The idols among our community shot up because they stood for something … As soon as your parents, and the priest at the altar, and your teacher are saying “These men are good men. They are fighting a just thing here”, it filters down quickly that these people are important and whatever they say must be right. So all of a sudden, you are bordering on supporting something that is against the government.
Engagement in “nationalist-separatist” groups, therefore, carries status not only within an immediate circle of activists, but also within a relevant supportive community. Not only then is there acceptance within the group, but there is also an accompanying sense of status and excitement for the individual within the broader community. This can be a powerful factor not only for sustaining commitment but also as an element in recruitment. An added factor that seems to enhance these processes is the Internet, and particularly social media, and its capacity to engage with and disseminate information and ideas.
As noted earlier, there has been a rise in what has been termed lone wolf terrorism. This is generally taken to refer to someone who engages in terrorist behaviour but does not appear to be part of some broader organisation (Gill et al., 2014). It would be wrong, however, to regard the lone wolf terrorist as someone outside of a broader ideological framework, as opposed to a specific organisation. There are also strong grounds for supposing that contact of some form (using the Internet or clandestine physical interaction) lies behind most lone wolf terrorists.
CASE STUDY 12.1 THE JEWEL OF MEDINA (AFTER TAYLOR, 2010)
This is an account of the events surrounding an attack related to the mooted publication of The Jewel of Medina in the UK. The details of this incident give some insight into both its group and individual context, and is also an example of an intelligence-led counter-terrorism operation that changed a potentially life-threatening attack into a relatively minor one. The book, by Sherry Jones, describes a fictionalised version of the life of Aisha, one of the wives of the Prophet Mohammed. Although a fictionalised account, the book generated protests in many quarters.
In September 2008, three men drove twice through a square in London where Martin Rynja (potential publisher of the book) lived, before two of the men left the car and approached Rynja’s front door, carrying a fuel can in a white plastic bag. They poured diesel fuel through the letterbox and used a disposable lighter to set it on fire. They were arrested after being stopped by armed London Metropolitan Police officers as they attempted to flee the scene. Due to previous intelligence, police had warned the publisher and his partner to move out of their house. Prior to this incident, all three men were under close police surveillance. Two were seen carrying out reconnaissance “drive-throughs” of the area in the weeks leading up to the attack. Hence, this was clearly a premeditated attack.
The proposal to publish the book had attracted a lot of adverse comments in some extremist quarters, and this attack gained wider meaning from this. One of the co-founders of Al-Muhajiroun (a radical Islamic group) said he was “not surprised at all” by the attack and warned of possible further reprisals over the book: “It is clearly stipulated in Muslim law that any kind of attack on his [The Prophet’s] honour carries the death penalty…People should be aware of the consequences they might face when producing material like this. They should know the depth of feeling it might provoke.” Omar Bakri, the founder of Al-Muhajiroun, living in Lebanon having been excluded from the UK, said, “if anybody attacks that man (Martin Rynja) I cannot myself condemn it.”
CASE STUDY 12.2 AN ATTEMPTED BOMBING OF AN EL AL AIRCRAFT
This is probably one of the most callous acts of terrorism in recent times. Although there are no formal psychological assessments of the perpetrator available, interview and other contact with him suggests he is someone who fully understands what he did, and quite cynically used his pregnant girlfriend as a medium for carrying a bomb on board an El Al flight. It also illustrates how States (in this case Syria) have used terrorism to further their own foreign policy objectives.
Nezar Hindawi was arrested in April 1986 at a hotel in West London. During interrogation, he admitted having handed his pregnant Irish girlfriend a bag containing an explosive device for her to take on a flight to Israel.
This operation was planned and controlled by the Syrian Government, through its intelligence service. Although a Jordanian passport holder, for this operation Hindawi held an official Syrian Service passport, and members of Syrian Arab Airlines transported and aided him. He was offered $250,000 to undertake this mission.
Hindawi had an intermittent relationship with his girlfriend, but appears to have left her when she became pregnant. On instructions from Damascus, he re-established contact and proposed marriage to her and a honeymoon in Israel, which she accepted (although he was already married to a Polish national). On the day before travel, Hindawi took the bag containing explosives to her flat, where he filled it with some of her clothes. The following day he took her by taxi to Heathrow Airport and, during the journey, activated the detonator. After explaining that he would follow on a later flight, he left her to board the El Al aircraft.
Israeli security at the airport identified the bag, and his girlfriend was arrested. Hindawi initially sought refuge with the Syrian authorities in London but, fearing for his life, he gave himself up to the UK police. Hindawi was convicted of attempting to place on an El Al aircraft at London (Heathrow) Airport a device likely to destroy or damage the aircraft contrary to Section 1(1) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, and he was sentenced to 45 years’ imprisonment. The judge commented that “this was a well-planned, well-organised crime, which involved many others besides yourself, some of them people in high places. A more cruel and callous deception and a more horrendous massacre it is difficult to imagine.” Experts testified during the trial that had the device, containing 1.5 kg of military explosives, been detonated, it would probably have caused the total loss of the aircraft and the deaths of all 375 passengers and crew. Hindawi was released from a UK prison in 2014 and deported.
