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INDEX
Note: entries in bold font indicate references to illustrations.
Ackermann, Eduard, 50–51, 62
Adenauer, Konrad, 51, 112–13
Afghanistan: Gorbachev’s disarmament policy and, 212; Soviet invasion and occupation of, 11, 12, 13, 23
After the Wall (Hensel), 3
Akhmatova, Anna, 88, 91
Akhromeyev, Sergei, 102, 163, 165, 167
Alliance for Germany, 104, 133–34, 142, 152; March 1990 election results, 143
Allied Control Commission, 7
Andreotti, Giulio, 75, 173, 199
Anschluss, as frame of reference, 28, 115, 132, 178–79
arms control negotiations, 15, 23, 26, 67, 77–78, 110, 163
Article 23 of Basic Law, 289n84; legality of pre-existing treaties under, 196; precedent for use of, 131; territorial expansion and controversy over, 131–32, 185, 196, 289n84; unification under, 129–32, 190
Article 146 of Basic Law, 116, 117, 130–32; treaties and, 130, 132
Asmus, Ron, 206
Atlantic-to-Urals military zone (ATTU), 187
Atomic, Biological and Chemical (ABC) weapons, 166, 180, 184
Attali, Jacques, 64, 147
ATTU (Atlantic-to-Urals) military zone, 187
Austria: Anschluss as frame of reference for unification, 28, 115, 132, 178–79; open border with Hungary, 29
Azerbaijan, 101
back-channel negotiations, 23, 106–7, 159, 169, 294n44
Baker, James A. III “Jim,” 4, 8–9, 54, 55; access to documents of, and interview with, xiii–xiv; formation of U.S. policy by, 23–25, 54–56, 57; German questioning of, 123; Gorbachev’s meetings with, 107–11; Kissinger and, 23–24; Kohl and, 81; media expertise of, 54, 81, 109–10, 124, 176; nuclear defense and, 26–27, 49; personal and biographical information, 107–9; role in negotiations, 67, 77–78, 80, 81, 107, 109–10, 121, 123, 207, 208; on Russia as potential NATO member, 205; on Soviet-U.S. relations, 23; Zoellick and, 77–78
Bangemann, Martin, 145
Basic Law: Article 23 as controversial, 185, 196, 288n84; Article 23 and provision for self-determination, 131–32; Article 146 and provision for unification, 116, 117, 130–31; as constitution, 130–31; prefab model and, 8, 119, 131–32, 148, 200; treaties and, 130, 132
Beard, Charles, 116
Beijing. See China; Tiananmen Square
Belorussia, 187
Berlin: celebration of extension of EU, 213; protests in East Berlin, 34
Berlin Appeal (Eppelmann and Havemann), 91, 153 Berlin Wall: construction of, 51; opening on November 9 as unplanned event, 3, 10, 36–37, 39, 41–43, 50, 59–60, 63, 210–11; potential for violence on November 9: 42–43; SED efforts to seal border, 63
Bertele, Franz, 34, 63, 94, 154, 298n88
Bindenagel, J. D., 203
Bismarck, Otto von, 72, 198, 301n11
Bitterlich, Joachim, 83
Blackwill, Robert, 293n113
Blüm, Norbert, 144
Bohley, Bärbel, 33–34, 34, 89, 92, 94, 98
Böhme, Ibrahim, 137, 300n7
Bornholmer Street border crossing, 41–43, 44
Brandenburg Gate, 1, 10, 39–40, 43
Brandt, Willy, 28, 51–52, 72–73, 140–43, 141, 198
Brokaw, Tom, 36–40
Bulgaria, 111
Bundesbank (West German Federal Bank), 85, 133–34, 145, 154
Bundestag (West German lower house of parliament), 72, 73–74, 136–38, 148, 171, 196
Bush, Barbara, 128, 166
Bush, George H. W., 4; access to documents of, xiii; Baker and, 109; departure from Reagan’s policies by, 22–26, 295n50; Gorbachev and, 25–26, 166, 67–68, 167–69, 205–6, 208; informed of Ten-Point-Program in advance, 73–74; Kohl and, 24, 78–79, 114, 121–22, 126–29, 148, 157, 208, 210; Mainz speech, 54; Malta Summit with Gorbachev, 49, 67, 77–78, 161; Mitterrand on, 24; NATO as priority for, 46, 151, 160–61, 185, 210; nuclear weapons policy of, 26–27; policy regarding Gorbachev, 205–6; reaction to news that Germany could join NATO, 185; reaction to opening of Berlin Wall, 54–55; restoration model, views on, 66–67; role in policy formation, 25, 111–12; sense of humor, 168; status quo as desirable to, 46; Thatcher and, 67, 210; views on Europe, 66, 188, 210; views on German unification, 66–67, 77, 208, 210
