Analysis of India's Ability to Fight a 2-front War 2018

by Ravi Rikhye

  Raise new Mech Div using 1 excess brigade of 12 RAPID, 340 (I) Mech Bde, and a new armd bde. On its side, Pakistan has one armored division (labeled as mechanized) plus two independent armored brigades, plus four infantry divisions, plus independent infantry brigades (V and XII Corps). On India’s side, we have two divisions. This forces the deployment of XXI Corps to this area; and limits the concentration of the 3 strike corps as an unstoppable wedge to break into Pakistan. A new mechanized division (3 independent brigade groups) gives Indian XII Corps a mechanized reserve to counter Pakistan V Corps without calling on XXI’s armored division for help.

  X Corps

  Convert 18 RAPID to 18 Armd. On its side, Pakistan has one armored division (labeled as mechanized) under XXXI Corps. Converting 18 RAPID to an armored configuration balances Indian X Corps without calling on I or II Strike Corps.

  XI Corps

  Expand 55 (I) Mech Bde into a mechanized division. Opposite our XI Corps, Pakistan has two infantry and the equivalent of a mechanized division as a corps reserve. A new mechanized division on our side saves us from calling on I or II Corps.

  IX Corps

  New Armored Div using one extra bde each of 26 and 29 Div, 1 new bde. On its side, Pakistan’s XXX Corps has two infantry divisions and the equivalent of an armored division which is likely to be soon declared as such. A new armored division on our side is needed to balance.

  XVI Corps

  Take two extra bdes of 25 Div plus new bde for a new RAPID. This helps to shorten the AOR of 25th and 10th Division and frees 39th Division to function as a Northern Command reserve or Ladakh

  XV Corps

  New Inf Div using one excess bde of 28 Div plus two new bdes. This gives XV Corps a reserve and permits shifting of its deployment from defensive to the offense.

  XIV Corps

  8 Div, New Inf Div north of Changchemo: use 102 (I) Bde, existing SSN bde, 1 new armd bde. This permits positionin an armored brigade at Daulet Beg Oldi, and one brigade to recover lost territory in the Galwan and Changchemo Rivers areas. It must clearly be understood that given the strength China can bring to the front DBO-Changchemo areas and that Pakistan can reinforce FCNA using its XI Corps, a minimum of one additional mountain division is also required for XIV Corps, but I’ve left that out here.

  XIII Corps (new)

  Takes 3 Div plus new Mech Div using existing armd bde and two new bdes. This shortens the very long AOR of 3 Division; and provides an offensive capability through Demchok to recover lost territory. China has available 4 combined arms divisions deployable against Ladakh.

  VI Corps (new)

  Sugar Sector: new Div HQ, 2 new bdes (5 bns); corps also takes 6 Div; new Div HQ takes 9 (I) Bde, existing (I) Bde, new (I) Bde Barahoti. This provides an offensive capability for the Central Sector, which is severely under-resourced at present. Adding a new brigade to Himachal one to Uttarakhand was a good move, but the army needs a new division on each sector.

  XXXI Corps

  New (I) Bde for Doklam. This permits XXXI Corps and XVII to be kept intact without dispersing their strength and matches China’s new deployment in the area.

  IV Corps

  Adequate. After 71st Division was added to the corps, this sector is well-balanced

  Central Arunachal

  New large (I) Bde (5 battalions). China’s construction of a lateral railroad (ready by 2020 or 2021) along north Arunachal border requires an immediate minimum of one reinforced brigade, later division, to prevent outflanking of IV and III Corps by an attack through Central Arunachal

  III Corps

  Adequate. With the addition of 56th Division, the corps is well balanced.

  XVII Corps

  Consider adding a third division (not provided in this 8-additional division scheme).

  2. Background to the 2-front war issue: China’s aggressions – Depsang Plains, Chumar, Doklam

  2.1 Depsang

  2.2 Interlude: fixed defenses

  2.3 Does appeasement work?

  2.4 The futility of negotiating

  2.5 Interlude: Poonch, 2013

  2.6 Chumar 2

  2.7 Doklam 2017 and 2018

  To understand what happened at Doklam in 2017, let’s step back to an identical crisis in 2013. The following account is an updated version from the author’s book Taking Back Kashmir.

