The Syrian Social Nationalist Party

by Salim Mujais

  A new plan by the hinterland government in March 1938 to issue a new currency separate from the one used in Lebanon was further fodder for Saadeh’s attack on the National Bloc.

  “The reversal of the politics of the Bloc from unionist to separatist is astounding and only compounds the Bloc’s failure to safeguard the integrity of the Syrian homeland and the national interests of the Syrian nation. The cost of the feeble treaty was exorbitant: to wit the loss of Alexandretta, the disarray in al-Jazira, the re-activation of separatism in the Syrian provinces, the new law for minorities, the customs obstacles between Lebanon and Syria, and now the peculiar idea of a new currency… The concept of economic unity is absent from the political lexicon of the Bloc.” 77

  Saadeh chronicles the continuing tyrannical rule in the hinterland:

  “The arrest of the leaders of the opposition is not a proof of the strength of the government as much as a testimony to the seriousness of the internal strife. Oppression is resorted to by government when their policies fail… The Bloc has no aspirations beyond the transmutation of the Mandate into a treaty and the monopolization of power in the hinterland and it has fulfilled these aspirations… Their aim now is to do all they can to safeguard these gains… The nation is facing a daunting and dire international situation and risks to disintegrate at the slightest attack, yet the Bloc continues with its ethnically divisive policies and aggravates national weaknesses.” 78

  Modern historians have generally characterized the politicians of the hinterland in concordance with Saadeh’s views. Philip Khoury the foremost expert on the National Bloc wrote: “French control in Syria, contrary to French design, made of nationalism the chief political instrument of a large segment of the Syrian political elite, members of absentee landowning and bureaucratic classes in Damascus and in other Syrian towns. Nationalist slogans – “unity” and “independence” – were used as a crude, lowest common denominator appeal to rally the Syrian masses behind the traditional elite. Although the ideological tool to muster support was new, and the words and content truly different from before, the short-run political goal of the Syrian elite was as old as the hills: the monopolistic control of local political power”. 79

  Saadeh’s attack on the National Bloc culminated in a series of six articles titled: Huquq al-Ummah bayn al-Kitlah al-Wataniyah wa al-Ajanib (National Rights between the National Bloc and Foreigners) that appeared in the first two weeks of May 1938. The thrust of these articles is summed up by the following quote:

  “No nation has been cursed with a poor political representation destroying its morale and squandering its national struggle the way Syria has been cursed by having the feudal national Bloc represent its national interests… Expecting anything besides erratic efforts from the national Bloc is like discussing philosophy, cosmology and economics with the tribes of Zimbabwe, or the Niam-Niam… The world has not seen more juvenile politicians than the leaders of the National Bloc…”

  ALLIANCE WITH THE OPPOSITION IN THE HINTERLAND

  Among the politicians of the hinterland, Abd al-Rahman Shahbandar (1879-1940) was one of the few with whom the SSNP would find some concordance on views and approaches. Shahbandar’s nationalist history uniquely qualified him for rapprochement with the SSNP. Shahbandar was a graduate of the medical school of the Syrian Protestant College (which subsequently became AUB) and connected to the Damascus notables class through marriage (his wife was from the Azm family). After the defeat of the Ottomans, he was a very active advocate of Syrian independence and nationalism. In May 1919 during the Feisal period, he established in Damascus Hizb al-Ittihad al-Souri (Party of Syrian Unity) whose slogan was “Syria for the Syrians!” The party advocated complete and absolute independence of Syria within its natural boundaries uniquely similar to those advocated by the SSNP. It also championed these demands with the King-Crane Commission. Shahbandar occupied the post of Foreign Minister in the Feisal government alongside Yusef al-Azma the War Minister and the hero of Maysaloun. He and Azma represented the anti-French nationalist line.80 After the defeat of the Feisal government, Shahbandar organized the Iron Hand Society in 1921 that agitated against the French and participated in the 1925-1926 revolt.81 In his exile in Egypt, he was active in the Syria-Palestine Congress, a group that young Saadeh had praised in the 1920s.

