Collected Works of Martin Luther

by Martin Luther

  — “And even if you do (says, the Diatribe) forcedly twist this to apply to “Free-will,” all confess that no one can hold on a right course of life without the grace of God. Nevertheless, we still strive ourselves with all our powers: for we pray daily, ‘O Lord my God, direct my goings in Thy sight.’ He, therefore, who implores aid, does not lay aside his own endeavours.” —

  The Diatribe thinks, that it matters not what it answers, so that it does not remain silent with nothing to say; and then, it would have what it does say to appear satisfactory; such a vain confidence has it in its own authority. It ought here to have proved, whether or not we strive by our own powers; whereas, it proved, that he who prays attempts something. But, I pray, is it here laughing at us, or mocking the papists? For he who prays, prays by the Spirit; nay, it is the Spirit Himself that prays in us (Rom. viii. 26-27). How then is the power of “Free-will” proved by the strivings of the Holy Spirit? Are “Free-will” and the Holy Spirit, with the Diatribe, one and the same thing? Or, are we disputing now about what the Holy Spirit can do? The Diatribe, therefore, leaves me this passage of Jeremiah uninjured and invincible; and only produces the gloss out of its own brain. I also can ‘strive by my own powers:’ and Luther, will be compelled to believe this gloss, — if he will!

  Sect. CXXIV. — THERE is that passage of Prov, xvi. 1, 9, also, “It is of man to prepare the heart, but of the Lord to govern the tongue, “which the Diatribe says— ‘refers to events of things.’ -

  As though this the Diatribe’s own saying would satisfy us, without any farther authority. But however, it is quite sufficient, that, allowing the sense of these passages to be concerning the events of things, we have evidently come off victorious by the arguments which we have just advanced: ‘that, if we have no such thing as Freedom of Will in our own things and works, much less have we any such thing in divine things and works.’

  But mark the great acuteness of the Diatribe.— “How can it be of man to prepare the heart, when Luther affirms that all things are carried on by necessity?” —

  I answer: If the events of things be not in our power, as you say, how can it be in man to perform the causing acts? The same answer which you gave me, the same receive yourself! Nay, we are commanded to work the more for this very reason, because all things future are to us uncertain: as saith Ecclesiastes, “In the morning sow thy seed, and in the evening hold not thine hand: for thou knowest not: which shall prosper, either this or that” (Eccles. xi. 6). All things future, I say, are to us uncertain, in knowledge, but necessary in event. The necessity strikes into us a fear of God that we presume not, or become secure, while the uncertainty works in us a trusting, that we sink not in despair.

  Sect. CXXV. — BUT the Diatribe returns to harping upon its old string— ‘that in the book of Proverbs, many things are said in confirmation of “Free-will”: as this, “Commit thy works unto the Lord.” Do you hear this (says the Diatribe,) thy works?’ —

  Many things in confirmation! What because there are, in that book, many imperative and conditional verbs, and pronouns of the second person! For it is upon these foundations that you build your proof of the Freedom of the Will. Thus, “Commit” — therefore thou canst commit thy works: therefore thou doest them. So also this passage, “I am thy God,” (Isa. xli. 10), you will understand thus: — that is, Thou makest Me thy God. “Thy faith hath saved thee” (Luke vii. 50): do you hear this word “thy?” therefore, expound it thus: Thou makest thy faith: and then you have proved “Freewill.” Nor am I here merely game-making; but I am shewing the Diatribe, that there is nothing serious on its side of the subject.

  This passage also in the same chapter, “The Lord hath made all things for Himself; yea, even the wicked for the day of evil,” (Prov. xvi. 4), it modifies by its own words, and excuses God as having never created a creature evil.’ —

  As though I had spoken concerning the creation, and not rather concerning that continual operation of God upon the things created; in which operation, God acts upon the wicked; as we have before shewn in the case of Pharaoh. But He creates the wicked, not by creating wickedness or a wicked creature; (which is impossible) but, from the operation of God, a wicked man is made, or created, from a corrupt seed; not from the fault of the Maker, but from that of the material.

  Nor does that of “The heart of the king is in the Lord’s hand: He inclineth it whithersoever He will,” (Prov. xxi. 1), seem to the Diatribe to imply force.— “He who inclines (it observes) does not immediately compel.” —

  As though we were speaking of compulsion, and not rather concerning the necessity of Immutability. And that is implied in the inclining of God: which inclining, is not so snoring and lazy a thing, as the Diatribe imagines, but is that most active operation of God, which a man cannot avoid or alter, but under which he has, of necessity, such a will as God has given him, and such as he carries along by his motion: as I have before shewn.

  Moreover, where Solomon is speaking of “the king’s heart,” the Diatribe thinks— ‘that the passage cannot rightly be strained to apply in a general sense: but that the meaning is the same as that of Job, where he says, in another place, “He maketh the hypocrite to reign, because of the sins of the people.”’ At last, however, it concedes, that the king is inclined unto evil by God: but so, ‘that He permits the king to be carried away by his inclination, in order to chastise the people.’ —

  I answer: Whether God permit, or whether He incline, that permitting or inclining does not take place without the will and operation of God: because, the will of the king cannot avoid the action of the omnipotent God: seeing that, the will of all is carried along just as He wills and acts, whether that will be good or evil.

