Ali Pasha, Lion of Ioannina

by Eugenia Russell

  If Ali Pasha had been less a man of his time and better endowed with political forethought, he would himself have organized this coup in time, and Albania and Greece, with the whole of Thessaly and Macedonia, might have become an independent State and a kingdom of great importance.

  Fig. 37: The tomb of Ali Pasha from Constantinople and the Scenery of the Seven Churches of Asia Minor… by Robert Walsh and Thomas Allom, London, 1836–38.

  1 Tax farming was tax collecting through a third party who would perform the function for a fee, a common perk in the Ottoman system.

  2 Other figures are 10,000 or 16,000.

  3 Sometimes given as Oksakoff.

  4 The divan efendi presided over the council of the local governors.

  5 Presumably the tiny village of Karjan/Karjani/Qarjani a few miles south of Tepelene, not far from Hormovo.

  6 The people of Hormovo.

  7 He was also the first collector of Mycenaean pottery.

  8 Karaferi, Negosti, Vodena—modern Veroia, Naousa and Edessa.

  9 Often given as Spyridon Colovo.

  Chapter 5

  Emissaries, Diplomats and Spies: Ali Pasha the Statesman

  When Byron and Hobhouse arrived at Arta in 1809 they unknowingly stepped into a mire of intrigue and obfuscation. Beneath the glamour, confusion and squalor a sophisticated game of diplomatic chess was being played out, a forerunner of future power politics in the Middle East. Despite Ali’s ferocious and cruel reputation, having him onside was seen as more important than ethical considerations or the welfare of the local population. Contrary to the image created by Western travel writers of Ali as a capricious Oriental, the slave to passions and emotions, the archival sources show a man capable of learning the techniques of statecraft. As Ali created his state within a state, he left his brigand roots behind, copying the bureaucracy of central government, running his own treasury and civil service, developing his own foreign policy and forming his own army. He was not alone in this. Pazvantoğlu, who was more forthright in his attempts to set up an independent state, went as far as minting his own coins and developing diplomatic relations with foreign states in the 1790s. As a friend of Rigas Feraios who was promoting pan-Balkan revolution, Pazvantoğlu was more politically motivated, and whether Ali bought into such ideas or not, he would have been influenced by the possibilities. Developments in international relations and political ideology were evolving as his own horizons were broadening, but aware enough as he was that he had to adapt, he only adopted those tools of government that would suit his purpose and maintain him in power. As the major holder of land and wealth in the Balkans his territory was a first line of defence for the Ottoman Empire against incursion from the west, especially during the Napoleonic Wars. In the knowledge that he held the key to the western front it became regarded as necessary for statesmen and heads of state to treat him on an equal basis. To this end four or five European powers would have consulates in Ioannina at a time and his charming hospitality to foreign visitors must be seen within this context. Dennis Skiotis has estimated that over fifty diplomats, military men, spies, gentlemen of leisure, scholars, doctors, adventurers, renegades, poets and painters took the hazardous trouble to pay him court, leaving a mass of memoirs and reports.

  Ali’s relationship with the Sublime Porte

  Before Ali developed relationships with foreign powers his first priority was his relationship with the Sublime Porte. The vast size of the Ottoman Empire inevitably led to a devolution of power from the centre and communication over long distances and difficult terrain enabled provincial governors to act with increasing autonomy. To some extent it was a case of out of sight was out of mind; as long as the Sultan received his dues and a semblance of peace was maintained, everything was in order. However freely the provincial pashas acted it was still important to keep a presence at the capital in order to be kept up to date with developments and to ensure they remained in favour. The Sultan may have been the supreme authority ruling by divine will but he did not rule alone. At court and within the Divan different factions vied for influence, and a good word here or a gift there might mean the difference between promotion or death for some far-flung pasha. The methods Ali used to achieve his ends inevitably made enemies. It was vital for him to match his gains in power with influence at court that would ensure his actions were given the correct spin in the Sultan’s ear and to nullify the ‘lies’ of his enemies. He also needed ‘ears’ at court aware of the mood so as to gauge his favour with the Sultan. In order to do this, along with the likes of Haxhi Shehreti, he maintained a coterie of friends in Constantinople willing to act on his behalf.

