attack, Obama recognized how quickly his political opponents would abandon the cause if they deemed it expedient.