Great Spies of the 20th Century

by Patrick Pesnot

  A catalogue of the spy's revelations, however, do have some semblance of reality. Firstly, Polyakov handed over many military secrets regarding Soviet weaponry and technological developments. This means he would have given the CIA, documents on Soviet anti-tank missiles; information that would later have allowed US forces to neutralise the weapons supplied to the Iraqis during the first Gulf War. Later, when he was stationed in Burma, he transmitted very precise information on the material aid that Russia and China were supplying to the Viet Cong.

  Polyakov also confirmed to his case officers that the split between the two major communist powers, despite this one-off collaboration to help the Vietnamese, was genuine, and was not a manoeuvre designed to deceive the West. Yet this vital piece of information was not enough to satisfy certain CIA analysts, who instead relied on the information given by another Soviet defector, the famous Anatoly Golitsyn, in whom the equally famous James Jesus Angleton (the head of the CIA) had complete confidence.104 Golitsyn had always claimed that the break between Beijing and Moscow was a sham and purely designed to mislead the western powers. It was a sweeping statement that could not fail to cause astonishment and even lead to people doubting Golitsyn's sincerity. This was especially true when you consider that James Angleton, the head of the all-powerful CIA counterintelligence unit until the mid-1970s, immediately regarded all those who contradicted his favourite defector must consequently have been working for the KGB. Polyakov, who Angleton had always been wary of, naturally fell into this category.

  Another of Polyakov's important contributions was his denunciation of many Soviet moles who were operating in the West. But were they genuine spies? Returning to Golitsyn, we know that some of the alleged spies denounced by the defector were eventually exonerated because not enough evidence had been found to convict them of anything. On the other hand, those denounced by ‘Top Hat' proved to be genuine spies, which would appear to give credit to the idea that he was operating in good faith. Or at least outwardly it gave this impression, as the history of espionage is full of examples where spies have denounced their own agents in an effort to enhance their credibility and give weight to any information that they handed over to the enemy. These smaller fish had to be sacrificed in order to save bigger ones and a spy who was about to be unmasked was often denounced without any real threat to his existing intelligence networks. In this way, as can be seen in the murder of Thomas de Quincy, espionage itself can almost be regarded as one of the fine arts.

  The two moles denounced by Polyakov were actually British subjects. The first, John Vassall, was employed at the Admiralty and was blackmailed by the KGB as a result of his homosexuality. The second, Frank Bossard, worked at the Ministry of Defence as a missile guidance specialist and in all likelihood was tempted into betraying is country for money - Moscow could be very generous to its informants when necessary. Both moles were denounced by Polyakov in the mid-1960s, who handed over the KGB documents, which could only have been sent by these two spies, to his American case officers. The two men were arrested, but the British secret service, who had not been able to uncover the spies themselves, were not too happy about them being unmasked by the CIA. What is more, it could not have happened at a worse time: the shockwaves were still being felt from Philby's betrayal,105 and as a result the US were still suspicious of their British allies. What is more, Golitsyn had declared that the Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson was a Soviet agent, even to the point where he was the subject of ongoing surveillance by the Americans.

  The fact that these incidences all happened around the same time inevitably led to significantly cooler feelings between the US and Great Britain, so much so that Harold Wilson planned to remove the CIA station that was based in London. Would such a tactic, undoubtedly favourable to Moscow, be deserving of the sacrifice of the two spies, Vassal and Bossard, who due to their impudence would probably have ended up being caught anyway?

  Edward Epstein, the American author of Deception:The Invisible War between the KGB and the CIA (1989), pays reference in his book to the Peter Ustinov comedy, Romanoff and Juliet. In one scene, the prime minister of a small European country declares to the Soviet ambassador that the United States is involved in a covert operation. ‘We know they know', the ambassador responds. The prime minister then tells the US ambassador, ‘they know you know', who then replies back, ‘we know they know we know'. The prime minister returns to the Soviet ambassador who proclaims ‘we know they know we know they know'. When the American is told this he counts it all out on his fingers before finally exclaiming, ‘What? They know?!'.

  Polyakov also had a key role to play in the sensitive area of chemical and biological weapons and given his high level responsibilities within the Soviet government, it was one subject in which he was very knowledgeable.

  In order to gain a clear view on these issues, we must return to the end of the Second World War, when both the Americans and Russians were seriously engaged in the hunt for Nazi brainpower. Among the scientists were experts with advanced research in the fields of chemical and biological weapons, which as we now know, were to have terrible consequences. Never forget that it was a German called Fritz Haber, who had won the Nobel Prize for chemistry, who invented the Zyklon B gas used in the Nazi death camps. These were highly skilled areas which naturally attracted a lot of attention and both Moscow and Washington each tried to lure the scientists while showing hardly any moral conscience. It was not just the German scientists but also the Japanese who were of interest, such as the sadistic doctors of the notorious Unit 731.

  Research concerning the development of chemical and biological weapons was the focus of numerous espionage and misinformation operations. The first aim was to seize the enemy's trade secrets, who at the same time had to be persuaded that they were the best in what they were doing, so that they continued to pursue what was ultimately extremely costly research. In short, it was the equivalent of Ronald Reagan's ‘Star Wars', who's main aim was to ruin the USSR.