  Fig. 38: Ali’s Audience Chamber from Twelve studies in double-tinted lithography of scenes in southern Albania by George de la Poer Beresford, 1855.

  He had a well-developed network of allies, clients and informers that he could rely on. He cultivated relations with well-connected members of the Greek Phanariot community at Constantinople to keep an eye on both the Turkish and Greek situation. Stefanos Missiou had a warm relationship with Ali, calling himself an adoptive father to Ali’s firstborn son, Mukhtar. An example of Missiou’s news-gathering was his passing on of a rumour in 1801 that ‘Captain Pasha’, in other words Kutsuk Hussein Pasha, grand admiral of the Ottoman Fleet, had had some conflict with the English at Alexandria. This was the Siege of Alexandria during which the Turks helped the British against the French. Missiou promised to get back to confirm his information. At the same time he expressed genuine concern for Ali:

  I am doing you duty in telling you, my lord, as best as you can to pass your time peaceably because, apart from the fact that it will extinguish your purse, the fighting and these wars are not a good thing and in the name of God as much as you can you ought to avoid them and cut them out altogether.

  This prescient letter coincided with others from his close friends, especially in Constantinople, showing general concern and fear that his involvement in troublesome activities and violence would backfire on him.

  Dimitrios Razis, a doctor, had met Ali when he was on campaign in Vidin and formed a close friendship with him. Razis was interested in the European political scene and kept Ali informed on military and political developments. He had a son studying in Paris and through his links there he kept tabs on the Ottoman Embassy. During 1806 Razis kept Ali up to date with the progress of the war between France and Prussia and the presence of the British Fleet in the Dardanelles in a letter to be read ‘secretly’. Sébastiani, the French ambassador at the Porte, was trying to persuade Sultan Selim to re-enter the war against Russia, and under request from Russia the British Mediterranean Fleet sent a squadron to prepare for an assault on Constantinople. Razis reported that the feeling at the Porte was that Turkey would end up at war whether it was desirable or not and despite Britain’s show of force, Sébastiani prevailed. Turkey went to war with Russia, bringing it also into war with Britain, bringing the British Fleet and the Russian, under Admiral Senyavin, against them. Razis’ interest in general politics kept Ali aware of broader issues such as the discontent in Russia, where the people wanted a Parliament ‘like England has’ and not ‘him’, the tsar, doing whatever he likes. But more pertinent to Ali’s own situation, through intelligence from his contacts Razis informed him in advance of a deal that meant Preveza would not be included in the Treaty of Tilsit that handed the Ionian Islands back to the French. Razis, with his French connections, was biased towards France and he expressed sorrow when Napoleon was exiled to St Helena and towards the subsequent weakening of France, blaming the British interests.

  On his own initiative, Razis devised a security system to protect his patron. In 1807 he explained to his contact Kostas Grammatikos that he was going to start numbering his letters so that if any got lost or intercepted it would be obvious and he would expect an acknowledgement of each received for his peace of mind. Though the letters were written in Greek it was no safeguard. Greek was the common language of communication even among Turkis
h officers, especially those in Greek-speaking areas of the Empire. With his professional hat on, as a sideline Razis sent pills and plasters to many of his correspondents and even a sick note on behalf of a woman who was to be sent to Ali ‘for his pleasure’ saying that she was suffering from an ailment. Razis worked closely with Georgios Marinoglou and they both corresponded with Mukhtar as well. Marinoglou, an elder from Zagori, kept Ali informed of events at Constantinople, passing on general information regarding the situation, including civil unrest and killings. As a person of rank Ali had connections within the ministries of government. Suleyman Divan Efendi was one such source of information. As a member of the Turkish establishment he would offer a corroborative alternative to material from Razis alluding to diplomatic affairs. In 1807 he wrote to Ali concerning the meeting between Tsar Alexander and Napoleon prior to the Treaty of Tilsit and details of the negotiations between Turkey and Britain leading to the Treaty of the Dardanelles that concluded the war between them in 1809. Even though Ali tried to be up to date, the news from Tilsit, modern Sovetsk, in the Kaliningrad federal Russian enclave on the Baltic, took twenty days to reach Constantinople. And then it had to reach him in Ioannina, which meant his information could be at least a month old by the time it got to him. The Treaty of Tilsit was signed in July and Divan Efendi was writing in October. Ali’s relationship with him was obviously cordial; Divan sent Ali a slave girl and a woman for his pleasure from Larissa. He was prepared to help Ali in more ways. After unsuccessfully trying to cover up the death of Ali’s nephew Adem Bey, in whose name Ali had purchased a lifetime lease, he was happy to bribe officials on Ali’s behalf to find an alternative dupe who would hold it for Ali.