  During the clandestine period, Saadeh had asked one of his lieutenants, Ma’moun Ayyas, to correspond with Shahbandar then in Egypt and gauge his views on several issues. That correspondence has survived in the files of the Lebanese judge Hasan Qabalan. Saadeh expressed the hopes that motivated this correspondence on the pages of an-Nahda in November of 1937:

  “When Dr. Shahbandar was still in exile in Egypt, the national generation in Syria had high expectations founded on his writings in the major Egyptian newspapers 82 in which he expressed opinions that distinguished him from his peers in Syrian politics. Among these views was his support for social reform, his appreciation of the imperative of Syrian nationhood and his separation between national principles and sectarian fanatism… On his return, a faithful nation celebrated his advent… Soon after his arrival in Damascus and his clash with the government, he became the center of interest of the opposition and was expected to announce a reform program as a basis for this opposition.” 83

  Newspapers in Damascus loyal to Shahbandar defended the SSNP against governmental abuses and opened their pages to articles by SSNP members and sympathizers.

  Shahbandar, however, was to disappoint these expectations by resorting to manipulative political tactics not much different from other traditional politicians, and by appearing to adhere to religious Arabism. By March of 1938, Saadeh’s disillusionment in Shahbandar was manifest in his writings.84

  Saadeh met secretly with Shahbandar on the latter’s request and a mutual understanding appeared to be in the making.85 Inexplicably, however, Dr. Shahbandar neglected internal political interests and left Syria to Europe and then Egypt on the pretext of pressing involvement in foreign affairs! While Shahbandar gave several indications in public and in private of his appreciation, admiration and endorsement of the SSNP and its principles, these did not translate into any meaningful alliance.86 Additional contacts between the SSNP and Shahbandar were continued but the apparent rapprochement did not bear any fruits. Shahabandar’s call for “the Arabic empire, Arab unity, Land of the Quran” led Saadeh to conclude that his goal was clearly the “manipulation of the masses for political gain.” 87

  THE CASE OF MAY ZIADEH

  No modern Syrian thinker stands higher in Saadeh’s esteem than the feminist author May Ziadeh. She figures prominently among the luminaries that Saadeh considers as forerunners of the national revival movement. A few years after the events to be related presently, on receiving news of her death he wrote,

  “There has never been in Syria in the last centuries a great woman thinker like May Ziadeh. Among all the literati that I have met or read, I have found but a small number who match her in education, culture and literary talent. May was a blessing to an aggrieved nation and was therefore a lost blessing. May’s original homeland was the monster that sank its claws in her soul and body and almost devoured her in al-Asfourieh and Rubeiz hospital. Besides the joy I feel of dedicating myself to the cause of my nation, few are the things that bring me happiness like the feeling I experienced with the success of the campaign I undertook to save May from the shameful conditions in the claws of the monster.” 88

  Feminist author May Ziadeh at her writing desk.

  May’s tragic course started with the insidious onset and progression of her depression following a series of personal losses. Thinking she might find solace with her Lebanese relatives, she agreed to accompany a cousin of hers Dr. Joseph Ziadeh to Beirut where she arrived on March 4, 1936. Little did she know that Dr. Ziadeh and his family were to exercise towards her a form of exploitative aggression motivated by greed. Within two weeks after her arrival in Beirut, Dr. Ziadeh engineered several psychiatric consultations ulti
mately resulting in her forceful incarceration against her will in the Asfouriyeh mental hospital 89 on May 16, 1936 with a diagnosis of involutional melancholia (an older name for major depression).

  Saadeh first heard of May’s plight in mid-January 1938 when he was approached by an acquaintance who related to him her case. Saadeh considered the case to represent a violation of May’s human and civil rights. As an advocate of the sanctity of both, he could not remain uninvolved. His admiration and respect for May were additional incentives.

  Saadeh went to visit May the next morning. His description of the encounter suggests that an intellectual affinity gradually developed between the two thinkers. He noted that May “showed a great spiritual readiness to embrace great ideas and address issues of philosophical and scientific thinking. May was a thinker of great culture and intellectual ability seldom encountered among the Syrian literati that preceded the Social-Nationalist Revival.”

