by Amanda
Assyrian king, Assurbanipal. On this tomb there was engraved a message,
reputedly in Assyrian: ‘These are still mine – what I ate, and my wanton
love-frolics.’ This was an allusion to the Assyrian king’s love of
banqueting and sexual promiscuity. In all probability the inscription was
invented by the ancient Greek authors to contrast an unmanly and
debauched Sardanapalus with the energetic and chaste Alexander.79 From
Anchialos the Macedonian army marched 20 km further west to the
coastal city of Soli. Here Alexander founded a democratic system of
government, installed a garrison and charged the inhabitants an
extraordinarily high fine of 200 talents. He also took hostages, for which
reason three quarters of the fine soon filled the royal treasury. This drastic
action indicates that Alexander’s finances were in a critical state at the
time. This is further confirmed by the fact that when after the Battle of
Issus the Macedonian army had acquired a lot of booty, Soli was relieved
from paying the rest of this fine. Military operations in western Cilicia
were ended with a seven-day campaign in the mountains around Soli that
were inhabited by independent and fairly primitive tribes. However, this
did not complete the conquest of Cicilia. Balacrus, whom Alexander had
appointed satrap of Cilicia, had to continue the pacification of the Taurus
mountain region and was indeed killed in fighting with the highlanders.80
78 Arr., An. , 2.5.1; Diod., 17.32.2; Curt., 3.7.6-7; Plu., Alex. , 20.4. Chronology: Bosworth 1980, p. 192. Topography: Seibert 1985, pp. 64-65.
79 Arr., An. , 2.5.2-4; Plu., mor. , 330f. Bosworth 1980, pp. 193-195; Hammond
1996, p. 94; Nawotka 2003, p. 86.
80 Arr., An. , 2.5.5-6; Curt., 3.7.2-4. Bosworth 1980, p. 195; Debord 1999, p. 164.
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Meanwhile war flared up again in a region that had seemed to have
been conquered: Caria. Its Persian satrap Orontobates, supported by the
citadels in Halicarnassus, managed to recapture several cities, including
Myndus and Caunus. In September or October 333 the Macedonian
generals Ptolemaios and Asander finally defeated Orontobates in a major
battle. Among those killed were the Persian satrap himself as well as 700
Persian infantry and 500 cavalry. The victory restored Macedonian control
of the coastline in the Ceramic Gulf, thus depriving Pharnabazus’ still
powerful navy of harbours in that part of Asia Minor. At the end of his
stay in western Cilicia Alexander held a military parade as well as
gymnastic and musical competitions before leading his army back to
Tarsus.81 The time he spent on operations of secondary importance in
western Cilicia and the division of his forces into two indicate that
Alexander was quite unaware of the manoeuvres by the main Persian
forces, which at this stage posed a very serious threat to his army.
Darius III gave instructions for his army to gather at Babylon.
According to the ancient authors the size of this army ranged from
312,000 (Curtius Rufus) to 500,000 (Justin) or even 600,000 (Arrian and
Plutarch). Of course all these figures are grossly exaggerated, in keeping
with the tradition of ancient historians to always overstate the size of
Persian forces. The first to do so was Herodotus, who claimed the army of
Xerxes which in 480 invaded Greece comprised as many as 1,700,000
soldiers. On the other hand, one cannot doubt that the Persian army was
considerably larger than the Macedonian force. Curtius provides a detailed
breakdown of Darius III’s army including (on information originating
from Callisthenes) 30,000 Greek mercenaries. Even if this figure is also
exaggerated, one can be certain that Greek hoplites were the primary force
in the Persian infantry. Although the other figures given by Curtius will
also not be accurate, the lack of a contingent from eastern Iran, the land of
the famous Persian cavalry, should not be doubted. It cannot be explained
by the sheer geographic distance of the east Iranian satrapies to the
battlefield as over one and half years had elapsed from Alexander’s arrival
in Asia Minor to the point when his army reached Issus. Even in ancient
times in one and a half years such distances could be covered several times
over. But it seems most probable that Darius only decided to personally
lead his army against Alexander after Memnon’s death, and it would have
only been then that the Persian side’s whole strategic concept of the war
81 Arr., An. , 2.5.7-8; Curt., 3.7.3-4. Bosworth 1980, p. 197; Ruzicka 1992, pp. 147-
149; Debord 1999, p. 461.
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161
changed. This would have left too little time for the entire imperial army to
be mobilised.82
The Persian forces most probably set out from Babylon in September,
after the hottest part of the Mesopotamian summer ended and the harvest
had filled granaries to provide the soldiers with sufficient provisions.
