by Amanda
However, the Persians failed to capture this great city. A smaller Persian
squadron of ten Phoenician ships under the command of Datames sailed in
the opposite direction towards the Cyclades and lowered anchors by the
shore of the island of Siphnos. On receiving news of this the Macedonian
Proteas sailed with 15 ships from Chalcis in Euboea and attacked the
68 Arr., An. , 2.1.3-5; Diod., 17.29.2-4, 17.31.3-4; Plu., Alex. , 18.5; Curt., 3.2.21.
Wilcken 1967, pp. 96-97; Lane Fox 1973, pp. 153-154; Bosworth 1980, pp. 112-
113, 181; Briant 1996, pp. 851-852.
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Chapter IV
enemy, capturing eight ships. This is the only recorded Macedonian
victory at this stage of the sea war.69
Despite this setback, Pharnabazus with his fleet of 100 ships retook the
island of Siphnos, having previously also captured Andros. Although
Curtius Rufus states that these events happened after the Battle of Issus,
the general chronology seems to indicate a lower chronology. The Battle
of Issus took place in late autumn, when the sailing season was already
finished, and therefore it is highly unlikely that major sea operations
happened soon afterwards. In the spring of 332, on the other hand, the
Persian fleet was already seriously depleted. It is therefore most likely
Pharnabazus’ actions in the Cyclades occurred in the early autumn of 333.
The weak island poleis had no option but to surrender to Pharnabazus, but
that there was anti-Persian feeling among the inhabitants is indicated by
the sources mentioning the installation of garrisons. Such garrisons were
not needed against the Macedonian fleet, which was too weak to make
longer excursions beyond its base. The islanders were also forced to remit
tributes, but this was not enough to pay for the fleet as big as this Memnon
had in 334. The sources record ever smaller numbers of Persian ships
engaged in successive sea operations: in the spring of 334 there were 400
at Miletus, the following spring Memnon had 300 at his disposal, whereas
in the autumn of that same year Pharnabazus had 100 in the Cyclades. The
other Persian fleet, commanded by Autophradates and operating near the
Hellespont, was so weak that a Greek fleet on the Macedonian side was
able to defeat it. Athens alone supplied the Macedonian fleet with 100
triremes, thus Persian supremacy at sea was steadily being whittled
away.70
A widely held opinion that Miletus was recaptured by the Persians is
most probably wrong as the only evidence for it is an amended passage in
Curtius Rufus. As the dominant sea power on this stretch of the Asia
Minor coast, the Persians under Pharnabazus’ command were able to exact
payments from Miletus and, no doubt, from other seaport towns that relied
on sea trade as an important part of their economy, but nothing more. The
financial problems at Miletus that resulted from these forced payments are
evident in the fact in 332/331 the expensive office of the eponymous
Stephanephoros was given to the god Apollo. Whenever a deity was
appointed to this office, the temple treasury covered the costs, but this only
69 Arr., An. , 2.2; Curt., 3.3.1; Polyaen., 7.27.2; Plu., mor. , 339f. Atkinson 1980, pp.114-117; Bosworth 1980, pp. 183-184; Bosworth 1988, p. 53; Seibert 1985, pp.
59-60; Debord 1999, p. 460.
70 Curt., 4.1.36-37; [D.], 17.20. Atkinson 1980, pp. 288-290; Seibert 1985, p. 60;
Bosworth 1988, p. 53; Debord 1999, p. 461.
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155
happened when the economic situation was so bad that no mortal was able
to bear the financial burden of holding the state’s most prestigious office.71
Memnon’s death dashed Darius III’s hopes of stopping Alexander’s
invasion by the traditional means of attacking the enemy from behind, i.e.
by employing diversionary tactics in Greece. Diodorus and, in a
rhetorically modified version, also Curtius Rufus relate a conference
between the Great King and a circle of notables concerning future plans
for the war held at Babylon, which was the nearest Persian capital to the
actual fighting. Most of the Persian advisors were in favour of the king
personally leading the army, which in Persian history was something that
happened very rarely, in exceptional cases. The Athenian Charidemus,
who had fled from Alexander to the Persian court, was of a different
opinion and suggested that Darius III should keep far away from the
fighting while an army of hundred thousand troops, a third of which Greek
mercenaries, would march to confront Alexander. The Athenian himself
could command such an army. Darius was initially inclined in favour of
this more sober suggestion. However, the Persian notables did not like this
idea at all. Genuinely or just in the fervour of debate, they even accused
the Athenian of intending to treacherously hand over the Achaemenid
Empire to the Macedonian king. Charidemus had not had time to learn
Persian customs and assuming this to be a political debate like the ones he
knew from democratic Greece responded in a shockingly free manner: he
questioned the Persians’ courage. Unfortunately this insulted the Great
King, who by touching the Athenian’s belt sentenced him to death. The
sentence was immediately executed. Thus Darius III lost yet another brave
and competent Greek general, this time as consequence of a cultural
misunderstanding, and now he had no other option than to lead his army
himself.72
Alexander most probably stayed in Gordium until early summer
(June/July) 333 to allow his troops to rest after the arduous autumn and
winter campaigns and to wait for news from Greece and the Aegean Sea.
