Key Thinkers of the Radical Right
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established partisan loyalties, Buchanan abandoned the Republicans and
sought the Reform Party nomination. However, the party then fractured
between supporters of Buchanan, Donald Trump (who was toying with
the possibility of running), and John Hagelin, a physicist with a back-
ground in transcendental meditation. Legal battles ensued, and although
Buchanan eventually secured the FEC funds, the party’s nomination for
the election remained in doubt. In the end, individual states determined
whether Buchanan or Hagelin should represent the Reform Party on the
ballot. Buchanan was therefore listed as an Independent in a significant
number of states and secured just 0.4 percent of the popular vote.
After 2000, Buchanan continued to support The American Cause,
which he had together with his sister established a base organiza-
tion in 1993, and maintained his role as an author and columnist. His
commentaries appeared regularly in journals such as the core paleocon-
servative magazine Chronicles, published by the Rockford Institute, which
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after a fractious split with neoconservatives became a principal point of
reference for paleoconservatives, and The American Conservative, a journal
that he cofounded in 2002. However, although still cited by the main-
stream media, Buchanan lost his position as a commentator with MSNBC
in 2012 as the racial and ethnic basis of his thinking became yet more
pronounced.9
Buchanan’s thinking
How should Buchanan’s politics be understood? He was above all else a
popularizer of paleoconservatism. In contrast with figures such as Paul
Gottfried and Thomas Fleming, former editor of Chronicles, and other pa-
leoconservative intellectuals, Buchanan had the ability to reach beyond
the narrow confines of activists and translate relatively dense intellectual
arguments into a form that could serve as a basis for political mobilization.
Because he sought to popularize a broad tradition rather than the
works of specific thinkers, Buchanan did not put forward a tightly struc-
tured worldview. Indeed, he did not generally take sides when there were
tensions between those within the paleo camp who leaned toward libertar-
ianism but still saw hierarchies and nations as a necessary basis for social
order, and those who sought more of a role for the state in structuring
the polity. Instead, he simply depicted paleoconservatism as a return to
“first principles,” and his commentaries often straddled the stresses and
ambiguities in paleoconservative thought.10
Buchanan’s paleoconservatism claimed to have inherited the mantle
of those conservatives that had been largely banished or at least confined
to the margins of the conservative movement after the defeat of Senator
Robert Taft in the 1952 Republican presidential nomination battle. They
had taken a stand against both the New Deal and the US’s growing global
commitments but were beaten back by fears of Soviet expansionism and
through the determination of William F. Buckley’s journal, National
Review, to define and limit the conservative movement’s boundaries.
National Review came to serve as a gatekeeper, distinguishing the legit-
imate conservative movement, structured around the free market, tradi-
tional moral conservatism, and the US’s role in the front line of the battle
against global communism, from both older conservative strands, such
as those that had backed the America First Committee and had opposed
military intervention in Korea, and the Right that took shape in the 1950s
and 1960s.11 This comprised organizations such as the John Birch Society,
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the Liberty Lobby, and the Citizens’ Councils that were formed in the
southern states. These campaigned against desegregation, took a stand
against the United Nations, fanned fears of both communism and supra-
nationalism, and at times edged toward conspiracism and anti- Semitism.
Because of his role in defining the boundaries of legitimate conserva-
tism and “excommunicating” dissident voices, Buckley was sometimes
described as conservatism’s “pope.”
The associations between the paleoconservatism that Buchanan
embraced and the pre- 1950s Right tell only a small part of the story, how-
ever. In practice, Buchanan’s paleoconservatism also rested upon the be-
lief that there is an American nation structured around a white, European
heritage. From this perspective, the US is defined by, and drawn from,
national folkways and mores rather than abstract affirmations of principle
such as the Declaration of Independence. At the same time, however,
paleoconservatism distances itself from England and Englishness and
instead celebrates the “white ethnic” communities drawn from Ireland,
Scotland, and the countries of central Europe. In doing so, it not only
expresses and conveys antipathy to racial and ethnic minorities but also
to the WASP elites that seemed to represent Anglo- Saxon hegemony over
those with a central and Southern European lineage.12
Alongside this, there is also a stress upon localism, sectionalism, and
regionalism. Indeed, Buchanan’s paleoconservatism adjoins and at times
merges with neo- Confederate claims that not only assert the distinctive-
ness of the South but also invoke the role that, at least mythically, the an-
tebellum South gave to order, tradition, place, as well as what they regard
as its rejection of materialism, and its anticapitalist ethos.