  2.1 Depsang Plain 2013

  In 2013, the Ministry of External Affairs saved the country from a war with China. It did this in the way Chamberlin saved Great Britain from war with Germany in 1938: by surrendering. To be fair, the British story is more complicated than ours. France had an alliance with Czechoslovakia, which country Hitler wanted, but was not ready to fight Germany. Since France was the land bulwark against expansionist Germany, and Britain provided the sea power, Chamberlin’s Britain could not stop Germany on its own. He is reviled as an appeaser that encouraged Hitler to demand more territory. There is another side to this. No one in the UK wanted war. Chamberlin bought another year for British rearmament. And in September 1939, Britain could do nothing when Germany invaded Poland, whose integrity Britain had guaranteed. Satisfying honor when you cannot fulfill your promise dooms you to defeat. Britain could not have a single division or fighter wing for Poland because geography isolated it from Britain. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) believed by capitulating to the Chinese in Ladakh; it had averted war and defeat. Except while Chamberlin was correct, MEA was wrong, because we were stronger than China on the northern border. The Army’s plea to retaliate was not heeded. The MEA’s actions were aimed more at maintaining its exclusive control over our China policy rather than what was best for India’s interest. The MEA prefers to have sole control over India’s China policy. In the event of war, the military takes control, and MEA is pushed into a secondary role. In April 2013, Indian patrols in the Depsang Plains south of Daulet Beg Oldi discovered that the Chinese had established an outpost 19-km inside India as measured from the Line of Actual Control. [5] Despite GOI’s effort to minimize the incident by insisting the Chinese deployed one platoon, it was a company (minus) with artillery support, and with the rest of a battalion in reserve about an hour away. A second battalion was on call within a few hours.

  All India had in the area were single companies from the Indo-Tibet Border Police and Ladakh Scouts. The Scouts were at Daulet Beg Oldi (DBO). The ITBP is a police organization, unlike the Assam Rifles. It can be used as a supplement to the regular army, for example, to screen the front and to protect lines of communication. In theory, the ITBP can function as regular infantry, but unlike the Assam Rifles, which are officered and trained by the Army, they are police. Moreover, the ITBP is dispersed in border observation posts. A Special Frontier Force company was also somewhere in the area. Again, however, the SFF screen the front

  Daulet Beg Oldi in Depsang Plain

  The dotted line is China claimed and occupied border

  against the Chinese army and can operate behind enemy lines. In 1971, in the East Pakistan campaign, the SFF was used as regular infantry. Strictly speaking, this is to be avoided unless the operating environment is benign: this highly trained force must be retained for its primary missions against China.

  Aside from the inferiority of forces, India was faced with the difficulty of protecting the Depsang Plains. Guarding a plain is different from protecting a pass or a valley. Those features can be held with relatively few troops to delay the enemy until reinforcements arrive. On the Depsang, however, there are no natural obstacles; outposts are vulnerable to attack from any direction. Locating a company or even a battalion without artillery backed by immediately available reinforcements is not a sound tactical proposition, given the Chinese had two battalions with more available in 72-hours. Situations such as these require the defender to have a strong, fortified brigade box with artillery, armor, air support, and helicopters, and a landing strip to bring in supplies and replacements and take out wounded.

  Leave alone a brigade and support
ing arms, the Indian Army did not have even a battalion in Daulet Beg Oldi, and of course no fortified brigade box. You may ask how the world’s largest army lacked a brigade for the area. It is not a matter of troops, but of logistic constraints imposed by the lack of roads. But why are roads lacking fifty-six years after the 1962 defeat? Because of Indian negligence. For now, it suffices to say that, given 6-8 weeks, China can build up, maintain, and supply three divisions in the Aksai Chin. Meanwhile, India will find it difficult to support even one division between the Changchemo River and Daulat Beg Oldi. In other words, all this time, the defense of what is known as 22 Sector was based not on military means, but a vague hope that the Chinese will not attack here. Hope is not a useful strategy in war.