  Immediately after this visit, Saadeh wrote an editorial on the first page of an-Nahdah that appeared on the morning of January 19. The article was an open letter to the Attorney General of Lebanon and the office of the French High Commissioner alerting them to the injustice being committed on their watch. This was a brilliant maneuver for it addressed the legal aspects of May’s incarceration and called into question the rights of the Consul of Egypt to intervene outside Egyptian jurisdiction. The political implications were significant for were the Attorney General and the High Commissioner’s office to remain silent, they would be abdicating their responsibilities of juridical sovereignty and allowing an injustice to be perpetrated at their doorstep.The article electrified the SSNP constituency and women members of the SSNP starting organizing for a potential public demonstration in support of May. Saadeh exerted unrelenting pressure. On January 20, he visited his friend judge Qabalan who facilitated his access to the office of the Attorney General. Fearing that the Lebanese judiciary may hesitate intervening in a case with political association and intervention of a foreign power, Egypt, Saadeh called the office of the political secretary of the High Commissioner, Baron Kiefer, and asked for a face-to-face meeting for that same day which was immediately granted. Saadeh met with Kiefer and detailed for him May’s case, the disturbing interference of the Egyptian Consul, and the deep interest of the SSNP and its leader in the welfare of May. On January 21, the Attorney General visited May in her hospital and was deeply moved by her story. He subsequently met with Dr. Ziadeh and news reached Saadeh that complications were arising. He called Nassif and informed him that if May was not released within 48 hours, he would forcefully liberate her. Saadeh renewed his contacts with the Attorney General’s office and the High Commissioner’s office. The next day, January 22, the Attorney General ordered May to be released to the hospital of the American University and appointed a commission of physicians to examine her including a high-ranking French physician courtesy of the High Commissioner’s intervention.

  May was released from the University Hospital on February 14 on her own recognizance to live in a house rented and furnished for her by supporters. Within days, however, a Maronite priest of the Ziadeh family filed a lawsuit in the Lebanese courts requesting May’s re-incarceration on the grounds of mental incapacity. People claiming to be May’s relatives also attempted to force their way into her home. Saadeh ordered the SSNP branch in Beirut to post permanent guards on the house. These guards were instrumental in aborting and preventing subsequent attempts at invading May’s privacy and potentially endangering her.

  To vindicate May in the eyes of the public, and to strengthen her legal case against her relatives, May’s lawyers arranged for her to deliver a lecture at the American University of Beirut under the auspices of al-Ourwah al-Wuthqa. Guards from the SSNP accompanied May to the University campus. Saadeh attended May’s lecture in West Hall on March 22 and an-Nahda publicized the lecture and praised it in a review.

  May’s legal problems took a protracted course in Lebanon and later in Egypt before she regained access to her assets and belongings. The details of this course need not occupy us here and the interested reader can pursue them in the cited sources. What needs to be addressed now is an evaluation of Saadeh’s intervention. How critical was his intervention in securing May’s release and safeguarding her freedom? Historians of the events have tended to maximize the role of the literati. Amin al-Rihani who for example wrote a book about his role in the affair. Rihani, however, had poor relations with the Lebanese government and the French and no political standing, his literary fame notwithstanding. While political leaders of great import such as Fares al-Khoury were intimately involved in the case, their involvement was mainly in the protracted legal proceedings in Lebanon and Egypt that followed her release from hospital. The interventions of other political leaders were mainly perfunctory and after the fact (e.g. Emir Abdallah of Jordan, and a few Syrian politicians). Saadeh’s role was critical. His intervention was the single most significant development that secured her release. Indeed, in less than a week after he became aware of the case, May was on her way to freedom! It is regrettable that historians of the case have either totally ignored his role or underplayed its significance.

  Saadeh visited May one last time before he left Lebanon later that spring. He was accompanied by Fakhri Maaluf and Charles Malik. By that time, May was surrounded by a coterie of literati and others all striving to make her happy and to keep her busy. Saadeh was sorry for her fate and the absence of considered and calm care that he thought the writer needed and deserved.