Buchanan’s paleoconservatism also drew upon a critique of the “man-
agerial class.” Although the concept is usually associated with James
Burnham and neoconservatism, its significance in paleo thinking rests
upon the ways in which it suggests that property- owning capitalism rooted
in local communities and the regions has been displaced by a “placeless”
class of managers, which is tied together with the political class and has
globalist aspirations.
Furthermore, although there are ambiguities in paleoconserva-
tive perspectives, identity and place trump economics and the market.
Indeed, in paleoconservative eyes, the economic nationalism that they
championed rested upon the subordination of the market to the na-
tion. For paleoconservatives (and at this point there was a divide with
the paleolibertarians such as Murray Rothbard who, although seeking a
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structured and ordered form of liberty, placed more stress on the market),
there was thus a case for protectionism and the management of trade. In
his 1998 book, The Great Betrayal, Buchanan sought to rehabilitate the
control of imports as a core Republican tradition and tie it to the preserva-
tion of nationhood.
Buchanan’s paleoconservatism was also a conscious reaction
against a relatively new breed within the conservative movement.
Neoconservatives who had broken with the Democrats during Lyndon
/> Johnson’s presidency stressed the principles upon which the US was
founded and their universal relevance. They also argued that the US
should use the “unipolar moment” brought about by the collapse of
the USSR to reshape the globe to bring down dictatorships and spread
liberal democracy and the market order. In contrast, Buchanan rejected
the concept of a universal nation constructed around a “proposition.”
He also called for a “new nationalism” which he directly counterposed
to neoconservative globalism. While he staunchly defended American
military might, he sought to rein in its ambitions. Indeed, he went
so far as to call for the withdrawal of US troops from their overseas
bases: “If Kim Il Sung attacks, why should Americans be the first to
die?”13 The responses to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990
highlighted some of the rifts within conservatism. While the war had
many cheerleaders, Buchanan spoke out against it and took aim at the
neoconservatives. The war, he asserted, was being fought at the behest
of Israel and served no vital American interest. Democracy should not
be forcibly exported or universalized. Indeed, democracy could take
root only in certain conditions. As he posted in the wake of the “Arab
Spring”: “When George W. Bush declared that the peoples of the Middle
East should decide their future in democratic elections, Lebanon chose
Hezbollah, the Palestinians chose Hamas, the Egyptians the Muslim
Brotherhood.”14
Nonetheless, although Buchanan’s paleoconservatism is structured
around a broad critique of the contemporary US and its place in the world,
the notion of an American nation based upon a distinctly white lineage
and heritage remains pivotal as a starting point. A deeply felt sense of
white dispossession is never far from the surface. Indeed, white identity
and identitarianism tie the American future together with the fate of the
West. Buchanan’s thoughts about the prospects for the native population
across the continents were conveyed in their most developed form in his
2001 book, The Death of the West.
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The Death of the West
Paradoxically, while eschewing the US’s global role as a standard- bearer
for liberal- democratic values and speaking in terms that are often dubbed
isolationist, The Death of the West not only invoked an American nation
but, as the title suggests, also sought to address the history and future of
the West much more broadly. Indeed, it portrayed the countries of Europe
as well as the US as being in the front line of the assault.
Europeans, by which Buchanan means whites, faced an unprece-
dented threat. Fertility rates had, he noted, fallen dramatically. Enlarged
state social provision and the hedonistic individualism of the countercul-
ture embraced by the baby- boom generation had undermined the family
and removed the need for children. Thus, by 2050, people of European
ancestry will constitute just a tenth of the world’s population.15 It was a
demographic process, Buchanan argued, comparable with effects of the
Black Death.
There were specific reasons why white European women kept “out of
the maternity ward.”16 The new or postindustrial economy drew women
toward careers and a college education. As real median wages declined,
the “family wage,” whereby men earned sufficient to maintain a wife and
children, had been eroded. The collapse of the established moral order
and the spread of feminism reshaped popular culture: “millions are
influenced by feminist ideology and its equation of marriage with prosti-
tution and slavery, and that ideology has persuaded many to put off mar-
riage and not to have children.”17
Buchanan’s critique edges toward conspiracism at this point. Feminism
and other forms of cultural assault on traditional Western institutions can,
it was said, be traced back to deliberate and coordinated forms of action
by those with Marxist goals. He cites Antonio Gramsci’s representations
of counterhegemonic strategies and the writings of the Frankfurt School.
