Mastering Modern World History
Page 95
(e) Civilian rule again
President Obasanjo tried hard to make civilian rule a success; he began by retiring many of the military who had held official posts in the administration, and introduced new restrictions designed to eliminate corruption. Nigeria’s international image improved and US president Clinton paid a visit in 2000, promising aid to restore the country’s infrastructure, which had been allowed to fall into disrepair. However, things did not run smoothly: there was religious and ethnic violence, and the economy did not fulfil its potential.
There was sporadic violence between different tribal groups. For example, in Nassarawa state, around 50 000 people were forced to flee from their homes after two months of fighting between the dominant Hausa tribe and the Tiv minority.
The most serious problem was the continuous violence between Muslims and Christians. There had always been hostility between the two, but this was now further complicated by the issue of Sharia law. This is a system of Islamic law which imposes severe punishments, including amputation of limbs and death by stoning; for example: for theft – amputation of the right hand for a first offence, left foot for a second offence, left hand for a third, and so on. A man in the state of Zamfara lost his right hand for stealing the equivalent of £25. Punishments are especially severe on women: committing adultery and becoming pregnant outside marriage can bring a sentence of death by stoning. By the end of 2002, 12 of the 19 states – those in the north, which are mainly Muslim – had adopted Sharia law into their legal systems. Sharia was only applied to Muslims, but it was opposed by many Christians, who thought it was barbaric and medieval. In the other states, which have Christian majorities, there were violent clashes between Muslims and Christians. The president and the attorney-general, both Christians and southerners, were against the introduction of Sharia law, but were in a difficult situation. With the presidential election due in April 2003, they could not afford to antagonize the northern states. However, the attorney-general did go so far as to declare Sharia law illegal on the grounds that it infringed the rights of Muslims by subjecting them ‘to a punishment more severe than would be imposed on other Nigerians for the same offence’. In March 2002 an appeal court overturned the death sentence imposed on a woman in Sokoto state for adultery; but in the same month, a woman in Katsina state was sentenced to death by stoning for having a child out of wedlock. Later in the year a young couple were sentenced to death for having sex outside marriage. These sentences aroused strong international protests; both the European Union and the USA expressed their concern, and the federal government of Nigeria said that it was totally opposed to such sentences.
There was serious violence in the northern city of Kaduna following the unwise decision to stage the Miss World contest in Nigeria in December 2002. Many Muslims strongly disapproved, but in November an article appeared in the national newspaper, This Day, which suggested that the Prophet Mohammed himself would not have objected to the Miss World contest, and would probably have chosen a wife from among the contestants. This outraged Muslim opinion; the offices of This Day in Kaduna were destroyed by Muslims, and some churches were burned. Christians retaliated and over 200 people died in the rioting that followed. The Miss World contest was relocated to the UK, and the deputy governor of the northern state of Zamfara issued a fatwa (formal decision) urging Muslims to kill Isioma Daniel, the writer of the article.
Early in 2003 there were outbreaks of ethnic violence in the southern Niger delta region. This was serious because it was an important oil-producing centre; three foreign oil companies were forced to suspend operations, and Nigeria’s total output of oil fell by 40 per cent.
In spite of all the problems, president Obasanjo won a convincing victory in the elections of April 2003, taking over 60 per cent of the votes; his People’s Democratic Party won majorities in both houses of parliament. But things did not become any easier for him: in July the country was crippled by a general strike in protest against large increases in the price of petrol. Violence between Christians and Muslims now seemed a permanent feature of life in Nigeria; in February 2004 at least 150 people were killed in Plateau state in central Nigeria, after Muslims attacked a church and Christians took revenge. Statistics published by the UN showed that between 66 and 70 per cent of the population were living in poverty, compared with 48.5 per cent as recently as 1998. The same basic problem continues – the misuse of Nigeria’s oil wealth. By 2004 the country had been exporting oil for more than 30 years, earning over $250 billion in revenue. However, ordinary people had seen very little benefit, while the ruling elites had amassed huge fortunes. In 2005 the president seemed to be making determined efforts to root out corruption. Several government ministers were sacked and even the vice-president, Atiku Abubakar, was accused of accepting bribes. During 2006 Nigerians were treated to the spectacle of their president and vice-president accusing each other of corruption and demanding the other’s resignation. The constitution did not allow a president to run for more than two terms; however, the 2007 presidential election was won by Obasanjo’s choice for the PDP party, the highly respected Umaru Yar’Adua.