  And as to my having made out of the particular will of the king, a general application; I did it, I presume, neither vainly nor unskillfully. For if the heart of the king, which seems to be of all the most free, and to rule over others, cannot will good but where God inclines it, how much less can any other among men will good! And this conclusion will stand valid, drawn, not from the will of the king only, but from that of any other man. For if any one man, how private soever he be, cannot will before God but where God inclines, the same must be said of all men. Thus in the instance of Balaam, his not being able to speak what he wished, is an evident argument from the Scriptures, that man is not in his own power, nor a free chooser and doer of what he does: were it not so, no examples of it could subsist in the Scriptures.

  Sect. CXXVI. — THE Diatribe after this, having said that many such testimonies, as Luther collects, may be collected out of the book of Proverbs; but which, by a convenient interpretation, may stand both for and against “Free-will”; adduces at last that Achillean and invincible weapon of Luther, “Without me ye can do nothing,” &c. (John xv. 5).

  I too, must laud that notable champion-disputant for “Free-will,” who teaches us, to modify the testimonies of Scripture just as it serves our turn, by convenient interpretations, in order to make them appear to stand truly in confirmation of “Free-will”; that is, that they might be made to prove, not what they ought, but what we please; and who merely pretends a fear of one Achillean Scripture, that the silly reader, seeing this one overthrown, might hold all the rest in utter contempt. But I will just look on and see, by what force the full-mouthed and heroic Diatribe will conquer my Achilles; which hitherto, has never wounded a common soldier, nor even a Thersites, but has ever miserably dispatched itself with its own weapons.

  Catching hold of this one word “nothing,” it stabs it with many words and many examples; and, by means of a convenient interpretation, brings it to this; that “nothing,” may signify that which is in degree and imperfect. That is, it means to say, in other words, that the Sophists have hitherto explained this passage thus.— “Without me ye can do nothing;” that is, perfectly. This gloss, which has been long worn out and obsolete, the Diatribe, by its power of rhetoric, renders new; and so presses it forward, as though it had first invented it, a
nd it had never been heard of before, thus making it appear to be a sort of miracle. In the mean time, however, it is quite self-secure, thinking nothing about the text itself, nor what precedes or follows it, whence alone the knowledge of the passage is to be obtained.

  But (to say no more about its having attempted to prove by so many words and examples, that the term “nothing” may, in this passage, be understood as meaning ‘that which is in a certain degree, or imperfect,’ as though we were disputing whether or not it may be, whereas, what was to be proved is whether or not it ought to be, so understood;) the whole of this grand interpretation effects nothing, if it affect any thing, but this: — the rendering of this passage of John uncertain and obscure. And no wonder, for all that the Diatribe aims at, is to make the Scriptures of God in every place obscure, to the intent that it might not be compelled to use them; and the authorities of the Ancients certain, to the intent that it might abuse them; — a wonderful kind of religion truly, making the words of God to be useless, and the words of man useful!

  Sect. CXXVII. — BUT it is most excellent to observe how well this gloss, “nothing” may be understood to signify ‘that which is in degree,” consists with itself: yet the Diatribe says,— ‘that in this sense of the passage, it is most true that we can do nothing without Christ: because, He is speaking of evangelical fruits, which cannot be produced but by those who remain in the vine, which is Christ.’ —

  Here the Diatribe itself confesses, that fruit cannot be produced but by those who remain in the vine: and it does the same in that ‘convenient interpretation,’ by which it proves, that “nothing” is the same as in degree, and imperfect. But perhaps, its own adverb ‘cannot,’ ought also to be conveniently interpreted, so as to signify, that evangelical fruits can be produced without Christ in degree and imperfectly. So that we may preach, that the ungodly who are without Christ can, while Satan reigns in them, and wars against Christ, produce some of the fruits of life: that is, that the enemies of Christ may do something for the glory of Christ. — But away with these things.

  Here however, I should like to be taught, how we are to resist heretics, who, using this rule throughout the Scriptures, may contend that nothing and not are to be understood as signifying that which is imperfect. Thus — Without Him “nothing” can be done; that is a little.— “The fool hath said in his heart there is not a God;” that is, there is an imperfect God.— “He hath made us, and not we ourselves;” that is, we did a little towards making ourselves. And who can number all the passages in the Scripture where ‘nothing’ and ‘not’ are found?

  Shall we then here say that a ‘convenient interpretation’ is to be attended to? And is this clearing up difficulties — to open such a door of liberty to corrupt minds and deceiving spirits? Such a license of interpretation is, I grant, convenient to you who care nothing whatever about the certainty of the Scripture; but as for me who labour to establish consciences, this is an inconvenience; than which, nothing can be more inconvenient, nothing more injurious, nothing more pestilential. Hear me, therefore, thou great conqueress of the Lutheran Achilles! Unless you shall prove, that ‘nothing’ not only may be, but ought to be understood as signifying a ‘little,’ you have done nothing by all this profusion of words or examples, but fight against fire with dry straw. What have I to do with your may be, which only demands of you to prove your ought to be? And if you do not prove that, I stand by the natural and grammatical signification of the term, laughing both at your armies and at your triumphs.

