The Temple of Set II
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of the arts which instruct us in the methods of action. The kingly art controls them according to its
power to perceive the right occasions for undertaking and setting in motion the great enterprises of
state. The other arts must do what they are told to do by the kingly art ... It is a universal art, and so
we call it by a name of universal scope. That name is one which I believe to belong to this art and
this alone, the name of “statesmanship”.
The Sphinx: On the whole, that’s not a bad definition. And, I might add, there is nothing in it which necessitates
the existence of an absolute standard for statesmanship. A statesman can simply be a person who is
relatively skilled at emphasizing, directing, and applying the various arts and sciences of a state or
community.
The Chimæra: So it would seem. In view of Plato’s attack on “arch-Sophists” as being the leaders of all but the
perfect [Form] government, one might suspect that he insisted upon an absolute standard of government
just so that he could attribute everything less than that to Sophistry. Having delivered such an
uncomplimentary blow to both Sophists and politicians, Plato could quietly abandon the notion of an
absolute governmental standard. In fact, the definition that I just quoted is thoroughly relativistic and
cannot be applied in terms of absolute standards.
The Sphinx: And just how do you draw that conclusion?
The Chimæra: If each subordinate art in a community possesses its own standard of absolute perfection, a raising
or lowering of the application of that art by the statesman would cause excess or deficiency in the art itself.
For example, the military art involves winning battles and wars. If the statesman, for the good of the entire
community, prevents the military from conducting battles or wars, the military art itself experiences a
deficiency. At a later date, if the military does go to war, that deficiency will be evident as inexperience in
combat. Similarly, if the statesman orders the military to fight too many battles or wars, excess will occur.
The military will become inefficient through demoralization and attrition. To permit the military to function
at an ideal level, a statesman would have to allow a level of continuous or intermittent warfare. This,
obviously, would not be ideal for the state as a whole.
The Sphinx: Your point being that the ideal level of a subordinate art as a thing in itself is at odds with its ideal
application by the statesman’s art.
The Chimæra: Yes, and there’s more to it than that. If there is an ideal standard or level for both component arts
and the statesman’s art, then the maintenance of that standard or level over a period of time should ensure
continuous and ideal prosperity for the state as a whole, correct?
The Sphinx: Theoretically, yes.
The Chimæra: But conditions outside that state will vary. A neighboring state may go to war against it, for
example.
The Sphinx: That would necessitate an alteration of certain component arts - such as materiel production,
resource allocation, and military activity - by the statesman, if he is to perform his ideal role.
The Chimæra: But this means exceeding or falling below the ideal standards of the individual component arts. In
other words, the ideal standards of a component art by itself and the ideal level of that art as a factor in the
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overall community do not coincide. Therefore, if Plato insists upon absolute standards, he places his
statesman in the position of having to continuously violate the absolute standards of component arts for the
sake of his own art.
The Sphinx: I suppose Plato would argue that the ideal standards of the component arts would include
consideration for the proper level of those arts within the community as a whole.
The Chimæra: That still begs the question. The posture of the community must change as its external
environment changes. Therefore the component arts will be subject to continuous revision of their levels of
activity and emphasis. They become factors relative to the community, just as the community becomes a
factor relative to its external environment. Q.E.D.
The Sphinx: So Plato’s definition of statesmanship is valid only if both that art and the subordinate arts are
assumed to be variable and relativistic. How intriguingly Sophistic!
The Chimæra: ... All of which brings us back to the basic “relativity vs. absolutism” issue between [what Plato
would call] Sophistry and Philosophy respectively. In a purely practical sense we cannot continue to use
those terms as Plato did, because “sophistry” now conveys the image of charlatanism, while “philosophy”
embraces relativistic as well as absolutist theories.
The Sphinx: True. The basic issue still remains, but the old labels are no longer accurate. Why do you suppose
Plato felt so strongly that absolute standards (Forms) existed?
The Chimæra: It probably started with what he believed to be common sense. Our senses seem to tell us that the
world around us is made up of reliable and permanent phenomena. A chair can be counted upon to remain
a chair, a desk a desk. The Sun and the planets behave regularly. Relativism carried to its logical conclusion
would deny these things. How could the Sophists say that “man is the measure of all things” as they walked
about on the solid and permanent ground of Greece? Man cannot decide that the ground will be there one
minute and transmute into water the next. Plato must have felt that he was arguing a case for the way things
actually are, even if he encountered difficulties in justifying that position logically.