Sadly, Yar’Adua was dogged by ill health and in November 2009 was flown to Saudi Arabia for medical treatment. Vice-President Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian, took over as acting president. Yar’Adua’s death was announced in May 2010. Goodluck Jonathan was elected president in April 2011. His popularity soon plummeted when he announced the removal of a fuel subsidy, one of the few benefits that ordinary Nigerians enjoyed from their country’s oil. The removal more than doubled the price of petrol from 45 cents a litre to 94 cents a litre, causing nationwide and violent protests culminating in a week-long strike. Eventually Jonathan bowed to pressure and announced that the price would be 60 cents a litre (January 2012). The unions called off the strikes but many people still believed that the price was too high. Meanwhile there was violence in the north where a radical Islamist group, Boko Haram, which wanted a separate Islamic state in the north, was blamed for a series of shootings and bombings killing around 500 people in the first of half of 2012. President Jonathan and his PDP supporters announced that they were determined to preserve the unity of Nigeria and to restore peace and security; but towards the end of the year there were reports that the government was on the verge of losing control of the north.
25.4 POVERTY IN TANZANIA
Tanganyika became independent in 1961 and was joined in 1964 by the island of Zanzibar to form Tanzania. It was ruled by Dr Julius Nyerere, leader of the Tanzanian African Nationalist Union (TANU), who had to deal with formidable problems:
Tanzania was one of the poorest states in the whole of Africa.
There was very little industry, few mineral resources and a heavy dependence on coffee production.
Later, Tanzania became involved in expensive military operations to overthrow President Idi Amin of Uganda, and provided help and training for nationalist guerrillas from countries like Zimbabwe.
On the other hand, tribal problems were not as serious as elsewhere, and the Swahili language provided a common bond.
Nyerere retired as president in 1985 (aged 63), though he remained chairman of the party until 1990. He was succeeded as president by Ali Hassan Mwinyi, who had been vice-president, and who ruled for the next ten years.
(a) Nyerere’s approach and achievements
His approach was different from that of any other African ruler. He began conventionally enough by expanding the economy: during the first ten years of independence, production of coffee and cotton doubled and sugar production trebled, while health services and education expanded. But Nyerere was not happy that Tanzania seemed to be developing along the same lines as Kenya, with an ever-widening gulf between the wealthy elite and the resentful masses. His proposed solution to the problem was set out in a remarkable document known as the Arusha Declaration, published in 1967. The country was to be run on socialist lines.
All human beings should be treated as equal.
The state must have effective control over the means of production and must intervene in economic life to make sure that people were not exploited, and that poverty and disease were eliminated.
There must be no great accumulations of wealth, or society would no longer be classless.
Bribery and corruption must be eliminated.
According to Nyerere, Tanzania was at war, and the enemy was poverty and oppression. The way to victory was not through money and foreign aid, but through hard work and self-reliance. The first priority was to improve agriculture so that the country could be self-sufficient in food production.
Nyerere strove hard to put these aims into practice: all important enterprises, including those owned by foreigners, were nationalized; five-year development plans were introduced. Village projects were encouraged and given aid by the government; these involved ujamaa (‘familyhood’, or self-help): families in each village pooled resources and farmed in co-operatives; these were small but viable units which operated collectively and could use more modern techniques. Foreign loans and investments as well as imports were reduced to a minimum to avoid running into debt. Politically, Nyerere’s brand of socialism meant a one-party state run by TANU, but elections were still held. It seemed that some elements of genuine democracy existed, since voters in each constituency had a choice of two TANU candidates and every election resulted in a large proportion of MPs losing their seats. Nyerere himself provided dignified leadership, and with his simple lifestyle and complete indifference to wealth, he set the perfect example for the party and the country to follow. It was a fascinating experiment which tried to combine socialist direction from the centre with the African traditions of local decision-making. It tried to provide an alternative to western capitalist society with its pursuit of profit, which most other African states seemed to be copying.
