We can contrast this with the use of what the terrorist does in a collective political context, which is driven or coordinated by an ideology or religious or political purpose (which might often be expressed by a leader “speaking” and interpreting on his or her behalf). This is what we might argue terrorism is concerned with. Terrorism therefore seems to be best regarded as essentially a second order activity, essentially a strategy (Neumann & Smith, 2005) that is used to generate an outcome for a group, movement, network or organisation (which might even be an army), which may be partially premised and dependent on the actions of terrorists in the sense of fuzzy categorical relationships, but conducted in a public arena, and perhaps involving other people as well, and always constructed around an array of explicitly political or religious agendas.
From this perspective, terrorism may be a strategic construction of a political leader or activist or an ideology, but it might also just as well be a construction of media coverage. It certainly has a reality in the sense that terrorism is concerned with terrorising and fear induction through violence, although the sense of fuzzy boundary means that what we might refer to as terrorism also leaks into insurgency, guerrilla warfare, civil war, actual war and criminality. But, from this view terrorism is always a process rather than an event, in which critically the underlying motivations of those engaged in propagating terrorism might well diverge from those factors involved in controlling, coordinating and facilitating individual terrorist behaviour. As in any process, it might be expected that pressures to adapt and change will be evident depending on the environment; these collective pressures and the nature of that adaptation may well be different from the pressures experienced by individual terrorists. We need to further explore these issues; it might also be assumed that the pressures affecting terrorism dynamically interact with the pressures affecting the terrorist – a testable hypothesis that might also merit further exploration.
Early psychologically focussed studies of terrorism tended to focus on “why” terrorists engage with violence. These explanations tended to be framed in terms of abnormality, psychopathology, or individual personality traits (Schmid & Jongman, 1988), and often either explicitly or implicitly drew on psychoanalytic perspectives. An extension of this approach, still current in some quarters, is sometimes expressed as psychological profiles (Russell & Miller, 1983). However, the consensus of contemporary views is that these approaches are unhelpful, and generally do not contribute to our understanding of terrorism (Beck, 2002; Corrado, 1981; Crenshaw, 1992), and there is little evidence of mental illness or more generally psychopathology as a factor in either understanding or predicting terrorist behaviour (McCauley, 2002; Sageman, 2004).
More contemporary approaches have emphasised the significance of learning and the situational context to behaviour as factors in the development of terrorism. An early powerful theoretical model that has informed much of this approach is social learning theory (Akers, 1994; Bandura, 1990). This approach emphasises the role of observation in learning, and by extension the social context in which learning might occur. Other contemporary approaches have drawn on cognitive theories, especially theories of aggression drawing on concepts such as social cognitions. Crenshaw (1988) for example has suggested that principles of social cognition apply to both terrorist organisations and terrorists: “the actions of terrorists are based on a subjective interpretation of the world rather than objective reality. Perceptions of the political and social environment are filtered through beliefs and attitudes that reflect experiences and memories” (Crenshaw, 1988, p. 12).
A difficulty with much of this early work is that it tended to focus on terrorism as something akin to a “state of being”, and in so doing asked questions related to why does terrorist behaviour occur, rather than asking questions about the behaviour itself. We noted earlier that the study of terrorism has been influenced by a range of disciplines, and it may well be that this emphasis is a reflection of a privileging of questions from largely theoretical driven disciplines such as political science, and a concern with assumptions about particular political qualities of social and individual motivation.
An implication of this approach is to tend to assume the terrorist makes a decisive “choice” to become involved in terrorism (based on identifiable events, social disadvantage, life experiences or conditions). However, this does not seem to reflect what we know about how terrorists engage with terrorist activity. As Horgan and Taylor (2001) note: “What we know of actual terrorists suggests that there is rarely a conscious decision made to become a terrorist. Most involvement in terrorism results from gradual exposure and socialisation towards extreme behaviour” (p. 17). Recent experience supports this view.
Furthermore, when we look at the characteristics of terrorists we find little uniformity or commonality and no particular relationship with structural factors such as economic disadvantage, discrimination and so forth (Bakker, 2006; Travis, 2008; McCauley and Moskalenko 2011a). Furthermore, and more importantly, when terrorists are asked why they became involved, they offer multiple accounts that vary over time, and may relate more to the context of questioning than “reality”. This fundamental methodological problem should temper our evaluation of research in this area.
A common theme that does emerge from descriptive studies based on interview, however, is a sense of gradual socialisation into terrorism and an initial sense of involvement characterised by gradual increases in commitment. Given this, we might assume that group factors may be centrally important in attempting to identify supportive qualities of initial and continuing engagement. Overall, we get a sense of the boundaries between apparent degrees of involvement, with a sense of premium attached not only to membership, but moreover to certain, specific roles (Alonso, 2006).