Camp David meetings: Gorbachev and Bush, 167–69; Kohl and Bush, 114, 121–22, 126–29, 148, 157, 208, 210; Thatcher and Bush, 67
Catto, Henry, 147
Caucasus, meeting between Kohl and Gorbachev in, 169, 180, 183, 186–87, 208
CDU. See Christian Democratic Union (CDU)
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 36, 166–67, 187
CFE Treaty. See Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty
Cheney, Dick, 23, 55, 110, 175
Chernyaev, Anatoly, xii, 27, 33, 41, 60, 68, 71, 76, 112, 158, 179, 185; observations during negotiations, 78, 102, 123
China: response to events in Europe, 21–22; Tiananmen Square protests and crackdown, 16–22, 19, 45, 214
Christian Democratic Union (CDU), 52; Alliance for Germany and, 104, 133, 142, 152; alliance politics and, 103–4; de Maizière and, 133; in East Germany, 92, 103–4, 119, 132–33; electoral politics and, 103–4, 119, 132–33, 143, 142–43, 160, 189; Gorbachev’s opinion of, 28; Kohl’s affiliation with, 28, 51, 52, 56, 103–4, 119, 132–33, 135–36, 138–43, 160; March 1990 election results, 143, 142–43
CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), 36, 166–67, 187
Clinton, Bill, and Clinton administration policies, 206–8
Cold War: arms race and, 26–27; as continuation of imperial era, 13–14; as cultural conflict, 6; Europe as hostage to U.S./USSR power struggle, 12–13; events during decline of, 12; map of Cold War Europe, 30; map of major borders and cities during, 17; military spending and, 23; nuclear anxiety and, 13–14; USSR in decline, 47
confederation model. See Revivalist model
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE): as alternative security structure to NATO, 106, 175–76; border issues and, 103, 126–27; as forum for negotiation of unification, 122, 126, 189, 195; Helsinki Final Act and, 103, 145, 162; Kohl’s Ten-Point-Plan and, 73; self-determination provision in, 162
constitutional convention, 49
consumer goods, access to, 29, 68–69, 134–35, 288n5
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, 78, 161, 163, 168, 176, 177–78, 184, 187, 195, 208, 294n164 Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA
), 176
CSCE. See Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
Curley, Walter, 148
Czechoslovakia, 19; border closing, 33; border issues, 35; as portal to the west for refugees, 31–35; travel restrictions and border closures, 31, 32, 33, 35; troops in, 134, 171; Velvet Revolution in, 68
Czech Republic, 205
Darman, Richard, 55
Davis, John, 25
The Day After (film, 1983), 12
DeFrank, Thomas, 168
De Gaulle, Charles, 57
De Hoop Scheffer, Jaap, 208–10
Delors, Jacques, 82, 83, 145, 148, 188
De Maizière, Lothar, 133, 142, 152–53, 157, 171, 172, 187, 189–90; Soviet efforts to intimidate, 157
De Maizière, Thomas, 133
De Maizière, Ulrich, 133
demilitarization: denuclearization as issue, 77, 110, 124–25, 153, 184, 191–92; of East Europe, 171–72; East German support for, 152–53, 198; and opposition to NATO expansion, 204; Soviet proposals linking unification to, 121, 165–66; troops in “demilitarized” Germany, 124, 184–85; Warsaw Pact and, 153. See also Troops, withdrawal of