(b) Success or failure?
Despite Nyerere’s achievements, it was clear when he retired in 1985 that his experiment had been, at best, only a limited success. At an international conference on the Arusha Declaration (held December 1986), President Mwinyi gave some impressive social statistics which few other African countries could match: 3.7 million children in primary school; two universities with, in total, over 4500 students; a literacy rate of 85 per cent; 150 hospitals and 2600 dispensaries; infant mortality down to 137 per thousand; life expectancy up to 52.
However, other parts of the Arusha Declaration were not achieved. Corruption crept in because many officials were not as high-minded as Nyerere himself. There was insufficient investment in agriculture so that production was far below what was expected. The nationalization of the sisal estates carried out in the 1960s was a failure – Nyerere himself admitted that production had declined from 220 000 tonnes in 1970 to only 47 000 tonnes in 1984, and in May 1985 he reversed the nationalization. From the end of 1978, Tanzania was in difficulties because of the fall in world prices of coffee and tea (her main exports), rising oil prices (which used up almost half her earnings from exports) and the expense of the war against Amin in Uganda (at least £1000 million). Although oil prices began to fall during 1981, there was soon the problem of the near-collapse of her other exports (cattle, cement and agricultural produce), which left her without foreign exchange. Loans from the IMF only brought her the added problem of how to meet the interest repayments. Tanzania was nowhere near being a socialist state, nor was it self-sufficient – two major aims of the Declaration. Nyerere’s socialist experiment might have worked well in a closed economy, but unfortunately Tanzania was becoming part of the ‘global village’, exposed to the vagaries of the world economy.
Nevertheless Nyerere was deservedly highly respected both as an African and as a world statesman, as an enemy of apartheid in South Africa, and as an outspoken critic of the world economy and the way it exploited poor countries. He played a vital role in the overthrow of Idi Amin, the brutal dictator who ruled Uganda from 1971 until 1979. Nyerere’s prestige was at its height when he was chosen as chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) for 1984–5.
(c) Tanzania after Nyerere
Nyerere’s successor, President Mwinyi, while at first keeping to the one-party system, began to move away from strict government control, allowing more private enterprise and a mixed economy; he also accepted financial help from the IMF, which Nyerere had always avoided. Mwinyi was re-elected for a further five-year term in 1990; in 1992 a new constitution was introduced, allowing a multi-party system. The first major democratic elections were held in October 1995. Mwinyi was obliged to stand down after two terms as president. The ruling party, which now called itself Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM – the Party of the Revolution), put forward Benjamin Mkapa as its presidential candidate. He won a clear victory, with 60 per cent of the votes, and the CCM won 214 out of the 269 seats in parliament.
Tanzania’s economy continued to be fragile and dependent on foreign aid. But foreign aid often came with unpleasant strings attached. In April 2000, for example, the IMF announced a debt-relief package for Tanzania, but one of the conditions was that parents had to contribute part of the fees for their children’s education. This was totally unrealistic for a poor country like Tanzania and consequently the numbers of children in primary schools fell sharply. Nor was the situation helped by the spread of the HIV/AIDS virus, which infected over a million people. Care and prevention became major public health problems. At the same time, there were some promising developments. In 1999 Tanzania’s first commercial gold mine went into production, and in 2000 preparations began for the mining of tanzanite, a precious stone even rarer than diamonds. As the elections of October 2000 approached, the government was troubled by a series of corruption scandals involving some of its wealthiest members, and also by nationalist sentiment in Zanzibar, which wanted more freedom from the mainland. However, the opposition parties were disorganized and seemed to have nothing better to offer; the president and his CCM won a sweeping victory – Mkapa took over 70 per cent of the votes and CCM won about 90 per cent of the seats in parliament. Foreign observers declared the elections to be free and fair, except in Zanzibar, where there were always complaints of rigging.
