Ali Pasha, Lion of Ioannina

by Eugenia Russell

  In October 1808, Leake was back in Epirus with supplies of artillery and ammunition as promised for use against the French. The following January, Sir Robert Adair wrote to Ali from HMS Seahorse in the Dardanelles, addressing him as ‘Most High, Magnificent, and Powerful Prince’, to thank him for his help in securing peace; but Adair was wary of entering into any further direct correspondence with him. Ali was quite likely to misconstrue the content of any letter in his favour. He claimed to have letters from Admiral Collingwood promising him Santa Maura and Parga and blamed Adair for blocking his plans. Instead Morier was to be dispatched to communicate in secret. In February Leake took up official residence at Ali’s court, and from that time until March 1810 when he returned to England armed with his researches on topography and military capabilities, he was usually either at Preveza or Ioannina, from where he was able to continue travelling throughout Epirus and Thessaly. Leake’s relationship with his counterpart Pouqueville was cordial enough for them to pursue some of their archaeological and geographical surveys together. With the French back in possession of the Ionian Islands, Spyridon Foresti had been exiled to Malta from 1807 to 1809 and it was there that he met with Byron and Hobhouse. Spyridon seems to have been largely responsible for Byron’s visit to Albania and Ali. Unbeknownst to Byron, Spyridon was assisting Admiral Collingwood, commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean Fleet, in a plan to take the Ionian Islands back by hoping to exploit French unpopularity and the islanders’ desire for British protection. Also Ali had his eyes on the islands, particularly Santa Maura, and Parga, and the British seem to have given him mixed assurances as to their intentions. In March 1809 Adair was implying that Ali should not give in to the French and with the supplies he had received from Leake and his cooperation, he was in a good position to get what he wanted ‘with little trouble and expense’. On 12 June, Collingwood wrote to Wesley Pole at the Admiralty:

  Fig. 42: William Martin Leake by Christian Albrecht Jensen.

  What the sentiments of the islanders are towards Ali Pacha, - their detestation of the Turkish Government, - and the abhorrence of the Pacha personally -, I have before had occasion to state to their Lordships, His view of subduing the islands is well known, but he can only make himself master of them by aid of the English; - and this introduction to putting the Republicans (now merely a name) under the protection of the British, is not improbably the expedient they have adopted to detach us from any Co-operation with the Pacha of Ioannina in his projects against them, - which will at least preserve them from a fate more dreaded, than their previous condition, but is diametrically opposed to the assurance Captain Leake is directed to give him.

  Adair wanted to take Parga and the Ionian Islands and re-establish the Septinsular Republic but was quite happy to use Albanians and Ali in order to do so, and at the expense of giving up the dependencies of the Republic on the mainland to Ali if necessary. The pro-Russian Kapodistria blamed the unrest on the islands and the support for Britain on Ali. This significant support for the British was bolstered by the many disaffected Greeks from the mainland who later went on to join the British Greek regiment. Lusieri, still endeavouring to get his lordship’s marbles back to him, arrived in Preveza that same June, presenting Ali with another opportunity to pander to the British and their lust for antiquities. Ali offered to smooth things over in Athens on Elgin’s behalf. When the subject of the vases came up Ali said they had been spoils of war and the emperor had received them with thanks. Ali said that nobody had wanted the residue so, presumably in response to the shift in the diplomatic wind, he had given the vases, which were small and of poor quality, to Leake who was loathe to give them up. Unfortunately Ali’s word did not carry enough weight at Athens and Lusieri had to approach Constantinople for his permits.

