Mastering Modern World History
Page 4
Some historians reject both points 1 and 2 and suggest that Germany did not want a major war at all; the Kaiser, Wilhelm II, and Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg believed that if they took a strong line in support of Austria, that would frighten the Russians into remaining neutral – a tragic miscalculation, if true.
(g) The mobilization plans of the great powers
Gerhard Ritter, a leading German historian, believed that the German plan for mobilization, known as the Schlieffen Plan, drawn up by Count von Schlieffen in 1905–6, was extremely risky and inflexible and deserved to be seen as the start of disaster both for Germany and Europe. It gave the impression that Germany was being ruled by a band of unscrupulous militarists.
A. J. P. Taylor argued that these plans, based on precise railway timetables for the rapid movement of troops, accelerated the tempo of events and reduced almost to nil the time available for negotiation. The Schlieffen Plan assumed that France would automatically join Russia; the bulk of German forces were to be sent by train to the Belgian frontier, and through Belgium to attack France, which would be knocked out in six weeks. German forces would then be switched rapidly across Europe to face Russia, whose mobilization was expected to be slow. Once Moltke knew that Russia had ordered a general mobilization, he demanded immediate German mobilization so that the plan could be put into operation as soon as possible. However, Russian mobilization did not necessarily mean war – their troops could be halted at the frontiers; unfortunately the Schlieffen Plan, which depended on the rapid capture of Liège in Belgium, involved the first aggressive act outside the Balkans, when German troops crossed the frontier into Belgium on 4 August, thus violating Belgian neutrality. Almost at the last minute the Kaiser and Bethmann tried to avoid war and urged the Austrians to negotiate with Serbia (30 July), which perhaps supports point 3 above. Wilhelm suggested a partial mobilization against Russia only, instead of the full plan; he hoped that Britain would remain neutral if Germany refrained from attacking France. But Moltke, nervous of being left at the post by the Russians and French, insisted on the full Schlieffen Plan; he said there was no time to change all the railway timetables to send the troop trains to Russia instead of to Belgium. It looks as though the generals had taken over control of affairs from the politicians. It also suggests that a British announcement on 31 July of her intention to support France would have made no difference to Germany: it was the Schlieffen Plan or nothing, even though Germany at that point had no specific quarrel with France.
Doubt was cast on this theory by an American military expert and historian, Terence Zuber, in his book Inventing the Schlieffen Plan (2002). Using documents from the former East German military archive, he argued that the Schlieffen Plan was only one of at least five alternatives being considered by the German high command in the years after 1900. One alternative dealt with the possibility of a Russian attack at the same time as a French invasion; in this case the Germans would transfer considerable forces by train to the east while holding the French at bay in the west. Schlieffen actually carried out a military exercise to test this plan towards the end of 1905. Zuber concluded that Schlieffen never committed himself to just one plan: he thought war in the west would begin with a French attack and never intended that the Germans should send all their forces into France to destroy the French army in one huge battle. It was only after the war that the Germans tried to blame their defeat on the rigidity and the constraints of the so-called Schlieffen Plan, which had, in fact, never existed in the form they tried to make out.
(h) A ‘tragedy of miscalculation’
Another interpretation was put forward by Australian historian L. C. F. Turner. He suggested that the Germans may not have deliberately provoked war and that, in fact, war was not inevitable, and it should have been possible to reach agreement peacefully. The war was actually caused by a ‘tragedy of miscalculation’. Most of the leading rulers and politicians seemed to be incompetent and made bad mistakes:
The Austrians miscalculated by thinking that Russia would not support Serbia.
Germany made a crucial mistake by promising to support Austria with no conditions attached; therefore the Germans were certainly guilty, as were the Austrians, because they risked a major war.
Politicians in Russia and Germany miscalculated by assuming that mobilization would not necessarily mean war.
If Ritter and Taylor are correct, this means that the generals, especially Moltke, miscalculated by sticking rigidly to their plans in the belief that this would bring a quick and decisive victory.
No wonder Bethmann, when asked how it all began, raised his arms to heaven and replied: ‘Oh – if I only knew!’
Nevertheless, probably a majority of historians, including many Germans, accept Fritz Fischer’s theory as the most convincing one: that the outbreak of war was deliberately provoked by Germany’s leaders. For example, in The Origins of World War I, a collection of essays edited by Richard Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig (2002), the editors examine and reject most of the suggested causes of the war discussed above (alliance systems, mobilization plans, threat of socialism) and reach the conclusion that ultimate responsibility for the catastrophe probably rests with Germany. The Kaiser and his leading advisers and generals believed that time was running out for them as Russia’s vast armament plans neared completion. It was a war to ensure survival, rather than a war to secure world domination, and it had to take place before Germany’s position among the Great Powers deteriorated too far for the war to be won. Herwig argues that the German leaders gambled on a victorious war, even though they knew it was likely to last several years. As for world domination – that might well come later. In the words of Moltke, the Germans took this gamble in 1914 in order to fulfil ‘Germany’s preordained role in civilization’, which could ‘only be done by way of war’.