Weighed down by huge baggage trains the Persian army needed two
months to cover the 900 km distance from Babylon to Cilicia, where in
November the battle against the Macedonians would be fought. The
crossing of the Euphrates itself lasted five days. Curtius Rufus colourfully
contrasts the elaborate Persian procession with the simplicity and
toughness of the Macedonian army. According to custom, the Persian
army would start marching at dawn. At the head of the column the sacred
fire would be carried on silver alters. This most characteristic of Persian
military rituals was also practiced in the Sassanid era, a thousand years
later. Following the flame there would be magi singing religious songs,
and behind them 365 youths dressed in purple. Both their number and the
colour of their attire were symbolic. Their number signified the days in the
Persian year and alluded to cosmic nature of the monarch’s authority,
whereas purple was the colour of warriors. Behind them travelled Ahura
Mazda’s (Jupiter’s, according to Curtius) chariot drawn by white horses
and Mithra’s (the Sun’s according to Curtius) horse. Next came a squadron
of cavalry and behind it marched the guard of 10,000 ‘immortals’ and
15,000 specially selected horsemen, the so-called ‘Kinsmen’ who were not
necessarily the monarch’s relatives but nevertheless granted this honorary
title by the Great King. Then came the Royal bodyguards called the
doryphoroi (‘spearmen’) or at other times the melophori after the apple-shaped ( melon) butts of their spears. Behind the bodyguards rode the Great
King wearing his ceremonial cloak and tiara, surrounded by 400 ‘relatives’.
The monarch’s chariot was gilded and adorned with symbols of Ahura
Mazda and Mithra (Ninus and Belus according to Curtius) as well as the
Achaemenid eagle. Following him were 30,000 infantry, the royal horses,
and in carriages the monarch’s mother, wife and children as well as 360
Royal concubines. Archers escorted the Royal treasure chests, which were
carried by 600 mules and 300 camels. And following on behind were the
courtiers, the servants and the rest of the army. To sum up, Darius III’s
82 Callisth., FGrH, 124 F35 (= Plb., 12.18.2); Curt., 3.2.2-9; Diod., 17.31.2; Just.,
11.9.1; Arr., An. , 2.8.8; Plu., Alex. , 18.6; POxy. 1798 (= FGrH, 148) F44, col.
2.2/3. Atkinson 1980, pp. 99-108; Vogelsang 1992, pp. 219-221.
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Chapter IV
marching army had as many aspects of a procession celebrating the sacred
nature of the Persian monarchy as it did of a military operation.83
The great Persian army eventually reached Sochoi, situated somewhere
in northern Mesopotamia in a place unknown to modern historians but
definitely on the eastern side of the Amanus Mountains, behind which
Parmenion’s corps was stationed. Darius now prepared for battle. In order
to increase his army’s mobility he despatched most of the baggage trains
and courtiers to Damascus. According to the ancient authors, Alexander’s
command was unaware of the Persian forces up until they were just a few
days’ march away from the Macedonian army. Unbelievable as this may
seem, this might well have been the case. Once his army progressed
beyond Caria, Alexander ceased being anyone’s liberator; beyond that
boundary population was more sympathetic to the legal Persian authorities.
The sources describe this attitude quite unambiguously in the cases of the
inhabitants of Soli and Issus. That is why it now became difficult for the
Macedonians to acquire reliable information about the enemy, and this
nearly led to their undoing. Darius, on the other hand, was kept very well
informed by his loyal subjects about the whereabouts of the Macedonian
invader.84
Having returned from western Cilicia, Alexander marched his army
further east across the coastal plain to the south of Tarsus without re-
entering the city. Soon afterwards he further divided his army into two. He
ordered Philotas to continue advancing with the cavalry across the Aleian
Plain to the river Pyramus (today Ceyhan), whereas he himself proceeded
with the infantry and the royal ile of cavalry to the seaside town of
Magarsus (today Karataş). This town was actually the port to the city of
Mallus and it lay where in Antiquity the river Pyramus flowed into the
Mediterranean Sea. The only reason for Alexander’s visit mentioned in the
sources was to offer sacrifices at the local temple to Athena. Alexander’s
soldiers built a bridge (at an unknown place) to get across the Pyramus and
then his army proceeded to Mallus. One can suppose that it was in this city
or in its vicinity that Alexander’s army was reunited with Philotas’s corps.
There the Macedonians also quelled some disruptions, perhaps fighting
between a democratic pro-Macedonian faction and a pro-Persian faction.
Alexander did not force the inhabitants of Mallus to pay tributes, not
because he was reverting to his previous policy of liberating Greek cities
but for the ideological reason that he was supposed to be related to them.
83 Curt., 3.3.8-25. Engels 1978, pp. 42-43; Atkinson 1980, pp. 120-133; Boyce
1982, pp. 286-287; Seibert 1985, pp. 68-69; Nylander 1993, pp. 150-151.
84 Arr., An. , 2.5.5, 2.6.1; Callisth., FGrH, 124 F35 (= Plb., 12.17.2); Diod., 17.32.2-3; J., AJ, 11.8.3.
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Legend had it that the city was founded by colonists from Argos, which
was also the homeland of Heracles, the mythological ancestor of the
Argead dynasty. However, as in the case of Soli, Mallus was obliged to
supply ships. The next stop on Alexander’s itinerary was Castabalum,
which lay a day’s journey from Mallus. It was there that Parmenion’s
corps joined up with the main Macedonian army.85
While he was still at Mallus Alexander learned that Darius was
encamped in Sochoi. In response to this news he summoned a council.