  Yet this squabble to gain information sometimes had devastating effects. In the late 1960s, the US military continued to pursue their research, fully aware that the future widespread use of chemical or biological weapons on the battlefield was uncertain, especially when one has far more effective nuclear weapons! The aim was for an arsenal made up of a smaller and more sophisticated neutron bomb, the so-called ‘clean bomb', that could kill people without destroying everything around it. In short, President Nixon took the decision to decrease research into chemical and biological materials, without destroying any existing stocks. However, the game of misinformation did not stop and an American double agent called Cassidy sent his Soviet contacts some very worrying information that US researchers had developed a frighteningly powerful nerve gas. In retaliation, Moscow sent its own scientists into overdrive. The paradox of this story is that thanks to the Americans, Moscow actually created a terrifyingly efficient chemical weapon, even though the US had actually given up trying to develop one in the first place.

  Polyakov was found to have been one of those responsible for this act of misinformation regarding the invention of this new weapon of mass destruction. After the double agent Cassidy, the Soviet general had indeed helped to inform Moscow about America's alleged success with chemical weapons. But had he misinformed Moscow at the instigation of

  the US? Or did he feel that it was his duty to alert the authorities in his home country? In sum, was Polyakov a traitor or a loyal servant to Moscow?

  Before we can answer this, we must first look at the fall of Polyakov. According to the Soviet version, which paradoxically is also supported by the CIA, the KGB began to have their suspicions about him in 1980. Polyakov was approaching sixty and about to enter his retirement, which he enjoyed for several years with his family, indulging in his favourite pastime: woodworking.

  The reality seems quite different, especially if one believes the Americans who were told of the affair very late in the day. In 1994 they had just captured a spy
called Aldrich Ames,106 who had been working in the CIA. When questioned by his colleagues, Ames reported that he had denounced Polyakov to his Soviet contacts in the early 1980s.Yet Ames was not the only one who betrayed Polyakov. There was another famous double agent who was unmasked at the beginning of the third millennium, Robert Hanssen,107 who turned out to be just as greedy as Ames and who also claimed to have denounced Polyakov. The only difference between Ames and Hanssen was that the latter had worked for the FBI. This meant that the two main American intelligence agencies had been infiltrated. This double treachery almost acted as a retrospective tribute to James Angleton, who throughout his life had claimed that a ‘big mole' (his expression), was raging at the heart of US intelligence!

  What is most surprising is the announcement by the Soviets themselves, through Pravda, that Polyakov had been a double agent working for the Americans. Ordinarily, any information that dishonoured their country or the communist regime was usually kept quiet so why make it public five years or so after Polyakov's supposed trial and execution? The only plausible explanation is that Moscow wanted to legitimise the mass of information Polyakov had provided to the CIA, which for the most part had been based on the idea of misinformation. However, in order to make the false data more credible, there had to be some genuine facts included in there as well. As a result, Polyakov was arrested and there was no way that the CIA could doubt the veracity of the enormous amount of intelligence that he had provided.

  This means that Polyakov was not a traitor and the best evidence for this is the fact that in spite of all the CIA's demands, the GRU general never considered the option of moving to the West. If he had been a double agent for the Americans, then he was risking the death penalty should his identity be discovered. Another factor that supports this case is that he never received any money from the CIA. As a passionate woodworker and hunter, the only gifts he accepted were those of carpentry tools and a hunting rifle: very little payment for a spy of his calibre.

  The final piece of evidence relates to the idea that the FBI traitor Robert Hanssen supposedly denounced Polyakov to the KGB in 1980. However, according to Pravda, Polyakov was not unmasked until the mid-1980s. So why the five year wait and thus allow him time to continue meeting with his former colleagues?

  The question remains though as to what really happened to Polyakov? One can imagine that the Soviets took advantage of his natural or accidental death and invented the story in order to poison the CIA. The Polyakov mystery had never really gone away and is still being debated among the best intelligence specialists. However, on one last note, it cannot be left out that this patriot sometimes worked for his own personal benefit by using the links that he had forged with his CIA case officers, in order to help his own agenda. Yet if you are working for peace, does that still count as betrayal? Judging by the testimony of Robert Gates, a former CIA director and then Secretary of Defence under President Obama, ‘Top Hat' rendered a great service to the world. He maintains that Polyakov gave the CIA top secret documents concerning the Red Army's high command, which thus allowed the United States to accurately assess the Soviet nuclear threat and the inability of their intercontinental missiles: an evaluation that convinced Washington that the Soviets could never have won an atomic war. In spite of himself, Polyakov had helped to put an end to the arms race. That is, unless he was only obeying the orders of his Soviet leaders, who were only too aware that the arms race would lead to the destruction of the USSR, which is effectively what actually happened!

  Chapter 20

  ‘Baba’s’ box

  The process is not new but is generally effective: all you need is a simple box and diplomatic accreditation. Add a handful of thugs and someone with basic medical knowledge and voila! Now you can forcibly repatriate an individual and engage in continued and discreet discussions. But this does not always work and sometimes work and prying customs officers or untimely revelations about the location of the secret box are enough to derail the entire operation.