  CONFRONTING A RELIGIOUS BASTION

  The confrontation between the SSNP and the leadership of the Maronite church was initiated by the latter. Soon after the discovery of the SSNP, a pamphlet labeling the SSNP as the “enemy of religion and country” was published with the blessing of Patriarch Arida.90

  The author of the pamphlet, Louis Khalil, a priest and close confidant of Patriarch Arida, is clearly addressing a Maronite Christian community when he asks, “Do the principles of the SSNP conform to the laws of God and the teachings of the Church?” After defining his medieval context, he goes further to relate the implications of the SSNP First Reform Principle (Separation of religion and state). “The clear meaning is that the state should separate itself from religion in an absolute sense neglecting our obligations and duties to Almighty God. It will not be founded on belief in God and will not respect His Laws. More precisely, it will be a state without religion Ignoring God in its constitution, legislation and the execution of its affairs as if God did not exist. This is the true meaning of the separation of state and religion, a grave matter for it is a major insult to Almighty God”. After more of the same obscurantist drivel, Father Louis Khalil concludes that the SSNP satisfies all the conditions that would bring excommunication on any members of the Catholic Church (Maronites included) who would join its ranks. The modern reader may scoff at the anachronistic language and the medieval concepts in the pamphlet, but in 1936 Lebanon, this was a serious obstacle to confront.

  It should not surprise us, therefore, that the Patriarch would take a swipe at the SSNP in his annual homily. The homily of the patriarch was an opportunity for Saadeh not only to defend his party, but also to undermine the legitimacy of political involvement by the clergy. Indeed, Saadeh’s rebuttal and the Patriarch’s speech were published by the SSNP in a pamphlet distributed widely in Syria and the immigrant communities.

  Saadeh’s rebuttal was three pronged: first, he offered an unflattering characterization of Patriarch Arida; second, he ridiculed the role of the patriarchy; and third, he showed the incompetence of the Patriarch in the handling of the specific political and civic issues tackled in the homily.

  The Patriarch gave Saadeh the excuse to rebut him by inserting the following paragraphs in his homily:

  “It is regrettable that a group of Lebanese have enrolled in political parties under foreign influence such as the Syrian Nationalist Party and the Communist Party, working against Lebanese independence
, and believing in principles nefarious to religion, country and morality. It is the duty of the government to resist these parties working to undermine Lebanese independence and spreading evil principles under the guise of seeking public good.

  It saddens us to see the government ignoring the Communist party while it disbands and resists Lebanese organizations… We do thank the government, however, for its actions against the Syrian Nationalist Party…

  The primary duties of the government are the protection of the citizenry and their livelihood from internal and external dangers… and the prohibition of societies and parties that threaten the existence of Lebanon and spread corruption and discord in the population such as the Communist Party and the Syrian Nationalist Party and their ilk.”

  Rebutting the Patriarch had great symbolic significance and Saadeh and the SSNP used this rebuttal to foster acceptance of their secularist agenda. The Patriarch delivered his speech on Dec 6, 1937. It was published in an-Nahda on December 8 and on the 9th an-Nahda announced the forthcoming rebuttal, and did that recurrently until the first part of the rebuttal appeared on December 21st and continued over four consecutive issues. The periodical then issued the whole rebuttal as a special supplement and it was later issued as a pamphlet with the speech of the Patriarch.

  Saadeh offers an anthropological view of the involvement of religious authorities in civic and political affairs:91

  “The tackling of social, economic and political affairs by religious authorities today is akin to their handling of physical and mental illnesses in days gone by. Priests claimed a hidden power accepted because of the prevalent ignorance of those backward times. As the advancements in medical sciences have made it impossible for the priest-sorcerer to replace the expert physician, the advancements in social and political sciences have equally made it impossible for an archbishop or a patriarch to supplant a social scientist, a political expert or an economics specialist. Just as the interference of a priest in the care of a patient leads to the ruin of the work of the physician, the interference of men of the cloth in the handling of economic, social and political issues will lead to the disruption of the work of experts in these economic, social and political issues.”