We can conceptualise the process of terrorist involvement as reflecting three related but different elements; becoming involved in terrorism; remaining involved; and disengaging. This has been termed the ARC of terrorist involvement (i.e. drawing on the idea of an arch or curve embracing the elements of terrorist involvement: Horgan & Taylor, 2011). The boundaries between these elements may be permeable and fuzzy, but as a way of conceptualising the emergence of the “terrorist” this approach has considerable merit. The existence of a complex set of dynamic, interacting factors, reflecting a process of assimilation and accommodation, and showing qualitatively distinct processes of incremental progression has been apparent to researchers for some time (Taylor & Quayle, 1994), although there may well be different accounts that characterise different kinds of people at different stages of political and organisational development (Jamieson, 1989). Given this, it is worth noting that what we frequently fail to appreciate when considering contemporary terrorist movements such as the European and African jihadi affiliates of Al Qaeda (a global militant Sunni Islamist group founded by Osama bin Laden) or Islamic State is that even the same terrorist movement can attract and engage people in very different ways, whether they be home-grown or foreign activists or the increasingly worrying “local walk-ins” (McAllister, 2004; Veldhuis, & Staun, 2009; de Bie et al., 2015).
12.4 BECOMING, REMAINING, DISENGAGING
Those who engage directly in terrorist violent activity are few in number relative to the overall movement; the actual perpetrator of a terrorist event is generally only one element or task within a much larger context. The Provisional IRA (the Irish Republican Army), for example, had a complex organisational structure (Horgan & Taylor, 1997) that controlled logistics, financing and even research (into things like bomb-making techniques). Terrorist movements can therefore be characterised by having a variety of roles, with many different kinds of involvement; the implication of this is that the visible terrorist is a tip of a larger supportive (both active and passive) iceberg. This diversity of function may be more difficult to appreciate in smaller groups, but it does exist.
The multiplicity of organisational functional roles is relevant to thinking about the process of terrorism,
and offers a way of understanding how an individual might move within an organisation, not only engaging in different activities and roles but also strengthening and confirming involvement by doing so, and subsequently also in reducing and diminishing involvement. From this perspective, the reality of what “becoming” a terrorist involves is a gradual progression into (and sometimes out of) certain roles. Involvement in terrorism is therefore best characterised as a dynamic process of incremental change based on initially supportive and attractive (to the recruit) qualities. From this perspective, it is not a state or condition that a person “is in”; rather, terrorism (and the violence associated with it) is something that some members of an extremist movement do, amongst other things.
To move this forward, we therefore need to appreciate the kind of roles a terrorist might adopt. These have grown in complexity with the development of new forms of terrorism (e.g. global Salafi jihad, single-issue terrorism, organised crime-related terrorism, and terrorist use of the Internet). It is also important to note that not all of these roles are necessarily illegal, although since the events of 9/11 we have seen a fundamental legal shift in the meaning of “involvement in terrorism” to one of mere association as opposed to having a more firm involvement in the planning, preparation or execution of a terrorist act.
PHOTO 12.2 Since the events of 9/11 we have seen a fundamental legal shift in the meaning of “involvement in terrorism” to one of mere association as opposed to having a more firm involvement in the planning, preparation or execution of a terrorist act.
Source: PCN Photography/Alamy Stock Photo
A further element to note is that increased engagement for the terrorist can often have positive qualities for that individual. These might include the rapid acquisition of some sort of skill or skills, an increased sense of empowerment, a sense of control, purpose and self-importance. Increased engagement, and changing roles, also act as a form of currency and give a tangible sense of acceptance within the group, and in combination with this the acquisition of status. We can identify these factors in groups such as the Provisional IRA, but the analysis is also consistent with Sageman’s (2004) analysis of engagement with Al Qaeda.
Although recent examples of “lone wolf terrorism” might temper this, individuals tend to engage in terrorism in association with others in some sense, which suggest a potential role for group factors influencing behaviour (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009; Gill, Horgan, & Deckert, 2014). These may be evident in a potential to attract members as well as to bind them together via sustained commitment and engagement. Similarly, extreme conformity and strict obedience are organisational qualities that enhance the effective maintenance of a secret, and above all illegal, organisation. Illegality, therefore, is an important factor maintaining control and conformity, which, along with a shared purpose or sense of unity and direction and a clearly identifiable enemy, facilitates a sense of strong group cohesion. Other group-influence factors such as conformity to social norms and compliance, identification and internalisation are all elements that might be expected to be of significance, as might processes such as diffusion of responsibility and displacement of responsibility. Blaming victims, and dehumanisation of victims, are related processes that are generally explained by social psychological processes that also have clear relevance to understanding terrorist behaviour.