Democracy (Frayn, play), 119, 140–41
Democracy Now, 92, 115
Democratic Awakening, 92, 104, 115
Deng Xiaoping, 18–19
deterritorialization, 212–13, 302n36 Deutsche Mark (DM), 8, 133–35, 154 disarmament: Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, 177–78; Gorbachev’s policy, 212. See also Nuclear weapons; Troops, withdrawal of
dissidents: approaching elections and loss of authority, 199; as catalyst for unification, 34–35, 46; commitment to East German independence and autonomy, 35, 53–54, 88–91, 94–95; commitment to nonviolence, 94; commitment to socialism, 90–91; decline in popular support for, 85, 91, 95; and heroic model for unification, 88–91; as members of Government of National Responsibility, 97; opposition to unification among, 95, 120; Stasi protected by, 98
Dobrynin, Anatoly, 294n44
Dregger, Alfred, 27
Dresden: protests in, 19; Putin’s KGB post in, 19, 86, 93–94, 195, 197, 214
Dumas, Roland, 121, 145
East Germany. See German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany)
EC. See European Community (EC)
economic issues: anxiety about economic impacts of unification, 145, 188–89; black markets, 134–35; as campaign issue, 63, 189; common currency in Europe, 148, 160, 209, 214; consumer goods, access to, 29, 68–69, 134–35, 288n5; costs of reunification, 188, 189; currency crisis of 1992, 204; difficulties caused by economic integration, 203; East German activism linked to, 29, 46; East German deprivation, 99; East German economic collapse, 29, 36, 70, 112, 135, 154; East Germany as competition for economic aid to EC members, 145, 202; economic crisis in East Germany, 112; employment issues, 95, 203; exploitation of East Germany as concern of dissident leaders, 95; financial incentives during negotiations, 127–28, 185, 186; funding for troop withdrawal, 182, 187, 190; Gorbachev’s commitment to economic improvement in the USSR, 211; Gulf War funding, 188; intelligence failures regarding East German economic status, 36; litigation linked to economic difficulties, 203–4; market economy as dominant, 214; monetary union (see monetary union); “money carrot” as incentive to USSR, 113, 128, 151, 157–60, 169–70, 172, 177, 179–80, 186, 188, 190, 191, 206, 212; money provided to East Germans entering West Germany, 45, 68; Poland and foreign debts, 64, 171, 185; prefab model linked to economic difficulties, 203–4; property ownership, 7, 88, 116–17, 118, 170, 203; reconstruction costs after unification, 204; rejection of aid requests for USSR, 177; reparations, 62, 64, 103–4, 127, 136–37, 197, 202; Soviet economic problems, 16, 36, 59, 102, 128, 151, 159, 172–73, 181–82, 211–12 (see also economic issues: “money carrot”); stock market fluctuations and economic uncertainty, 69; surveillance as economic burden in East Germany, 13; Ten-Point-Plan and provisions for aid to East Germany, 73; trade agreement between EC and GDR, 145; trade among Warsaw Pact nations, 36, 137, 156; trade between GDR and USSR, 154; U.S. aid to eastern Europe, 25; USSR, Cold War military spending, 13; western financial support of East Germany, 135; West German forgiveness of Polish debts, 64
elections: all-German, 86, 160, 200–201; alliance politics and, 133; corruption under Krenz, 297n76; in East Germany, 103, 119; electoral politics as context for unification process, 82–83, 85, 120, 132–33, 160; Kohl and CDU campaign in East Germany, 132–33, 135–36, 138–43; legitimacy of Kohl’s plans indicated by electoral victory, 120, 140, 143, 144, 146, 149, 200–201, 205; legitimacy of NATO expansion linked to, 205; March 1990 election results, 142–43; monetary union as campaign issue, 104, 133, 135, 154; as referendum on plan for unification, 143; SED and corrupt election practices, 42; Sicherman memo analyzing, 138–40