In 2007 a new collection of essays edited by Holger Afflerbach and David Stevenson appeared. Entitled An Improbable War, the book focused on the single issue: the degree of probability and inevitability in the outbreak of the conflict. Not surprisingly, no consensus was reached, but there was a clear leaning towards the view that in the circumstances that existed in 1914, war was certainly not inevitable, though it was possible. Some of the contributors moved in new directions. For example, Samuel Williamson, a leading expert on the Habsburg Empire, believes that the government in Vienna had not taken a decision to attack Serbia before the assassinations at Sarajevo, because they had other political priorities. Thus the murders of Franz Ferdinand and his wife really did provide the decisive moment: without that there would have been no decision for war in Vienna and therefore no general conflict. Nor does he believe that German pressure and promises of support were important – the Austrian leaders made their own decisions. Another contributor, John Rohl, was more traditional: he argues that the German leaders deliberately started the war and that Wilhelm II bears the main responsibility because of his duplicity and his recklessness.
It is also possible to argue that if Russia’s rearmament was indeed making the Germans so nervous, then Russia should bear at least equal responsibility for the outbreak of war. This is the conclusion reached in a new analysis by historian William Mulligan in his book The Origins of the First World War (2010). He argues that Russia’s defeat by Japan in 1905 had fatal consequences for the peace of Europe. It sparked off a revolution in Russia which severely weakened the government, and it forced the Russians to focus their foreign policies towards the Balkans instead of in the direction of the Far East. This foreign policy had two main aims: the desire for peace and the necessity of winning back their lost prestige. Until 1911 the desire for peace was paramount. But in that year the Russian leading minister, Pyotr Stolypin, who favoured peace, was assassinated, and the government began to succumb to the growing jingoistic public opinion which demanded that action should be taken to increase Russian prestige. Consequently, following the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, in February 1914 the tsar promised to help the Serbs in the event of an att
ack by Austria–Hungary, and signed a naval agreement with Britain which, it was hoped, would help safeguard Russian access to the Mediterranean, if the Germans and Turks should ever try to block the Dardanelles. Mulligan argues that these new policies had ‘a devastating impact on German foreign policy, bringing about an important shift in German thinking about the international system’. The naval agreement outraged the Germans, who saw it as a betrayal by the British; and the promise of backing for Serbia convinced the Germans that it was vital for them to support Austria–-Hungary. Together with the vast Russian military expansion, all this was enough to galvanize the Germans into risking a war for survival, before Russia became any stronger. Perhaps the most sensible conclusion is that Germany, Russia and Austria–Hungary must both share the responsibility for the outbreak of war in 1914.
FURTHER READING
Afflerbach, H. and Stevenson, D. (eds), An Improbable War? The Outbreak of World War One and Political Culture before 1914 (Berghahn, 2007).
Clark, C., The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 (Allen Lane, 2012)
Fischer, F., Germany’s Aims in the First World War (Norton, new edition, 2007).
Hall, R.C., The Balkan Wars 1912-1913:Prelude to the First World War (Routledge, 2000).
Hamilton, R. and Herwig, H. H., The Origins of World War I (Cambridge University Press, 2002).
Henig, R., The Origins of the First World War (Routledge, 3rd edition, 2001).
Mulligan, W., The Origins of the First World War (Cambridge University Press, 2010).
Strachan, H., The First World War, Vol. 1: To Arms (Oxford University Press, 2001).
Taylor, A. J. P., The First World War (Penguin, New Impression edition, 1974).
Turner, L. C. F., Origins of the First World War (Edward Arnold, 1970).
Zuber, T., Inventing the Schlieffen Plan (Oxford University Press, 2002).
QUESTIONS
Explain why relations between the European states were so full of tensions in the early years of the twentieth century.
How far would you agree that the arms race was only one of many causes of the First World War?
To what extent was Germany responsible for the outbreak of the First World War?
There is a document question about Germany and the origins of the First World War on the website.
Chapter 2
The First World War and its aftermath
SUMMARY OF EVENTS
The two opposing sides in the war were:
The Allies or Entente Powers:
Britain and her empire (including troops from Australia, Canada, India and New Zealand)
France
Russia (left December 1917)
Italy (entered May 1915)
Serbia
Belgium
Romania (entered August 1916)
USA (entered April 1917)
Japan
The Central Powers:
Germany
Austria–Hungary
Turkey (entered November 1914)
Bulgaria (entered October 1915)
The war turned out to be quite different from what most people had anticipated. It was widely expected to be a short, decisive affair, like other recent European wars – all over by Christmas 1914. This is why Moltke was so worried about being left at the post when it came to mobilization. However, the Germans failed to achieve the rapid defeat of France: although they penetrated deeply, Paris did not fall, and stalemate quickly developed on the western front, with all hope of a short war gone. Both sides dug themselves in and spent the next four years attacking and defending lines of trenches.