  This is how President Nasser's secret service agents were surprised at Rome airport, when they were about to load a trunk containing a spy whom they intended to question. This was not the first time that this spy trunk, which was designed to carry a passenger in the most comfortable conditions without the inconvenience of brutal porters, had been used by Nasser's agents. There is also no doubt that similar modes of transportation have been devised by other intelligence agencies.

  The misadventures of Umaru Dikko immediately spring to mind, proving that even the best intelligence can fail and that agents can be caught with their hands in the cookie jar!

  The incident took place in the centre of London, in a well-to-do area. On a day in July 1984, an African man stepped out of his fine residential complex. He was wearing the traditional dress of a long white robe, with a hat, while his thick glasses gave him a distinguished air. Scarcely had he walked two paces down the road when a canary yellow van pulled up alongside. Several men jumped out, seized him, and threw him into the back of the vehicle which sped off immediately. It was impossible to resist, especially when this rather small man was faced with such sturdy and determined men.

  The kidnap had been successful. However, there were two rather odd details about what had happened. Firstly, the colour of the van: if you are conducting a kidnapping on a road, surely you would use a more discreet vehicle! Another issue was that the incident took place right outside the victim's home. A friend or family member could have seen what happened and alerted the authorities - which is exactly what happened. The African man's secretary was at the window and witnessed the kidnapping, then naturally called the police.

  The kidnapped man was called Umaru Dikko. A former Nigerian government minister, he had been instrumental in the election of President Shehu Shagari, who had won the first democratic election in 1979 after years of military dictatorship. However, in 1983, a few months before Dikko's kidnapping, Shagari had been the victim of a coup and the military was now back in power. As usual, they had promised to restore democracy once order had been returned and politics had been cleaned up but in reality, a real dictatorship was established. Putsch after putsch followed and it was not until 1999 that a return to the polling booths took place. But that is another story, and recent news confirms that the situation in Nigeria is still chaotic.

  Umaru Dikko was very close to Shagari when the military seized power and had to flee his country in extraordinary circumstances. Knowing that he was a wanted man, at first he spent a few days hiding out in the capital city of Lagos. After somehow managing to obtain a cassock, he disguised himself as a priest and crossed the border with Togo on a moped. He fled to Amsterdam before later settling in London, finding refuge with his country's former colonial power as many other Nigerians had done when forced to flee their homeland.

  Firstly, a few basic facts need to be addressed. While the Nigerian people themselves lived in great poverty, the country itself was actually very rich. Nigeria is one of the true giants of Africa; with a population of well over 100 million it is also the largest oil producer on the continent. Yet oil rarely leads to the happiness of a country, mainly due to the corruption it causes; and as it forms a country's main resource, the wealth it generates can often fluctuate as prices go up and down. On the other hand, if the country does not have the facilities to process the oil, then it becomes highly dependent on help from abroad. The oil revenues also have to be strictly controlled so as to avoid too much debt and when prices fall there is a temptation to appeal to international lenders. Nigeria was a victim of its own wealth, especially in early 1980: under the leadership of President Shagari, oil suddenly lost 60 per cent of its value.

  Dikko's nickname was ‘Baba', which means ‘Old' in Yoruba, although at the time, he was not even fifty. However, the name probably stems from the respect that he inspired. ‘Baba' originally came from northern Nigeria and had been educated at a school for the country's elite. He afterwards left for London where he gained a mathematics
degree and for a time, worked for the BBC.

  Dikko had been interested in politics from early on: in London he had been the leader of an organisation of Nigerian students and later, when he returned to his home country, he was appointed commissioner of public finances for his state (Nigeria is a federal state). He gradually climbed up the ranks; however, the turning point in his life came when he met the future president, Shagari, who became his brother-in-law. It should also be mentioned that his own brother was later appointed advisor for oil affairs: a key position in Nigeria.

  When Shagari was elected president, it was natural that Dikko was also at the heart of power and became the Transport and Aviation Minister. However, this position concealed the true nature of his duties: in reality, Dikko was the Number Two in the regime. So much so, in fact, that some compared his power to that exercised by Jacques Foccart under the presidency of Charles de Gaulle. Dikko was now a power broker and a very influential figure, the president even entrusted him with the task of organising his next election campaign. Yet it was another of his prerogatives that began to attract attention.

  Rice is a traditional part of the Nigerian diet, but the country is not self-sufficient and therefore has to import large quantities of wheat, the import and distribution of which was not to everyone's satisfaction. President Shagari thus decided to create a special body to address this issue, which he rather pompously called ‘Task Force on Rice'. The group's aim was to bring the trade to order and to stabilise it. Dikko was responsible for leading this new government agency and had to regulate the imports that were worth tens of millions of dollars. This meant that he was now in charge of signing the contracts with the importers.

  There was a great temptation to help oneself or to bribe the producers and transporters - especially as Dikko was also the Transport Minister. ‘Baba' was slowly building up an immense fortune, which some even estimate was up to a billion pounds. This systematic corruption, which also benefitted the ruling party, was one of the reasons that pushed the military into action and to expel Shagari.