Eliot, T. S., 11
Eppelmann, Rainer, 91, 92, 115, 153–54
Estonia, 206
European Commission, 145, 146
European Community (EC), 3–4; common currency (Euro), 148, 160, 209, 214; Dublin summit, 160; East Germany as potential member of, 145; and economic provisions for unification, 188–89; endorsement of German monetary union, 173, 177; endorsement of German self-determination, 82; endorsement of German unification by, 148–49; European integration and, 147–48; expansion of, 212–14; Great Britain as member of, 64–65, 67, 76, 82, 100; joint Kohl-Mitterrand initiative presented to, 147; map of member states, 30; Mitterrand’s leadership of, 56, 65, 82, 149, 171, 197; opposition to German unification within, 64–65, 67, 82, 100, 188 (see also specific member states); as potential rival for NATO, 146; and prefab model, 8; role in process, 22, 50, 64, 83, 96, 126, 140, 147–48; stake in German unification process, 56–57, 64–65, 73, 82, 145, 173; Thatcher’s dismissive comments regarding, 100; trade agreement with East Germany, 145; unified Germany as member of, 132, 145, 196, 211; West Germany as member state in, 71, 130
European Council, 82, 147–48
European integration: German unification linked to, 8, 65, 82–83, 145, 146–47, 149; as Mitterrand’s goal, 80, 82–83, 138
European Parliament, 65, 76, 83
European Union (EU), 213; common currency, 148, 209, 214; Maastricht treaty, 148. See also European Community (EC)
Falin, Valentin: disagreements with Gorbachev’s positions, 71, 106, 155–57, 163, 178–79, 185–86, 203, 208; as excluded by Gorbachev from decision making, 106, 185–86, 199–200, 208; and heroic model as alternative, 105–6, 121; and intimidation of de Maizière, 157–58; role in negotiations, 71, 156–57, 158, 167, 169, 178–79; on speed of unification process, 203
FDP (Free Democratic Party, also known as the Liberals), 49, 51, 103–4
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany): Bush administration policy and, 26; as EC member, 71; internal political tensions, 52; as NATO member, 71; peace activism in, 27; relative autonomy of, 65–66; U.S. troops stationed in, 26, 27. See also Kohl, Helmut
Fedorov, Rafael, 102
4, the. See Four Powers
Four Powers: 2 + 4 forum and role of, 103–4, 110, 190; Basic Law provisions for unification and, 131–32; cooperative failures among, 101, 129; December 11 meeting of, 80–81; four-power rights as vestige of W.W.II, 26, 65–66, 80–81, 123, 165; German self-determination and, 66–67, 80–82; Kohl’s plan to involve and constrain the, 99–100; map showing sectors controlled by, 41; military presence in Germany, 26, 100, 193; occupation rights relinquished by, 193; “quadripartitism” and, 64–65, 66, 80, 197, 296n137; reactions to Ten-Point-Program by members of, 80–81; restoration model and quadripartite control, 7, 62, 65–68, 80, 86; Thatcher as proponent of continued quadripartite control, 67, 80; troop withdrawal and, 100
France: European integration as objective of, 82–83, 138; role in unification process, 56–57. See also Mitterrand, François
Free Democratic Party (FDP), 103–4
FRG. See Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany)
Friedrichs, Hanns, 40, 43
Führer, C
hristian, 20
Fukuyama, Francis, xi, 201
G-7, 155, 177, 302n28
Gaddis, John Lewis, xi, xiv, 295n50