  Fig. 39: Tsar Alexander I of Russia and Napoleon I of France embrace after the Treaties of Tilsit (French Medallion).

  Internal security

  Ali’s friends in Constantinople with their contacts in Paris or Vienna also kept him in touch with developments closer to home and where there was discord within the Ottoman provinces. Ali kept good relations with low-ranking government officials and relied on many Greek notaries, merchants, community leaders and professionals to form a network of representatives, advisors and informants throughout the villages from Epirus to Macedonia. Brought together by a web of mutual interest and dependency, nevertheless it seems that these distinguished figures were genuinely devoted to serving Ali and had great loyalty to him. Marinoglou’s sons, Kostantis and Christodoulos, continued to serve Ali after their father’s death. Mukhtar was in contact with Marinoglou and Razis and from his letters to Ali, it is evident they worked closely together. A sense of warmth can be derived from their correspondence as when Marinoglou congratulated Ali on Mukhtar’s instalment as pasha of Lepanto. Many of Ali’s informers were his tax-farmers and tax collectors and therefore were gainers under his protection: Kostas Grammatikos and Georgios Marinoglou were tax collectors and administrators; Konstantinos Priskos was a lessee of the sheep tax for Larissa and Salona (Amfissa near Delphi), Alexis Noutsos, another notable from Zagori, a lessee of his area’s sheep tax and a general tax administrator and Stergios Zotoglou was the sheep tax collector for Thessaly and Thebes. These were Ali’s eyes and ears on the ground, but they were more than impartial observers.

  International Diplomacy

  During Ali’s lifetime the increasingly volatile political situation in the eastern Mediterranean became the perfect breeding ground for aggressive diplomacy, intrigue and espionage. There was feverish activity on all sides as the various parties jostled for advantage: for the Sultan, he had to keep an eye on his insubordinate subjects, notables or otherwise, as well as on foreign manoeuvring and sedition; for Ali, he was aware that his insecurity increased as his gains in power were balanced against the threat this posed to the Empire; for the British, French and Russians, eager to exploit any opportunity to weaken the opposition, they had to be kept abreast of developments before their rivals; and for the disgruntled subjects of the Sultan, intrigue was the only way to foster their aims. This led to a situation not dissimilar to that in the Second World War, with Turkey awash with spies.

  The information from his friends at Constantinople was important in his negotiations with foreign powers, but Ali did not rely on one source, he gathered news from various sources. He had the foreign newspapers translated for him and his own people created a kind of newsletter collated from European news outlets, called the ‘Posta’. Hatzeris Beyzade, who is referred to in Ali’s correspondence, was one of those employed to filter the news from the foreign press. When Edward Everett met him in Ioannina he was receiving the Lugano newspaper via Vienna, and the French state newspaper Le Moniteur on behalf of his protector. Everett calls Hatzeris, ‘Prince Chanzerly of Joannina, the chief interpreter of the Pasha’, saying he claimed to be the son of a ‘Hospidar or Wallachian prince’ and he had come to Ali’s court to seek protection after his father’s execution by the Sultan. He was indeed a prince of sorts and one and the same as the Phanariot ‘Beyzady’ mentioned by Hughes. Beyzade is Turkish for ‘son of a bey’ and Hatzeris can be identified as the son of Constantine Hangerli, one of two brothers who were princes of Wallachia and Moldavia respectively. Constantine was strangled and beheaded in 1799 for his lack of support against the rebel Pazvantoğlu. His brother, Alexander, fell foul of the authorities too but managed to flee to Moscow where he received sanctuary in 1805. The Hangerli family was related to and rivals of the important Ypsilantis family. With these connections to Russia and the Phanariot Greeks, Ali would see Hatzeris as a useful asset and would only be too happy to provide sanctuary. By the time of Everett’s meeting Hatzeris was already a seasoned diplomat on Ali’s behalf, having been entrusted with missions to Paris and Vienna, and to Napoleon when on his Moscow campaign (1812). At this time he would have been working with Manthos Oikonomou, an informer of Ali’s and secretary.