  The Chinese withdrew from their intrusion on May 5, 2013. But they did not let India patrol a large area that is on our side of the Line of Actual Control. At Depsang, Sirijap (Pangong Tso), and Chumar, the Chinese seized control of 640-square-kilometers of territory that they never previously claimed. This includes 85-square-kilometers at Chumar, Himachal Pradesh, and 70-km at Pangong Lake. Other areas where it is publicly known the Chinese have seized territory is in Barahoti, Uttarakhand.

  In Parliament the GOI claimed there was no problem with the Chinese. This was a lie. The Indian media reported that China had occupied 640-km2. See, for example, Hindustan Times and India Today’s “Headlines Today.” The reports originated from Ministry of Defense leaks, themselves based on a document presented to the Prime Minister by a senior national security advisor known for his integrity. This triggered an off-point and routine GOI denial,[6] saying that the report primarily focused on border infrastructure and did not make any statements regarding the occupation of Indian territory. Perhaps. The official went on tour August 2-9; gave his report(s) on August 12; and the Defense Ministry got it on September 2, 2013. Since everyone is in the same administrative block, we cannot assume the report was sent by snail courier: the slowest snail needs only 1.6-days to cover 75-meters at 2.8-mm/second. Possibly the same snail carried the report one page at a time, while proofing for grammar and spelling errors, adding annotations, and explaining Tibet history since the Chinese arrived in the 13th Century. The Chinese, aiming to become the the World’s Greatest Clown Show, recently said they have ruled Tibet since it was first settled. The Chinese are to be congratulated for claimed ownership only 7-20,000 years ago, [7] given

  the genus homo reached China ~2-million years,[8] the Chinese claim is charmingly modest. Earlier, of course, China dated its claim from the 13th Century Yuan Dynasty. This is just another example of how opportunistically worthless Chinese claims are and why India should avoid arguing claims with Beijing. By the way, is this the time to

  remind China that the settlers came via India? So technically we can claim to have settled China.

  Another misrepresentation by GOI concerned Sirijap, where the Defense Minister told Parliament India was in full control of the situation. Instead, it turns out the Chinese had dug themselves in at Srijap. India has made no compromises at Chumar, said the Defense Minister. But we gave 85-square-kilometers to Chinese control. The Minister of Defense vehemently denied reports saying the Chinese had occupied territory in the Daulat Beg Oldi/Depsang Plains area. It was unclear how the Ministry of Defense was defining “occupied.” Given that Indian patrols cannot enter the area, it is under Chinese control, not ours.

  An earlier report by the India-resident French expert on Tibet Claude Arpi,[9] talks about the impunity with which Chinese troops intrude in Ladakh, how they object to Indian herdsmen grazing animals on India territory but encourage Chinese herdsmen to keep intruding, and in one case how India took down a bridge erected to access to a big Indian grazing ground because the Chinese objections.

  Chinese intrusions continue. The latest was revealed by the photo-analyst Vinayak Bhat. The Chinese have set up a large base 5-km south of the Arunachal border. The GOI has said nothing. If India resists, the Chinese withdraw, only to return. If India does not turn back every herder intrusion, China creates a precedent to bolster its claims. In one area, at least, India has acted to strengthen its patrolling. In the Doklam Plateau area, it has raised a new paramilitary battalion closer to the border. Close patrolling helps, but the Chinese just intruded somewhere else. It takes hours after an intrusion for the border troops to get a report from herders/villagers and to move up temporarily. India needs constant surveillance, radios given to locals, and helicopters for quick reaction in 30-minutes. It is a fantasy to imagine this will be done.

  Since the Ministry for External Affairs has never provided a detailed explanation for its soft stand on the border, I am forced to make their case for the 2013 incidents.