Gates, Robert, 22–23, 24–25, 55, 66, 151; on Baker, 109–10; observations during negotiations, 167–68, 203, 206
GDR. See German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany)
Genscher, Hans-Dietrich: and Article 23 as instrument for unification, 132, 139; competition with Kohl, 103–4, 178; Kohl’s relationship with, 29, 49, 73, 103–4, 126–27, 132, 137, 143, 161, 177–78; as liberal leader, 27, 49, 104; meeting with Gorbachev after announcement of Ten-Point-Program, 76; and opening of Hungarian border, 29, 31; opposition to updating nuclear weapons in Germany, 27, 125; peace activism supported by, 27; Raisa Gorbachev’s private conversation with, 3, 182, 204; role in negotiations, 49, 75–76, 80, 104–5, 121–27, 161, 179, 181–84, 186, 193; and Russian stake in German unification, 181, 204, 211, 289n79; Teltschik as rival for influence, 71; U.S. distrust of, 122–23, 126–27
George, Alexander, xiv, 289n12
Georgia, Russian invasion of, 208
Gerasimov, Gennady, 75
Geremek, Bronislaw, 60
German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany): de Maizière as elected leader of, 152–53; dependence on Soviet Union, 137; economy of, 36, 135; elections in, 135, 137, 140–43; emigration and refugees from, 29–31, 31–33, 54, 68, 69–70, 73; government in, 152–53 (see also round table in East Germany); as neutral and non-allied “bridge” between NATO and Warsaw Pact, 153–54; political collapse of, 79; prohibition against election speakers in, 135; reaction to Tiananmen violence, 18; self-confidence as factor in fall of Berlin Wall, 28–38, 46; as sovereign state, 145, 152–53; Soviet troops stationed in, 26; Stasi in (see Stasi [East German state security force]); street (protests) as political power in, 19–20, 34–35, 48, 68, 85–86, 94, 97, 288n5; trade agreement between EC and, 145; travel and emigration restrictions in, 35–36
González, Felipe, 82
Gopkalo, Pantelei Yefimovich, 107
Gorbachev, Mikhail, 3, 166; access to documents of, xii; agreement to unification, 113–14, 177–86, 211–12; and back-channel diplomacy, 106; Berlin Wall opening as surprise to, 59–60; Bush and, 25–26, 67–68, 167–69, 193, 194, 208 (see also Gorbachev, Mikhail: Malta Summit with Bush); common European home, concept of, 7, 104, 198–99; coup in 1991 and removal of, 200; Falin and, 71, 106, 155–57, 163, 178–79, 185–86, 199–200, 203, 208; heroic model proposed by, 7–8, 91–92, 101–2, 104–7, 118, 150, 154–55; on Honecker, 293n30; Honecker and, 20; internal political affairs and, 101, 109, 128, 155–56, 176, 178–79, 185–87, 200, 202–3, 206; as key actor, 50, 60; Kohl and, 202, 206; Kohl’s meetings and negotiations with, 72, 103, 112, 150–51, 160, 169, 177–86, 180, 183, 191, 208; Malta Summit with Bush, 49, 67, 77–78, 161; military leadership as dissatisfied with, 155–56; NATO expansion as concern of, 110–15, 136–37, 182–85, 208, 212; and Nobel Peace Prize, 199; nonviolent responses preferred by, 18, 45–46; perestroika and, 23; personal and biographical information, 59, 107, 181, 182; political and personal consequences of German unification, 202–3, 204, 206; popularity in the west, 11–12; and Reagan, 15; reform agenda of, 15, 211–13; reluctance to seek or sign written agreements, 123–24, 183–85, 200, 205, 208; restoration model proposed by, 7; role in process, 3, 16, 60; sense of humor, 168; at signing of 2 + 4 accord, 194; socialism and, 14; Thatcher and, 27–28, 61, 67, 106, 171; U.S. policy regarding, 205–6; W.W.II as experiential frame for, 59. See also Washington Summit