The Nuremberg magistrates appealed, among other reasons, to the clear testimony of Scripture which did not sanction such proceedings against the supreme secular authority. They feared the consequences of a religious war for Germany, just as Luther himself had formerly done, but, in spite of their adherence to the new faith, they were more frank and courageous in their effort to avert it than he on whose shoulders the chief responsibility in the war was to rest.
One sentence of Melanchthon’s, written in those eventful days, singularly misrepresents the true position of affairs. To his friend Camerarius, on January 1, 1531, he says: “We discountenance all arming.”
Melanchthon also writes: “We are now consulted less frequently than heretofore as to the lawfulness of resistance,” and he repeats much the same thing on February 15, 1531: “On the matter of the League no one now questions either Luther or myself.” If we can here detect a faint note of wonder and regret, we may assuredly ask whether the very behaviour of the theologians at Torgau was not the reason of their advice being at a discount; their dissimulation and ambiguity were not of a nature to inspire the lawyers and statesmen with much respect.
It was some time before this vacillation in official, written statements came to an end. Some more instances of it are to be met with in the epistolary communications between Luther and the town of Nuremberg, which was opposed to the Schmalkalden tendencies.
Prior to November 20, 1530, the Elector of Saxony had addressed himself to the magistrates of Nuremberg with the request that “they would make preparations for resisting the unjust and violent measures of the Emperor.” Of this Veit Dietrich informed Luther from Nuremberg on that day, adding that the Elector had made a reference to an approval of the measures of defence secured from his “Councillors and Doctors,” but had said nothing of the theologians. News was, however, subsequently received in Nuremberg that the Saxon envoys present at Schmalkalden had boasted of the support of Luther and his friends.
It was in consequence of this that the Nuremberg preacher, Wenceslaus Link, enquired of Luther in the beginning of January, 1531, or possibly earlier, whether the news which had reached Nuremberg by letter was true, viz. that “they had expressed the opinion that resistance might be employed against the Emperor.”
Without delay, on January 15, Luther assured him: “We have by no means given such a counsel” (“nullo modo consuluimus”).
By way of further explanation he adds: “When some said openly that it was not necessary to consult the theologians at all, or to trouble about them, and that the matter concerned only the lawyers who had decided in favour of its lawfulness, I for my part declared: I view the matter as a theologian, but if the lawyers can prove its permissibility from their laws, I see no reason why they should not use their laws; that is altogether their business. If the Emperor by virtue of his laws determines the permissibility of resistance in such a case, then let him bear the consequences of his law; I, however, pronounce no opinion or judgment on this law, but I stick to my theology.” It is thus that he expresses himself concerning the argument which the lawyers had, as a matter of fact, drawn almost exclusively from canon law, the texts of which they misread.
He then puts forward his own theory in favour of the belligerent nobles of his party, according to which a ruler, when he acts as a politician, is not acting as a Christian (“non agit ut christianus”), as though his conscience as a sovereign could be kept distinct from his conscience as a Christian. “A Christian is neither Prince nor commoner nor anything whatever in the personal world. Hence whether resistance is permissible to a ruler as ruler, let them settle according to their own judgment and conscience. To a Christian nothing [of that sort] is lawful, for he is dead to the world.”
“The explanations [Luther’s] have proceeded thus far,” he concludes this strange justification, “and this much you may tell Lazarus [Spengler, the clerk to the Nuremberg Council] concerning my views. I see clearly, however, that, even should we oppose their project, they are nevertheless resolved to offer resistance and not to draw back, so full are they of their own ideas; I preach in vain that God will come to our assistance, and that no resistance will be required. God’s help is indeed visible in this, that the Diet has led to no result, and that our foes have hitherto taken no steps. God will continue to afford us His help; but not everyone has faith. I console myself with this thought: since the Princes are determined not to accept our advice, they sin less, and act with greater interior assurance, by proceeding in accordance with the secular law, than were they to act altogether against their conscience and directly contrary to Holy Scripture. It is true they do not wit that they are acting contrary to Scripture, though they are not transgressing the civil law. Therefore I let them have their way, I am not concerned.”