Social networks and social connections and relationships are also factors that influence individual behaviour, and might therefore be expected to be factors in understanding engagement with terrorist behaviour. Della Porta (1995) noted that what characterised early Italian terrorists’ engagement was membership of a structured group that influenced its membership, and Sageman (2004) has extended this analysis to our understanding of what characterises mujahedeen involvement in jihadi organisations such as Al Qaeda. Enders and Jindapon (2010) have extended this analysis further to notions of terrorist readiness being a function of the “shape” of the terrorist network to which they belong.
The theme of overall terrorist structure has been usefully explored by Post (1984, 1987, 1990), who identifies two major types of groups on the basis of the relationships they have with their environment (see Box 12.2). Post suggests that each type may exert psychological influences on those members in dissimilar ways and accordingly may differentially attract members on the basis of different kinds of expected rewards, and in turn differentially influence terrorist behaviour through membership.
BOX 12.2 POST’S TWO MAJOR TERRORIST GROUPS
The anarchic-ideologue group: These are small, “revolution-based” groups, committed to the overthrow of current political or social regime, largely for ideological reasons. The old left-wing European terrorist movements such as the German Red Army Faction (also known as the Baader-Meinhof Group, Germany’s most violent and prominent left-wing terror group) and the Italian Red Brigades (a Marxist-Leninist group) typified this type. Post describes “alienation” from the member’s families or immediate community as a characteristic of such groups.
The nationalist-separatist group: The Provisional IRA, with its long tradition of resistance against England and British rule in Ireland is a good example of this type of group. In this type of terrorist group, members (at whatever level of peripheral or focused involvement) are not estranged from their families or communities whose interests they claim to represent. Lately our attention has been drawn to groups of this kind because of the threat of radical Islamic terrorism, but it may well be that in the future anarchic-ideologue groups will again become significant.
The critical point that Post makes is that within nationalist-separatist groups the legitimisation of personal decision to engage in violent protest, as well as continuation of commitment in a more general way, can within the context of local circumstances (or communities) be seen as a rite of passage, a movement towards consolidation of identity within the broader community. These distinctions seem as relevant today as they were to the largely European groups of the 1970s and 1980s that Post focussed on, although we may need to embrace religious ideology as a further element. There are obvious parallels with contemporary terrorist movements, particularly those based in the West Bank and Gaza strip where martyrs from Hamas and other movements are held in high esteem within the community. Hassan (2001), who interviewed many militants in the region, describes how in Palestinian neighbourhoods:
… the suicide bombers’ green birds appear on posters, and in graffiti – the language of the street. Calendars are illustrated with the “martyr of the month”. Paintings glorify the dead bombers in Paradise, triumphant beneath a flock of green birds. This symbol is based on a saying of the Prophet Muhammad that the soul of a martyr is carried to Allah in the bosom of the green birds of Paradise.
Post, Sprinzack, and Denny (2003) interviewed incarcerated members of various Palestinian-affiliated groups, in particular Hamas and its armed wing Izz a-Din al Qassan, Hizbollah, the Islamic Jihad, and others from secular movements. The researchers discovered similarities between the supportive qualities that shaped individual “pathways” into terrorism, despite the wide variety in participants’ backgrounds and histories:
The boyhood heroes for the Islamist terrorists were religious Figures, such as the radical Wahabi Islamist – Abdullah Azzam; for the secular terrorists, revolutionary heroes such as Che Guevara or Fidel Castro were identified. Most had some high school, and some had education beyond high school. The majority of the subjects reported that their families were respected in the community. The families were experienced as being uniformly supportive of their commitment to the “cause”.
This work serves not only to emphasis types of network and organisation, but also introduces the notion of role models, which serve to offer a source of authoritative legitimacy as far as the justification of violent reaction is concerned. What the individual terrorist perceives to be the authority inherent in such roles is an important factor in sustaining the commitment of the individual, as well facilitating commitment to th
e violent group more generally. In Post et al.’s (2003) analysis, the significance of social setting appears to be privileged, (via implicit or explicit approval from peers and family), but other supportive qualities of involvement became clear via their interviews with imprisoned activists. The following from Post et al.’s analysis suggests this (2003, p. 177):
Perpetrators of armed attacks were seen as heroes, their families got a great deal of material assistance including the construction of new homes to replace those destroyed by the Israeli authorities as punishment for terrorist acts…the entire family did all it could for the Palestinian people, and won great respect for doing so. All my brothers are in jail. One is serving a life sentence for his activities in the Izz al-Din Al Qassam battalions.
Post et al. (2003) suggest joining a terrorist group increased social standing among would-be recruits. Recruits were treated with great respect. A youngster who belonged was regarded more highly than one who did not belong to a group, and got better treatment than unaffiliated individuals. Similar themes can be seen in interviews with activists in Northern Ireland. Burgess, Ferguson and Hollywood (2009), for example, interviewed one activist who pointed to his awareness of the importance associated with becoming involved in active resistance (p. 32):
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