12.5 RADICALISATION
A term frequently used to describe the origins of terrorism is radicalisation. Radicalisation might be characterised as exposure to, and sympathy with, radical ideology. Although its usage has grown, particularly in the media, it is a very contentious term, particularly as few commentators make the critical distinction between holding radical views, and engaging in the expression of those views through violence. The following summarises a range of potential factors that can be identified that seem to relate to increased vulnerability to radicalisation. It is important to stress that these may or may not relate to violent radicalisation, and we lack adequate evidence at the moment to definitively resolve this issue.
Indeed, to elaborate on the caution expressed above; all of the following might be regarded as necessarily conditions leading to violent radicalisation (in that in aggregate they may be evident), but none (in aggregate or individually) is a sufficient account of engagement in violence (Taylor, 2010). As we have noted earlier, personal, organisational and situational factors are also important in an individual’s engagement with violence, and this is further complicated by one of the few assertions we can make in this area: no one single socio-economic profile characterises potentially violent radicalised young people (Dalgard-Nielsen, 2010). However, in total, the following offers a global list of factors, explored in further detail later, that have some measure of empirical verification. These factors relate to Islamic contexts, but there is evidence to suggest that in broad outline they address other forms of extremist narratives; for example, excluding the overt and obvious religious elements, the themes identified below would also characterise the terrorism of Western Europe in mid-twentieth century, and contemporary right-wing hate activity.
Major themes that characterise the justifications given for engagement with Islamic radicalisation (which it should be noted is only one form of radicalisation, but illustrates some of the pertinent points) are shown i
n Box 12.3.
BOX 12.3 THEMES FOR ISLAMIC RADICALISATION
Islam is under attack (in the most recent iteration led by the United States as a form of crusade).
Jihadis, whom the West refers to as “terrorists”, are defending against this attack.
The actions they take in defence of Islam are proportional, just and religiously sanctified.
It is the duty of good Muslims to support these actions (Betz, 2008).
Embedded in these themes are four separate narratives (Leuprecht et al., 2010) that support and extend these themes, which are shown in Box 12.4.
BOX 12.4 NARRATIVES THAT SUPPORT RADICALISATION (FROM KESSELS, 2010)
A political narrative that focuses on the evils of the West, and includes neo-Marxist notions related to global inequities and distributive effects arising from Western hegemony and exploitation.
A moral narrative that focuses on the contradictory Western values that assert freedom as their core value and equality and justice as their subsidiary values, although these values are unrealisable ideals and indeed (from a radical Islamic perspective) drivers of a society’s moral decay.
A religious narrative that serves to legitimise violent struggle to defend Islam against the crusader West.
A social-psychological narrative that draws on a classic in-group/out-group strategies to brand as “infidels” those outside of the group, while promoting the brotherhood-of-arms as a means of countering social exclusion, and fulfilling a yearning for adventure and sacrifice that compels the “true believer”.
We will now explore factors that are imbedded in these themes.
12.5.1 Factors Related to Ideology
Research on jihadi movements suggests that adherence to and influence by ideologies are significant that emphasise some or all of the following:
structural exclusion (Buijs, 2009)
grievance, hostility of society lived in, disenfranchisement, lack of social justice, the significance of emblems as visual markers (dress – wearing veil, for example) (Change Institute, 2008b; Slootman & Tillie, 2006)
religious revival (Change Institute 2008b)
focus on the plight of Muslims in various conflict zones around the world (Slootman & Tillie, 2006).
Given these factors, the core Islamic ideological elements that seem to be significant elements of radical views are (from the Change Institute, 2008b):
an emphasis on jihadism (in Arabic this refers to a notion of a religious duty of “struggle”; in the West, this is often used to imply a sense of holy war)
the role of Takfir (a declaration of apostasy, the result of someone knowingly abandoning Islam, the sentence for which may be interpreted as death)
the world as Dar-al-Harb (“house of war”), a reference to countries where Muslim law (Shari’a) is not in force
lack of discrimination between civilian and military targets
attack/confrontation with the enemy
an emphasis on the appropriateness and desirability of martyrdom
a looking forward to the return of the caliphate.
It is important to note that not all elements of these factors are necessarily equally held by everyone attracted to radicalised ideological narratives, and that one may not necessarily predict another. For example, Leuprecht et al. (2010) note that poll data from the 2007 Pew poll of US Muslims included items related to “doubts about the war on terror”, and “justification of suicide bombing” showed low correlations. They suggest that this means that “knowing who believes one aspect seems to say little about who believes the other aspect” (p. 61). In psychological terms, what are probably the most significant consequences of ideological involvement of the form described here, as noted earlier, is dehumanisation of the opponent, enhanced group identification and in the context of radical Islam ideology a focus on martyrdom. The particular strength of these narratives is enhanced by action and commitment.