  As master of Epirus and controller of much of central Greece Ali became of supreme interest to the warring powers, sitting as he was between the prized Ionian Islands and the route to the Ottoman capital and Egypt. Up until this point open conflict in Epirus had been either internal or confined to that between Venice and Turkey, and most foreign intervention had been clandestine. The Venetians had exploited weaknesses in the local population and Russian agents had been at work inciting rebellion amongst the Greeks, most spectacularly leading up to the failed Orlov Revolt. The European powers had diplomatic relations with Venice, and therefore a consular presence in the Ionian Islands’ dependencies was normal practice. That the French consul Lasalle in Preveza was making promises of military aid to Ali by 1792 was an omen of things to come. The French occupation of the islands in 1797 only brought in another player willing to encourage disunity amongst the various factions backed up with money and arms. But the French brought more, the idealism of revolution. To this end they sought to incite rebellion in the Mani Peninsula through their agents and spies. Dimo Staphanopoli and his nephew Nicolo, Corsicans of Greek descent, were particularly active. Dimo later acted as a military surgeon, but for now he was travelling to areas receptive to the idea of Greek liberation, including Himara in Epirus. Ali’s attitude to the French vacillated between hostility and friendship fuelled by his contradictory desires to acquire a foothold on the islands and possession of the old Venetian ports while appearing to do his duty to the Ottoman government.

  Even before the French had set foot on Epirote soil, in anticipation Ali was writing with fulsome admiration to Napoleon with offers of friendship. Napoleon was the commander in charge in Italy, and Albania came under his jurisdiction. The French forces in Italy were in need of Albanian grain and wood and if the troops on the Ionian Islands were to survive they too required supplies from the mainland. It was imperative for the French to initiate good relations from the start. Their garrison on Corfu was small and unpopular and Ali hoped to exploit their weakness by secretly pressing for control of their mainland possessions. He was soon making demands for free passage through the Corfu
Strait and military aid from their commander, General Gentili, while piling on the flattery to the unfortunate Adjutant General Rose during their meetings. Ali’s charm worked so well he even managed to acquire two gunboats and Gentili provided support for his massacre of the Himariotes, an action that was ostensibly carried out in the territory of his rival pasha, Mustafa of Delvino. At first, French strategy had been to play the warring pashas off against each other, in a similar manner adopted by the Porte, but when Napoleon wrote to Gentili he expressed the opinion that the unfettered strength of Ali could be to their advantage and should be encouraged. The idea of Albania as a French satellite state appealed to Napoleon and he was keen for Ali’s support in case of war with Turkey, but in the end Ali decided his best interests were served elsewhere. Napoleon’s attack on Egypt meant that France was no longer acting as a prop for the beleaguered Ottoman Empire and that role would pass to Britain. So when the Russo-Turkish alliance turned on France, Ali no longer needed to profess friendship, and would proceed to slaughter the inhabitants of Preveza. Initially however, even after the French defeat at the Battle of the Nile, Ali played a cagey game, continuing talks with Gentili’s successor, General Chabot and Rose while through his informants he assessed the capability of Corfu to withstand a siege. However, once he had taken and tortured Rose and imprisoned Chabot, the cat was out of the bag and he made his demands for the Ionian dependencies to what he assumed was the losing side with the French in retreat in Egypt.