  The handsome Byron was part of a plan cooked up by Foresti to sweeten Ali. After seducing Byron and Hobhouse with the delights and gossip of Malta, where Byron even had time to have a fling with John Spencer-Smith’s wife Constance, he was able to persuade the footloose pair to head East by way of a diversion to Preveza and hence to Ali’s court at Tepelene. Whether they knew or not a force of 1,800 men was only three days behind them heading for the Ionian Islands, it was something neither of them ever recorded. Byron’s arrival in Ioannina was not greatly appreciated by Leake; he was in the midst of a tense situation as Ali was threatening to take him hostage in case Britain abandoned Ali to the French. Sir Robert Adair, ensconced as ambassador in Constantinople, had to send letters of reassurance on Leake’s behalf to Ali. While the high profile tourists were at Ioannina, Hobhouse records in his diary a rumour that the Russians were about to attack Constantinople and that sixty men-of-war from the British Adriatic Fleet were already in the Dardanelles putting pressure on the Turks to make war with the French. The Greeks were supporting the Russians, and there were fears that a Greek uprising would put the British in Ali’s territory in danger. However the British diplomats gained assurances, with the help of a few bribes, that Ali would honour his friendship. In the event the rumour proved false. Foresti was happy to give the impression that, although Byron was a lord, he was actually more elevated than that, perhaps even a son of George III. When Peter Howe Brown, 2nd Marquis of Sligo, visited Veli Pasha in the Morea and was mistaken for Byron, he was told that Veli had assumed Byron was a nephew of the King. Either way, Ali was duped into thinking he was highly honoured in receiving such an important guest. The Marquis, who knew Byron from Eton and spent some time with him in Greece, is better remembered for his later career as governor of Jamaica, where he acquired the unofficial title of ‘liberator’ for his reform programme.

  George Foresti, who succeeded Leake as English resident in Ioannina (he was there in 1814 when Charles Cockerell visited), wrote to Colonel Lowe in January 1810 of the efficacy of Byron’s visit to Ali and the subsequent offers of aid by Ali in the taking of Santa Maura and Corfu. Byron also wrote to Lowe, who he was keeping abreast of developments of Turkish advances at the expense of Russia, expressing his surprise at the outcome. Leake was in a difficult position. He had been told by Collingwood to encourage Ali in his desires on Santa Maura and Parga. When Leake supplied the rockets and artillery to take Berat, Ali opened his ports to British cruisers and merchant ships, and supplied provisions for the army in Spain and Portugal. In return Ali allowed the British to actively recruit mercenaries from the population but as these were generally taken from the Greek peasantry this did not go down well with the Ottoman authorities in the prescient knowledge these would-be soldiers might one day turn against them. Ali had ignored British requests to send troops to help the Austrians push the French from the Dalmatian coast. Such manoeuvres were having an effect on Leake who was feeling the pressure. He was trying to protect his sub-consul at Preveza who had played host to Byron and Hobhouse in Arta. Signor Commeniuti, in other words a Greek, Panos Kominiotis, was aided by his illiterate brother; ‘a rogue’ according to Hobhouse’s dairy. From a letter to Ali by Stergios Zotoglou, one of Ali’s informers and tax collectors, it appears that Ali wanted Commeniuti removed, and that Leake was unhappy with the behaviour of ‘Mr Forestis’, probably Spyridon. Pouqueville on the other hand was complaining directly to the Porte concerning Ali’s assisting the British in taking Santa Maura. Although the Porte did not accept the accusation, Divan Efendi, Ali’s contact in Constantinople, expressed his doubts about Ali’s position in a letter to him in May 1810. The French ambassador had been working hard influencing top members of the Ottoman government to put pressure on the Sultan to declare Ali a rebel.