12.5.2 Factors Related to Social Context
In terms of social context, what seems to be most significant is engagement with a strong real or virtual peer group (Nesser, 2004), where needs to seek meaning are met, where participants can achieve a sense of belonging (Slootman & Tillie, 2006) and where reactions to perceived injustices elsewhere can be expressed (Slootman & Tillie, 2006). This might be expressed through engagement in protest activities (actual) or media through the Internet (virtual) (Change Institute 2008aa). Of particular significance, identification with a group perceived as victims can radicalise an individual who has not personally experienced any grievance (see Masuda, Donati, Ward Schaefer, & Hill, 2016 for a potential account of this framed within a contextual behavioural science account). Quite clearly, many radicalised young people in the West have no direct experience of life in, say, Palestine, but can be drawn into a process of identification and social influence in this way. As noted earlier, a significant factor in facilitating membership is the presence of friends and/or family. Factors such as group polarisation, group competition and enhanced group cohesion under threat have been identified as significant process factors in the group dynamics of radicalisation.
12.5.3 Factors Related to Leadership/Charismatic Figures
The involvement of significant and charismatic leaders as part of broader peer group and social involvement (Change Institute 2008aa; Slootman & Tillie, 2006) are of significance. Research suggests that returning jihadis from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Balkans and Somalia may play particularly important roles as inspirational peer group figures (Change Institute 2008a) in mosques or places of community gathering, as may family. The role of “spiritual sanctioners” and “operational leaders” can be identified from examining radicalised groups (NYPD, 2007), which have particular significance when expressed through returned jihadis. A sense of personal and social isolation may be an important element in understanding engagement with both ideology and peer group.
12.5.4 Factors Related to Situational and Personal Context
Recent research also suggests a strong transformative event may be of significance as part of the individual’s pathway towards radicalisation (Change Institute, 2008a) although not necessarily to violence, which may be either of personal or collective significance. Related to this is the notion that an individual is angry because of the kind of events noted above, and seeks revenge for government action that harms that person or their loved ones. However, it is important to stress that personal grievance usually does not lead to action unless interpreted as part of some larger group grievance (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008).
What is missing from this analysis is an extension of the argument into the factors that precipitate expression not simply through engagement with radical ideas, but expression of those ideas through violence. As we have noted earlier, the critical point to make here is that individually, these factors have little predictive value – they do not explain why people “become” terrorists. Taken in combination, however, they do provide us with a complex and powerful framework that may enable us to contextualise an “openness” to involvement with terrorism or radicalisation.
12.6 PROGRESSION INTO TERRORIST ACTIVITIES: AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL ACCOUNTS
We have noted that a social and psychological quality of increased involvement in a terrorist movement is a sense of gradual progression. This might be characterised by a slow marginalisation away from broader, “conventional” society towards a much narrower society where extremism becomes all embracing. Capturing knowledge of this in any systematic way, however, is extremely difficult, given the clandestine and covert nature of terrorist organisations. Perhaps the most effective way of doing this is to use autobiographical accounts, which at least give a glimpse of long-term processes. Such accounts can be problematic, in that they are generally partial, written after the event, and may serve as justification by the author rather than an account of what actually happened. However, such accounts are probably all that is available to us to address this issue.
Both Kellen (1982),
who examined the histories of German terrorists, and Taylor and Quayle (1994), who interviewed loyalist terrorists in Northern Ireland, identified as an emergent theme that involvement in terrorism featured not only a gradual socialisation into increasingly commitment, but a parallel sense of increasing disillusionment with alternatives. In a sense the culmination of this was that the individual grew into an active terrorist, through the focussing of social and personal opportunities that limited the capacity to engage with alternatives. It is tempting to speculate that this may reflect a process similar to that identified by Hundeide (2003) as a “community of practice”. Communities of practice are informal but potentially very powerful learning environments, where the individual learns from peers by example, and by exposure to common and shared experience. A by-product of this may also be that increased commitment and ever greater and ever more focused involvement will carry with it for the individual the realisation that in difficult or challenging times, the need to “stick it out” is paramount (Sherman, 2005).
We can supplement these accounts with what we know about terrorist organisations, which at least can act as a validity check. In the case of the Provisional IRA, for example, we know that an individual may have expressed an intention to join the group, but in some cases it might take weeks before the would-be recruit was actually accepted into the organisation (Horgan & Taylor, 1997). When the recruit was finally accepted, they did not necessarily embark upon the activities of active service for some time. While there are a number of roles to be filled within the organisation, active service is but one, which entails some degree of discipline and training, involving weapons use and explosives training. While expectations to occupy such a role may play a part in influencing a potential recruit to seek out opportunities for increased engagement, the recruit may find him or herself having to occupy peripheral roles that might initially seem less attractive. A rare insight into a sense of “role allocation” in Irish terrorist movements comes from documentation produced by the Official IRA. The Reporter’s Guide to Ireland is a sophisticated intelligence manual written by the Official IRA Director of Intelligence for distribution to his regional intelligence officers, and subsequently used by the Provisional IRA (Horgan & Taylor, 1999).
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