In explaining the death of the West, the Frankfurt School was, Buchanan
considered, “a prime suspect and principal accomplice.”18
The fall of the birthrate went together with an unwillingness to assert
the distinctiveness of Western values and a loss of national purpose: “But
if Europeans are so uninterested in self- preservation that they refuse to
have enough children to keep their nations alive, why should Americans
defend Europe— and perhaps die for Europe?”19 In contrast, Islam had
vigor and purpose. The decline of Christian church congregations in
Europe has been matched by growing numbers attending mosques.
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Similarly, the US faced the consequences of mass Hispanic migration.
Contemporary migrants came for simple economic reward rather than
allegiance to the American nation. And they share, Buchanan maintains,
“a new ethnic chauvinism”: “Why should Mexican immigrants not have
greater loyalty to their homeland than to a country they broke into simply
to find work? Why should nationalistic and patriotic Mexicans not dream
of reconquista?”20
As in Europe, the demographic restructuring of the US has electoral
consequences. Immigration had given the Democratic Party a renewed
lease on life, insofar as immigrants lean heavily Democratic, and has also
raised the possibility of separatism. California is “on its way to becoming
a predominantly Third World state.”21
Alongside all of this, mass immigration poses a direct challenge to
established understandings of nationhood. Whereas the nation was tradi-
tionally brought together and defined by a people with the same ancestors,
speaking a common language, united by a religious faith, attached to the
same principles of government, as well as sharing customs and mores,
it is being reconfigured so that it simply rests upon principles of govern-
ment.22 The rest has been discarded. This, however, provides a very weak
and fragile basis for nationhood, particularly given low levels of engage-
ment with the political process.
Buchanan and the paleoconservative critique
Buchanan established himself as by far the US’s most prominent popular-
izer of paleoconservative claims. Alongside The Death of the West, he is the
author of at least twelve other books and coauthor of many others. He has
written innumerable commentaries.
Many of these reproduced familiar paleoconservative themes. Buchanan
echoes the ideas developed by fellow columnists and commentators. These
included in particular Joe Sobran (who despite his paleoconservative
leanings wrote for National Review until fired in 1993 amid accusations of
anti- Semitism) and Samuel T. Francis. Francis put forward paleo thinking
in its most rounded and conceptual form but also represented a bridge
to openly white- identity groupings and interests such as those
within the
orbit of American Renaissance.23
While distancing himself from conspiracy theories, the paramilitarism
that characterized the farther reaches of the American Right, and southern
secessionism, Francis spoke of a white social revolution.24 He looked
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toward those whom the sociologist Donald Warren had termed “Middle
American Radicals” (MARs).25 The concept merged class and race to-
gether insofar as MARs were drawn from whites on the lower, but not
the lowest, rungs of the economic ladder. MARs, Francis asserted, were
under threat from large- scale corporate capitalism, globalizing processes,
and minority groups. Nonetheless, they had a role akin to that assigned
to the proletariat in classical Marxist thinking. They were the only social
force that could develop an authentically American counterculture and
thus over time redeem the nation.26
Buchanan did not, however, simply reproduce claims such as these,
although they inform many of his commentaries. Perhaps because of
the role that Roman Catholicism played in his life, or perhaps because
he recognized that Protestant evangelicals were a core Republican con-
stituency playing a pivotal role in some primary states, Buchanan gave
much more weight to cultural issues than many others within the paleo
camp. This brought him closer than many others within paleo circles
to the organizations and networks that collectively constituted the
Christian Right.27 He repeatedly returned to issues such as abortion, gay
and lesbian rights, and other themes associated with what he considered
moral decline. His 1992 Republican primary campaign included a tel-
evision advertisement directed against the National Endowment for
the Arts funding for work that “glorified homosexuality,” and in the
mid- 1980s he described AIDS as retribution for “defying the natural
order.” His 1992 address to the Republican national convention hailed
“the Judeo- Christian values and beliefs upon which this nation was
built.” He lambasted abortion, same- sex marriage, efforts to restrict
school prayer, and “radical feminism.” The address tied Bill and Hillary
Clinton together:
The agenda Clinton & Clinton would impose on America— abortion