  Although Adair wanted to keep Ali onside against the French he thought his claims for Parga unacceptable and the British position regarding the Ionian Islands and their dependencies was that they should be kept together. If they gave the impression otherwise they equally did not trust Ali’s double-dealing. George Foresti was in contact with Stratford Canning, who had replaced Adair in Constantinople, informing him that Ali, their one true Balkan friend, was more anxious than
ever for an alliance with Britain and that he had been responsible for the overthrow of the pro-French Alemdar Mustafa Pasha, the grand vizier, and that Britain should redirect its Baltic Fleet for his protection. These reports were backed up by Ali’s agent Suleyman in Constantinople who was also in contact with Canning and passing all correspondence from the French Embassy via Canning before sending it on to Ali. Although Canning was aware of Ali’s exaggerations he also knew that the French garrison on Corfu had grown to 10,000, swollen by the 2,000 Albanian fugitives from his rule, and they were putting pressure on him for supplies. Ali claimed he was only being a dutiful subject but he informed Canning secretly that the grand vizier was pushing him to supply the French. He also informed him that the British blockade of Corfu was ineffective and was easily being broken and in consequence he had to look to his own coastal defences. The British saw Ali’s continued support of the French as a test of his loyalty towards them. As a result they tightened their grip and Foresti’s agents monitored every harbour, intercepting boats and making arrests. Foresti wrote to the Foreign Office urging action to take Parga from the French but the British preferred to let the course of events unfold in the belief Parga would fall of its own accord. Ali, after sending his advisor and dragoman Spyros Kolovos to London to no avail, resorted to force. When the British pre-empted him by encouraging the Pargians to take the town themselves passing it to British protection, he resorted to diplomacy once more, appealing to Lord Castlereagh, the Foreign Secretary, and Earl Bathurst, the Colonial Secretary. They responded that the status of the islands and their dependencies was as determined in the Congress of Vienna which respected the previous Treaty of 1800 ceding Parga to the Porte. The complicated process whereby the Porte could not afford the compensation required for the inhabitants without Ali’s financial assistance gave him a foot in the door, leading to the extended negotiations that eventually gave him possession of his long illusive prize.

  Meanwhile at Ioannina, Hugues Pouqueville, who had joined his elder brother as a consul in 1811, was making complaints about Ali’s duplicity that would eventually reach the ears of the Sultan. The fearful Ali’s refusal to go to the Danube front suited British interests, so to counter French reports to the Sultan of Ali’s duplicities, many of them instigated by themselves, Canning supported Ali’s decision. The philhellenic Canning was never fully committed to Ali. If the Ottomans remained strong Britain was prepared to fight alongside Turkey, but during the Dardanelles negotiations, he secretly floated the idea of supplying arms to Ali and supporting any other insurrectionist groups within the Balkans and even some form of independent Greek state in return for services rendered if the Ottomans failed to hold Constantinople. It was thought that an independent state under a tyrant could be a transitional phase in the establishment of a free Greece, for, once he was no longer needed Ali could be easily toppled; preferable to the messy affair of supporting a full-blown revolution against Turkey. Canning continued to give the illusion of fostering Ali’s ambitions without antagonizing him, for instance dissuading him from appointing a permanent delegate at London. As the French threat in the Adriatic faded Ali’s usefulness to Britain diminished.

  In the age of sail, the dissemination of information from the embassies was slow. Spyridon Foresti’s messages could take up to two months to reach London depending on conditions and the state of the war. He utilized King’s Messengers as they passed through Corfu on their way from Constantinople to London or if the dispatches were important a special express boat might be engaged. If available a naval ship provided quick and secure transmission, or if he knew the reliability of the captain, a merchant ship. Express or other boats were shared by nations and surprisingly little concern was given to the security of sealed packages. Messages to the fleet were quicker, being sent through their own system of communicating ships. Land routes were used from Ioannina to the east, and through Trieste and Vienna across Germany and on to London, but they were hazardous, crossing difficult terrain, prone to attacks by bandits and interceptions by the French through Italy. Foresti did not have access to ciphers despite his requests. That letters were intercepted is borne out by one that fell into the hands of Pouqueville that described how at Gardiki, after the soldiers had rounded up hundreds of women and delivered them to Ali’s sister, Shainitza, she told Ali that she meant in future always to sleep on a mattress stuffed with their hair.