The Sphinx: To be quite precise, a chair does not remain a chair or a desk a desk. Both are undergoing continuous
molecular breakdown, which is not apparent to humans because they normally experience sensory input at
a relatively swifter rate. Nor are astronomical bodies truly constant; they only seem that way, again because
of the relative differences in their rates of change and in human perceptive powers. At the other end of the
scale, there are phenomena that occur too swiftly for human senses to register them. So they seem
“instantaneous”. So how dependable is Plato’s “actual world”?
The Chimæra: I am tempted to say that, relatively speaking [from the human point of view], the world appears to
adhere to absolute laws.
The Sphinx: Now that is an interesting statement! You mean that the human ability to perceive relative change
exists in a comparatively small range, and that phenomena changing at rates beneath or above that range
appear to be instantaneous or permanent, as the case may be.
The Chimæra: I suppose so.
The Sphinx: Can we not identify anything that is truly permanent? That is in fact absolute and not relative?
The Chimæra: That was Einstein’s problem. He was able to postulate only one thing that was absolute - the speed
of light. But in that he was wrong.
The Sphinx: Wrong? Kindly explain!
The Chimæra: We run the risk of straying rather far from The Statesman.
The Sphinx: But not from our ultimate topic. Remember that we are trying to get a grip on true conceptual
analysis, and to do that we had better resolve this relative/absolute issue once and for all. According to the
Platonic school of thought, political science has an absolute standard, just as physical laws do. That is the
argument of The Statesman. So now we
have said that Einstein reduced physics to only one absolute - the
speed of light - and you dispute even that. I for one consider a resolution of this germane. If you destroy
absolutism in the physical world, then the basis for attempting to parallel the “absolute physical world” with
an “absolute political world” disappears altogether. So proceed.
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The Chimæra: All right. According to Einstein’s second fundamental postulate of the Special Theory of Relativity,
the velocity of light is always constant relative to an observer, no matter how fast the observer and the light
source may be separating or converging. A derived equation states that, when an object is moving with
respect to an observer, the mass of the object becomes greater, the amount of increase depending upon the
relative velocity of object and observer. As the mass of the object increases, its length along the axis of its
direction will decrease. At the speed of light, the object’s mass becomes infinite, and its length shrinks to
zero. Since an infinite-plus amount of energy would be required to raise the speed of an infinite mass
beyond the speed of light, such hyper-light speed is not possible.
The Sphinx: So states the Special Theory.
The Chimæra: Now, internally the Special Theory is consistent, because it treats the speed of light as a constant
and incorporates a series of equations which rely upon that constant and are consistent with one another.
As the Special Theory applies to phenomena which are substantially below the speed of light, it is practical.
The interrelationship of mass and energy relative to 186,000 miles per second (the Einstein speed of light
constant) has been formulated as E=mc2 and put into practice through nuclear fission.
The Sphinx: Where, then, lies the fault?
The Chimæra: The Achilles’ Heel of the Special Theory is that, while applying the principle of relativity to
everything else except the speed of light, it thereby treats the speed of light as an exception to the rule. An
exception to a rule of physics is an indication that the rule is inadequate to cover all known phenomena.
Einstein’s decision to treat the speed of light as a constant was based upon the difference between the speed
of light and non-light-wave-related phenomena being so vast as to make sub-186,000 mps light speed
impossible to detect; and also upon the inability of science to detect anything traveling faster than 186,000
mps.
The Sphinx: Why this emphasis upon the word “detect”?
The Chimæra: Detection and existence are two different things, and that difference is crucial to my argument.
Now consider this hypothesis: If light waves from a stationary source travel at 186,000 mps, and those light
waves are the only means an observer located elsewhere has for detection of that source, what would
happen if the source were to begin moving away from the observer at 186,001 mps? Those light waves that
are the sole source of the observer’s information would no longer reach that observer. The waves are now
receding from him at 1 mps. As far as the observer can detect, the light-source vanished when its speed
exceeded the speed of light. But did the source in fact cease to exist? It did not. [And its presence may be
detectable by observing warps in radiation waves and emissions affected by it - a possible explanation of the
“black hole” phenomenon.]
The Sphinx: What about light-sources that are proceeding in directions other than diametrically away from an
observer?
The Chimæra: As for an object approaching an observer at 186,000+ mps, it would arrive before it could be
detected at any distance as a moving object, because humans do not possess instruments that can identify
approaching light speeds in excess of 186,000 mps - which would be the only means of identifying the
object’s approach. If the source were to proceed at a tangent to an observer, it will seem to compress as it
approaches the speed of light. The explanation for this illusion is more complex, but I may approximate it
by saying that the lateral movement/oscillation of the emitted light waves is less detectable as the lateral
speed of the object approaches 186,000 mps. At 186,000 mps the waves are no longer detectable as waves -
merely as radiation; hence the illusion that the source has transmutated from matter to energy.