He thus disclaimed all responsibility, and he did so with all the more confidence by reason of his sermons to the people, where he continued to speak as before of the love of peace which actuated him, ever with the words on his lips: “By the Word alone.” “Christ,” he exclaims, “will not suffer us to hurt Pope or rebel by so much as a hair.”
It was easy to foresee that after such replies from Luther, Spengler and the magistrates of Nuremberg would not be pleased with him. Possibly Link had doubts about making known at Nuremberg a writing which was more in the nature of an excuse than a reply, since, on such a burning question which involved the future of Germany, a more reliable decision might reasonably have been looked for. On February 20, fresh enquiries and complaints concerning the news which had come to Nuremberg of Luther’s approval of organised resistance, reached Veit Dietrich, from the Council clerk, Spengler, and were duly transmitted to Luther (see above, f.). Luther now thought it advisable, on account of the charge of having retracted his previous opinion, to justify himself to Spengler and the magistrates. In his written reply of February 15, he assured the clerk, that he “was not conscious of such a retractation.” For, to the antecedent, he still adhered as before, viz. that it was necessary to obey the Emperor and to keep his laws. As for the conclusion, that the Emperor decrees that in such a case he may be resisted, this, he says, “was an inference of the jurists, not of our own; should they bring forward a proof in support of this conclusion — which as yet they have not done — (‘probationem exspectamus, quam non videmus’) — we shall be forced to admit that the Emperor has renounced his rights in favour of a political and Imperial law which supersedes the natural law.” Of the Divine law and of the Bible teaching, which Luther had formerly advocated with so much warmth, we find here no mention.
The scruples of the magistrates of Nuremberg were naturally not set at rest by such answers, but continued as strong as ever. After the League had already been entered into, an unknown Nuremberg councillor of Lutheran sympathies, wrote again to the highest theological authority in Wittenberg for information as to its legality. In his reply Luther again threw off all responsibility, referring him, even more categorically than before, to the politicians: “They must take it upon their own conscience and see whether they are in the right.... If they have right on their side, then the League is well justified.” Personally he preferred to refrain from pronouncing any opinion, and this on religious grounds, because such leagues were frequently entered into “in reliance on human aid,” and had also been censured by the Prophets of the Old Covenant. Had he chosen, the distinguished Nuremberger might have taken these words as equivalent to a doubt as to the moral character of the League of Schmalkalden. Furthermore, Luther adds: “A good undertaking and a righteous one” must, in order to succeed, rely on God rather than on men. “What is undertaken in real confidence in God, ends well, even though it should be mistaken and sinful,” and the contrary likewise holds good; for God is jealous of His honour even in our acts.
The citizens of Nuremberg had, in the meantime, on February 19, sent to the Saxon envoys their written refusal to join the League of Schmalkalden. The magistrates therein declared that they were still convinced (as Luther had been
formerly) that resistance to the Emperor was forbidden by Holy Writ, and that the reasons to the contrary advanced by the learned men of Saxony were insufficient. George, Elector of the Franconian part of Brandenburg, who was otherwise one of the most zealous supporters of the innovations, also refused to join the League.
The memorandum in which Luther, Jonas, Bugenhagen and Melanchthon had declared, in March, 1530, that the employment of force in defence of the Gospel “could not in any way be reconciled with Scripture” (above, f.) was kept a secret. Not even Melanchthon himself was permitted to send it to his friend Camerarius, though he promised to show it him on a visit. Myconius, however, sent it from Gotha confidentially to Lang at Erfurt, on September 19, 1530, and wrote at the same time: “I am sending you the opinion of Luther and Philip, but on condition that you show it to no one. For it is not good that Satan’s cohorts should be informed of all the secrets of Christ; besides, there are some amongst us too weak to be able to relish such solid food.”