In eastern Europe there was more movement, with early Russian successes against the Austrians, who constantly had to be helped out by the Germans. This caused friction between Austrians and Germans. But by December 1917 the Germans had captured Poland (Russian territory) and forced the Russians out of the war. Britain, suffering heavy losses of merchant ships through submarine attacks, and France, whose armies were paralysed by mutiny, seemed on the verge of defeat. Gradually, however, the tide turned; the Allies, helped by the entry of the USA in April 1917, wore down the Germans, whose last despairing attempt at a decisive breakthrough in France failed in the spring of 1918. The success of the British navy in blockading German ports and defeating the submarine threat by defending convoys of merchant ships was also telling on the Germans. By late summer 1918 they were nearing exhaustion. An armistice (ceasefire) was signed on 11 November 1918, though Germany itself had hardly been invaded. A controversial peace settlement was signed at Versailles the following year.
2.1 1914
(a) The western front
On the western front the German advance was held up by unexpectedly strong Belgian resistance; it took the Germans over two weeks to capture Brussels, the Belgian capital. This was an important delay because it gave the British time to organize themselves, and left the Channel ports free, enabling the British Expeditionary Force to land. Instead of sweeping round in a wide arc, capturing the Channel ports and approaching Paris from the west (as the Schlieffen Plan intended, if indeed the Germans were attempting to carry out the plan – see Section 1.4(g)), the Germans found themselves just east of Paris, making straight for the city. They penetrated to within twenty miles of Paris, and the French government withdrew to Bordeaux; but the nearer they got to Paris, the more the German impetus slowed up. There were problems in keeping the armies supplied with food and ammunition, and the troops became exhausted by the long marches in the August heat. In September the faltering Germans were attacked by the French under Joffre in the Battle of the Marne (see Map 2.1); they were driven back to the River Aisne, where they were able to dig trenches. This battle was vitally important; some historians regard it as one of the most decisive battles in modern history:
It ruined the Schlieffen Plan once and for all: France would not be knocked out in six weeks, and all hopes of a short war were dashed.
Map 2.1 The Schlieffen Plan
The Schlieffen Plan intended that the German right wing would move swiftly through Belgium to the coast, capture the Channel ports, and then sweep round in a wide arc to the west and south of Paris, almost surrounding the French armies – see (a). In practice, the Plan failed to work out. The Germans were held up by strong Belgian resistance; they failed to capture the Channel ports, failed to outflank the French armies, and were halted at the First Battle of the Marne – see (b).
Map 2.2 The western front
The Germans would have to face full-scale war on two fronts, which they had probably never intended.
The war of movement was over; the trench lines eventually stretched from the Alps to the Channel coast (see Map 2.2).
There was time for the British navy to bring its crippling blockade to bear on Germany’s ports.
The other important event of 1914 was that although the Germans captured Antwerp, the British Expeditionary Force held grimly on to Ypres. This probably saved the Channel ports of Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne, making it possible to land and supply more British troops. Clearly the war was not going to be over by Christmas – it was settling down into a long, drawn-out struggle of attrition.
(b) The eastern front
On the eastern front the Russians mobilized more quickly than the Germans expected, but then made the mistake of invading both Austria and Germany at the same time. Though they were successful against Austria, occupying the province of Galicia, the Germans brought Hindenburg out of retirement and defeated the Russians twice, at Tannenburg (August) and the Masurian Lakes (September), driving them out of Germany. These battles were important: the Russians lost vast amounts of equipment and ammunition, which had taken them years to build up. Although they had six and a quarter million men mobilized by the end of 1914, a third of them were without rifles. The Russians never recovered from this setback, whereas German self-confidence was boosted. When Turkey entered the war, the outlook for Russia was bleak, since Turkey could cut her main supply and trade route
from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean (Map 2.3). One bright spot for the Allies was that the Serbs drove out an Austrian invasion in fine style at the end of 1914, and Austrian morale was at rock bottom.
Map 2.3 Europe at War
2.2 1915
(a) Stalemate in the west
In the west the stalemate continued, though several attempts were made to break the trench line. The British tried at Neuve Chapelle and Loos, the French tried in Champagne; the Germans attacked again at Ypres. But, like all the attacks on the western front until 1918, these attempts failed to make a decisive breakthrough. The difficulties of trench warfare were always the same:
There was barbed wire in no-man’s land between the two lines of opposing trenches (Figure 2.1), which the attacking side tried to clear away by a massive artillery bombardment; but this removed any chance of a quick surprise attack since the enemy always had plenty of warning.