The Sphinx: In fact, then, the Special Theory contains its own invalidation. It states that everything is relative, but
it cannot exist as a formula without at least one absolute constant - which, upon examination, proves to be
relative itself. Which leaves only one question: If it is wrong, why does E=mc2 work?
The Chimæra: Because the values which are plugged into that formula are so far below 186,000 mps that the
speed of light might as well be treated as a constant. For equations that include values closer to 186,000
mps, the formula becomes increasingly less accurate. Hence the preposterous calculation that a mass at
186,000 mps becomes infinite. That is simply the result of the formula’s intrinsic distortion.
The Sphinx: This is all very unsettling. So everything is relative?
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The Chimæra: Let’s not jump to conclusions. Remember what we decided concerning Plato’s own proof of
absolute Forms?
The Sphinx: Yes. I referred to the Platonic Academy’s inscription Let no one ignorant of mathematics enter here,
and then I said:
Plato saw in mathematics unshakable evidence that there was an absolute standard for the
Universe. And where one such standard existed, it was logical to assume that there were others.
Today humans regard mathematics principally as an applied science, but in Plato’s time it was
considered by the Pythagoreans to be “pure”, having nothing to do with the gross and imperfect
everyday world.
The Chimæra: Would you care to elaborate upon that?
The Sphinx: The best thing to do is to quote directly from Thomas Stanley’s 1687 account of the Pythagorean
doctrines, which draws its material from Porphyrus, Iamblicus, Strabo, etc. The Stanley text materializes,
and the Sphinx turns to Part IX page #522. Consider the following: [sic]
The mind being purify’d [by Discipline] ought to be applied to things that are beneficial; these he
procured by some contrived ways, bringing it by degrees to the contemplation of eternal incorporeal
things, which are ever in the same state; beginning orderly from the most minute, lest by the
suddenness of the change it should be diverted, and withdrew itself through its great and long
pravity of nutriment.
To this end, he first used the Mathematical Sciences, and those Speculations which are intermediate
betwixt Corporeals and Incorporeals, (for they have a Threefold Dimension, like Bodies, but they
are impassible like Incorporeals) as Degrees of Preparation to the Contemplation of the things that
are; diverting, by an artificial Reason, the Eyes of the Mind from corporeal things (which never are
permanent in the same manner and estate) never so little to a desire of aliment; by means whereof,
introducing the contemplation of things that are, he rendered men truly happy. This use he made of
the Mathematical Sciences.
These Sciences were first termed μάθημα by Pythagoras upon consideration that all Mathesis
(discipline) is Reminiscence, which comes not extrinsecally to souls as the phantasies which are
formed by sensible objects in the
Phantasie; nor are they an advantageous adscititious knowledg,
like that which is placed in Opinion; but it is excited from Phænomena’s, and perfected intrinsecally
by the cogitation converted into it self.
The Chimæra: How very interesting. It would seem that the recollective basis of knowledge, heretofore assumed
to be a Platonic concept, is in fact Pythagorean.
The Sphinx: And the use of mathematics as a key to this particular sort of knowledge, i.e. of the Forms.
The Chimæra: Who is this Stanley, and how reliable can he be considered to be?
The Sphinx: Thomas Stanley graduated from Cambridge at age 16 as a Master of Arts. He practiced law; was fluent
in French, Italian, Spanish, and the Classical languages; and issued the first volume of his famous History of
Philosophy when he was only 30. The three paragraphs cited above are all footnoted to original Greek
sources.
The Chimæra: So Plato used mathematics as a “place to stand”, in an effort to make the Universe intelligible by
reason alone. And Platonists tend to emphasize this, shielding Plato from the despised title of “mystic”. See
here: He indicates page #xv in the Collected Dialogues .
[Huntington Cairns:] But the difference between Plato and the mysticism that has attached itself to
his philosophy is essential. Plato’s aim is to take the reader by steps, with as severe a logic as the
conversational method permits, to an insight into the ultimate necessity of Reason. And he never
hesitates to submit his own ideas to the harshest critical scrutiny; he carried this procedure so far in
the Parmenides that some commentators have held that his own doubts in this dialogue prevail over
his affirmations. But the beliefs of mystics are not products of critical examination and logical
clarification; they are, on the contrary, a series of apprehensions, flashes, based on feeling, denying
the rational order. The mystic’s reports of his experiences are beyond discussion inasmuch as they
are subjective and emotional; they must be accepted, by one who wishes to believe them, as a matter
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of faith, not knowledge. Plato’s view of the world is that of an intelligible system that man can know