As Tanzania moved further into the twenty-first century, the economy began to fulfil some of its promise. President Mkapa privatized a number of state-owned corporations and introduced free-market policies, hoping that this would attract foreign investment and help towards economic expansion. The IMF and World Bank were so impressed by this that they obligingly agreed to cancel some of Tanzania’s foreign debts. By the time Mkapa stepped down at the end of his second term in 2005, Tanzania was well on the way to becoming the world’s third largest gold producer, and both foreign investment and tourism were increasing. However, although he had promised to put an end to corruption, he himself was accused of having, during the privatizations, illegally appropriated to himself, a coal mine. He was also criticized for spending £15 million on a private presidential jet. In the 2005 election the CCM candidate, Jakaya Kikwete, a protégé of Julius Nyerere, was elected president. He vowed to eliminate corruption and invested in the building of around 1500 new schools around the country and a new university at Dodoma, the capital. The USA gave a grant of some $700 million to help Tanzania’s general development, and the UK promised £500 million towards education.
25.5 THE CONGO/ZAIRE
(a) Why and how did civil war develop?
Section 24.6(b) explained how the Belgians suddenly allowed the Congo to become independent in June 1960, with completely inadequate preparations. There was no experienced group of Africans to which power could be handed over. The Congolese had not been educated for professional jobs, very few had received any higher education and no political parties had been allowed. This did not mean that civil war was inevitable, but there were added complications.
There were about 150 different tribes (or ethnic groups, as they now tend to be called), which would have made the Congo difficult to hold together even with experienced adm
inistrators. Violent and chaotic elections were held in which the Congolese National Movement (MNC), led by a former post-office clerk, Patrice Lumumba, emerged as the dominant party; but there were over 50 different groups. Agreement of any sort was going to be difficult; nevertheless the Belgians handed power over to a coalition government with Lumumba as prime minister, and Joseph Kasavubu, the leader of another group, as president.
A mutiny broke out in the Congolese army (July 1960) only a few days after independence. This was in protest against the fact that all officers were Belgians, whereas the Africans expected instant promotion. Lumumba was deprived of the means of keeping law and order, and tribal violence began to spread.
The south-eastern province of Katanga, which had rich copper deposits, was encouraged by the Belgian company (Union Minière) which still controlled the copper-mining industry, to declare itself independent under Moïse Tshombe. This was the wealthiest part of the Congo, which the new state could not afford to lose. Lumumba, unable to rely on his mutinous army, appealed to the UN to help him preserve Congolese unity, and a 3000-strong peacekeeping force soon arrived.
(b) The civil war and the role of the UN
Lumumba wanted to use UN troops to force Katanga back into the Congo, but the situation was complex. The president had already made himself unpopular with the Americans and British because of his outspoken socialism; the Americans in particular regarded him as a dangerous communist who would align the Congo on the side of the USSR in the Cold War. Many Belgians preferred an independent Katanga, which would be easier for them to influence, and they wanted to continue their control of the copper mining. Faced with all these pressures, the UN secretary-general, Dag Hammarskjöld, refused to allow a UN attack on Katanga, though at the same time he refused to recognize Katangese independence. In disgust Lumumba appealed for help to the Russians, but this horrified Kasavubu, who, supported by General Joseph Mobutu and encouraged by the Americans and Belgians, had Lumumba arrested; he and two former ministers in his government were later badly beaten and then murdered by Belgian troops. As the chaos continued, Hammarskjöld realized that more decisive UN action was needed, and although he was killed in an air crash while flying to Katanga to see Tshombe, his successor, U Thant, followed the same line. By mid-1961 there were 20 000 UN troops in the Congo; in September they invaded Katanga and in December 1962 the province admitted failure and ended its secession; Tshombe went into exile.