  Where is now that ‘probable opinion’ which determined, ‘that “Free-will” can will nothing good?’ But perhaps, the ‘convenient interpretation’ comes in here, to say, that ‘nothing good’ signifies, something good — a kind of grammar and logic never before heard of; that nothing, is the same as something: which, with logicians, is an impossibility, because they are contradictions. Where now then remains that article of our faith; that Satan is the prince of the world, and, according to the testimonies of Christ and Paul, rules in the wills and minds of those men who are his captives and servants? Shall that roaring lion, that implacable and ever-restless enemy of the grace of God and the salvation of man, suffer it to be, that man, his slave and a part of his kingdom, should attempt good by any motion in any degree, whereby he might escape from his tyranny, and that he should not rather spur and urge him on to will and do the contrary to grace with all his powers? especially, when the just, and those who are led by the Spirit of God, and who will and do good, can hardly resist him, so great is his rage against them?

  You who make it out, that the human will is a something placed in a free medium, and left to itself, certainly make it out, at the same time, that there is an endeavour which can exert itself either way; because, you make both God and the devil to be at a distance, spectators only, as it were, of this mutable and “Free-will”; though you do not believe, that they are impellers and agitators of that bondage will, the most hostilely opposed to each other. Admitting, therefore, this part of your faith only, my sentiment stands firmly established, and “Free-will” lies prostrate; as I have shewn already. — For, it must either be, that the kingdom of Satan in man is nothing at all, and thus Christ will be made to lie; or, if his kingdom be such as Christ describes, “Free-will” must be nothing but a beast of burden, the captive of Satan, which cannot be liberated, unless the devil be first cast out by the finger of God.

  From what has been advanced I presume, friend Diatribe, thou fully understandest what that is, and what it amounts to, where thy Author, detesting the obstinate way of assertion in Luther, is accustomed to say— ‘Luther indeed pushes his cause with plenty of Scriptures; but they may all by one word, be brought to nothing.’ Who does not know, that all Scriptures may, by one word, be brought to nothing? I knew this full well before I ever heard the name of Erasmus. But the question is, whether it be sufficient to bring a Scripture, by one word, to nothing. The point in dispute is, whether it be rightly brought to nothing, and whether it ought to be brought to nothing. Let a man consider these points, and he will then see, whether or not it be easy to bring Scriptures to nothing, and whether or not the obstinacy of Luther be detestable. He will then see, that not one word only is ineffective, but all the gates of hell cannot bring them to nothing!

  Sect. CXXVIII. — WHAT, therefore, the Diatribe cannot do in its affirmative, I will do in the negative; and though I am not called upon to prove the negative, yet I will do it here, and will make it by the force of argument undeniably appear, that “nothing,” in this passage, not only may be but ought to be understood as meaning, not a certain small degree, but that which the term naturally signifies. And this I will do, in addition to that invincible argument by which I am already victorious; viz. ‘that all terms are to be preserved in their natural signification and use, unless the contrary shall be proved:’ which the Diatribe neither has done, nor can do. — First of all then I will make that evidently manifest, which is plainly proved by Scriptures neither ambiguous nor obscure, — that Satan, is by far the most powerful and crafty prince of this world; (as I said before,) under the reigning power of whom, the human will, being no longer free nor in its own power, but the servant of sin and of Satan, can will nothing but that which its prince wills. And he will not permit it to will any thing good: though, even if Satan did not reign over it, sin itself, of which man is the slave, would sufficiently harden it to prevent it from willing good.

  Moreover, the following part of the context itself evidently proves the same: which the Diatribe proudly sneers at, although I have commented upon it very copiously in my Assertions. For Christ proceeds thus, John xv. 6, “Whoso abideth not in me, is cast forth as a branch and is withered; and men gather them and cast them into the fire, and they are burned.” This, I say, the Diatribe, in a most excellent rhetorical way, passed by; hoping that the intent of this evasion would not be comprehended by the shallow-brained Lutherans. But here you see that Christ, who is the interpreter of His own similitude of the vi
ne and the branch, plainly declares what He would have understood by the term “nothing” — that man who is without Christ, “is cast forth and is withered.”

  And what can the being “cast forth and withered” signify but the being delivered up to the devil, and becoming continually worse and worse; and surely, becoming worse and worse, is not doing or attempting any thing good. The withering branch is more and more prepared for the fire the more it withers. And had not Christ Himself thus amplified and applied this similitude, no one would have dared so to amplify and apply it. It stands manifest, therefore, that “nothing,” ought, in this place, to be understood in its proper signification, according to the nature of the term.

  Sect. CXXIX. — LET us now consider the examples also, by which it proves, that “nothing” signifies, in some places, ‘a certain small degree:’ in order that we may make it evident, that the Diatribe is nothing, and effects nothing in this part of it: in which, though it should do much, yet it would effect nothing: — such a nothing is the Diatribe in all things, and in every way.