Next he marched his army closer towards the Persians until he reached the
city of Myriandrus, whose exact location is unknown. We only know from
Xenophon’s Anabasis that the city lay 5 parasang (27 km) from the Syrian
Gates, therefore somewhere in the region of today’s city of Iskenderun and
c. 140 km from Mallus. It took the Macedonian army five days to cover
this distance. The ancient sources do not concur as to what Alexander’s
actual plan was. Arrian states that objective of the march was to attack the
Persian army where it was stationed. Curtius Rufus, on the other hand,
states that Alexander accepted Parmenion’s advice to seek confrontation in
a mountain pass where the terrain would not allow the Persians to make
use of their numerical advantage. However, although the Battle of Issus
did indeed take place in an area where numerical superiority failed to work
in the Persians’ favour, Alexander’s actions contradict Curtius’s
explanation. Not only did he not secure all of the mountain passes into
Cilicia but, what is worse, he himself actually went through one of them to
the other side, where he expected to find the Persian camp. Therefore the
first version seems more probable, that is, an offensive plan to seek out the
enemy forces and attack them where they were stationed. That was why
Alexander crossed over to the other side of the Amanus Mountains. On the
way Alexander’s army passed through Issus, which had previously been
occupied by Parmenion. This fairly small town was in a place known
today as Kinet Hüyük, on a low (20 m) hill half a kilometre from the sea
and 7 km to the north west of today’s town of Dörtyol. The Macedonians
set up a field hospital at Issus for their wounded and sick soldiers; thus the
army was now free to move much faster. It has been estimated that
Myriandrus was over 30 km from Issus and the Macedonian army covered
that distance within one day. After this forced march, the Macedonian
army had to stop over at Myriandrus on account of a violent storm. It was
also there that Alexander received the disturbing news that Darius’ army
was no longer at Sochoi and had now reappeared behind them. At first he
could not believe this to be true, but the crew of a thirty-oar ship was sent
85 Arr., An. , 2.5.8-9; Curt., 3.7.5; Str., 14.5.17; It. Alex. , 31. Bosworth 1980, pp.
197-198; Huttner 1997, pp. 91-92.
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Chapter IV
out to reconnoitre and later it confirmed that the Persians were now indeed
camped on the coast behind Alexander’s army.86
Sochoi was situated on a broad plain that would have been ideal for the
massed Persian cavalry if the Macedonians had crossed one of the
mountain passes. The reason why the Great King left this strategically
advantageous position and moved into mountainous Cilicia, where the
terrain did no allow him to use his army’s numerical superiority is one of
the greatest puzzles of the Macedonian-Persian war. Curtius’s suggestion
that the Great King decided to move into Cilicia on receiving news of
Alexander’s illness is quite unconvincing on account of the chronological
sequence of events. Alexander’s illness lasted some time and was then
followed by the Macedonian campaign in Cilicia, which in a way can
explain the Persian army’s haste. Arrian writes about Darius’s drawn out
stay at
Sochoi and uncertainty as to what Alexander was planning on
account of the surprisingly long time he was spending in Cilicia as well as
the imprudent advice of his Persian flatterers. The sycophants convinced
the Great King that Alexander was too fearful of the mighty Persian army
to advance any further. They encouraged Darius to engage Alexander in
battle in Cilicia, for even there the excellent Persian cavalry was capable
of defeating the Macedonians. Arrian and Plutarch show that the
Macedonian fugitive Amyntas who knew Alexander well assured the
Great King that the impetuous young ruler would be eager to fight. One
only had to wait for him to turn up wherever a prepared Persian army was
stationed. In Curtius’ account this were some anonymous Greek
mercenaries who offered Darius this more sensible advice badly received
by the Persian courtiers. We know that the Great King did not heed the
sober words of the real expert or experts, but the sources do not tell us why
he took the decision he did other than making some general comments
about fate and a propensity to follow bad advice.87
There is no reason to doubt the reports of sensible advisors in the
Persian camp, even if Curtius Rufus’s account of mercenaries giving
advice is probably erroneously borrowed form the incident between
Charidemus and Darius at the Babylon conference. It is possible that one
of the reasons why such advice was rejected – mentioned here by Curtius
and also referred to in descriptions of councils in the Persian camp –
concerned the mistrust held by the Iranian aristocracy towards the Greeks,
86 X., An. , 1.4.6; Callisth., FGrH, 124 F35 (=Plb., 12.17.2, 12.19.4); Arr., An. , 2.6.1, 2.7.1-2; Curt., 3.7.9-10. Engels 1978, pp. 47-51; Bosworth 1980, pp. 199-202; Bing 1993.
87 Arr., An. , 2.6.3-7; Plu., Alex. , 20.1-4; Curt., 3.7.1, 3.8.1-11. Atkinson 1980, p.
170.
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whom they suspected of treason or at least being more concerned with
their personal interests than with those of the Persian state. The Great King