There he received envoys from Greece and Asia Minor. His authority was
put to the test when he ordered the tyrant of Heraclea Pontica, Dionysius,
to receive back those who had been banished by his father, Clearchus, and
restore democracy to his state. Unfortunately, Macedonian authority did
not stretch that far north and so the tyrant was able to ignore Alexander
with impunity. Soon after the Gordian knot incident (two days later
according to Arrian) Alexander and his army set off on the Royal Road in
a northeast direction. The first major city they encountered on this new
71 Curt., 4.5.13, 4.1.37; Milet i.3.122.iiI 83. Debord 1999, pp. 462-463.
72 Diod., 17.30; Curt., 3.2.10-19. Atkinson 1980, pp. 108-114.
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Chapter IV
campaign was Ancyra, situated some 100 km from Gordium. It was there
that he was met by envoys from Paphlagonia, a land that was part of
Hellespontine Phrygia but which for much of the 4th century was ruled
only indirectly by the Persian satrap; his deputy was a local monarch who
was always eager to show his independence. It is possible, as Curtius
Rufus writes, that Alexander launched a short campaign to subjugate
Paphlagonia. The country remained part of Hellespontine Phrygia and was
put under the authority of Alexander’s appointed satrap, Calas. That this
rule was weak or perhaps only nominal is reflected in the fact that no
tribute was imposed. Hostages were taken to ensure loyal
ty, but the next
year Paphlagonia returned to the Persian side.73
The next objective of the Macedonian invasion was Cappadocia; or
rather so-called Great Cappadocia for Pontic Cappadocia on the Black Sea
coast may have been a separate satrapy which remained always outside
Macedonian control. Ariarathes, this country’s king or perhaps satrap, not
only acquired at that time independence but even managed to gradually
expand his domain. The royal dynasty he founded was to rule Cappadocia
for the next three centuries. On account of its central location and
intensive Iranian colonisation, Great Cappadocia was strategically
important to anyone who wished to rule over Asia Minor. The sources
report no battles in this region. After occupying this province Alexander
appointed an oriental noble as satrap, most probably a local Cappadocian.
His real name is now impossible to identify as the ancient authors call him
either Sabictas (Arrian) or Abistamenes (Curtius Rufus).74
It was in Cappadocia that Alexander learned of Memnon’s death and it
was presumably soon after receiving this news that he decided to cross the
river Halys, which on more than one occasion in history delineated an
important border for the territorial aspirations of great powers. If that was
the case, Alexander’s next objective must have been Mazaca – the
residence of the satrap of Cappadocia. After that he led his army through
Tyana and over the Taurus Mountains to Tarsus, the capital of Cilicia. In
face of this sudden turn of events the country’s satrap, Arsames, tried to
apply the scorched earth policy that had once been suggested by Memnon.
Curtius Rufus criticises Arsames for not deciding to defend the Cilician
Gates (today called Gülek Bogazi), the 1,050 metre high pass and Tarsus
73 Arr., An. , 2.4.1; Curt., 3.1.22-24; Plu., Alex. , 18.5; Memnon, FGrH, 434 F4.1.
Burstein 1976, pp. 73-74; Atkinson 1980, pp. 96-97; Bosworth 1980, p. 188;
Seibert 1985, pp. 62-63; Debord 1999, pp. 301, 455.
74 Arr., An. , 2.4.2; Str., 12.4.1; Curt., 3.4.1. Bosworth 1980, p. 189; Atkinson 1980,
pp. 135-136; Seibert 1985, p. 63; Jacobs 1994, pp. 140-144; Heckel 2006, p. 44.
On Pontic Cappadocia see: Briant 1996, p. 761; Sartre 2003, p. 15.
From Abydus to Alexandria
157
river valley that joins the Anatolian Highlands with the Cilician lowlands,
from what was in Alexander’s day called the Camp of Cyrus (today
Pozanti) to Tarsus. However, the Cilician Gates could be easily bypassed
and even a determined defence could not have stopped Alexander’s army.
On the other hand, the version of events given by Curtius Rufus was based
on an anonymous eyewitness’s account and is therefore more credible than
Arrian’s glorifying tale of Alexander personally leading a select unit of
soldiers against the Persian guards. However, Arsames scorched earth
tactics that devastated some of the land beyond the Gates also proved
ineffective. The inhabitants of Tarsus, who were terrified by Arsames’
plans to burn their city, warned Alexander of what the satrap was doing.
The king immediately dispatched Parmenion with the cavalry and the
fastest marching troops to save the city. They covered the 55 km distance
from the Cilician Gates to Tarsus in a short enough space of time
(according to Justin in one day) to save the city. Arsames next joined up
with Darius III’s army.75
Alexander reached Tarsus at the end of summer, after a short but tiring
campaign in central Anatolia. His stay there could well have marked the
end of his spectacular career, not because of any wounds incurred in
fighting the Persians but because of an illness. Aristobulus is of the
opinion that the king was simply exhausted. However, another source (one
the ancient authors do not identify) claims it was consequence of his
bathing in the river Cydnus, which flowed through Tarsus. Probably the
original and most plausible version was that Alexander bathed in water
that was too cold. Aristobulus, however, would not have wished to say
Alexander imprudently immersed himself in icy-cold water in summer and
therefore preferred to explain that the illness was a result of exhaustion.