  Sirijap

  Proposition 1: China has 5 times India’s GDP; $10-trillion versus $2-trillion (2013). It is the second most powerful country in the world. It spends, at the minimum, $100-billion annually on defense, almost three times more than India. If western estimates of the Chinese military budget are used, then China spends four-times more.

  Proposition 2: Because of its excellent Tibet road/rail network, China can quickly move 30 divisions to Tibet. We can get only a few divisions in place.

  Proposition 3: Therefore, should we act belligerent, China can and will escalate, and India will be defeated again as in 1962.

  Conclusion: India is no position to take on China, so best to avoid escalation.

  But will not the Indian public oppose a Government surrender? It will, thanks to our irresponsible press. So, it is best to keep everything concealed. Indeed, the MEA and associated minions blamed not the Chinese for intruding into India, but the press for daring to reveal the intrusion, raising the temperature, and endangering India’s “quiet diplomacy”, Indian diplomatic doublespeak for secret surrender.

  A word about our “quiet diplomacy”. First, the smug way in which the MEA uses the term suggests it is the only sensible option. Quiet diplomacy, however, is just one part of the diplomatic spectrum. It should be used when appropriate. The MEA has not shown this form is appropriate when dealing with aggressive nations like China and Pakistan. Second, we no longer live in the 19th Century, when diplomacy was an affair of the elite upper class and the public was kept ignorant about what was being done on its behalf. In a democracy, everyone gets a say in the conduct of diplomatic affairs.

  The Government of India declared the non-crisis over when the Chinese said they would withdraw. According to GOI, the Chinese withdrawal was unconditional. Except the press reported that India had agreed to destroy bunkers it had set up at Chumar,[10] another point altogether on the Ladakh LAC. And while the Chinese did indeed withdraw after India complied at Chumar, the Chinese are not letting Indian patrols enter the Depsang Plains. It is out of bounds for India. To add insult to injury, the Chinese have taken to holding up long banners that say: “You have crossed the boundary. Please go back.” So, they are claiming as their boundary territory that is up to 20-km forward of their own claim line. The GOI does not think this is a problem.

  Interestingly, at least according to the Press Trust of India quoting “sources”, India had set up the Chumar bunkers as retaliation for the Chinese setting up posts in the Depsang Plain months earlier. This implies that by making a deep intrusion into India in April 2013, the Chinese forced India to dismantle the Chumar bunkers, but likelytheir original intrusions remain intact. Moreover, the Chinese insisted they would consider withdrawal from DBO only after India demolished the Chumar bunkers.[11] India wanted a simultaneous withdrawal. So when MEA says no concessions were made, perhaps it is referring to the rejection of the Chinese demand that India retreat first. The problem with labeling this a “no compromise” is that the original intrusions that led to Chumar are intact, and that Chumar is on India’s side of the LAC. There is also the point we do not recognize the Chinese line of control.

  These bunkers had bugged the Chinese from the time they were set up because the media explained, they permitted the Indian Ar
my to watch the G219 highway between Kashgar in Xinjiang and Lhasa. This is China’s main line of communication through the Aksai Chin, the building of which set off the 1962 War. This sector is one of the few in Ladakh where India can cause real damage to the Chinese in Aksai Chin because India can send medium armor and mechanized infantry to seize large areas quickly. India refused to remove the bunkers, saying they were only to provide shelter for Indian patrols, on its side of the LAC, and in no manner aggressive. That did not stop the Chinese from disabling video cameras India had installed as an attempt toward smart border surveillance. That the Chinese could do this is proof of India’s position that the bunkers were only for sheltering patrols, though why India must justify itself since it is on its own territory well west of its claim line remains a question. There is an unexplained anomaly in that Chumar is not near Demchok, from where India could launch a mechanized assault, but southeast of Tso Mori, near the Himachal Pradesh border. Being on top of the tallest mountain range in the area, Chumar certainly does offer an excellent view of Tibet, but G219 is nowhere near. Moreover, Google Earth 3D shows no plateau on which armored forces can operate.