  As Ali consolidated his position in Albania, French intrigues against him at the Porte increased. Napoleon’s foreign minister and chief diplomat Talleyrand initiated a propaganda campaign through the chargé d’affairs at Constantinople, Latour Mabourg, stating his acts of aggression and violation of neutrality. Ali countered with accusations of secret French activities and intrigue with rebel groups. Ali’s stock at the Porte had suffered since he declined to go to the Danube front in 1809. As a result the French upped their demands, threatening a break in diplomatic relations and war on Ali unless he returned captured boats and French fugitives at his court, expelled British corsairs from his waters and lifted the grain embargo on Corfu. Talleyrand’s increasingly aggressive tone eventually brought results. The Porte dispatched an inspector, Celal Efendi, to look into his administration and foreign relations. The Porte trod carefully. In consequence of his report, as a sanction they removed Ali from his newly acquired sanjaks of Ochrid, Trikkala and Elbasan to placate the French, while at the same time impressing on Ali to retain good relationships with the British. But once the British had settled the Parga affair they became indifferent to his advances and his last-ditch approach in 1820 during which Colonel Napier was sent by Maitland to assess his military capabilities lead to nothing. Other matters were taking precedence.

  Filiki Eteria

  Ali Pasha’s positioning of his regime in opposition to the Ottoman state suited the agenda of Western provocation and as his attitude hardened he provided, wittingly or otherwise, an ideal incubator for Greek nationalism. By making Ioannina stronger for his own advancement he had provided the Greek merchant class a platform from which to expand their horizons. They took full advantage of the opportune climate of relative stability creating a network for the advancement of trade; but the merchant diaspora could also be used to further the nationalist cause or ‘the mystery’, as it was called in Filiki Eteria parlance, or ‘the school’, as Patriarch Gregory V in Constantinople referred to it in correspondence. Under the pretext of such a ‘scientific school’ or ‘Greek Museum’, the patriarch and clerics, such as the Metropolitan of Old Patras, Germanos, could openly gather funds for the uprising and even mention it in correspondence with the Sultan.

  As a result the most important clandestine activity in the region was carried out by the Greek underground movement, the Filiki Eteria. Widely spread throughout the towns and villages, and with support from klephts and intellectuals alike, the organization had infiltrated to the heart of Ali’s administration. After years of subversive activity stoked by the Venetians, Russians and French, and a growing bourgeoisie and literate class, Epirus was fertile ground for revolution. The proximity of the Ionian Islands under their various rulers provided access to Western ideas and a haven to radicals and renegades. Through the growth in Greek trade internationally the Filiki Eteria was able to establish a wide reach, from Moscow and Vienna, to Constantinople and Greece itself. In Russia Greek nationalism was welcomed and encouraged, but in Austria and Turkey it was a dangerous affiliation. Rigas had been captured by the Austrians and handed over to the Turks to be executed. Therefore there was an imperative need for complete secrecy. The Filiki Eteria established the classic forms of recruitment and cells keeping the identities of the chain of command secret from the members. To do this correspondence was carried on in code. Important members were referred to by a number. The first spot, number ‘1’ was kept vacant until a leader could be found, eventually filled by Alexander Ypsilantis, the son of Constantine who had made the attempt to liberate Greece via the Danube principalities with Russian help in 1806. Kolok
tronis was ‘118’; Perraivos ‘114’. Non-members had code names: Kapodistrias, who turned down the leadership was ‘the man of good deeds’, Ali was known as ‘the father-in-law’, the tsar, ‘the philanthropist’ and Sir Thomas Maitland, ‘the old man’. Code words were used for sensitive information, betraying a certain sense of humour: the ‘wine drinkers’ were the Phanariotes, the ‘unfortunate ones’ were the bishops, the ‘trees’ were the muskets, the ‘flock’ was the fleet and the ‘singer’ was the cannon. Correspondence was carried on using a cryptographic alphabet, switching letters and numbers for the Greek alphabet. Some members of the Filiki Eteria were not Greek. When George Petrovich, known as Karađorđe, the leader of the Serbian uprisings, had to flee to Moldavia from Ottoman retribution he became a member. He was assassinated in 1817.