The water of the Kydnos River, like that of other rivers flowing from the
snow covered mountains of Taurus, is extremely cold. Much later, on 10th
June 1190, it was as consequence of bathing in one of them (Calycadnus
also known as Saleph and today as Göksu) that Emperor Frederick
Barbarossa, who had been leading an up to that moment victorious Third
Crusade, lost his life. Alexander’s dip in the Cydnus resulted in
convulsions, a high fever and insomnia. Such symptoms are usually
associated with pneumonia. The only physician in the camp to agree to try
and cure him was Philip of Acarnania, who prepared for the king a potent
medicine, according to Arrian a purgative. The ancient authors add greater
drama to the situation by relating a letter from Parmenion warning the king
against this very physician, who had allegedly been given 1,000 talents by
75 Plu., Alex. , 18.5; Arr., An. , 2.4.3-6; Curt., 3.4.1-15; Just., 11.8.2; It. Alex. , 26-27.
Bosworth 1980, pp. 189-190; Seibert 1985, pp. 63-64.
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Chapter IV
Darius III to poison Alexander. As always, Alexander is said to have
ignored the advice of his most important commander, drunk the potion
prepared by the accused physician and then given him the letter to read.
The physician swore he was innocent and promised that the king’s health
would improve. Indeed, after some time Alexander’s condition got better
and eventually he recovered his health. One can assume that this was
thanks to Alexander’s extraordinarily powerful constitution, which was
able to overcome the disease and not succumb to Philip’s of Acarnania
medicine. Even if some of its more dramatic elements were merely
invented by the ancient authors, Alexander’s serious illness was a fact and
it explains why he remained at Tarsus until the end of September 333.76
It was presumably during Alexander’s illness, when there was a
serious danger of him dying and therefore of Macedonian control of
Cilicia and the whole of Asia Minor collapsing in chaos, that Harpalus
made his first escape. As a member of the ruling family in Elimeia and a
relative of one of Philip II’s wives, Harpalus had been one of Alexander’s
hetairoi when he was just the heir to the throne. Along with the
successor’s other companions he was banished from Macedonia by Philip
II for his involvement in the Pixodarus affair but returned when Alexander
ascended the throne. On account of a physical disability Harpalus was
unable to serve in the Macedonian army but Alexander rewarded his
loyalty by appointing him the state’s treasurer. An evidently emotionally
weak Harpalus was unable to withstand the tense atmosphere during
Alexander’s illness and on the whispered advice of a mysterious figure
called Tauriscus he absconded to Greece. There he spent most of his time
in Magara. Almost two years later, in 331, he returned to Alexander and
was quickly re
appointed to his previously held position.77
4. The battle of Issus
Before he had fully returned to health, Alexander ordered the resumption
of the Cilician campaign and sent east his top commander Parmenion,
leading the Corinthian League army, Greek and Thracian mercenaries and
the Thessalian cavalry. Their objective was to secure a pass in the Amanus
Mountains between Cilicia and Syria. The Macedonian commander
76 Arr., An. , 2.4.7-11; Diod., 17.31.4-6; Curt., 3.5-6; Plu., Alex. , 19; Luc., Dom. , 1; Ps.-Callisth., 1.41 (rec. b); Fragmentum Sabbaiticum, FGrH, 151 F1.6; POxy.
1798 (= FGrH, 148), fr. 44; V. Max., 3.8, ext.6; Just., 11.8; It. Alex. , 28-30.
Wilcken 1967, p. 98; Schachermeyr 1973, p. 202; Lane Fox 1973, pp. 161-162;
Green 1974, pp. 220-221; Bosworth 1980, pp. 190-192; Salazar 2000, pp. 190-192.
77 Arr., An. , 3.6.7. Bosworth 1988, p. 57; Heckel 1992, pp. 213-217.
From Abydus to Alexandria
159
occupied eastern Cilicia including the city of Issus, in the vicinity of which
the first battle between Darius III and Alexander was to be fought.
Unfortunately, the fairly vague descriptions in the sources do not allow us
to establish for certain which of the two passes Parmenion was heading for:
the Pillars of Jonah (Merkes Su) or the more distant Syrian Gates (Belen
Pass). If we accept Plutarch’s suggestion that the Macedonian strategy at
the time was to shift the war into Syria, it seems more probable that
Parmenion secured the latter of these two passes. Next this expeditionary
force returned west to meet up with Alexander’s army.78
By about mid October 333 Alexander had fully recovered his health
and the first thing he did was to take a daylong journey to the south west
of Tarsus to the city of Anchialos. Here was what in Antiquity was called
the Tomb of Sardanapalus, but it may have also been a monument to the
Assyrian King Sancherib’s victory over a rebellious Cilicia. Sardanapalus
was a legendary figure whose name was derived from that of the last great