In spite of these precautions copies of the “counsel” came into circulation. The text reached Cochlæus, who forthwith, in 1531, had it printed as a document throwing a timely light on the belligerent League entered into at Schmalkalden in that year. He subjoined a severe, running criticism, a reply by Paul Bachmann, Abbot of the monastery of Altenzell, and other writings.
Cochlæus pointed out, that it was not the Emperor but Luther, who had been a persecutor of the Gospel for more than twelve years. Should, however, the Emperor persecute the true Gospel of Christ, then the exhortation contained in Luther’s memorandum patiently to allow things to take their course and even to suffer martyrdom, would be altogether inadmissible, because there existed plenty means of obtaining redress; in such a case God was certainly more to be obeyed than the Emperor; any Prince who should assist the Emperor in such an event must be looked upon as a tyrant and ravening wolf; it was, on the contrary, the duty of the Princes to risk life and limb should the Gospel and true faith of their subjects be menaced; and in the same way the towns and all their burghers must offer resistance; this would be no revolt, seeing that the Imperial authority would be tyrannously destroying the historic ecclesiastical order as handed down, in fact, the Divine order. Luther’s desire, Cochlæus writes, that each one should answer for himself to the Emperor, was unreasonable and quite impossible for the unlearned. Finally, he warmly invites the doctors of the new faith to return to Mother Church.
The author of the other reply to Luther’s secret memorandum dealt more severely with it. Abbot Bachmann declares, that it was not inspired by charity but by the cunning and malice of the old serpent. “As long as Luther had a free hand to carry on his heresies unopposed, he raged like a madman, called the Pope Antichrist, the Emperor a bogey, the Princes fools, tyrants and jackanapes, worse even than the Turks; but, now that he foresees opposition, the old serpent turns round and faces his tail, simulating a false humility, patience and reverence for the authorities, and says: ‘A Christian must be ready to endure violence from his rulers!’ Yet even this assertion is not true always and everywhere....” Should a ruler really persecute the Divine teaching, then it would be necessary to defend oneself against him. “I should have had to write quite a big book,” he concludes, “had I wished to reply one by one to all the sophistries which Luther accumulates in this his counsel.”
The League of Schmalkalden and the Religious Peace of Nuremberg.
The League of Schmalkalden was first drawn up and subscribed to by Johann, Elector of Saxony, and Ernest, Duke of Brunswick, on February 27, 1531. The other members affixed their signatures to the document at Schmalkalden on March 29. The League comprised, in addition to the Electorate of Saxony and the Duchy of Brunswick-Lüneburg, the Landgraviate of Hesse under Philip, the prime mover of the undertaking, and was also subscribed to by Prince Wolfgang of Anhalt, Counts Gebhard and Albert of Mansfeld, and the townships of Strasburg, Ulm, Constance, Reutlingen, Memmingen, Lindau, Biberach, Isny, Lübeck, Magdeburg and Bremen.
A wedge had been driven into the unity of Germany at the expense of her internal strength and external development. What had been initiated at Gotha in 1526 by the armed coalition between Landgrave Philip of Hesse and the Elector of Saxony, in the interests of the religious innovations, was now consummated.
The obligation to which the members of the League of Schmalkalden pledged themselves by oath was as follows: “That where one party is attacked or suffers violence for the Word of God or for causes arising from it, or on any other pretext, each one shall treat the matter in no other way than as though he himself were attacked, and shall therefore, without even waiting for the others, come to the assistance of the party suffering violence, and succour him to the utmost of his power.” The alliance, which was first concluded for six years, was repeatedly renewed later and strengthened by the accession of new members.
Luther, for his part, had now arrived at the goal whither his steps had been tending and towards which so many of the statements contained in his letters and writings had pointed, inspired as they were by a fiery prepossession in favour of his cause. It suited him admirably, that, when the iron which had so long been heating came upon the anvil, he should remain in the background, leaving to the lawyers the first place and the duty of tendering opinions. In his eyes, however, the future success of the League, in view of its then weakness, was still very doubtful. Should the Schmalkalden conference turn out to be the commencement of a period of misfortune for the innovations, still, thanks to the restraint which Luther had imposed on himself, in spite of his being the moving spirit and the religious link between the allies, his preaching of the Evangel would be less compromised. The miseries of the Peasant War, which had been laid to his account, the excesses of the Anabaptists against public order, the unpopularity which he had earned for himself everywhere on account of the revolts and disturbance of the peace, were all of a nature to make him more cautious. There are many things to show, that, instead of promoting the outbreak of hostilities in the days immediately subsequent to the Diet of Augsburg, he would very gladly have contented himself with the assurance, that, for the present, the Reichstagsabschied not being capable of execution, things might as well take their course. By this policy he would gain time; he was also anxious for the new faith quietly to win new ground, so as to demonstrate to the Emperor by positive proofs the futility of any proceedings against himself.
The wavering attitude of many of the Catholic Estates at Augsburg had inspired him with great hopes of securing new allies. It there became apparent that either much had been rotten for a long time past in that party of the Diet which hitherto had been faithful to the Pope, or that the example of the Protesters had proved infectious.
Wider prospects were also opening out for Lutheranism. In Würtemberg Catholicism was menaced by the machinations of the Landgrave of Hesse. There seemed a chance of the towns of Southern Germany being won back from Zwinglian influences and making common cause with Wittenberg. Henry the Eighth’s failure in his divorce proceedings also raised the hopes of the friends of the new worship that England, too, might be torn away from the Papal cause. At the conclusion of the Diet, Bugenhagen had been summoned by the magistrates of Lübeck in order to introduce the new Church system in that city.
In Bavaria there was danger lest the jealousy of the Dukes at the growth of the house of Habsburg, and their opposition to the expected election of Ferdinand as King, should help in the spread of schism.
It is noteworthy that Luther’s letter to Ludwig Senfl, the eminent and not unfriendly musician and composer, bandmaster to Duke William and a great favourite at the Court of Bavaria, should have been sent just at this time. To him Luther was high in his praise of the Court: Since the Dukes of Bavaria were so devoted to music, he must extol them, and give them the preference over all other Princes, for friends of music must necessarily possess a good seed of virtue in their soul. This connection with Senfl he continued in an indirect fashion.
The best answer to the
resolutions passed at Augsburg seemed to the first leader of the movement to lie in expansion, i.e. in great conquests, to be achieved in spite of all threats of violence.
Instead of having recourse to violence, the Empire, however, entered into those negotiations which were ultimately to lead, in 1532, to the so-called Religious Peace of Nuremberg. At about this time Luther sent a missive to his Elector in which his readiness for a religious war is perfectly plain.
The document, which was composed jointly with the other Wittenberg theologians, and for the Latinity of which Melanchthon may have been responsible, treats, it would appear, of certain Imperial demands for concessions made at the Court of the Elector on September 1, 1531, previous to the Schmalkalden conference. These demands manifest the utmost readiness on the part of the authorities of the Empire to make advances. Yet Luther in his reply refuses to acquiesce even in the proposal that people everywhere should be allowed to receive the Sacrament under one kind, according to the ritual hitherto in use. We are bound to declare openly and at all times, he says, that all those who refrain from receiving under both kinds are guilty of sin. He continues, referring to the other points under debate: It is true that we are told of the terrible consequences which must result should “war and rebellion break out, the collapse of all public order fall like a scourge upon Germany, and the Turks and other foreign powers subjugate the divided nation. To this our reply is: Sooner let the world perish than have peace at the expense of the Evangel. We know our teaching is certain; not a hair’s breadth may we yield for the sake of the public peace. We must commend ourselves to God, Who has hitherto protected His Church during the most terrible wars, and Who has helped us beyond all expectation.”
Collected Works of Martin Luther Page 670
